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CHAPTSa I
THS PROBLEM AND BBPIÏÏITI0N3 OP TERMS USED
THE PROBLEM

'

"" .

of the jwohlem. In..a study of literature
concerning the development of the public school system in
the State of Montana it was noted that veiy little mention was
made of the office of the attorney general*

The history of

the Montana public school system has been the subject for a
, section in most of the general histories of Montana*

It has

been the subject of at least one doctoral dissertation*
In these studies » however* very little mention was made of
the attorney general and no mention was made of the weight
of his opinion*
The weight of an opinion of an attorney general of the
State of Montana was decided in the case of Barr v# District
Court*

It may be stated as followsJ
*While construction of a law in an an opinion of
an attorney general is not binding upon the
supreme court* even though ecquleseed in by
several legislative sessions* it is entitled
to respectful consideration, end will be upheld
if not palpably erroneous***

This study* in an attempt to show the importance of the
position of the attorney general to education in the State
of Montana, has compiled in a single paper the Official
Opinions of the Attorney General of the State of Montana
which have had some effect on Montana*s educational system
from January 1, 1946 through December 31, 1955* These
opinions have been placed together in specific categories in

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

—2—
« meaner that they will be eeelly accessible to all
latereated persons without nécessitating such persons having
to go to the glflslaj M22ES.

22.W .P1L1 2 l JÜm M m m

Qene,ral when a legal problem ruled on by t W attorney general
confronts him# This compilation of official opinions of the
attorney general might also be a useful reference tool in a
course In school law#
Importance pf the stud?. Since the official opinions of
the attorney general carry the weight of law until overruled
by the courts# there was a need for them to be complied in
such a manner that the opinions rendered in clrctasstancea of
a similar nature might be seen together end comparison and
collation might more easily take place# In this way the
actual effect of the office of the attorney general is more
easily seen# This study might eliminate some unnecessary
re<%uests to the attorney general for opinions on school matter;
where opinions covering like circumstances already exist.
Procedure U8®4*

first step was to determine what

'

constitutes sn official opinion of an attorney general#

An

official opinion of ®a attorney general I# sa opinion rendered
•t

i n ft field of general Interest to the people of the St^^te of

Montana published in the Report m # Pfj^’iclc.I OptaloM s i.
Attorney General, ftaring the ten year period under considéra»
tion countless numbers of letters of opinion were written by
the attorney general which differ from the official opinions

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

only in that the attorney general did not deem them to involve
questions of general public Interest and therefore did not
havéî them published*
With this in mind the next task was to extract all of
the official opinions of the attorney general which concerned
education from the Report and Official Opinions of the Attorney
General*
Since no volumes of the Report end Official Opinions of
the Attorney General have been issued since early 1951, the
problem of compiling these opinions was on® of much greater
. magnitude than had been expected*

It would have been impossible

without the cooperation of the then Attorney General, Arnold
H. Olsen .and his first assistant Moody Brlckett#
The pertinent official opinions were segregated according
to specific headings as seemed necessary in the light of the
problem considered end pieced under these headings in chrono-*
logical order.
As an added precaution the writer used the official
opinions exactly as they were rendered by the attorney general#
Ko editing was done*

Ho personal views were injected*

care was taken to quote the attorney general exactly*

Great
If

the terminology of the attorney general had been taken out of
context or if briefing had been attempted, extensive explana
tions would have been necessitated and the meaning or the
intention of the attorney general easily might have been
altered*

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

Each of the official opinions reported contains the
opinion number and/ year in which the opinion was rendered,
a brief summary of the opinion in the words of the attorney
general and the letter written by the attorney general to the
person or agency requesting the opinion in which the facts of
the case and the rule or laws utilised by the attorney general
in reaching his decision were given#
At the conclusion of each chapter there is placed a
section of references*

These references Indicate the

particular volume of the Report and Official Opinions of the
Attorney General in which the opinions used in the chapter
can be found*
DEFINITIONS OF TEEMS
Appellant. One who appeals from a decision of law#
Conversion. Illegally taking and using the property of
another person as if it were ones own*
Decree. An authoritative order or injunction forbidding
some action*
Defendant# A person required to make an answer in a
legal action*
In junction# A court writ requiring a party to do or
restrain from doing certain acts*
Judgment. The determining, as in a court, what conforms
to law and justice; also the decree or sentence of a court.
Mandamus. A writ issued by a court against a lower court
or aginst a corporation or an individual, to enforce some duty,
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

Petition» A formal request, addressed to an official
person or body, for some privilege or right#
P^hibition» A declaration or injunction forbidding
some action*
Tort# Any wrong,injury or damage#
Writ. An order issued in the name of the sovereign
power or in the name of a court or judicial authority, com**
mending the performance or non-performance of some act#
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CHAPTER II
ELECTIONS
Opinion 131 • 1946
Held;

A public meeting at which candidates lor the office

of school trustee of a first class district are nominated
must be held forty full days before the date of the election,
and as held in the above case* the day of the meeting and
the day of the election must be excluded from the computa-»
tion of the forty day period*
March 5* 1946
Mr* Horace d» Dwyer
County Attorney
Deer Lodge County
Anaconda* Montana
Dear Mr* Dwyer;
Tou have submitted the following for my consideration;
The Clerk of School District Ho* 10* Deer Lodge
County* Montana* has advised you that a group of
fifty^seven electors held a meeting on Monday
night* February 25* 1946* He stated that notice
was published or extended to the public to attend
said meeting* but on the other hand* an invitation
or request was extended by telephone to the said
electors that attended said meeting* The purpose
of the meeting was to nominate two nominees to run
for trustees of a school district* Did that con
stitute a bona fide public meeting in accord with
Section 990* Revised Codes of Montana, 1935* as
amended by Chapter 205* Laws of 1943* at page 399?
Section 990, Revised Codes of Montana* 1935# as amended
by Chapter 205* Laws of 1943* provides in part;
•In districts of the first class* no person shall
be voted for or elected as trustees unless he has
been nominated therefore at a bona fide public meet
ing, held in the district not more than sixty (60)
days nor less than forty (40) days before the day
of election and at which at least twenty (20) quali
fied electors were present**#"
- 6—
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Th« meeting la questloo %tm h«I4 oa fé b ru & rf 25th «rtd
the eXeetloa 1# ta h« held April 6th,

(Seetloa 9#7# Revised

Codes of Moatsae, 19)5# ) The meeting v m held more th&a
forty day# before the election if the day of the election
is counted a# one of forty days.

However, if the day of

the election is excluded from the computation, the meeting
was held on the fortieth day before the election end the
statute provides the meeting should be held not "less than
forty (40) days before the election,"
Our $uprme Court la State v# Mountjoy, $Z Mont* 594
266 W *

566, considered e statute %hich required that

petitions for aminations be filed "not less then forty
day# before the date of the primary nominating election•*
The court ««id in construing the provisiont
"The language of the statute is exclusive, and
Section 10707» Revised Codes of 1921, providing
that "the time la which any act provided by lew
is to be done is computed by excluding the first
day and including the last,* etc,, relied upon
by the learned counsel appearing in support of
the secretary of state*# position is without ep*
llcatloa, {State ex rel St* George v« Justice
ourt, 80 Mont* 5Î 257 fee, 1034$) A# the act
here required must be done at least forty day#
before the date of the primary election, which is
July 17 this yesr, it i» manifest that July 17 can^
not be included in computation of the forty*^y
period. The statute say# it must be prior to the
date of election, July 17, and forty day# before
July 17 would be June 6, as full day# are required
and the date of filing must be excluded from
comfmitation,"

f

The above quoted case i# conclusive of the meaning of
the language used in Section 99G, a# amended.
It i# therefore my opinion that e public meeting at
which candidate# for the office of school trustee of a
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first cl&as school district are nominated must be held fœ ty
fall days before the date of the election# and as held in
the above case# the day of the meeting and the day of the
election. must be excluded from the computation of the
forty "-day period*
Sincerely yours#
R. Y* BOTTÛMLY#
Attorney General
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Opinion 2U - 1946
Held*

An absent voteras ballot for a school district bond

election has not been authorized by our legislature and
therefore the only ballots which may be counted at such
election are those cast by qualified electors who are
present at the polls and vote in person&
October 30 I 1946
Mr* R. T* Delaney
County Attorney
Lake County
PoisonI Montana
Dear Mr# Delaney;
You have requested my opinion concerning the right of
a qualified elector to vote by absent ballot in a special
school district bond election* Tou advisee that the
special election will be held on tbe same day as the general
election#
Section 715# Revised Codes of Montana, 1935, as amended
by Chapter 234# Laws of 1943, providesi
«Any qualified elector of this state, having com
plied with the laws in regard to registration, vho
is absent from the county or who is physically in
capacitated from attending the precinct poll of which
he is an elebtor on the day of holding any general
or special election, or primary election for the
nomination of candidates for such general election,
or any municipal# genefal,
or primary election,
may vote at such election as hereinafter provided,*
(Emphasis mine#)
The above quoted section would seemingly grant the author
Ity and right to a qualified elector to vote by absent voter’s
ballot at a school bond election as it would be a special
election*
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-10However, Section 716# Eevlsed Codes of Montana# 1935# as
amended by Chapter 234# Laws of 1943# provides that those who
are eligible to such absent voter’s ballot ”may make applica
tion to the county clerk of such county, or to the city or
town} clerk, in the case of a municipal, general^ or primary
election # for an official ballot or official ballots to be
voted at such election as an absent or physically Incapaci
tated voter’s ballot or ballots,*
It Is to be noted that the application la made to the
county clerk# or to the city or town clerk# and no mention
is made of the clerk of the school district# and this becomes
important when it is observed that the county clerk has the
ballots printed for county wide election {Section 6?0, Re
vised Codes of Montana, 1935)# Section as amended# and the
4

city clerk has the ballots printed for municipal elections
{Section 679» Revised Codes of Montana# 1935)#

Section 1224,11#

Revised Codes of Montana, 1935# as amended by Chapter 17##
Laws of 1939# states "the school district clerk shall cause
ballots to be prepared for all such bond elections,,,*

The

conclusion to be drawn is that the application for an absent
voter’s ballot is addressed to the clerk having custody of
the ballots and as the school district clerk is not mentioned
no such application can be made to him,
ill of the sections pertaining to absentee voting men
tion the county and city or town clerk# but do not name the
school clerk who is the custodian of the bond election bal
lots,

Section 969# Revised Codes of Montana# 1935* provides

that the general election laws do not apply to school elections#
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and this would suggest that the legislative Inteit was not
to Include school elections within the absent voteras law#
It Is therefore my opinion that an absent voter»a
ballot for a school district bond election has not been
authorised by our legislature and therefore the only bal«*
lots which may be counted at such election are those cast
by qualified electors who are present at the polls and
vote in person#
Sincerely yours>
S* V# BOTTOMLI
Attorney General
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Opinion 216 - 1946
Held*

An election to abolish à county' high school shall

be submitted to the registered voters of the county, with
out the requirement that their names appear on the assess
ment rolls.

The poll books for such election are the same

as those used for the election of county officers, without
the requirement of the preparation or posting of a separate
list#
November 1, 1946
Mr. Mlson W« Kent
County Attorney
Granite County
Phillpsburg, Montana
Dear Mr. Kent*
Tou have requested my opinion concerning the procedure
to be followed In the conduct of the special election for
the abolishment of the county high school. Tou ask If
there are any special qualifications for the electors.
Section 1262.19 to 1262.25, Revised Codes of Montana,
1935, cover the manner of holding an election to abolish
a county high school.
Section 1262.20, Revised Codes of Montana, 1935, states
that the petition for abolishment of the county high school
must be signed by 20^ of the qualified electors "who are
also assessed in their own names on the assessment books
of the county for that year upon real or personal property."
The qualifications of those eligible to vote on the proposl#
tlon are to be distinguished from the qualifications of the
signers of the petition to abolish, in that Sections 1262,21,
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-13and 1262,23 # Revised Codes of Montana^ 1935# provide that
the question of the aholishment of the county high school
shall be submitted to the **registered voters,* So qualifi*
cation of being a taxpayer is included in the sections next
above referred to concerning the right to vote on the
abolishment of the high school*
Touvdid not advise me the date your high school was
1

established, but you will find that Chapter 76# Laws of
y

1913 # sets out a procedure for the establishment of a

■.L '
county high school, and in that chapter it was provided that
■

the petition for the creation of the high school must be
signed by one hundred freeholders of the county, but the
electors eligible to vote were *qualified electors* and
there was no requirement that the voters on the question be
freeholders*

In other words# in the establishment of a

high school, there was not the requirement that the elec
tor be a freeholder although the latter were the only au
thorized persons who could, by petition Institute the pro
cedure for such an election*
Section 2, Article IX of the Montana Constitution, was
amended In 1932 by the addition to the qualifications to
vote that*
«If the question submitted concerns the creation
of any levy, debt or liability the person, In
addition to possessing the qualifications above
mentioned# must also be a taxpayer whose name
appears upon the last preceding completed assess
ment roll, in order to entitle him to vote upon
such question**
The question of the abolishment of the county high
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school does not come within the above quoted portion of
our constitution In that a debt or liability does not re
sult from the abolishment of the high school#
Section 1262$%3, Revised Codes of IWtana, 1935| pro
vides In parts
***♦##such question shall be submitted to the re
gistered voters of the county at the ensuing general
election in November# and the votes cast thereon
canvassed and returns thereof made in the manner
provided by law for the election of county officers
at that election *#*♦**
The above quoted indicates that the poll books used
and the manner of conducting the election do not differ
from the manner of electing county officers with the ex
ceptions of the notice given under Section 1262*22 and the
form of ballot as found in Section 1262*23#
It is therefore my opinion an election to abolish a
county high school shall be submitted to the registered
voters of the county, without the requirement that their
names appear on the assessment rolls*
It is also my opinion the poll books for such election
are the same as those used for the election of county offi
cers, without the requirment of the preparation or posting
of a separate list#
Sincerely yours,
a. V. B0TTGM1Ï,
Attorney General
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-15Oplnion 25 - 1947
HeldJ That the extra levy authorized by Chapter 274, taws
of 1947 * for County High Schools may be submitted to the
qualified electors of a high school building district under
the provisions of Chapter 114 of the Political Code of the
Revised Codes of Montana, Î935*
That the election submitting the question of an extra
levy for county high schools In counties not divided into
high school building districts must be held in confoneity
with the general election laws#
April 9, 1947
Mr# Robert F# Swanberg
County Attorney
î^issoula County
Missoula I Montana
fear Mr# Swanbergt
You have requested my opinion as to the procedure to
be followed in submitting the question of a special levy
for a county high school*
Chapter 274 , laws of 1947» authorises a special levy
for county high schools# The Act contemplates that the
question shall be submitted to the qualified electors of a
high school building district, when the county has been
divided into high school building districts, Section 2 of
Chapter 274» states that”the question of the special levy
shall be submitted la high school building district at the
regular election held in such high school building district,
or special election called for that purpose*" There is no
regular election held in high school building districts as
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they were created for construction purposes only^ Section
1501*5 Eevlsed Codes of Montane* 1935# ard Chapter 275*
laws of 1947» However* the Act does provide for the call-*
Ing of a special election by the board of trustees of said
district*

Sections 1219.to 1223# Revised Codes of îîontana#

1935# provide a method and procedure for holding an election
and submitting the question of a special levy to the quali
fied electors of a school district and such procedure would
be adaptable to the election held in a high school building
district*
The method of holding a special election in counties
not divided into high school building districts offers a
more difficult problem.
Section 2 of Chapter 274* laws of 1947# prmrldes in
part#
****.•*.Where a County High School has no building
district» then such special levy may be submitted
and voted upon on the date of tne regular county
school election# or/at a special election called
for that purpose by the board of county trustees
of such county high school shall, by resolution
in their minutes# state that such extra tajcatlon
levy is necessary for any of the purposes herein
above mentioned.”
/
There is no regular county school election asi trustees
of county high schools are appointed to their offices by
the board of county commissioners with the exception of
the county superintendent who is ex#offlclo a member.
Section 1262*4# Revised Codes of Montana# 1935*
The only solution is to call a special election.
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-17Sections 1219-1223^ supra* are not applicable as such
sections by their terms are operative in school districts*
It must have, been the intent of the legislature to utilise
the general election laws in the procedure for such an
election*
There Is not designated by the codes any specific
notlcefor such a special election, except that Section
#53^# Revised Codes of

1935, require» that all

questions submitted to the people of the county must be
advertised for two weeks before the election*
In the absence of a more specific statute for such
a special election, registration must be closed In accord
ance with the provisions of Section 566, Revised Codes of
!4ontana, 1935 , and the list of registered electors printed
and posted as provided in Section 567, Revised Codes of
Montana, .1935, as amended by Chapter 167, laws of 1945*
The county clerk, by virtue of Section 686 , Revised
Codes of Montana, 1935* is authorised to prepare the necessaiy ballots whenever any question is submitted to the voters
of a county#

The ballot might well conform with the form

found in Section 1222, Revised Codes of Montana, 1935#
As this is an election to vote upon the creation of a
levy the eligible voters must be taxpayers whose names appear
upon the last preceding complete assessment roll*

Section 2

Article IX, Montana Constitution, and Section 544# Revised
Codes of Montana, 1935*
It would seem that Chapter 114 of the Political Code of
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-lôth® Revised Codes of 1935# which defines the procedure for
an election to authorise a special levy in school district
would be pertinent# This Chapter# however Is limited to
school districts*

In Panchot v# Leet# 50 Bîont. 315# 146 Pac*

927# our Court held that a county high school is county pro#»
party and obligations Incurred In behalf of the county hij^
school are county obligations#

It therefore follmfs that a

levy for county high school purposes in a county not divided
into high school building districts must be a county levy
and in the absecace of any prescribed procedure the elec
tion held in conformity with the general election laws per
taining to county wide elections#
However# the hours the polls shall be open are specifi-cally fixed by Chapter 2# Laws of 1937» and this Chapter
must bo followed*
In proceeding in this matter the Board of County Com
missioners should keep in mind the dates of the preliminary
and final budgets for high schools#
The levy provided by said election is only for the
fiscal year following said election as the need for the funds
must be determined in anticipation of the current budget#
It is apparent that the procedure suggested above is
cumbersome# but the legislature did not see fit to fix a
more satisfactory procedure#
It is therefore my opinion that the extra levy authorised
by Chapter 274# Laws of 1947» for the county high schools may
be submitted to the qualified electors of a high school
building district under the provisions of Chapter 114 of the
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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Political Code of the Revised Codes of Montana# 1935#
It is also my opinion that the election submitting the
question of an extra levy.for county high schools in counties
not divided into high school building districts must be held
in conformity with the general election laws*
Sincerely yours#
R* V# 0ÜTTOÎLX
Attorney General
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Opinion 99 • 1950
Held; 1$ The School Trustees appointed to office after
the creation of a new school district by consolidation and
and change of classification of the district hold office
until the next school election*
2à

%here the terms of the five trustees of second class

district expire at the next school election due to the
fact they were appointees, five trustees should be elected
at the election, one of whom shall serve for one year, two
for two years and two for three years*
March U, 1950
Mr* John M* Comfort
County Attorney
Madison County
Virginia City, Montana
Dear Mr, Comfort;
You have requested my opinion concerning the election
of trustees in a school district of your county. You ad
vise me that o third class districts were consolidated
end a new district was formed and three trustees were
appointed to serve until the next school election* Sub
sequently, the County Superintendent made an order changing
the class of the district to that of a second class district
and appointed two additional trustees*
Section 75-1613, Revised Codes of Montana, 1947, authorises
the consolidation of two or more adjacent school districts
or the annexation of one or more districts to an existing
district*
Only a third class district can be annexed by a second
or first class district. Two third class districts can be
under the provisions of Section 75-1813, Revised
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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Codes of Montana I 1947# and a new district la formed#

Sub

sections 4 and 5 of Section 75-1013 provide In part*
"• • # If the order be for the formation of a new
district# it shall specify the name and number of such
district, and the County Superintendent shall appoint
three (3Î trustees to serve until the first Saturday
in April succeeding#
(5) At the regular election succeeding there shall
be elected by the regularly qualified electors three
(3) trustees# one of whom shall serve for one (1)
year# one for (2 ) two years# and one for three (3 )
years# The election of trustees end terms shall be
the same as for other districts under general school
laws#**
Your County Superintendent# in appointing three trustees
for the new district created by the consolidation of the two
third class districts followed the above quoted statute*
The two trustees appointed by the County Superintendent,
after the classification of the district was declared# were
appointed in accordance with the provlsionsof Section 75*
1002# Revised Codes of Montana# 1947#

This means that

there are now five trustees who were all appointed to office#
The terms of office and the number of trustees to be
elected are the problems which are presented under your
unusual situation#

Subsection 5 of Section 75-1313 quoted

above would solve the problem if it were not for the fact
the classification of the district has been changed from that
of 6 th Ird to a second class district#

The appointment of

two additional trustees presents a situation not contemplated
in the first sentence of Sub-section 5 of Section 75-1313#
Revised Codes of Montana# 1947*

However, the second sentence

directs that the general school laws shall apply in the
election of trustees#
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In t&# *&## of Stftto ftjc ml# Itihl v# Katwr# «t at# 95
Mont# $$3# 27 (2<i) 111), t&# eotrt hold that SoGtlan 1001
â$vl@W GWw of Montmm# 1921, (wm Soctloa 75-1617, Eovlmed
Cod#* of Koatmn#, 1947î b#* w

apÿU#«ttôa to tho «laotion

of tru#t«#* who b*vo boon appoint#d to offloo# Sootloa
75-1617 1» #* follow;
**hon at any annnal oohoal election th® t#m# of th*
majority of th# tm#t##o ropnlofly oaplrstn dietriota
of th# firot *1*#*, thro# tmotooo, in diotrlot* of
tho # w m d *1#*#, two tnwt###, in diatria# of th#

third *l9»#, on# tm#t*#, #h#ll h# oleotod for thro#

y m r » i and th# romainlag truiteo or trwateo* who»#
torn® «acyire #h*ll hold ovor for on# or two yts-r# a*

nsy h# nooaooary to praront th# term* of « majority
of th* hoard of Tnxat### axplrlng in any on# year*
provided, th%t it ahhll ha dotarmlnod hy lot wtiat
tmat## *hall hold or*,, and for whet torn#»
Opinion 50# 61, Volm# 16, daport a nd Official Opinion#
of th# Ittomay Oanaral followadth* Kwhl #### nmdar f&ot#
*l»llar to tho## pr###nt#d bar# and hald that ill tnjataw
indio reoaivW thair offio* hy appointment hold offlea %&til
th* na%t aohooi alaotlon at which time thalr t« m* expired
and avca#aaora mn#t h« alaoted#
Suh-aaotion 5 of Section 161) aantaaplttaa that in th*
election of tm#tee$ for a dlttriet eraatad hy coaa^Jldstlon
th# tru&t*#* electad to offla# *k*ll hold office for tawi#
of 1 , 2 aad > y ear* m that In any on* y#»r, there will h*
a majority of tnasteei held over with amperieac# ao that th*
buain*## of th# ##hool district c m go on withcot iatarruptlon, Thi# l#gl#lativ# policy 1# #l#o #%pr9 **$d in Section
75-1617 and c m fe# givm recognition by electin# on# truate#
£<fr a ter» of on* year, two far tara# Of two yo'ra ar.d two

for term# of thm# ytrr»# th* method of selection of the
term# for which caWldAtea will atmnd for election c m be
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dona by the aominatlng petitions filed with the clerk asprovided in Section

Revised Codes of Montana^ 1947#

is therefore my opinion that the school trustees
appointed to office after the creation of a new school distric
by consolidation end change of classification of the district
hold office until the next school election#
It is also ray opinion that where the terras of the five
trustees of a second class district expire at the next school
election due to the fact they were appointees, five trustees
should be elected at the election, one of whom shall serve
for one year, two for two years and two for three years#

Very truly yours,
ARNOLD H# ÜI3ER
Attorney General*
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Opinion 25 - 1951
Helds

Establisbiaent» holding retail baer and liquor

licenses must be closed during the hours when the polls
are open on the day of the annual election of school
trustees and on the days of special bond elections*
June 27» 1951
Mr* H* M* 0*Heam
State Liquor Administrator
Helenaj Montana

Dear Mr# 0»Hearn}
You have requested the opinion of this office on the
following question;

"Must licensed retail beer and liquor

establishments be closed during the hours the polls ere
open on (1 ) the day of the annual election of school
trustees; (2 ) the day of the annual election in cities and
towns;

(3 ) days of special bond elections*"

Section 4-414» H# C* M*, 1947» provides that retail
liquor establishments ■shall not sell» offer for sale or
give away liquor at retail "on any day of a general or pri
mary election during the hours the polls are open» excepting
bond elections*"

Ssetioa 4*303» H, 0* M*, 1947» provides

that licensed beer establishments shall be closed during
the hours the polls are open "on any day of a. general,
primary, or special bond election#" A retail liquor licensee
must also be the holder of a retail beer license#
4-411, E. C# M*» 1947.

Section

Section 4-303» &. C. M., 1947 is

later legislation than Section 4-414» E. 0# M. » 1947 having
been enacted as Section I, Chapter 16» Laws of 1943» while
Section 4-414 was enacted as Section 12, Chapter 04» Laws
Î

/* A retail beer establishment, when "closed", must
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ba closed for all purposes f including the dispensing of
liquor* See note 22 In 11 Corpus Juris at page 917*
relating to definitions of «closed saloon*»♦ Obviously*
an establishment licensed for the sale of beer or for the
sale of beer and liquor at retail must be «closed*» on a
day of a special bond election during the hours the polls
are open In view of the wording of Section 4-303* R. C. M«*
1947#
A **general election* Is one that recurs In each election
precinct of the state on a day designated by law for the selec
tlon of officers»

Arps# v* State Highway Commission* 90 Mont,

152 , 162, 300 Fao# 549#

A «general election" Is also defined

as one provided by law for the election of officers through
out the state or certain subdivisions thereof, 29 C, J# S,
Elections* par, 1 {b).

Election of school trustees occurs

annually in each school district in the state under the
requirement of Section 75-1603* R# G* K#* 1947# Such elec
tions are* therefore* "general elections" within the usually
accepted meaning of the term.

In the case of Ford v* Moss

124 Ky. 2SS, 9# S# W# 1015 It was held that school elections

were general elections within the meaning of a statute pro
hibiting the sale of intoxicating liquor on "general election"
days.
The elections held by cities end towns annually are not
elections held In each and every voting precinct of the state
and are not therefore «general elections". Therefore, Sec
tions 4-303 and 4-414, R# G. M.* 1947, do not require that
establishments licensed to sell beer and liquor be closed
during the hours the polls are open for such municipal
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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exactions*
It is my opinion that establishments licensed for the
sale of beer or liquor at retail must be closed during the
hours the polls are open on (1 ) the day of the annual elec*
tlon of school trustees} (2 ) the day of any special bond
election held in the voting district where the licensed
establishment is located* Of course, there is no question
but that such establishments shall be closed during the
hours the polls are open on days of elections regularly
recurring the first Tuesday after the first Monday of
November in each even numbered year and the regular S0'*>
called Primary election" held every other year on the third
Tuesday of July*
Very truly yours,
ARNOLD H. OLSEN
Attorney General
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-27Opinion Ô6 » 1952
Held* The names of deceased voters may not be deducted from
the registration llsis in determining the necessary forty
per cent of the qualified electors voting on a bond pro
position submitted at school district election»
May 20, 1952
Mr# Bert W* Kronmlller
County Attorney
Big Horn County
Hardin, Montana
Dear Mr# Kronmiller t
lou have requested my opinion as to whether there may
be deducted from the list of registered electors for a bond
election the names of those who have died prior to election#
I ou advise me that in determining the necessary forty per
cent of the qualified ©lectors, the election failed by two
votes# You ask if the names of two deceased voters on the
mgistration list may be disregarded#
Section 75-3912, Eevlsed Codes of Montana, 1947, provides
that at a school bond election "only qualified registered
electors residing within the district who are taxpayers upon
property therein end whose names appear upon the last com
pleted assessment roll*#*###* shall have the right to vote*"
This section also requires the county clerk to prepare lists
of such registered electors and poll books for the use of the
judges at the election*
Under the provision of Section 75-3914, Revised Codes of
Montana, 1947, it is provided*
"Whenever the question of issuing bonds for any purpose
is submitted to the qualified electors of a school
district at either a general or special school election
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not less than forty (40 ) per centum of the qualified
electors entitled to vote bn such question at such
election must vote thereon^ otherwise such question
shall be deemed to have been rejected; provided,
however, that If forty (40 ) per centum or more of such
qualified electors do vote on such question at such
election and a majority of such votes shall be cast
In favor of such proposition, then such proposition
shall be deemed to have been approved and adopted#"
It is to be noted that forty per cent of the qualified
electors must vote, otherwise the proposition will be con*
sidered rejected* As Section 75-3912 requires the voters
to be registered and makes it the duty of the county clerk
to prepare lists of the registered elector®, it is reason
able to assume that the forty per cent must be determined on
the basis of the list prepared by the county clerk# The
Supreme Court of Georgia, in several cases, considered a
similar question as presented here, and held that where a
majority must be computed on the basis of registration lists
that the courts may not deduct disqualified voters from the
list in order to determine whether & j^ajority has favored
the proposition submitted* Chapman v* Sumner Consolidated
School District, 152 Ga* 452, 109 S* S# 129; P&irburn School
District V* McClarin, 166 Ga# 367, 144 S* S* 765;

and Cal*

, loway V# Tunnell Hill School District, 51 Ga, App. 101, 179
S. S. 737.
The purpose of the requirement of a forty per cent vote
is to set a standard for public interest in the election and
it is not designed to disenfranchise qualified electors, but
to assure that the taxpayers will not be subjected to payment
of bonds approved by the very small number of qualified
electors within a school district#
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It is, therefore, my opinion that the names of deceased
\'
voters may not be deducted from the registration lists in
determining the necessary forty per cent of the qualified
electors voting on a bond proposition submitted at a school
district election#
Very truly yours,
A&KOLD H# OLSEN

Attorney General
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Oplnioa 33 - 19^5
Held; The defeat of the question to change the site of a
school house in a third class district does not preclude
a second election in less than three years time resubmitting
the question of change of site,
August 5, 1955
Mr, Roy W, Holmes
County Attorney
Carter County
Ekalaka, Montana '
Dear Mr* Holmes;
tou have requested my opinion as to whether a second
election may be held on the question of changing a school
house- site in a third class district within a period less
than three years after an election at which the majority
voted again* the change of site.
Section 73-3101# Revised Codes of Montana# 1947#
authorite# an election in a third class district to vote
upon the question of selection of a school site in a third
class district with the limitation "that any sites so changed
cannot again be changed within three years from the date of
such action,"
It is apparent that where the question of selecting a
new site is rejected by the voters there has been no change
of site. In 14 C, d, S, 397# the text defines change as mean
ing ".♦#i.,,,to alter or make different, to exchange# to put
one thing in the place of another# or to render someth'ing
essentially different from what it was,,**. If the present
location of a school is rejected by the electors and a new
site selected# then there would be a change in site. In
School District No, 6 , 110 Kan, 317, 203 Pac,
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71#, this distinction was recognized#

The limitation of the statute is directed to the ayoldam
of too frequent changes of location of schools end not to
multiplicity of elections*

In a recent Montana case, Schmied*

kamp vs* School District No* 24, Mont* 27# fae* (2d) 5#4, the
court recognized that,
**#$Tbe defeat of a proposition to issue bonds does not
prevent a second submission of the proposition, where*»
as a proposition to Issue bonds which has been adopted
by the voters ordinarily cannot be resubmitted in the
absence of statutory authority*"
The above quoted is analogous to the question submitted
by you*
It is therefore my opinion that the defeat of the
question to change the site of a school house in a third
class district does not preclude a second election in less
than three years time resubmitting the question of change of
site*
Very truly yours,
ARNOLD H. OLSEN
Attorney General
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CHAfTER III
^
Opinion 31S ^ 1946

Held;

TRUSTEES

The trustees of a second class school district have

the power to purchase two lots adjoining a grade school
for playground purposes without submitting the question to
a vote of the electorate#
2#

School trustees may enter into a contract for the pur

chase of additional land adjoining a school site and the
purchase price paid by an appropriation provided in the
next ensuing budget or the purchase price may be paid in
installments by provision contained in three successive
budgets#
3#

A school board of the first or second class may not

build a school house* or purchase or locate a school site
unless directed so to do by a majority of the electors of
the district voting at an election as provided in Section
1015*6* Revised Codes of Montana* 1935, as amended by
Chapter 165, laws of 1937*
January 29, 1946
i

Mr# Wilbur P* Werner
County Attorney
Glacier County
Cut Bank, Montana
Dear Mr# Werneri
You advise me that a second class school district in
your county contemplates the purchase of two lots which
adjoin the present school property for .playground jpbrposes^
You ask specifically the following questions;
Can the trustees of School District Mo. 15 purchase
the lots as additional playgrounds or as a possible
—33—
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

•34*
additional grade sehool site without an election
authorising them to do so?
If the school board can purchase the lots with or with
out authorisation from the electorate, can they set
up in their budget for the years 1946-47 a sufficient
sum to purchase t h m or should they have a bond elec
tion for the purchase of them? If they purchase them
under their budget would it not be permissable to make
the purchase price payable over a three-year period?
If the lots are not purchased and it is decided to
build a grade school in the north part of town away
from their present grade school, would it be necessary
to submit to the electorate the site that the new
grade school would be built upon?
Your first question is answered by Section 101$, Re
vised Codes of Montana, 1935i

amended by Chapter 16$

Laws of 1937, which provides in part as followsj
**Every school board unless otherwise specifically
provided by law shall have power and it shall be its
duty*#,.##
"6 * To purchase, acquire, sell and dispose of plots
or parcels of land to be used as sites for schoolhouses, school dormitories and other school buildings,
and for other purposes in connection with the schools
in the district, and to sell and dispose of the same;
provided, that they shall not build or remove schoolhouses or dormitories, nor purchase, sell or locate
school sites unless directed so to do by a majority
of the electors of the district voting at an election
held in the district for that purpose, and such elec
tion shall be conducted and votes canvassed in the
same manner as at the annual election of school offi
cers, and notice thereof shall be given by the clerk
by posting three notices in three public places in
the district at least ten days prior to such election,
Wiich notices shall specify the time, place end pur
pose of such election* Provided further, that this
subdivision shall not be so construed as to prevent
the board of trustees from purchasing one or more
options for a school site#* (anphasls mine)
The above quoted permits the trustees "to purchase###
parcels of land for other purposes in connection with the
schools of the district#" From the facts given, it appears
that the trustees contemplate the enlargement of the school
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-35groimds by pturchage of mdjolnlng lot@* end not the
eeleotlon of # «ohool alto. In $& G* J. 740» the word "alt#*
1 » defined e« follow:

»A plot of ground aultabl# or m t apart for aoaa apaol»
fie ua#| « aeat or ground plot. Th« term does not of Itself
neeeasarlly mean a pise# or tract of lend fixed by definite
boundsriea.”
Our codes ws« the word "site* as above defined| th&t la,
In the aeiis# that It means s general location for a specific
purpose, but not In the sense that the boundaries are fixed.
An ealergOTent of the school grounds would not constitute a
change in the site, and thus necessitate submission of the
Question to the voters at m election#
Tour first Question also states that the two additional
lota together with the lots the school district now owns may
be used for the construction of a new grade school building.,
Bubsectloa $ of Section 1015. supra, provides that the con
struction of a new building shall be submitted to the voters
and also the selection of a school site shall likewise be
euWltted.

Authorisation for the trustees to build a school

building and the aelection of the site for the same must be
given by the electors at m election h%ld for that purpose.
Section 1019.3, Revised Codes of Montais, 1935# which
is « part of the budget act for school districts, provides fox
"new building and alterations." While this item does not
specifically mention the purchase of additional l&nd, yet it <
is broad enough to cover such a purchase. If the district
may allocate fund* under this Item for the fiscal ye%r 1946-
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1947 sufficient to make the purchase without exceeding the
funds available for the year, and without depriving some
other items of the budget of necessary funds, it would be
within its power#

Also the district could enter into a

contract of purchase and agree to pay the purchase price
over a period of three years* The trustees, having the power
to make such a purchase, may enter into a contract for the
best interest of the district#

An analogous situation is

the case of Bennett v* Petroleum County, Ô7 Mont* 436, 2ÔÔ
Pac# 101#, in which case our court held that the coramissionerg
having the power to lease county buildings may enter into a
lease for a term of four years although such a lease would
extend beyond the terra of the commissioners entering into
the lease. The court did not direct its attention to the
fact the lease would create an obligation to be met in future
budgets, but such would be the effect, as would the plan
of purchase under consideration here. The limitation of
indebtedness, Section 6 of Article HII must be observed in
the incurring of this indebtedness.
Your third question is answered by subsection # of Sectlc
1015, Revised Codes of Montana, 1935, as amended, which is
the applicable statute for the acquisition of a new school
site by a second class district, Nichols v. School District,
#7 Mont* 131, 2#7 Pec, 624, held that Section 1014, Revised
Codes of Montana, 1921, had been amended by Chapter 122, Laws
of 1923#

Section 1014, appears in the 1935 Codes as giving

the power to trustees In first and second class districts to
change or select school sites, but the Nichols case would con
trol#

It would, therefore, be necessary to submit the ques-
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tioa of the sale of the school site and also the question of
the location and purchase of a new school site to a vote of
the qualified electors.
It la therefore my opinion that)
1* The trustees of a second class school district have
the power to purchase two lots adjoining a grade school for
playground purposes without submitting the question to &
vote of the electorate,
2,

School trustees may enter into a contract for the

purchase of additional land adjoining a school site and the
purchase price paid by an appropriation provided in the
next ensuing budget or the purchase price may be paid by
installments by provision contained in three successive
budgets,
3*

A school board of the first or second class may,not

build a school house or purchase or locate a school site un
less directed so to do by a majority of the electors of the
district voting et an election as provided in Section 1015,0,
Revised Codes of Montana, 1935, as amended by Chapter 165,
haws of 1937#
Sincerely yours,
R, V, BUTT0Î4LX
Attorney General
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Opinion 132 ~ 1946
HeldI At a Joint meeting of a board of trustees of a
county high school and a district high school which acts
upon the question of the employment of a district super*
intendant and county high school principal, the board of
tNsthes- of the county high school shall have the number of
votes at said meeting equal to the number of votes of the
board of trustees of the school district*
j^îarch 6, 1946
Mr# Seth G# Manning
County Attorney
Wibaux County
Wibaux, Montana
Dear Mr* Manning;
You requested my opinion concerning the following facts;
The seven trustees of the Wibaux County High School met
with the five trustees of the School District Ho* 6
as a joint board on the l6th day of January, 1946, The
county superintendent of schools was also in attendance
at the meeting* All of the trustees present voted on
the question of rehiring the incumbent of the combined
office of superintendent of school district No, 6 and
principal of the county high school* The vote cast was
nine votes not to rehire and three votes to rehire the
present incumbent* The chairman of the board gave notic
to the incumbent that his contract would not be renewed.
You asked what the effect is of the action taken#
Section 1262*61 I Revised Codes of Montana, 1935, provides
for the organisation of & joint meeting of the two boards end
states in part as follows %
"For the purpose of voting upon any question relative
to the employment of a district superintendent and
county high school principal, or to the employment of
joint teachers, or of determining any question of joint
administrative policy, or of apportioning any item of
joint expense, the board of trustees of the school dis
trict and the board of trustees of the county high schco
shall each be entitled to the same number of votes at
any meeting of the joint board# To this end the board
of trustees of the county high school shall choose a
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-39number o t its members equal to the number of members
of the school district which comprise its board. The
county superintendent of schools shall not be one of
the trustees so selected by the county high school
board* The names of the trustees, so chosen by the
county high school board, shall be given to the sec
retary of the joint board as the designated represen
tatives of the board of
trustees of the county high
school who are entitled
to vote at all meetings of the
joint board*”
It is to be noted in the foregoing quoted provision of
our •'law the Board of Trustees of the County High Sdiool shall
have the same number of votes
School District*

as the Board of Trustees ofthe

In this case it would mean the Board of

Trustees of the County Hi^ School would have five votes*
From the facts you gave me It is apparent all of the trustees
of the County High School voted at the meeting and thus vio
lated the above section of our code*
In 14 American Jurisprudence 323 the text states j
"If the statute requires a particular procedure In
elections of administrative officers by a school board,
it must be strictly adhered to, and the mere unanimity
of the choice will not validate an election in which
the statutory requirements were ignored***”
In 56 Corpus Juris 334 it is stated: .
"A board of education, or of directors, trustees, or
the like, of a school district or other local school
organization can exercise its powers in no other mode
than that prescribed or authorized by statute,.#*
The, foregoing authorities make it the duty of the boards
to conform to the statutory procedure, which obviously was not
done.
In McNair v* School District No, 1, $7 Mont* 423, 2BÔ
Pac* 10S, our Supreme Court said:
"The board of trustees, therefore, constitutes the
board of directors and managing officers of the cor
poration, and may exercise only those powers expressly
conferred upon them by statute and such as are neces
sarily Implied in the exercise of those expressly conReproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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' ■
ferred# The statute granting power
be regarded
both as a grant and a limitation upon the powers, of the
board*"
A school board must act in conformity with the statute
granting the power which in this instance was not done* Since
the legislature has prescribed! a specific and mandatory pro
cedure to be followed$ that procedure and no other — will
meet the legislature’s requirements*
It is therefore my opinion that, at a joint meeting of a
board of trustees of a county high school and a district high
school which acts upon the question of the employment of a
district superintendent and county high school principal, the
board of trustees of the county high school shall have the
number of votes at said meeting equal to the number of votes
of the board of trustees of the school district; and in the
event all the members of the board of trustees of the county
high school are permitted to vote, then said meeting and the
action taken thereat is of no effect and not in conformity
with Section 1262*61, Revised Codes of Montana, 1935#
Sincerely yours,
R* V* BQTTOMLÏ
Attorney General

• .
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Opinion 136 • 1946
Held*

In school districts of the first class, where but one

public meeting Is held, and only one candidate be nominated
for each term to be filled, then and in that event no election
need be held and the clerk of such district shall certify.
such facts to the board of trustees of the district, acting
as a board of canvassers who shall thereupon certify the
election of such persons to the county superintendent of schools*
March 16, 1946
Mr# Horace J# Dwyer
County Attorney
Deer Lodge County
Anaconda, Montana
■ Dear Mr* Dwyer*

I am In receipt of a copy of the opinion you rendered
to Mr# G# A* Peterson, Clerk of School District Ho* 10,
Deer Lodge County, Anaconda, Montana* As I understand it,
the facts are as follows*
On February IB, 1946, the board of education called a
mass meeting in the junior high school auditorium at
7 o’clock P*M* for the purpose of nominating school
trustees to fill two vacancies* Five persons were
nominated; then a ballot was cast and the two receiving
the ^highest number of votes were declared the two
nominees* You now Inquire as to whether all five names
should appear on the election ballot or just the names
of the two candidates nominated*
Section 1 of Chapter 130, Laws of 1945, governs elections
In districts of the first class as to nominations and conduct
ing of elections*

Said Section 1, insofar as the same Is

pertinent here, reads as follows *
®In districts of the first class, no person shall be
voted for or elected as trustee unless he has been
nominated therefor at a bona-fide public meeting, held
Jla the district not more than sixty (60) days nor less
'' forty (40 ) days before the day of election, and at
at least twenty (20) qualified electors were present,
chairman and secretary were elected, and a certi
ficate of such nomination setting forth the place where
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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the meeting was held, givihg the nmuv* of the candidates
In full, and If there are different terms to be filled,
the term for which such candidate was nominated, duly
certified by the chairman and secretary of such meeting,
shall be filed with the district clerk within 10 days
after such public meeting,#* In the event there be held
only one (l) such public meeting, end only one (!)
candidate be nominated for each term to be filled then
and la that event no election need be held and the clerl
of such district shall certify such facts to the board
of trustees of the district, acting ee a board of can
vassers who shall thereupon certify the election of such
persons to the county superintendent of schools,*
As I understand the facts, the public meeting held on
February iBth wos for the purpose of nominating two caddidatec
for the offfc e of school trustees for two terms to be filled.
The names of five candidates were placed in nomination. There
upon

the ballot was cast and the two persons receiving the

highest number of votes were declared to be the nominees of
that particular public meeting.

In this event, the names of

the two nominees for the two terms to be filled would ordin
arily go upon the election ballot.

However, inasmuch as there

are but two terms to be filled and but two candidates nominate
and only one public meeting held, there would be no need of
holding an election, as the last part of Section 1 of said
Chapter 130, supra, provides}
*In the event there be held only one (1) such public
meeting and only one (1) candidate be nominated for
each term to be filled then and in that event no elec
tion need be held and the clerk of such district shall
certify such facts to the board of trustees of the dis
trict, acting as & board of canvassers who shall there
upon certify the election of such persons to the county
superintendent of schools,*
Therefore, it is my opinion that in school districts of
the first class, where but one public, meeting is held and onlj
one term to be filled{as in this instance), then and in that
event no election need be held and the clerk of such district
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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shall certify such facts to the bosrd of trustees of the
district, acting as a board of canvassers who shall thereupon
certify the election of such persona to the county superlntent
ent of schools#
Sincerely yours,
'

a

,

V

#

B

ü

T

T

Q

M

L

Î

,

Attorney General

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

"*■ '
Opinion 179 - 1946
Held* A school trustee Is not precluded from holding such
office because he Is not registered to vote and the residence
of such trustee must be determined from the facts in accordgnc
with the rules of Section 574# Revised Codes of Montana, 1935.
July 6 j 1946
Mr* Chester E# Onstsd
County Attorney
Powder River County
BroaduSf Montana
Dear Mr* Onstadt
You have requested my opinion concerning the eligibility
a school trustee to hold office.

You advise me the trustee

in question maintains a home in Wyoming and owns a large
ranch in Montana* You also state he was a registered voter
in Wyoming for the 1944 election and is not now registered
to vote in Montana*
The qualifications for holding public office are pres
cribed by the Constitution sad legislative enactment. Sec
tion 11 of Article IX of the Montana Constitution provides I
•Any person qualified to vote at general elections end
for state officers in this state, shall be eligible to any
office therein except as otherwise provided in this consti
tution, and subject to such additional qualifications es may
be prescribed by the legislative assembly for city offices
and offices hereafter created.®
The qualifications for electors at school elections are
fouW

in Section 1002, Revised Codes of Montana, 1935, as

amended by Chapter 83, Laws of 1939, and Chapter 65, Laws of
1941 , which provides*

•Every citizen of the United States of the age of twenty
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one years or over who has resided In the State of
Montana for one year, and thirty days in the school
district next preceding the election, may vote thereat.*
The qualifications of a school trustee are found in
Section 9#5, Revised Codes of Montana, 1935§ which reads as
follows*
“Any person, male or female, who is a qualified voter at
any election under this act, shall be eligible to the
office of school trustee in such district**
In the facts which you submitted for my consideration,
you stated the trustee vdiosa right to bold office is ques
tioned Is not registered to vote in the State of Montana*
Our Supreme Court in the case of State v# ^umish, 4S
Mont. 2d, 134 Pac* 297, said;
*It is a principlelong established that registration is
no part of the qualifications of an elector and adds
nothing to them; it is merely a method of ascertaining
who the qualified electors are, in order that abuses of
the elective franchise may be guarded against.”
The Supreme Court of Nevada had under consideration the
same question, end held;
"**, that if, by the expression ’qualified voters* the
legislature of 1939 had Intended that registration be
required (as a qualification of holding office) they
would naturally have used the word ’registered* as was
done, for example, by the legislature of North Carolina
when the words ’qualified registered voters’ were em
ployed.**” (Gilbert v, Breithaupt, 60 Nev. 162, 104
Pac* (2d) 143,)
Meffert v. Brown, 132 Ky 201, 116 S. W* 779 , 730, 1177.
42 American Jurisprudence, page 913#
From the foregoing it would appear to me that the fact
the trustee is not registered to vote would preclude him from
voting but will not disqualify him from being elected to and
holding the office if otherwise a qualified voter* However,
Section 1002, as amended, requires that electors must have
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

"46f*.

resided In the State of Montana for one year and in the school
district for thirty days#

Any person eligible to hold the office

of trustee must meet such residence requirements* This raises
a question of fact#
Section $74# Revised Codes of Montana^ 1935, sets out
rules for determining the place of residence for the purpose
of voting* Subsection 4 of Section 574 states that a person
who leaves the home to go into another state or district for
t^porary purposes does not lose his residence "provided he
has not exercised the right to the election franchise in said
state or district*" If the trustee in question voted at the
election in Wyoming in the year 1944 his residence in Montana
could only be acquired subsequent to that date*
Under the rules set out in Section 574, it was necessary
for the trustee to move to Montana with the intent to remain
there as a resident which is a question of fact to be deter
mined from all the evidence available*
It is therefore my opinion that a school trustee is not
precluded from holding such office because he is not registered
to vote and that the residence of such trustee must be deter
mined from the facts in accordance with the rules of Section
574, Revised Codes of Montana, 1935*
Sincerely yours,
-, a# V* BUTTvMLI

Attorney General
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Opinion 15 # 1947
[
Helds Board of school trustees may enter Into contracts with
teachers at any time during the year» except as restricted*
Board of school trustees has t only such powers and authority
as granted by statute* or reasonably implied* but has wide dis
cretion in exercising same* When Board finds anticipated ex
penditures for year exceed anticipated revenue from authorised
levy and other sources* it is its duty to submit question of
an extra levy to electors of the district as provided by law*
j
" February 22* I947
Mr# James D* Freeboum
County Attorney
Silver Bow County
Butte* Montana
Dear Mr* Freeboum 1
You have submitted to this office your opinion rendered to
the Board of Trustees of School District Ho* 1, Silver Bow Count]
with reference to the duties and powers of the board* and parti
cularly to the duties end powers of entering Into contracts with
teachers*
Your opinion has quite fully covered the law applicable to
the questions presented, and after careful consideration and
study of the opinion I am glad to concur therein*
In determining the powers and duties of ^ school board we
must keep in mind the rule laid down by our Supreme Court in
many cases* to the effect that such boards have no powers except
those expressly granted* or necessarily implied from those grants
{McNair v. School District No* 1 of Cascade County, Ô7 Mont* 423
2Ô8 Pac. 199*)

With this rule of law in mind the questions sub

mitted to you and considered in your opinion will be considered
in the same order in this opinion*
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

1 # la It legal for the board to enter into contracts with

the teachers at the present time for the school year I947-1948?
Section 1015» Revised Codes of Montana, 1935, as amended
by Chapter 103, Laws of 1943» dealing with powers of boards of
trustees, provides, insofar as applicable here;
”2, To employ or discharge teachers,#,and to fix and
order paid their wages,.*# All contracts of employment
of teachers authorised by proper resolution of a board
of trustees shall be in writing end executed in duplicate
by the chairman and clerk of the board, for the district
and by the teacher,”
Section 1075, Revised Codes of Montana, 1935, provides in
part as follows;
"After the election of any teacher or principal for the
third consecutive year in any school district in the
state, such teacher or principal so elected shall be
deemed re-elected from year to year thereafter at the
same salary unless the board of trustees shall by major-*
ity vote of its members on or before the first day of
May give notive in writing to said teacher or principal
that he has been re-elected or that his services will
not be required for the ensuing year: provided that
nothing in this act shall be construed to prevent reelection of such teacher or principal by such board at
en earlier date,,,," (Emphasis mine,}
With reference to the specific question, these are the
only statutes applicable end clearly give the trustees the
power and duty to enter into contracts of re-employment with
the teachers and principals who have been employed for three
years or more at any time with the provision, of course, that
if any such teacher is not notified prior to May first his
services are not required, he is deemed re-employed for the
ensuing year at the same salary. It is likewise made the
duty of the trustees to enter Into written contracts with
these teachers. Having the power to fix and order paid the
wages or salaries of teachers employed by the board as pro
vided in Section 1015, supra, the board therefore has the
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power to fix the salary and provide for the same in the contrat
at any time*

'

The second question present iaj

"Should the board enter

into a contract with the teachers at this time on the antici
pation that the amount would be voted as a special millage by
the people of the district in the election in April, and the
people failed to so vote, would the contract still be binding
upon the district?"
I fully agree with your opinion that;this question, as to
whether the board should enter into such a contract, is a
question of administrative discretion with which the board is
vestlve and determinative only by the board itself* As to
whether the board has authority to enter into such a contract,
we may again look to the statutes to find such authority.
The board is given the power end duty to employ and dis
charge teachers and to fix their salaries*
Revised Codes of Montana, 1935, supra)#

(Section 1015,

Aside from the re

strictions as to employment of teachers prior to May 1, there
are no restrictions on the power of the board in the hiring
of teachers or fixing salaries#
In the provisions of the statutes dealing with the prepar*
ation, submission and final adoption of school budgets, we fine
the following language in Section 1019*13, Revised Codes of
Montana, 1935*
"#,* provided further that if any contract has been
entered into between the boardl of trustees of any
school district and any teacher, principal or other
person, by the terms of which contract such teacher,
principal or other person has been employed for the
school year for which the preliminary budget has been
d, or when any teacher or principal, by reason
oyment during the last school year, is entitled
he provisions of Section 1075, to retain his
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position and salary during the sehool year for which
the preliminary budget was prepared, the board of school
budget supervisors must not make any change in any item
for salaries or wages which will reduce or in any manner
affect the salary or wages of such teacher, principal or
other person,*
As stated In your opinion, therefore, the law is clear
that, apart from the restrictions imposed by Section 1075,
the board may et any time hire teachers and fix salaries end
terms by written contract, and from the time of the execution
of the contract, the amount of such salary must be inserted
In the budget and cannot be changed. The contract becomes a
binding obligation of the district. That the board has the
Implied if not the granted power to fix the salary at any
figure it deems advisable, within its reasonable discretion,
is apparent from the further provisions of the statute pro*
vlding for the submission of an extra levy to a vote of the
«
people in the event the proposed expenditures a&proved in the
?!

‘budget ^ 1 1 exceed the anticipatèàirevenue,
,v

"

Section 1019.7, Revised Codes of Montana, 1935, which is
a part of the chapter of the Code on the preparation, submission
end approval of the budget, provides in part*
*».. the board must determine and make an estimate of
the amount of such deficiency and the number of mills
of additional levy required to be made to meet and take
care of such deficiency and must call an election
for the purpose of obtaining the approval of the quali
fied electors.••*
This section then provides for the time when such election
may be held*
It would appear, therefore, from these provisions of the
statute that the legislature contemplated that at some time
the estimated expenditures of a district would exceed the es
timated revenue to be derived from the authorized levies, and
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fill Other fioureea» end therefore provided ui ..«ens of meeting
such filtustion by enacting Section 1019*7, supra.

It may be

reasonably inferred the legislature contemplated such a de*
. *
flciency might be caused by an increase in salary from the
feet that it made it the duty of the board to enter into
written contracts with the teachers and provided there should
be no reductions in the budget of the amount fixed in such
contracts.
Prom the express authority given the board to enter into
written contracts as to term and salary, and the prohibition
against the reduction the amount of salaries so fixed In such
contracts, together with the provisions for the submission of
the question of an extra levy to a vote of the people in the
event of a deficiency in the budget, it would appear that the
only considerations of the board In fixing the amount of sa
laries to be paid the teachers should be reasonableness of the
amount based upon a fair and just remuneration for the ser
vices under the existing economic conditions.
The third question presented Is* *Would it be possible
to make a contract in such a way that it would be binding if
the people voted the money but not binding If the people falle
to vote it?"
As has been pointed out, the board has power and it is
made its duty to enter into Contracts with the teachers as to
terms and salary. Having the power to contract with the teach
the board may contract as to any conditions not restricted by
law.

I find no law preventing the board from entering into a

conditional contract such as suggested in your question*

Like

any other contract, the terms thereof depend upon the agree*
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-52ment of the parties end, nnlesa euch terms, or any thereof,
ere prohibited by law become binding upon both parties.
The fourth question present is;

»»Are the Individual board

members personally responsible for the contracts they enter int
If the people of the district fail to vote proper millage to
cover the amount designated in the contracts?**
I assume by this question is meant — are the members of
the board individually liable to pay the amount of the salaries
contracted for In the event the electors fall to authorize the
extra millage.
A board of school trustees is a body politic and may act
only as a body and not individually*

Only such contracts as

are entered into by the board acting as such in meeting duly
assembled are binding upon the district* When contracts are
entered into in such manner they become the contracts of the
district and not of the individual members, and hence only the
district is liable thereon*

State ex rel School District No,

29 , Flathead County v. Cooney, 102 Mont* $21, 59 Pac, (2d)

School District No* 2 of Silver Bow County v. Richards, 62
. Mont* 141 , 205 Pac* 206. McNair v. School District No, 1 of
Cascade County, S? Mont, 423, 23S Pac* ISS,
Hence, if the contract In question is entered into by the
board acting as such la meeting duly assembled, the board havic
the power to enter into such contract, In the absence of fraud,
such contract is binding upon the district and the individual
members may not be held liable .therefore.
The board of trustees of a school district having only su<
powers end authority es the legislature has given it, may act
only within such powers.

It is the duty end obligation of a
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board of trustees toexercise such powers and such authority
' >reasonably and for the best interests of the district* la
the present Instance It Is the duty of the board to negotiate
a contract with the teachers which Is just, equitable and
reasonable both for the teacher and the district, based upon
the economic conditions presently existing* If the amount
contracted for salaries on this basis, together with other
anticipated expenditures of the district, exceeds the an' ticipated revenue from the authorized mlllege and other
sources, It is the duty of the board under the provisions of
f

f

f

Section 1019#7, supra, to determine the amount necessary to
cover the deficit end to submit the question of levy of such
extra mlllege necessary to the voters of the district* The
trustees are not bound to conjecture as to the result of such
election* When the question is. submitted to the electors the
boards* duty has been performed and the matter is then left
to the electors*
It is therefore my opinions
1 * A* board of school trustees may enter into contracts

with teachers at any time during the year, except as restricted
by the provisions of Section 1075 Revised Codes of Montana, 1935*
2* A board of school trustees has only such powers and
authority as la granted it by statute, or which ere reasonably
implied from those granted, but has a wide discretion in honestly
and fairly exercising such powers and authority,
3* When the board finds that the anticipated expenditures
for the year exceed the anticipated revenue from the authorized
levy and other sources, it is its duty to submit the question of
an extra levy to the electors of the district as provided by law*
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4# Members of a board of sehool trustees are not liable
individually' for any contracts or acts done by the board acting
08 such in meeting duly noticed and assembled.

Sincerely yours*

E. ?. BOTTŒ&Y
Attorney General
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Opinion 23 * 1947

Held ; That the failure of a school trustee to qualify within
V

the time fixed dOes not of itself create a vacancy in the
office end this hla qualification prior to an appointment to
the office precludes there being any vacancy in the office#
k

April 8 , 1947
Hr* Robert F# Swanberg
County Attorney
Missoula County
Missoula, Montana
Dear Mr# Swanbergî
You have requested my opinion as to whether there Is a
vacancy in the office of school trustee resulting from the
failure of the trustee elected to file his oath of office
within fifteen days from the time he received notice of
election and the blank oath of office from the clerk# You
advised 'me that the trustee was elected to succeed himself#
Section 997* Revised Codes of Montana, 1935* providesî
"Trustees elected shall take office immediately after
qualifying, and shall hold office for the term of three
years e;œ@pt as elsewhere expressly provided herein, end
until their successors are elected or appointed end
qualified#
The clerk of the district shall, at the time of Issuing
certificate of election to a person elected as trustee,
deliver to such person a blank oath of office# Every
trustee shall file his oath of office with the county
superintendent of schools within fifteen days of the
receipt of the certificate of election and blank oath
of office from the cclerÿ^. Any trustee failing to qualify
as herein provided shall forfeit all rights to his office
and the county superintendent of schools shall appoint to
fill the vacancy caused thereby#"
From the above quoted code section it appears that the
failure to file the oath of office within fifteen days from the
date of the receipt of the certificate of election and blsnk
oath of office may result in a vacancy in the office#
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In State ex rel Wallace v. Callow* 7ê Montana 30&, 254
Pac* I87 » onr court considered Section $11, Revised Codes of
I92I, which provides In part that en office becomes vacant
wpon the refusal or neglect to file the official oath or bond
within the time prescribed,

Under the facts In the case a

proper bond was not filed and an appointment made, with the
result that the appointee received the office# The court In
considering Section $11, which is similar to Section 997, said
"As courts are required to construe statutory provisions
in accordance with the legislative intent, it is held
that the word *v&c&ncy^, as used in such statutes, is
not to be considered in its literal sense, it is ordin
arily given a more liberal figurative meaning conforming
to the Intention of the lawnaker and the purpose to be
acocmplished; *•• that 'within the meaning* of a statute
identical with ours, such officer-elect is to be con*
sidersd an 'incumbent* of the office to which hehaa been
elected; •«« and, while the statute is not self exe
cuting, the declaration of the proper authority, after
the expiration of the statutory period and before quali
fication by the officer elect, creates a 'vacancy! in th
office on the commencement of the term to which euch
officer is elected»"
'
It is to be noted that the court held the statute not to
be self-executing and that a vacancy is created by the "declar
tioa of the proper authority, after the expiration of the stat
tory period and before qualification by the officer-elect,"

I

other words if the officer files his oath beforw an appointmen
is made, even though after the prescribed time, there is no
vacancy.

Also in the Callow case, the court quoted with ap

proval from a leading text the following r
"These provisions es to time, though often couched in
most explicit language, are usually construed to be
directory only ana not mandatory; •»* a failure to give
bond within the time prescribed does not therefore, ipse
facto work a forfeiture, »#, even thou^ the statute
expressly provides that upon a failure to give the bond
within the time prescribed, the office shall be deemed
vacant and may be filled by appointment,"
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la State ex rel B&gle v# Stafford 99 Montana SS 43
P&o# (2nd) 636 , onr court again considered Section 511 end
held that the failure to file a bond would preclude the in*
cumbent from holding an office claimed by an appointee whose
appointment had been confirmed by the Senate* The Court
recognised the rule that the vacancy occurs upon the appoint
ment and its confirmation as the court said;
"Such a vacancy may be filled by the official authorized
to do so as soon aslt occurs, as the appointing power
is plenary, but where, as here, confirmation is necessar
the appointment is not effective to oust the Incumbent
until the new appointee Is confirmed**
The text in 42 Am* Jir* 97^ states in regard to a statute
providing for forfeiture of an office for failure to qualify
within the time fixed as follows1
*The object of such provisions is accomplished, it is
said by holding that a faulure to qualify does not in
itself work a forfeiture of the party’s right to office,
but simply authorizes the proper authority to declare
such forfeiture and fill the office by appointment*®
From the facts you gave,no appointment has ever been made
and in particular none was made during the time the trustee wa
in default for failure to file his oath of office*
It is therefore my opinion that the failure of a school
trustee to qualify within the time fixed does not of itself
create a vacancy la the office and that his qualification prie
to an appointment to the office precludes there being any va
cancy la the office.
Sincerely yours,
a, V. jsorroîLî
Attorney General
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Opinion 55 ^ 1947
:
Held Kl) A Board of Trustees of $. school district may set up a
school In a church building for temporary use and to meet an
emergency* The selection of a permanent school site end the
construction of a school building must be authorized by the
qualified electors of the district at an election called for
that purpose* within e reasonable time*
(2)

School trustees must purchase end furnish textbooks for

the use of the schools In their districts*
t3) School trustees must hire # teacher or teachers for the
schools in their districts even though the teachers will be
employed in a new school temporarily located#
I

August 11, 1947
Air, Melvin S# Magnuson
County Attorney
Lewis and Clark County
Helena, Montana
Dear Mr# Magnusonj
Tou have advised me that, in school district Ho# 27, the
school building and the school site were previously sold* Since''
the sale, a colony of Hutterites have moved into the district
and wish to have a public school established# Tou also state
the Hutterites have offered the use of their church for school
purposes for the next school year# The questions which you sub
mitted are as follows *
{e) Kay the school trustees temporarily set up a public
school in the church building owned by the Hutterites,
w^iich is located upon the private property of the Hutterites?
(b) Must the school trustees furnish free textbooks for the
conduct of such a school?
(c) Must the school trustees furnish a teacher for the
conduct of such a school?
The Montana Constitution makes it the duty of the legisReproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

leture to provide for schools♦ Our Supreme Court* in Grant
V# Kichels, 9$ Mont* 452* 23 Pac# (2d) 266* considered the
constitutional provision and said*
"Section 1 of Article XI of the Constitution declares
that *lt shall be the duty of the legislative assembly
of Montana to establish and maintain a general, uniform
and thorough system of public, free, common schools#»
This is a »solemn mandate» to the legislature for the
purpose of insuring to the people the system described.
{Evers v* Hudson, 36 Moat. 135, 92 Pac. 462*1 This . '
mandate was obeyed by the legislature In the enactment
of laws setting up the machinery for the creation and
maintenance of school districts throughout the state*.
The number, location and extent of the districts within
a county must, of course, be, and is by law, left to
local option and governed by circumstances;*....#.#."
It is apparent from the above quoted that the maintenance
of schools within the state is of paramount importance.

In

Section 1015, Revised Codes of Montana, 1935, as amended it is
made the duty of trustees to employ teachers, to provide school
furniture and to acquire school houses. The selection of a
school site must be done under the direction of & majority of
the electors. However the problem wh Ich you present is not
the selection of a permanent school site or school house, but
the selection of a temporary school house to meet idiet amounts
to an emergency.

In State ex rel. Bean v* Lions, 37 Mont* 354,

96 Pac# 922, our Court held;
"It may well be that in cases of emer*gericies, and for
temporary purposes until electors may be consulted the
trustees might move the school*"
A similar conclusion was reached by this office in Volume
7, Report and Official Opinions of the Attorney General, page
157 , wherein it was held;

"A Board of Trustees has the authority to employ a teacher,
furnish books, and temporarily maintain a new school without
a vote of the electors# This would not include the right
to locate a permanent site for the school house#*
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It must be kept ia alad that such a school is of a tan*
porary nature, to meet an emergency| end that a permanent site
for the school house must be authorised by the qualified electors
of the district within e reasonable time*

Also, the school will

be a public school conducted under the laws of the State of
Montana# ^
The question of fumishlng free textbooks is answered by
Section 1198# Revised Codes of Montana, 1935, which makes it
the duty of all school boards to purchase textbooks for the
us® of the pupils in attendance at their schools*
I am assuming that the board of trustees has taken the
proper budgetary problems#
It is therefore, my opinion*
(1) A board of Trustees of a school district may set up
a school in a church building for temporary use and to meet
an emergency# The selection of a permanent school site and the
construction of s school building must be authorised by the
qualified electors of the district at an election called for
that purpose, within a reasonable time#
(2) School trustees must purchase and furnish free text
books for the use of the schools in their districts*
(3) School trustees must hire a teacher or teachers for the
schools in their districts even though the teachers will be em
ployed temporarily in a new school temporarily located#
Sincerely yours,
R* V# BOTTUMLT
Attorney General
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Opinion ÊO - 1947
,
s
Held; 1, The board of trustées of a county high school has
the authority to sell real property owned by the district and
. undesirable for school purposes under the provisions of Chapter
106, Laws of 1939» as amended by Chapter 232, Laws of 1947*
2» The board of county commissioners has the power to pur
chase real property necessary for county purposes under the
authority granted in Section 4465#7» Revised Codes of Montana»
1935» and in conformity with the provisions of the "Budget Act."
November 16, 1947
Mr# Dick Armstrong
County Clerk and Recorder
Sweet Grass County
Big Timber» Montana
Dear Mr# Armstrong;
You have requested my opinion concerning the sale of
county high school property and the purchase of the property
by the county# You advise me that the trustees of the county
high school purchased a site for a dormitory in 1919, and It
has never been used and the trustees would like to sell the
property* You also state that the county would like to pur
chase the same for a county hospital site#
In answering your question It is Important to note that
a board of trustees has limited powers as was observed in
McNair v. School District 6? Mont* 423 266 Pac# 166, in which
case the Court said:
"The board of trustees, therefore, constitutes the board
of directors and managing officers of the corporation, and
may exercise only those powers expressly conferred upon
them by statute and such as are necessarily implied In the
exercise of those expressly conferred* The statute grant
ing power must be regarded both as a grant and a limita
tion upon the powers of the board*"
There is no express authority which would permit the
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trustees a t a county high school to convey property to the
county ^without holding a sale.
As the property under consideration has been held by the
school for a great number of years and never been used, and
the trustees do not contemplate that it will be used, it can
be considered as undesirable for school purposes# Chapter
106, Laws of 1939, as amended by Chapter 232, Laws of 1947,
authorises trustees to sell lands which are unsuitable or
undesirable for school purposes and defines the procedure to
be followed. The chapter does not require that an election
shall be held and thus results in a saving to the county for
the sale of property coming within the provisions of the statute.
The board of County Commissioners is limited in its powers
as is the board of trustees of the county high school, which
principle was recognized in Lewis v. Petroleum County, 92
Mont. 563, 17 Pao# (2d) 60, wherein it was statedî
"The principle is well established that the board of
county commissioners may exercise only such powers as
are expressly conferred upon it or which ere necessarily
Implied from those expressed, and that where there is a
reasonable doubt as to the existence of a particular
power in the board of county commissioners, it must be
resolved against the board, and the power denied."
Section 4465.7, Revised Codes of Montana, 1935, grants the
power to the board of county commissioners to purchase real
property necessary for the use of the county, but a purchase
of real property in excess of flOQv.OO must not be made without
securing an appraisal of the value, and in accordance with the
Budget Act.
In your letter you did not state the approximate value of
the property, but if the purchase priceis in excess of $10,000,00,
one of the provisions of the Section 5 of Article XIII of the
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Montana Constitution must be observed, which providesi
•’Sio county shall Incur any Indebtedness or liability for
any single purpose to an amount exceeding tea thousand
dollars (110 ,000*00 ) without the approval of a majority
of the electors thereof, voting at an election to be
provided by law**
See Opinion No* 43, Report and Official Opinionsof the
Attorney General, Volume 22, and Opinion No* 15 , Report and
Official Opinions of the Attorney General, Volume 21*
It is

opinion that the board of trustees of a county

high school has the authority to sell real property owned by
the district and undesirable for school purposes under the
provisions of Chapter 106, laws of 1939, as amended by Chapter
232, Laws of 1947.
It is also my opinion that the board of county commissioners
has< the power to purchase real property necessary for county
purposes under the authority granted in Section 4465.7, Re»
vised Codes of Montana, 1935* and in conformity with the pro
visions of the ^Budget Act**
Sincerely yours,

R. V. BOTTOMLT
Attorney General
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Opinion 7 * 1951
Held I That e majority of the board of trustees of a school
district may be elected at the annual election when oneof
the trustees so elected will fill the unexpired term resulting
from a vacancy in the office,
March 20, 1951
Mr, Frank T# Hooka
County Attorney
Broadwater County
Townsend, Montana
Deer Mr, Hooks*
You have requested my opinion concerning the filling of
a vacancy in the hoard of trustees of a school in your county#
You advise me that the district is a second class district
with five trustees and that a vacancy has occurred due to the
death of a member whose tens would not expire in the year 1951,
Section 75*1614# Revised Codes of Montana, 1947» provides
in part:
♦•A vacsncy In the offic©shall be filled by appointment by
the county superintendent of schoolsj provided, that
in districts of the first and second class, such appoint*
ment shall be subject to confirmation by a majority of
the remaining members of said board, if those remaining
constitute a majority of the total number of the board.
The trustees so appointed shall hold office until the
next annual election, st which election there shall be
elected a school trustee for the unexpired term,"
The above quoted would apparently conflict with Section
75-1617 which reads:

"When at any annual school election the terms of a majority
of the trustees regularly expirein districts of the first
class, three trustees, in districts of the second class, two
trustees in districts of the third class, one trustee,
shall be elected for three years, and the remaining trustee
or trustees whose terms expire shall hold over for one
or two years as may be necessary to prevent the terms of
a majority of the board of trustees expiring in any one
year: provided, that it shall be determined by lot, whet
trustee shall hold over, and for what term,"
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As there ere five trustees in your district, two of whose
terms will expire in 1951# the election of a candidate to fill
the unexpired term resulting from the vacancy would then re
sult in a majority of the trustees being elected et the next
school election.

Section 75-1617 contemplates that the terras

of trustees be arranged to prevent the terras of a majority
expiring in eny one year.

In the case of Euhl v, Kaiser,

95 Mont, 550, 27 Pac, (2d) 1113, the court considered the
above code sections and held that there is no conflict between
the sections and that the word "terra" applies to the office
and not to the persona and under Section 75-161^ a person
appointed to fill a vacancy holds until the next annual elec
tion st which time a trustee is elected for the unexpired
term. The fact that a majority of trustees will be elected
is not violative of Section 75-1617, What is prohibited by
the Section is the expiration of the terms of a majority of
the trustees at the same time. The election of a trustee for
the unexnlred terra will in no way change the expiration of
the terms with the result that at some future date the terras of
a majority will expire at the same time.
This will mean in the next election in your county two
trustees will be elected each for a three year term and one
trustee elected to fill the vacancy and who shall hold office
for the unexplred term of the personally originally elected.
It is therefore my opinion that a majority of the board
of trustees of & school district may be elected at the annual
election when one of the trustees so elected will fill the
unexpired terra resulting from a vacancy in the office.
Very truly yours,
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/mold H» Olsen
Attorney General
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, Opinion 36 - 1951
Held; The board of trustees of a school

rict may lease

a grade school building which is not needed for present school
purposes to the United States Government for a period of one
ye&r, or for a term that will not interfere with the useof

the building in the future for school purposes*
August 27 t 1951
Mr* J* J* î'îcintosh
County Attorney
Rosebud County
ForsythI Montana
Dear Mr* McIntosh;
You have requested my opinion concerning the power of .,,
the Board of Trustees of a school district to lease a school
building to the Federal Government for a period of one year*
You advise me that one of the grade school buildings in your
district la not needed at present for school purposes, but
the board of trustees contemplates that the building will
be needed for school purposes in the future*
Section 75-1&32 Revised Codes of Montana, 1947, as amended
by Chapter 207, Laws of 1951, enumerates the powers of every
school board and sub-section 7 grants to the trustees the
authority;
*To repair and insure schoolhouses and to rent, lease
and let to such persons or entities es the board may
deem proper, the grade school ha2s, gymnasium and buildings
and part thereof for such time and rental as the board
may designate. All rentals shall be paid to the county
treasurer for the credit of the school district*"
The above quoted is a broad authorization to the board of
trustees to lease school buildings that are not needed for
school purposes#

In the case of Young vs* Board of Trustees,

90 Mont* 576, 4 Pac* (2d) 725, our Supreme Court approved the
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rental of a high school gyujassium for public dances and ssld;
*As evidencing the legislative intent and progressive
thou^on the subject, the foregoing section was amended
by the next legislative ass^bly by eliminating ell
restrictions and permitting the board to "rent, lease
or let" the described property to any "person or entities
the board may deem proper, for any purpose and for such
time and rental ©s the board may designateé".
Another Montana case which approved the lease of a muni
cipal building la that of Colwell vs# City of Great Falls, 11?
Mont 126, 157 Pac# (2d) IOI3 ,where the court said;
"Indeed a benefit wouldand does result to them (the
taxpayers) by the Interim renting of the auditorium of
the Civic Center Building at such times as it is not
needed for other purposes as provided in the exception
clause of the lease under the interim leasing Ordinance
No# 835#*
There is additional statutory authority given to the
Board of trustees of each school district to receive rental
for school property as Section 75**1624 E# G# M# 1947, provides
in part, "the trustees of the

districtshall have the powerto

lease any property belonging to the district which is not being
used for school purposes#
School property is acquired by the district for the schools
of the district and not as an investment# The lease of any
school property should always be made subject to the use of
the property for school purposes# It is to be noted that both
the Supreme Court and our Legislature in approving the renting
of public property restricted the use of the property by others
to such times as it was not needed for public purposes#

It

would therefore, be incumbent upon your trustees to limit the
term of the lease of the building so thft there will not be
any interference with the prospective;need for the building
for school purposes#
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It is^ therefore, my opinion
that the board of trustees of
t
a school district may lease a grade school building which is
■%

not needed for present school purposes to the United States
Government for a period of one year, or for a tom that will
not interfere with the use of the building in the future for
school purposes.
Very truly yours ^
ARNOLD H. ÜLSSS
Attorney General
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Held:
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(1) Neither school districts nor Board of Trustees

ere liable in tort for injuries arising out of the govern^
)

mental activities of the school in the absence of a specific
statute*
(2)

(

School district boards of trustees have no authority

to expend school district funds to contract for liability
Insurance*
October 19$ 1951
Mr, Edward J, Ober, Jr.
County Attorney
Hill County
HavreI Montana
Dear Mr, Ober*
You have requested my opinion regarding the liability of
a school district and the trustees for injury where a student
sustained a broken ankle while engaged in a regularly scheduled
tumbling class# This same question has arisen in several dis
tricts in connection with the authority of trustees to contract
for liability Insurance*
In Volume 6 , Opinions of the Attorney General* page 427*
it was held that the board of trustees has no authority in law
for using any part of the school monies to pay doctor's bills
for treatment of a student injured by an electric saw in the
manual training department* despite the fact that the injury
was due to defective machinery.

Then Attorney General Poindexter

stated*
"A school district is not liable in tort and its officers
have no jurisdiction to compromise or pay any claim such
as you describe* It is my opinion the doctrine announced
by our suprmae court in Smith v* Zimmer* 45 Mont* 2o2*
4Ô Mont, 332* with respect to non-liability of counties
for tort and individual Habilites of county officers for
neglect* applies with equal force to school districts and
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the officers thereof**
In the many years since that opinion has been issued, it
has not been reversed or questioned*
Our Supreme Court has directly passed upon school district
liahlity on several occasions*
The general rule holds the school district immune from
suit for injuries caused by negligence of its officers, agents
or employees, unless liability is imposed by specific statute.
Perkins v* Trask, et &1«, 95 Mont* 1. This rule vas kffirmed
generally by the later case of Bartell v* School District 2d,
114 Mont* 451, 1)7 Pac. (2d) 422.
The Bartell case involved an accident which occurred on
a playground field, end the language of the court thereon Is
applicable to the Instant situation*

At page 457 of 114 Mont*

the Court stated5
*It is unquestioned that physical training is part of
the educational duty entrusted to the public schools
(Mcîîair V. School District Ko* 1, Ô7 Mont* 423, 28S Pac.
iSà, 69 A* I. R* 866), We find no authority for the
proposition that these educational duties are limited
to members of voluntary athletic teams and can Imagine
no serious argument which could be made to that effect*"
In the latest case concerning the liability of a school district, Rhoades v* School District No, 9, the argument of
distinction between governmental and proprietary functions was
strongly urged* The Rhoades case concerned an Injury to a
paying spectator at a brsketball game conducted by the high
school and resulting from s collapse of a stfWay in the gym.
The court found the allegations of negligence sufficient to
state 8 cause of action *if the school district or its board
of trustees is liable in negligence,* and held th%t the school
was acting in a governmental capacity in conducting the basketReproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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ball gam®, and was therefore not liable*
The general rule has been little modified by the language
of the later cases*

So fir as it applies to the Instant

situation, it is unchanged*
It Is therefore my opinion that neither the school district
nor the trustees are liable in tort for any injury arising
out of the governmental activities of the school*
The stated distinction between governmental and proprie
tary functions which has developed in the later opinions of
the SupremeCourt has given rise to a correlative question con
cerning the authority of school districts to contract for lia
bility insurance*

In view of the long established

of non-

liability set forth supra, there appears little practical basis
for such an expenditure of school district funds* Decisions
based upon cases arising against municipalities are not good
yardsticks by which to measure the liability of a school dis
trict* While both are corporate entities, the scope of acti
vity allowed a municipal corporation lords to many activities
proprietary In nature* The school districts operate within the
more restricted area of statutory authority* It is not empowered
to engage in aon-educational activities and is therefore not
bpbject to the same possibilities for liability rs is a muni
cipal corporation today* This distinction is set forth by our
Supreme Court in the recent case of Felton v# Great Falls, lid
Mont, 536, 169 Pac* (2d) 229.
It Is therefore my opinion that a board of trustees has
no authority to expend school district funds upon liability
insurance in the absence of specific statutory authority*
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Very truly yours,
M30LD H, 01331!
Attorney General

J
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Opinion 54 - 1951
. Reldi 1* The board of trustees of a school district
maintaining a high school and the board of trustees of
a county high school have the power to enter into contracts
with the State Water Conservation Board a water users*
association for the furnishing of water and sewerage
disposal for the schools of the district and the county
high school#
2* A high school district, acting through its board of
trustees, does not have the power or authority to enter
into a water and sewerage disposal contract#
December 29, 1951
Mr# M# 1. Parcells
County^ Attorney
Stillwater County
Columbus, Montana
Dear mr. farcellsi
You have requested my opinion concerning the authority
of a high school district end ® school district to enter
into water and sewerage service contracts with the State
Water Conservation Board and a water users* association#
The contracts provide for annual payments over a
period of years for the services furnished# The school
districts would be participating purchasers in the water
users* association#
The case of Parmer# State Bank v« City of Conrad, 100
Mont# 415, 47 P*(2nd) &53, approved the execution of such

y
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contracts by ft city, and the reasoning In the case would
apply to school districts*

An opinion of this Office,

Opinion No# 23#, Vol. 1#, Report and Official Opinions
of the Attorney General, approved such contracts for school
districts and I agree with this opinion#
A high school district is to be distinguished from
a school district as a high school district has limited
powers#

Section 75-4605, S# C* M#, 1947, as amended,

states I
"The high school districts created under the
provisions of this act, are for construction,
repair, improvement and equipment purposes only
and it shall not be construed so as to interfere
with or repeal any existing laws relating to the
maintenance or operation of high schools within
the county."
*
This is a specific limitation on the powers of the
high school district and it is an express recognition that
the law for the government of a high school. as found
elsewhere is not altered or repealed#

Section 75-4101

H, C# M#, 1947, defines a high school as follows;
"A high school is a public school as defined in
the general school laws end is an integral unit
of the public school system which comprises some
one or more of the grades of school work intermediate between the elementary schools and the
institutions of higher education of the state of
Montana, and which has its own administrative
head and corps of teachers under the direct super
vision either of a district superintendent and
the board of trustees of a school district, or
of a county high school principal and board of
trustees of such county high school, as the case
may be.*
This statute pieces the control end supervision of the
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'
high school in the bo?rd of trustees of the school district
maintaining the high school or in the board of trustees
of th%;|^county high school. This Is not altered by the law
authorising the establishment of high school building.
■»
districts as Section 75-4601, H. G, M,, I947, as amended,
provides in part:
"In any county having a high school, the board of
trustees of the county high school, if there be one,
and the boards of trustees of any school districts
maintaining high schools, are hereby designated as
the boards of trustees or the respective high school
districts established under this act.*
The recent case of Rankin v. love, Kont.*, 232 Fee. (2nd)
99&, raises a doubt as to the validity of high school building

districts, yet such is not materiel here as in any event a
high school district does not have the authority, acting
through its board of trustees, to enter Into a contract per
taining to the operation of a high school.
This does not mean the trustees of a district maintaining
a high school, or the board of trustees of a county high
school, cannot enter into such a contract. In fact they
have such power.
It is therefore my opinions
1. The board of trustees of a school district main
taining a high school rnd the board of trustees of a county
high school have the power to enter into contracts with
the State Water Conservation Board and a water users♦
association for the furnishing of water and sewerage dis
posal for the schools of the district and the county high
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achool,

t
‘i.
2# A high eehaol dlmtrlot* eetlag through ita hoard

of truatoosy do®a not h«v« th* power or authority to enter
into # water end aewerage dl#po*al contract»

Very truly your#.

laavLB %» 9L32K
Attorney a»n@r@l

J
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Opinion 102 * 1952

Held;

Tha Board o f Trustees o f a School district may not

engage in any activities which are not exclusively for
educational purposes*
Whether or not the school district may operate a cannery
as part of their adult education program is a question which
must be decided by the members of the board of trustees* The
determinate factor being the utility of the appliance for
educational uses* However, the cannery may la no manner be
used as a commercial or general service device*
July 9, 1952
Mr# Robert Hurley
County Attorney
Valley County
Glasgow, Montana
Dear Mr* Hurleyî
You have submitted the following question to me for an
f

official opinions
*May the board of trustees of a school district
operate a cannery as part of their adult education
program?*
It is a basic proposition that school boards have no

/’

powers except those expressly granted, or necessarily
Implied from those granted#

See, McNair vs# School District

No* 1 of Cascade County, 3? Mont# 423# 223 Pac# 133.
Section 75*1633, Revised Codes of Montana, 1946, provides;
"The board of trustees of any school district or
of any county high school is authorized to permit
the use of/School rooms for adult education, schools
or classes for adults sixteen (16 ) years of age or
over, and $f the school Is desirous of raising money

J
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To help effect the purpose of this met, the board
of county commissioners may levy a tax of not to
exceed one (1 ) mill on the dollar of all taxable
property real end personal within the district,
in addition to ell other levies for school pur
poses, for the support end maintenance of such
adult education, schools or classes, provided
that the board of school trustees of any such
district requiring such levy must call an
election in the manner prescribed for such extra
levies by section 75-170?, for the purpose of
obtaining the approval of the district to the
making of such additional levy end provided
further that such election must be held before
the first day of July*”
It has been held that ^education* is the process of
developing and training the powers and capabilities of
humrn beings, as preparing end fitting one for a calling
or business, or for activity or usefulness in life, and
may be particularly directed to either mental, moral or
physical powers and facilities, but in its broadest and
best sense it relates to all of them* Lyme iHigh School
Asa’n vs* Ailing 113 Conn* 220, 154 A* 43&, also, McNair
vs. School District No* 1 of Cascade County, ( supra)
A cannery, that is, canning machinery and the operation
thereof is as much a pert of adult education as welding
machines and manual training equipment, as such it may be
maintained and operated in the school* However, a com
mercial cannery not Intended for instructional purposes
not be within the purview of a school district*
School funds cannot be used for a community project which
is unrelated to education*

Section 75-4131,

C, M., 1947,

enumerates the general powers end duties of boards of
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*"

trustees.

—

It Is a basic proposition that school boards

have no powers except those expressly granted, or neces
sarily Implied fixm those,granted* McNair vs* School
District Ho. 1 of Cascade County, Ô7 Mont* 423, 228 Pac*
188. Consequently, the school board must act within the
purview of this statute* The statute clearly limits the
school trustees to educational functions.
What constitutes educational purposes has been
raised in eases involving private liability* See Perkins
vs. Trask et al., 95 Mont. 1* 23 Pac. (2d.) 983. Bartell
vs* School District No. 28, Lake County, 114 Mont. 451,
137 Pat. 422. The question might well arise again In this
Instance. Given & community project operated by a school
district and utilized generally, who would be liable for
accidents? If used exclusively for education general
immunity would extend to the school district. However,
if the cannery is used commercially, the trustees might
be individually liable.
Whether the board should enter into such an arrange
ment is in the fin^l analysis, a question of administrative
discretion with which the bo^rd is vested and determinative
only* by the board itself. It becomes a question of fact
rather than law* In order to bring the facts within the
law the cannery must be operated exclusively to educate
adults in the methods of canning. Whether it is necessary
to have a canner in order to teach proper canning methods
such as would be adaptable to better home techniques la
_

for the board to decide. If the cannery is to be operated

J
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es a coiamereial project whereby people can bring their
goods to be canned as they desire It is not a proper func
tion of the school district in the absence of legislative
permission, no matter how worthwhile the project may be
from a civic viewpoint*
It is therefore my opinion that the board of trustees
may not engage In any endeavors which are not exclusively
for educational pruposes# Whether or not the school
district may operate a cannery as a p&rt of their adult
education program is a question which must be decided by
the members of the board, the determinate factor being
the utility of the appliance for educational uses*
It is further my opinion that the cannery may in no
manner bÀ used as a commercial or general service device.
Such functions are beyond the powers of the board of <
trustees#
Very truly yours.

AENOLD H* OLSM
Attorney General

y
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

Opinion 4

1953

Held! The additional members elected to the board of
trustees of districts maintaining high schools which
high schools are also district high schools, shall
participate on an equal basis with other members in all
business transacted pertaining to the high school.
January 30, 1953
Mr. Leo H* Murphy
County Attorney
Teton County
Chouteau, Montana
Dear Mr* Murphy?
You have requested my opinion concerning the powers
of the additional trustees elected to the board of trustees
of districts maintaining high schools#
Chapter lôâ, Laws of 1951, emended Section 75*4601,
R 4 C#>M*, 1947, to allow the election of additional
trustees to boards of trustees of school districts main
taining high schools which are also district high schools#
The amendment provided in parts
”The additional members elected to the board
of trustees of districts maintaining high
schools, shall take office immediately after
qualifying and shall participate on an equal
basis with other members in all business trans
ected by the board of trustees pertaining to
the high school maintained by said districts#"
The above quoted portion of the state is unambiguous
&
and standing alone would not require Interpretation* How
ever, there is another statutory provision in the high

_J
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school district Xm that is in apparent conflict* I
refer to Section 75-4605» K* C, M,, 1947, es amended by
Chapter 188, laws of 1951, which reads In part as follows;
”The high school districts crested tinder the pro
visions of this act, are for construction, repair,
Improvement, and equipment purposes only, and it
shall not be construed so as to interfere with or
repeal any existing laws relating to the mainten
ance or operation of high schools within the county.»
The,amendment to Section 75-4605 did not affect or alter
this part of the statute which has been the law since its
enactment as Chapter 275, Laws of 1947* In State ex rel*
>'S

Henderson vs* Dawson County, 87 Mont* 122, 286 Pac, 125,
**

'

.

Our Supreme Court said;
»***wher@ a section or a part
of a section is
amended, it is not to be considered as havingbeen
repealed and re-enacted in its amended form, but
the portions which are not altered are to be con
sidered 68 having been the law from the time when
they were enacted.**
The limited purposes of high school districts were
designated in Section 75-4605 prior to the amendment of
Section 75-4601, which latter section was amended so as to
provide additional

trustees end thus make high school dis

tricts administrative units for high schools. If wewere
to ignore the express declaration that the ^additional
members shall participate in all business pertaining the
high school** then the amendment would be^a nullity*

In

Nichols vs* School District, 87 Mont. 181, 287 fac* 624,
the court said;

y
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"la the coastruction of an amendatory set it will
be presumed that the legislature, in adopting it,
intended to make some change in the existing law,
and the courts will endeavor to give some effect
to the amendment
It is therefore my opinion that the additional members
elected to the board of trustees of districts maintaining
high schools, which high schools are also district high
schools, shall participate on an equal basis with other
members in all business transacted pertaining to the high
school*

Very truly yours,

AMOLD H. OLSSS
Attorney General
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Opinion 67 • 1954
Held*

t

1% is not the duty of the board of trustees of

school districts to conduct the election of trustees of
hospital districts.
March 29, 1954
Miss Mary M#, Condon
Superintendent of Public Instruction
State Capitol Building
Helena, Montana
Dear Miss Condon*
You have requested my opinion as to whether school
trustees are to conduct the elections for hospital district
tp u'Btees.

Section 7# Chapter 155» Laws of 1953» provides for the
government of hospital districts and fixes the terns of
procedure for election of trustees. This section states
in part*
"...All elections thereafter shall be conducted
by said qualified voters in the seme manner as
election for school trustees of a first-class
school district.*."
The election of school trustees is held on the first
Saturday in April, of each year, as Section 75-1603» R* 0. M,,
1947» fixes such day as school election day. Section 7
of Chapter 155# supra, does not designate any particular
day of the year for holding the election of hospital district
trustees.

However# s method is fixed for ascertaining the

election day for hospital district trustees.

Section 7
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of Chapter 155* stipra, states that the trustees first
elected hold for terms which commence oa the date of the
organisation of the district and these terms ere for one,
two or three years# The election for the creation of the
hospital district may be held, according to Section 5 of
the act, at the next general election or at a special
election. Such an election would not be held, in all
probability, on the first Saturday In April, and es a
consequence would not conform with the school election
date, end a change from the anniversary date of the first
election of trustees to the first Saturday In April would
alter the terms of the trustees first elected#
The fact that Section 7 of Chapter 155* supra, requires
*all elections thereafter shall be conducted by said quali
fied voters in the seme manner as election for school
trustees of a first class school district, ” does not make
it the duty of school officers tlo conduct the election.
The effect of this provision is to Incorporate by reference
the procedural statute for conducting the election, but
no duties are Imposai on the school trustees. The title
to Chapter 155, supra, does not state that this is one of
the purposes of this new legislation.
As a ppÿfeiicsl matter, it would not be possible in all
counties for the trustees of a school district to conduct the
election as there is a marked difference in nominating
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candidates in flrst-olsss districts end third-class districts#
»

(Sections 75-1604 end 75-1606 R* G*

1947)#

In fact,

there is no election held In first-class districts when
only one candidate Is nominated for each terra to be filled#
Also, many conntiea do not have first-class school districts#
Another probable obstacle to an election conducted by
school trustees is that the boundaries of any one school
district will not conform to the boundaries of the hospital
district with resulting conflicting authority of two or
more schools boards#
It Is, therefore, ray opinion that it is not the duty of
the board of trustees of school districts to conduct the
election of trustees of hospital districts#
Very truly yours,

ARNOLD H# OLSSN
Attorney General
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Oplnlon 93 ^ I954
Held; The board of oouaty coaaaieaionera and the board of
I
trustees of a county high school may lease to a school
district for a term not exceeding four years a county high
school building not needed for the purposes of the county
high school* %hich building would be used by the district
for school purposes*
;

August 27i 1954

Mr* Harold I* Allen
County Attorney
Gallatin County
Bozeman, Montana
Dear Mr. Allen;
.

,

Tou have requested my opinion concerning the power of
the board of trustees of a county high school to lease a
high school building to a school district to be used for
junior high school purposes, tou advise me that a new
high school will b© constructed and the present county
high school building will not be needed for high school
purposes after the construction of the new building.
As a county high school is constructed with county
funds and by the issuance of county bonds, the legal title
to the county high school is in the county.

(Pierson v.

Hendricksea, 9^ Mont. 244# 38 Fac (2d) 991.) Section 751636, R» C* M* 1947, gives specific authority to the county

commissioners to lease any county real or personal pro
perty to school districts. This section reads as follows;
"Leasing of County Lands for School Purposes -
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Limitation of Term, Whenever any county of the
state of Montana shall have acquired title to any
real or personal property in any manner now pro
vided by law and such property is suitable or use
ful for dormitory or gymnasium or school purposes
to any public school located within the same city,
town or school district where said property is
situated, the board of county commissioners of
said county may, upon request of the board of
trustees of any such school district, lease said
property to such school district for school dor
mitory or gymnasium purposes for such rental as
the said board of county conimlssioner» may deem
adequate end for such term of years, not exceeding
four years, as the board may see fit,"
It is to be noted in the above quoted statute that
the commissioners have not only discretionary power as to
whether a lease should be given to a school district, but,
also, as to the rental* However, the term of the lease
cannot exceed four years,
V.

Subsection 11 of Section 75-4231, E. C# M, 1947,
grants to the trustees of every county high school the
power*
"To rent, lease and let to such persons and entities
S3 the board may doem proper the high school halls,
gymnasiums, buildings, and parts thereof, for such
time and rental as the board may designate, and to
pay over to the county treasurer all sums collected
on account of such letting for the credit of the
high school,"
The above quoted gives broad authority to the trustees
of a county high school to lease school buildings.

Exact

limitations are not prescribed on the exercise of the
power and as a consequence much is left to the discretion
of the trustees.

In view of this section and Section
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75-1626, R* C# M* 1947$ both the county commissioners
and the trustees of the high school district should
execute the lease and avoid any question concerning the
proper parties to sign the lease on behalf of the county*
In considering your problem, the authority of the
school district to become the lessee must be sanctioned
by statute.

Subsection S of Section 75-1632, E, C, M,

1947» gives authority to every school board ”to build,
purchase or otherwise acquire schoolhouses, school dor
mitories and other buildings necessary in the operation
of schools of the school district, and to se^l and dispose
of the same,* This also is a broad power and permits the
trustees of a school district to lasso buildings necessary
for the operation of the schools of the district. The
case of Bennett v# Petroleum County, 07 Mont# 436, 2BB
Psc, 1018, approved a lease entered into by the board of
county commissioners of buildings for the use of the county.
The statute under which such lease was made was very broad
in its terms and while it specifically authorised the
leasing of buildings for county purposes yet the case is
authority for a school district to lease buildings as
Subsection 8 of Section 75-1632, E* C* M,, 1947# i® also
a broad grant of power#
The beneficial title to all school property is in the
state (Pierson v# Hendrickson, 96 Mont, 244, 38 Psc (2d) 991)
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and It would serve the public Interest by permitting a
school district to use county high school buildings not neces
sary for the county high school*
It is, therefore, my opinion that the board of co^mty
commissioners and the board of trustees of a county high
school may lease to a school district for a term not ex
ceeding four years a county high school building not
needed for the purposes of the county high school, which
building would be used by the district for school purposes*

Very truly yours.

PMOUD H* OLSM
Attorney General
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Opinion 24 - 1955
Held!

The trustees of a school district do not have the

power of authority to establish and budget for a six- year
high school*
^uly 2 , 1955
Mr* Chester L« Jones
County Attorney
Madison County
Virginia City* Montana
Dear Mr* Joness
Tou have requested my opinion as to whether a school
district has the authority to establish and budget for a
six-year high school.
In answering your question it is necessary to consider
the limited power of the trustees of the school district.
In McNair v# School l^lstrlct No. 1, 07 Mont* 423, 200 Pac,
100, our Supreme Court said;
".*.The board of trustees, therefore, constitutes
the board of directors end managing officers of
the corporation, and may exercise only those powers
expressly conferred upon them by statute and such
as are necessarily implied la the exercise of those
expredsly conferred* The statute granting power
must be regarded both as a grant and a limitation
upon the powers of the board.*."
from the above quoted it is apparent that the officers
of the school district are limited to express statutory
provisions in the administration of the schools of the
districts.
Section 75-4101 , R* ^* M., 1947» defines a high school
as an integral unit of the public school system which comJ

prises one or more of the grades of school work between the
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between,the elementary school and the Institution of higher
education#

A junior *high school
is defined in Section 75'

4102^ E* C« M«| 1947, as a public school which comprises
work of the seventh^ eighth and ninth grades of the school
system*

In your question you ask if a school can be estab'
llshed which will include all of the grades of a high
school and in addition the seventh and eighth grades which
are elementary grades#

As the trustees have limited powers

and the statutes authorise high schools, junior high schools
end eleaentary schools* the proposed school does not fit
in any one of the three. The High School Budget Act has
application to a # districts maintaining high schools and
all county high schools#

When a junior high school is

established, the high* school budget supports the educational
costs of all high school pupils in the junior high school#
There is no statutory provision for the adoption by the
trustees of an independent budget for the junior high school.
Also, the legislature has not authorized a school comprising
the last six grades of work and In the absence of a, statute
authorizing such a new school, the doubt must be resolved
against the power to establish such a school with an inde
pendent budget#
It is therefore my opinion that the trustees of a
school district do not have the power of authority to
establish and budget for a six-year high school.
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Very truly yours*

ARNOLD H# OLSEN
Attorney General
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-95Opinion 34 - 1955
Holdi 1* The trusteed of a school district ere not
authorised to aedept a coiabinatlon bid for contracts of
transportation for two School bus routes when the ad
vertisement for bids stated end requested bids for each
route separately, and when the lowest bidder for each
route was rejected and a combination bid accepted with
greater es^ense to the school district*
2»

The board of trustees of a school district has

discretionary power in determining the responsibility of
bidders, but such discretionary power must be based on
facts and is not an arbitrary power*
August Id, 1955
Mr* B« Miles Larson
County Attorney
McCon© County
Circle, Montana
Dear Mr* LarsonI
Tou have requested my opinion as to whether the trustees
Î
of a school district may accept a combination bid for two
transportation routes when the two routes were advertised
as separate Items# You state that separate bids were
offered for the two routes which were lower than a combina
tion bid for the two routes and the trustees accepted the
combination bid*
Contracts for transportation of school children are
covered in Section 75-3405, R* C« M#, 1947* The portion of
't

this section with which we are concerned reads as followsj
«•#*The board shall let the contract to the
lowest responsible bidder; provided, that the
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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board shall have the right to reject any and all
blda*^ . .
The problem you present is whether a combination bid
of two routes may be considered the lowest bid when bids
were submitted for the two routes at an aggregate figure
lower than that contained in the combination bid*

While

the trustees had the authority to request bids for the
two routes as a unit, y et not having done so, bids
must be considered only on the contracts as advertised»
In

C« J« 3» 1266, the text states;
**»»,A board of education may not let contracts
for two different buildings to e bidder whose
aggregate bid is the lowest, if contracts with
responsible bidders might be made for a smaller
sum by contracting separately for each building»*
The above quoted is in accord with our statutory

requirement that the contract shall be let to the lowest
bidder.

To accept a combination bid which will result in

a greater cost to the school district and also very from
the request for bids contained in the advertisement would
not be in the best interests of the school district and
would mislead bidders.
It is true that the trustees of a district have some
discretionary power in determining the responsibility of
bidders.

In Hudson vs, the Board of Education, 41 Ohio,

app, 402, 179 K, E, ?01, in determining the responsibility
of a prospective contractor, the court recognized the
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i
limitation placed on a board of trustees in determining
the responsibility of a prospective contractor* The Ohio
Court quoted with approval the followingj
•The term ’responsible* is net, however, limited
to pecuniary* ability*** but pertains to many
other characteristics of the bidder, such as his
general ability and capacity to orry on the
work, his equipment and facilities, his prompt»
ness, and the quality of work previously done by
him, his suitability to the particular task, and
such other qualities as ere found necessary to
consider in order to determine whether or not,
if awarded the contract, he could perform it
strictly in accordance with its terms.* (Qsphasis Supplied)
It is therefore my opinion that the trustees of a
school district are not authorized to accept a combination
bid for contracts of transportation for two school bus
routes when the advertisement for bids stated end requested
bids for each route separately, and when the lowest bid
from a responsible bidder for each route was rejected and
If

a ccwabination bid accepted with greater expense to the
school district*
It is also my opinion that the board of trustees of a
school district has discretionary power in determining the
responsibility of bidders, but such discretionary power
must be based on facts and is not an arbitrary power*
Very truly yours,
ARNOLD H. OLSEN
Attorney General
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Opinion 35 - 1955
Held*

^

1# That the Board of Trustees of School District

No# 1 of Silver Bow County in appointing a teacher who Is
not a teaching principal to the position of supervisory
principal I violated Section 3 of Rule 4 when there were
teaching principals qualified and willing to accept the
position*
2* That it is the duty of the Board of Trustees
when there is & vacancy In the position of supervisory
principals, to give sufficient and adequate notice to
all teaching principals of such vacancy, which notice
should request applications to be filed with the board
on or before a fixed date#
3# That the Board of Trustees has the power and
authority to transfer supervisory principals from one
school to another, and after such transfer any vacancy
in the position of supervisory principal must be filled
from the ranks of the teaching principals*
August 22, 1955
Mr# N.
Qounty
Silver
Butte,

A* Rotering
Attorney
Bow County
Montana

Deer Mr# Rotering*
Tou have requested my opinion concerning the employ
ment of e supervisory principal for a school In your county,
Tou have submitted for my consideration a copy of the rules
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relating to the employment o f teachers In School District
Ko# 1 of your county which are a result of an agreement
between the Board of Trustees and the Butte Teacher's
Union*

Tou state that the trustees appointed a teacher

to the position of supervisory principal and this resulted
in a controversy as to whether there had been a violation
of one of the riles of employment in the school system#
Section 3 of &ule 4# which is pertinent to the con
troversy here# reads as followss
"Section 3# Beginning principals will be considered
for assignment to teaching principalships. and the
teaching principals with the greatest seniority
will be considered for advancement to supervisory
principàlships# All teaching principals must
indicate their desire and file requests with the
Board to become supervisory principals; however,
if any teaching principal with seniority does not
wish to accept a supervisory principalship, the
principal next in line of seniority will be con
sidered for the position."
The first sentence of the above quoted rule in
stating "Beginning principals will be considered for .
assignment to teaching principalships,#**" clearly
indicates that teachers who are appointed principals must
first start ea teaching principals*

An apprenticeship

as a teaching principal is contemplated before an advance
ment is made to a supervisory principalship* This con
clusion becomes apparent when the second part of the first
sentence of Rule 4 is considered, which reads*

"*##and

the teaching principals with the greatest seniority will
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be considered for advancement to supervisory principalship."
f

*

•>

The word "consider" aa used in the rule might be inter-

preted to mean that teaching principals| together with all
other persons having the necessary qualifications other than
the position of teaching principal will constitute a group
from which the Board has the power to pick a supervisory
principal.

Such an Interpretation would render Section 3

of Rule 4 meaningless and of no effect.

However, if the

word "consider" as used in the rule is limited in meaning
and the Board must pick from the teaching principals the
supervisory principals, then the rule will accomplish its
purpose.
The selection of a supervisory principal from a group
of teaching principal® is analagous to a civil service sy
stem wherein the appointing power may select an employee
from Ê number of names which are certified as eligible by
the civil service commission to an appointing officer in
reference to the making of a,particular appointment*
In State vs* Frear, 146 Wis. 302 , 131 H.W. #32 , it was
held that a Civil Service Lew which provided that upon notice
by an appointing officer of a vacancy, the Civil Service
Commission shall certify three names of eligible persons for
appointment is a valid law*

The court said concerning the

discretionary appointing power that;
"The opinion doubtless also prevailed in the
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Legislature that a selection from three candidates
on the certified eligible list would provide a
sufficient scope for the exercise of a reasonable
discretion by the appointing officer In making
appointments of persons found to be qualified to
perform services under the appointing officer#**
The Board of Trustees has the appointing power#

Section

3 of Rule 4i means that supervisory principals must be
selected from teaching principals#

Thus, Section 3 of Rule

4 regulates the selection of supervisory principals, but

'

does not deprive the trustees of the appointing power#
The second portion of Section 3, Rule 4# provides?
"All teaching principals must indicate their desire end
file request with the Board to become supervisory principals,***
While this provision does not specifically state that
notice must be given to each teaching principal that there
is a vacancy to be filled for a supervisory principalship,
yet, if such notice;!is pot given, then an injustice might
result#

In the absence of a specified form of giving no

tice, a reasonable method which gives adequate time for
preparation would satisfy this requirement#

It is my

opinion that a written notice, or letter, directed to each
of the teaching principals stating that a vacancy is to
be filled in the position of supervisory principal should
be mailed to each teaching principal and such notice should
State the time in which applications should be filed with
the board#

As the board has the power to transfer a super

visory principal from one school to another, it would be
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the better policy first to make any transfer considered
desirable and then state In the notice the school for
which a supervisory principal Is to be appointed.
Under Section 75'*2517t R# 0. ,M$, 1947# It Is provided In
Subsection 4, that a person^ In order to be a principal
or supervisor# must not only be qualified to teach In
such school# but In addition shall have such qualifications
as the State Board of Education may from time to time

prescribe.

The applicant must have a certificate from

the State Board of Education stating that he or she is
qualified before a contract may be entered into with the
Board of Trustees of the school district*
It is therefore my opinionj
1* That the Board of Trustees of School District No*
1 of Silver Bow County In appointing a teacher who Is not
a teaching principal to the position of supervisory prlncl*

pal, violated Section 3 of Rule 4 when there were teaching
principals qualified and willing to accept the position*
2* That it la the duty of the Board of Trustees# when
there is & vacancy In the position of supervisory principal,
to give sufficient notice to all teaching principals of such
vacancy, which notice should request applications to be
filed with the Board on or before a fixed date*
3*

That the Board of Trustees has the power end

authority to transfer supervisory principals from one school
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to 6aoth«r» end eXter such transfer any vacancy in the
ÿposition oX supervisory principal must be filled from the
ranks of the teaching principals#

Very truly yours,

ARNOLD Ht OtSKN
Attorney General
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ATTENDANCg
Opinion 11 • 1947
Held;

A school district may recover under the law the amount

of the cost of educating a child in the elementary school
from the school district of the child’s residence when the
requisite permission for attendance had been given.
A school district is not required to permit the attendance
of a child resident In another district at its elementary
school when the child has not received the requisite per
mission for transfer from the county superintendent of the
county of:the child’s residence.
February 14, 1947
Mr, Herb W. Conrad, Jr*
County Attorney
Pondera County
Conrad, Montana
Dear Mr, Conrad;
You have requested my opinion concerning the following;
Prior to the school year of ■s1945-1946 and within the
time required by law the Board of Trustees of School District
No, 19 in Pondera County gave its written permission for five
elementary school children residing in School District No, 26
of Teton County to attend school in School District No, 19 of
Pondera County, Montana,

The superintendent of schools of

Teton County gave her consent to the attendance of said childri
at School District No. 19. The budget for School District No,
-105-»
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26 of Teton County included an item for the transfer of funds
to pay the educational costs of the school in Pondera County
for five childrenI but the county superintendent in Teton
County did not notify the treasurer and request a transfer
of the funds#

tou ask if the Pondera County School District

may recover the amount due for the attendance of these chil
dren at the Pondera County School.
You also advise there are children from Teton County
who are attending school in Pondera County> but the super
intendent of schools of Teton County refused to grrnt per
mission for such attendance and the school district in
Teton County refuses to pay the costs for such attendance.
Your questions corac within the provisions of Chapter
203, Laws of 1943, which provides in parti
"Children may attend public elementary schools.•#
when in a district in an adjoining county ivritten
permission is secured from the Board of Trustees
of the district in which they are to attend school
and when written permission has been given by the
county superintendent of schools of the County in
which the children reside."
The proper written permissions were given for the
attendance of the five children in the school year 1945-1946
and the liability of the district of the residence is apparent
from the following quoted portion of Chapter 203î
"When approval of attendance in another district
within or without the county has been granted,
the district in which such cl.ild resides shall ppy
to the school district where such child attends,
the actual cost of educating a child in the school
attended
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While Chapter 203 makes it«the duty of the county
superintendent of the county of the child*s residence to
notify the treasurer the child is attending school in another
district, yet the failure to notify will not relieve the
school district of the child’s residence of the liability.
The liability becomes fixed upon the requisite permission
being granted by the county superintendent of the county
of the child’s residence and also of the board of trustees
of the district educating the child*

It is to be noted

the board of trustees of the school district in which the
child resides is not required nor has it the authority to
grant or deny permission for the attendance of a child in
another district.
Section 1022, R. G* M., 1935, provides a school district
"may sue arid be sued."
It is, therefore my opinion a school district may
recover under the law the amount of the cost of educating
a child in the elementary school from the school district of
the child’s residence when the requisite permission for atten
dance had been given.
Under the facts given in your second question, the
county superintendent of the county of the child’s residence
did not give permission for attendance in the elementary
school located in your county#

Such permission is a condi

tion precedent to the liability rnd also to attendance under
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Chapter 203 *
Under certain conditions enumerated in Chapter 203,
”pemission must be granted for such attendance in another
district.” It is the duty of both the county superintendent
of"' the county of the child’s residence and the board of .
I

trustees of the school to be attended to gr^^nt permission
for attendance in another district when such conditions are
met and an appeal may be trken to the state superintendent
of public instruction to remedy any unwsrrrnted refusal to
grrnt permission*
It is, therefore, my opinion a school district Is not
required to permit the attendance of a child resident in
another district at its elementary school when the child has
not received the requisite permission for transfer from the
county superintendent of the county of the child’s residence*

Sincerely yours,
R. V. BUTTU4LI
Attorney General
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Opinion 73 - 1947
Held;

'

%

A ffamily which moves from^one county to another county

which change of habitation is the ssme ranch, results in the
family becoming residents of the letter county end the
children should be included in the latter county*
Octbber 31, 1947
Mr* Chester S* Onstad
County Attorney
Powder River County
Broadus, Montana
I
Deer Mr,'Onstadt
You ihave requested my opinion concerning the residence
I
of a family which lives on a ranch located in both Powder
River County and Rosebud County,

You state that the family

resided on that portion of the ranch which is in Powder
River County for a period of ten years, but in December,
1945, they constructed a #10,000,00 house on the ranch
property in Rosebud County, and have, since December 1945,
lived in the house the"major part of each year*

You also

state that the family never intended to change residence
to Rosebud County and the parents consider their residence
to be in Powder River County,
You have also asked in which county the children should
be considered residents for school census purposes.
Section 33, R. C, M,, 1935, states rules for determining
residence.

Rule one defines residence as follows;

"It is the place where one remains when not called
elsewhere for labor or other special or temporary
purpose and to which he returns in seasons of repose,"
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If the pbove quoted rule were alone the test, then
under the facta given habitation in the new 'home would make
Rosebud County the residence*
Section 33 states,

However, sub-section 7 of

“The residence c m be changed only by

the. Hijinion act ('ud intent.*

Prom the facts you give, it

affirmatively appears that there is no intent to change the
residence from Powder River County to Rosebud County.

V/hile

this intent must be given great weight, yet in 17 /m, Jur.
605 , the text states, “A raanfe home is where

not where he would like to have lt.“

he makes it

I

The determination o f the residence of a family is not
*
a question of law alone, but is in great measure a question
of fact*

Our Supreme Court, in Sommers v* Gould, 53 Mont*

53&, 165 Pac# 5991 recognized that rules for detennining
residence must be of necessity mere guides and rules of
assistance.

There might well be other facts which will alter

the conclusion reached.
In the c^se State ex rel. Duckworth v. District Court,
107 Mont. 97# BO Pac. (2d) 367 # the Court recognizes the

importance of habitation in fixing the domicile and said:
“That place is the domicile of s person in which he
has voluntarily fixed his habitation, not for a mere
temporary or special purpose, but with a present
intention of making it his home unless and until
something, which is uncertain and unexpected, shall
happen to induce him to adopt some other permanent
home."
Also, Subsection 9 of Section 574, R* C. M., 1935# in
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relation to residence for the purpose of voting, statesî
”A change of residence can only be made by the act
of removal joined with the intent to remain in
another piece. There can only be one residence*
A residence cannot be lost until another is gained.”
The application of the above to the facts submitted
results in the conclusion that Rosebud County is now the
residence of the family.

The construction of the new house

and the habitation within the house constitutes the act of
removal joined with the intent to remain sufficient to be a
change in residence.
The holding in Opinion 510, Volume 15* Report and Official
Opinions of the Attorney General, is contrary to the views
herein stated in th^t the intent for the purpose of resi
dence in thzt opinion apperrs to be divorced from the acts
of the parties*

The acquisition of a permrnent place of

abode establishes an Intent superior to the intent expressed,
which amounts to a mere desire to retain a former residence
from which the person has removed permanently*

To the above

extent, the former opinion is hereby expressly overruled.
The residence of minor children is that of the parents
and this is true under both Section 33* R. C# M., 1935* ®nd
Section 1051, R. C* M., 1935* which latter section defines
the manner of making the school census.
It is, therefore, my opinion under the facts given,
that a family which moves from Powder River County to
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Rosebud County, which ckenge of hebltstlon Is on the spme
ranch, results In the family becoming residents of Rosebud
County end the children should be included in the census of
the school district in Rosebud County*

Sincerely yours

R. V* BOTTOiay
Attorney General
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Opinion 135 * 1950
HeldI 1#
a School Bosrd closes a school In a school
’ district the Dosrd l3 not required to furnish actual trans
portation by bus or rail, but rather maÿ pry to the prrent
or guardian the cost of transportation in accordance with
the schedule of payments provided by law,
2.

Sections 75-2901 end 75-2906, R, C. M., 1947,

provide a procedure for compelling a parent to send
children within the school age to school,
November 24th, 1950
Mr, Roy W, Holmes
Bounty Attorney
Carter County
Ekalaka, Montana
Derr Mr. Holmesj
You hrve requested my opinion on the following questions
on behalf of the County Superintendent of Schools of your
County*
1* May the Board of Trustees of a school district close
a school in a district and merely pay the parents of pupils
for transporting the pupils to another school, or must the
trustees furnish actual transportation by bus or other
vehicle?
2.

How may a parent who refuses to send his children to

school be forced to do so?
. . Section 75-3404 , R. C* M., 1947, was originally enacted
as Section 4, Chapter 152, Session Laws of 1941, and provides
in part as follows %
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"the Bosrd of Trustees shell have the power to
close any elementary school within the district,
and transport the pupils to another school or
schools within th?t district, when the Board
deems such act to be for the best interests of
all the pupils attending school..
It is clemr that the Board of Trustees may close a
school in a district and the question then arises es to
what is meant by the word "transport" in the above section.
Section 75-3402, S* 0. M., 1947» which was enacted as
Section 2, Chapter 152, Session Laws of 1941» defines what
is meant by the term "transportation" as that term is used
in Chapter 152 of the Laws of 1941*

This section providess

"Unless a different meaning is plainly required,by
the context, ♦transportation* shall, in this act,
mean (1) the actual transporting of pupils who
live three (3) or more miles distant from a public
school, by bus, rail or otherwise; (2) the pro
viding of any services whereby the school board is
relieved of actually transporting such pupils,
such as paying parent or guardian for transpor
tation, paying rent or board or any part thereof
and providing supervised correspondence study or
supervised home study."
The context of Section 75-3404» supra, clearly indicates
that the wcrd "transport" as used therein is defined by
Section 75-3402, supra.

Therefore, it is my opinion that

if the Board of Trustees of a school district closes a
school it may pay the parent or guardian in accordance with
the schedule set forth in Section 75-3407» R# G. M*, 1947»
as amended by Chapter 200, Session Lews of 1949, and need
not provide actual transportation by bus, rail, or otherwise.
The purpose of giving the term"transportation"a dual meaning
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In Chapter 152> Session Laws of 1941, was to allow a School
Board to exercise its discretion and provide for payment to
parents for transportation when circumstances were not such
as to warrant the supplying of actual transportation facili
ties by the school district*
Section 75*2901 to 75-2906> inclusive,make it compulsory
that children between the ages of eight and sixteen years
of age be sent to a school in which the basic language
taught is English*

Section 75-2901, as amended by Chapter

61, Session Laws of 1949, provides in part as follows ;
"*..Any parent, guardian or other person having the
care end custody of a child between the ages of
eight (Ô) and sixteen (16) years, who shall fail to
comply with the provisions of the section, shall be
deemed guilty of a misdemeanor, and upon conviction
thereof shall be fined not less th^n five dollrrs
(^5«00) nor more than twenty dollars ($20.00)."
Thus a parent who refuses to send hia child to school
may be found guilty of committing a misdemeanor, and subject
to fine*
However, I believe that Section 75-2905, R* C, M., 1947,
which provides an alternate procedure in lieu of a fine is
perhaps a more effective procedure to compel a parent to send
his child to school.

This section provides that the truant

officer may notify the parent in writing of the nonattendance
of his child end of the consequences of continued nonattendance,
and

require the parent to cause the child to attend school

within two days from the date of the notice.

The statute then
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provides as follows:
"Upon, failure to do so, the truant officer shall
make complaint against the parent, guardian, or
other person in charge of the child, in any court
of competent Jurisdiction in the district in which
the offense occurs for such failure, and upon such
conviction, the parent, gu^rdlan or other person in
charge sh^ll be fined not less th.^n five dollars nor
more than twenty dollars; or the court may, in its
discretion, require the person so convicted to
give bond in the penal sum of one hundred doliars,
with sureties, to the approval of the court, con
ditioned that he or she will cause the child under
his or her charge to attend some recognized school
within two days thereafter, and to remain at such
school during the term prescribed by law; and upon
failure or refusal ©f any parent, guardian, or
other person to pay said fine end costs, or furnish
said bond, according to the order of the courtthen said parent, guardian or other person shall
be imprisoned in the County jail not less than
ten days nor more than thirty days*"
Thus, through the institution of court proceedings
may the County Superintendent coerce parents into sending
their children to school, providing that the children are
within the school age*
Vexy truly yours,

ARHULD H , OLSiiU,

Attorney General

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

Opinion 64 • 1952
Held;

That the residence of sn elementary school pupil for

purposes of payment of tuition and of transportation shall
be that place where the pupil resides with his family for
at least eighty days during thé calendar year, when school
is not in session.
*

February Ô, 1952

Miss Mary M, Condon
Superintendent of Public Instruction
State Capitol Building
Helena, Montana
Dear Miss Condon;
You have requested my opinion concerning the applicable
statute for determining the residence of pupils for the payment,
by school districts, of tuition and transportation.
Section 75-1630, Revised Codes of Montana, 1947, as amended
by Chapter 207, Laws of 1951, authorizes the attendance of
pupils of the elementary schools in districts other than that
of residence and states;
’*Por the purpose of determining the residence of
such child the place where the father resides and
earns the major portion of the living for his
family, shall be used.”
This quoted portion of Section 75-1630 was first made a
part of the section byiChapter 203, Laws of 1943# and the 1951
I

amendment to the sectibn did not alter this portion of the
statute.

j

f
i

Section 75-3405 ,

C. M., 1947, was amended by Chapter
\

IS9 , Laws of 1951 , and the new matter added to the section
Î
included;
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"For thé purposes of this fct (transportation
statute) end also for the purposes of paying
tuition, residence shall be defined as that
plrce where the spplicant resides with his
family for at least eighty (80) days during
the calendar year# when school is not in
session#"
It is apparent th t the l^st definition of residence
for elementary school pupils was given to us by the amend
ment above quoted to Section 75-340$, R# G# M#, 1947#
While the* 1951 legislature amended both sections, yet
no change was mrde in Section 75-1630, pertaining to
residence and this definition must be considered as having
been enacted in 1943#

Recognition of such a construction

is found In State ex rel# Henderson v* Dawson County, 87 ,
Mont. 122, 286 Pac. 126$, where it was said:
"'yChere a section or a
is amended, it is not
and re-enacted in its
which are not altered
been the law from the

part of a section of a lew
to be considered as repealed
amended form, but the portions
are to be considered as having
time they were enacted."

A rule thrt is also helpful in construing these con
flicting statutory provisions, is found in Nichols v.
School District No# 3, 87 Mont. 181, 28? Pac. 624, in which
case the court stated:
"In the construction of an amendatory Act it will
be presumed that the legislature, in adopting it,
Intended to make some change in the existing law...
and the court will endeavor to give some effect to
the amendment."
In view of the fact that the legislature, by its amend
ment to Section 75-340$ gave a new rule for the determination
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of a child’s residence and the new rule is inconsistent
with the rule which bed been the law for years before, it
must be held that the latest definition in time controls,
and the prior rule was repealed by implication*
It is therefore my opinion that the residence of sn
elementary school pupil for the purposes of payment of
tuition snd of transportation shall be that place where the
pupil resides with his family for at least eighty days
during the calendar year, when school is not in session

Very truly yours,

ARNOLD H. OLS^N
Attorney General
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Opinion 65 - 1952
Held* 1# The trustees of a school district have the power
to enter into a contract with the psrents of non resident
students for the payment of tuition*
2» It!is the duty of the trustees of a school district
to budget for and pay tuition for resident children who
attend elementary school in another district if the county
superintendent and the trustees of the school district of
the school to be attended consent in writing to such atten
dance*
February 9, 1952
Mr* John M* McCarvel
County Attorney
Deer Lodge County
AnacondaI Montana
Dear Mr* McCarvel* '
You have requested my opinion concerning the validity
of a contract between a school district and the parents of
school children*

You advise me that the children attend

elementary school in a district where they do not reside*
and the contract was entered into between the district and
the parents for the payment of tuition by the parents for
the children#

You also state the trustees of the district
i

of the residence df the children have refused permission*
Section 75-I63O, R# C* M*, 1947»

amended by Chapter

267 , Laws of 1951 » provides for the transfer of funds between

school districts for the payment of tuition of transfer
elementary children*

This section provides in part:
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.121“Children may attend public elementary schools In
districts in the county outside of the district
in which they reside,#*,,when written permission
is secured from the board of trustees of the
district in which they ere to attend school and
when written peraission has been given by the
county superintendent of schools of the county
in which the children reside#
"#ien approval of attendance in another district
within or without the county has been granted,
the district in which such child resides shall
pay to the school district where such child
attends, an amount based on the following tui
tion rates,*##“
From the above quoted It Is apparent that the consent
of the trustees of the district of residence Is not a pre
requisite for the attendance of the children In another
district#
Under the facts submitted the consent for attendance
was secured from the trustees of the district operating the
school to be attended and of the county superintendent and
therefore it is the oblig?»tion of the district of residence
to pay the amount of tuition as fixed in the schedule set
out in Section 75-1630, as amended#

A similar conclusion

was reached in the case of McOlerkin v. San Mateo School
District# 4 Cel* (2d) 363, 49 Pac. (2d) S30 , 102 A.L.R.
If the county superintendent had not consented in
writing to the attendance, the trustees of the district where
the children wished to attend elementary school could enter
into a contract for tuition, as Section 75-1632, R# C, M.,
1947 , 03 amended by Chapter 207> Laws of 1951, grants the

power to a board of trustees:
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"To deténain© the rate of tuition of non-resident
pupils according to the provisions of Section 751630 I Ré G* Mé , 1947 * ©s amended."
That a school district may charge tuition for non
resident pupils ©nd exclude ,,them for non-payment was
recoj^iisod in Peterson v. School Board, 73 Mont. 442, 236
Pac. 670#
While the trustees of a school district have the authority
to charge tuition for non-resident elementary pupils attending
their district, yet under the facts you submitted the require
ments of Section 75-1630, R, C* M., 1947, ©s amended, have
been satisfied*

It is the obligation of the district of

the residence of the pupils to pay the tuition and the parents
should be relieved of this obligation.
It is therefore, my opinionî
1* The trustees of a school district have the power to
enter into a contract with the parents of non-resident stu
dents for the payment of tuition.
2.

It is the duty of the trustees of a school district

to budget for end pay tuition for resident children who attend
elementary school in another district if the county superin
tendent end the trustees of the school district of the school
to be attended consent in writing to such attendance.
Very truly yours,
ARNOLD H. OLSEN
Attorney General
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The following official opinions of the attorney general
can be found in Volume 22 of the Report end Official Opinions
of the Attorney General»
Opinion 11 - 1947
Opinion 73
1947
The following official opinion of the attorney general
can be found in Volume 23 of the Report and Official Opinions
of the Attorney General.
Opinion 135 - 1950
The following official opinions of the attorney general
can be found in Volume 24 of the Report and Official Opinions
of the Attorney General. (To be published)
Opinion 64 - 1952
Opinion 65 - 1952
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V
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HIGH SCHOOL DISTRICTS
Opinion 135 - 1946
Held I A high school district which was heretofore created
under the provisions of Sections 1301.1 to 1301*6, R. C* M.,
1935f as amended* has the power and authority to issue bonds
for construction purposes*
March 16* 1946
Mr. D* W* Doyle
County Attorney
Pondera County
Conrad, Montana
Dear Mr* Doyle;
You have requested my opinion concerning the following
facts ;
Pondera County has been divided into high school districts
under the provisions of Section 1301*1 to 1301.6, R* C. M.,
19351 as amended;

School District Ho* 10, previous to the

decision maintained a district high school and the high
school district of which district Ho. 10 is a part proposes
to issue bonds. “
In your request for an opinion you called attention to
Opinion No. 6, Volume 21, Report and Official Opinions of the
Attorney General, which held that Section 1301.1 to 1301.6,
R. C. M., 1935, were enacted as Chapter 47 of Sx. Laws of
1933 , end that the act was passed as an emergency measure.

The facts under consideration in the above opinion differ
i

■

124*»

«•
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•125from those presented here in thf*t It wss there proposed to
'a
create high school districts# Tour county has already been
divided into high school districts and the districts once
created continue to exist under the statute with the powers
granted to them at the time of their creation.
Chapter 47 was enacted for the purpose of siding a
building program and to take advantage of federal aid.
The districts crerted were given the power to incur indebted-*
ness and there was no limit to the time for the exercise of
this power.

Indebtedness by the issuance of bonds may still

be incurred by the district.
It is therefore, my opinion that a high school district
which was heretofore created under the provisions of Sections
1301,1 to 1301,6 , R, C, M,, 1935, as emended, has the power

and authority to issue bonds for construction purposes.
Sincerely yours,
H. Y, BOTTUÏ'ÎLÏ
Attomey General
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Opinion 157 - 1946
Held: ^ corarson school district’s proportionate shere of a
high school building district’s indebtedness must be included
in the computation of the limit of indebtedness of the common
school district.
May 16, 1946
Mr. D. W* Doyle
County Attorney
Pondera County
Conrad, Montana
Dear Mr* Doyle*
You hove requested my opinion whether a comion school
district which is included in a high school district created
under Sections 1301.1 to 1301.6, R. C. M., 1933, will be
limited in incurring indebtedness by its proportionate share
of the indebtedness of the high school district.
Section 6 of Article XIII of the Montana Constitution,
and Section 1224*2, R. U. M., 1935, limit the indebtedness
of a school district to three per cent of the value of the
taxable property therein*

However, it is arguable that the

indebtedness of the high school district is not that of the
component common school districts that they are separate legal
entities.

However, in Pierson v* Hendrickson, 9^ Mont, 244, 3&

Pec. (2d) 991, our court recognized that common school districts
were consolidated for a limited purpose and then considered
the precise problem presented by your question without de
ciding the point.

Thei court said:
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**It 1» next contended that Uh«*pter 47 la In
conflict with section 6, Article IIll, of the
Constitution> which limits the indebtedness of
c school district to three per cent of the
value of the taxable property therein, boo#use of
the possibility of Incltrdinj» In the now district
» comaon school district sire* dy indebted to
such m extent that Its proj^rtlon of the pro
posed bond issue, fdded to Its existing indebted
ness, would exceed the constititionml limit#
The record discloses without controversy that,
if the indebtedness proposed by the bond issio
involved here were divided betwcim the various
oomKion schoul districts composing the new dis
trict in proportion to the essessed v lue of the
property la such districts and Added to the
existing lndebt«dné?in of ench of such com'^on
districts respectively, the Indebtcdnfss of e%ch
would still be les* than three per cent of the
esaesscd v^lue of its taxable property* "ssuming,
without deciding, that, in dctenaining whether
nny commn school district W d exceeded Its constltvtloncl limit of indebtedness, the indebted
ness of the proposed bond Isoue must be allocated
in th* manner above stated, it follws th* t plain
tiff and no other individual taxpayer of «ry of
the common school districts here involved and
none of the common school districts themselves
c m reis* the question here attempted to be
raised, for, #s to them, th® ret is not open to
this objection* Only those adversely effected
,by an unconstitutional *ct c m question its
Vflidity##*^

Th* reseoa for Section 6 of Article Kill of our Con
stitution was expressed in Butler v* fndrus, 35 Mont* 575,
90 fee* 7^5, where th* court said:
*£x4>©rienco has demonstrated tbrt those who con
trol mmicipAl govemiaonts era not fXw*'ys honest,
discreet, end conservative citizens, m d that
when there is no restraint upon their .power to
contract indebtedness, extravagant courses fre
quently result la imposing intoler? ble birdens
of ti»x?tloa upon the people of their at.nlcipAlitles*”
The purpose of the section of the Constiti, tloa is to
limit the burden of tax»»tlon, and to penalt the high school
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district bonded Indebtedness to be excluded from the
computation of the indebtedness of the common school
districts would violate the spirit of the constitutionnl
prohibition*

It is therefore my opinion that e common school
district’s proportionate share of a high school building
district’s indebtedness must be included in the computa
tion of the limit of indebtedness of the ccanmon school
district.
Sincerely yours,

R, V. BoTTOMlY,
Attorney General

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

-129-

Opinion 175 - 1946
Held % High school students who attend high school outside
of the county of their residence and who reside closer to
a high school in the county of their residence than the one
attended are not entitled as a matter of right to permission
for transfer and resulting payment of such funds although
the same students may be entitled to transportation,
June 27, 1946
I'lr, Chester E, Onstad
County Attorney
Powder River County
Broadus, Montana
Dear Mr* Onstad:

I

ÏOU have requested my opinion asking if funds must not

be transferred by a school district for students who attend
high school in a county adjoining thrt of their residence
when they reside closer to a high school in the county of
their residence than a high school in an adjoining county*
Your question is answered by the provisions of Section
1262,81 , Revised Codes of Montana, 1935, as amended by

Chapter 217, Laws of 1939, and Chapter 219, Laws of 1943,
*

1

1

which section providesith^t the transfer of students:
”,,,must be authorized by the county superin
tendent of schools of the county of his residence
when a pupil lives more thm three (3) miles
from the nearest high school in the county of his
residence and more than one rnd one-half (1 1/2)
miles from an established bus route operated by such
high school, and closer to a high.schoûl of
adloining county th-n to any high school located
in une county of his resldmicep and when proper
application has been made to the county super
intendent of schbols, not Irter than October 15th,
by the parent or guardian of the pupil for who such
transfer is desired (Emphasis mine,)
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The emphasized portion of the Above quoted section
indicates that it is not mandatory for the County superin
tendent of Schools to authorize the transfer unless there
is a high school In the adjoining county closer to the
student*3 residence than in the county of residence.
Section 9 of Chapter 152, Laws of 1941, as amended by
Chapter 116, Lews of 1945, states the rules for eligibility
for transportation and contains similar distance require
ments for transportation to those above quoted, but does
not have the prohibition that if a high school in the
county of residence Is closer than the one in the adjoining
county, it is not mandatory to furnish transportation*
It is therefore ray opinion that high school students
who attend high school outside of the county of their
residence and who reside closer to a high school in the
county of their residence than the one attended arenot
entitled as a matter of right to permission for transfer
end resulting payment of such funds although the same
students may be entitled to transportation.
Sincerely yours,
R. y* düîïu-iLï
Attorney General

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

Opinion XX5 - X94Ô
Held;

The commission which divides th© county into high

school building districts under the provisions of Chapter
I

275 * Laws of 1947; must divide the whdb county without

omitting any portion and may create high school building
districts which, at the timeof the division, do not have
high schools»
April 27 , 1948
Mr» Denzil R. Young
County Attorney
Fallon County
Baker, Montana
Dear Air. Young,
You have requested my opinion as to whether a portion
of the county may be left out of the division of the county
into high school building districts by the commission which
proceeds under the provisions of Chapter 275, Laws of 1947.
You advise me that the citizens in a part of your county
object to the inclusion of the area in which they live in
either of two proposed high school building districts, as
the citizens contemplate the re-establishment of a high
school in that area»
Section 2 of Chapter 275, Laws of 1947, states in part;
«In all counties having a high school, or high schools,
a commission consisting of the county commissioners
end the county superintendent of schools shall at
the request of any high school board of trustees
in the county,!divide the county into high school
districts for the purpose of this act, after
hearing»”
It is to be noted that the above quoted provides that

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

-132-

the commission shall "divide the county into high school
districts," snd the use of such phrase means the whole
county without omission must be divided.

To permit a

portion of the county to be left out of the division would
lead to abuses end in many instances, unfair taxation.
^11 of the provisions of Chapter 275 give the commission
broad powers and while the initial step for the division
of the county is instituted by the trustees of a high
school within the county, yet there is no requirement
that all of the districts created by the commission have a
high school in existence at the time of the division.
In your letter you state that e high school wrar in
existence in the area from which protests arise and that
the electors in such portion of your county desire that
their community be designated as a high school district
with the view thrt a high school will be established#

As

was observed in fierson v. Hendrickson, 9^ Mont. 244* 3&
Pac# (2d) 991» the purpose of the school building district
law is to permit consolidation of common school districts
for construction purposes.

Section 5 of Chapter 275 states

specifically th^t one of the purposes of the ret is to permit
construction of high schools*

The creation of ^ high school

building district which does not have a high school in
existence et the present time would encourage the establish
ment of B high school in th^t the construction .would be'
made easier#

In fact it appears that a liberal interpretation
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of this law would encourage the improvement of our school
system*
The previously quoted portion of Section 2 of Chapter
275 , indicates the legislative intent that an existing high

school is not necessary for each high school district*

The

section reads, in part, that *In all counties having a high
school,,*a commission*,*shall,,,divide the county into high
school district*,,” In other words, the language used
contemplates that counties having only one high school shall
be divided, If the proper request is made, end the fact
that there is only one high school would not preclude such
division.
In determining the boundaries of a high school building
district, since the entire county is being divided, a
district may be created wherein no high school at present
exists, and no immediate plans to build have been formu
lated, but which building district is to be utilized when
conditions warrant a building program.
The prohibition found in Section 1022, Revised Codes of
Montana, 1935, against the creation of school districts
between March and July applies to the districts authorized
by Chapter 275,
The legislature has given us this law and it Is
mandatory on the part of the commission.

The law as it

stands may not be desirable, but the relief is to apply
to the legislature to emend or repeal.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

-134*

It la therefore, ay opinion thft the coTOiilsalon which
divides the county Into high school building districts
under the provisions of Chapter 275i Lsws of 1947» must
divide the whole county without omitting any portion and
may create high school building districts which, at the
time of the division, do not have high schools*
«

Sincerely yours,

R* V. BUTTÙÜLÏ
Attorney General
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Opinion 29 - 1949

Held:

The boioidsries of a high school building district ere

not altered hy the merger of two common school districts end
the boundaries of an established high school building district
can be altered only in the manner provided in Section 1,
Chapter I3 O, Laws of 1949#
June 27 , 1949
l-îr» Charles L* O’Donnell
County Attorney
Chinooki Montana
*

,

1

Dear Mr# O’Donnell:
You have requested my opinion concerning the boundaries
of high school building districts within your County.

You

advise me that several common school districts were consoli
dated subsequent to the division of your County into high
school building districts with the result th-1 the two
common districts are in two high school building districts#
As your County was divided into high school building
districts by an order of the commission made on the l8th
day of JulyI 193&» the statutes which were applicable at that
time were Section I3OI.I to 1301.6, Revised Codes of Montana,
1933 , as amended by Ch'pter 16, Laws of 1937#

Section 1301.2

as amended, provided in p'rt;
"No common school districts shall be divided for the
purposes of this act but must be made a part of a
high school, district in its entirety."
The above quoted prohibition of the statute was not
violated at the time of the creation of the high school
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building districts*

The subsequent consolidation of two

A

common school districts or the annexction of one common
school district to another might well result in one common
school district being located in two high school building
districts.

Chapter 275, Lows of 1947, by providing that

common school districts shall hot be divided, does not pre
clude the subsequent merger of districts and the chapter
does not provide for the change of the boundaries of the
high school building district once it is established*
In McrJair v. School District No# 1, 87 Mont. 423, 288
Pac* 188, our court held that the Bo rd of Trustees of a
school district may exercise only those powers expressly
conferred upon them by statute and such as fre necessarily
implied.

The court said:

"The statute gr'nting e power must be regarded both
eg a gr^nt and a limitation upon the powers of the Board."
The quoted rule applies with equal force to the com
mission which acts under the provisions of Chapter 275, Laws
of 1947*

No provision was made for the redivision of a

county end the eltorrtlon of high school district boundaries
until the en-ctment of Chapter 130, Laws of 1949, which author
izes the commission to meet in accordance with the procedure
found in Chapter 275 end alter the boundaries previously
established*
It is thus apparent from this legislative history th;t the
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boundaries of high school districts, once hrving been estab
lished, c m be altered only by the commission acting under
Chapter 130 , Laws of 1949, and that the merger of common
school districts will not result in a change in the .boundaries
of established high school building districts*
In your letter you call attention to Section 3, Chapter
11

130 , Laws of 1949; which provides thPt the trustees of a

school district within which a high school is located may call
a meeting composed of the Board of Trustees of the high school
district and the chairmen of the boards of all common school

.

districts included within the high school district for the
purpose of considering the calling of an election to vote upon
the question of an extra levy for the maintenance and opera
tion of the high school*

It would appear that the chairman

of a common school district, located In two high school build
ing districts, might be asked to attend two such meetings.
Such a situation would not invalidate either of the elections
and there Is nothing to prevent a chairmen of such district
from acting in two of such meetings on the extra levy problem
aa he would represent an area affected by each of the two
meetings.
The preparation of an assessment roll for a high school
district which shares a common school district with another
high school building district will be complicated and require
additional work on the part of the assessor*

However, it will
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be necessary to prepare such an assessment roll so that a
proper computation can be made for the purpose of voting on
the question of an extra levy as the records on hnnd would
not give this information, also the valuation of the high
school district must be ascertained for the determination
of the levies on the area end the assessment roll will give
the valuation.
It is therefore, my opinion that the boundaries of a
high school büiidiag district are not altered by the merger
of two common school districts and that the boundaries of
A
an estcbliched high school building district can be altered
only in the manner provided in Section 1, Chapter 130, Laws
of 1949.
Very truly yours.

ARNOLD H. OLSON
Attorney General
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Opinion 34 ~ 1949
Held I 1, Coiinty High Schools come imder the provisions of
?

Section % 0Î Chapter 130j Laws of 1949» providing for
special tax levies for high school purposes.
July 8th, 1949

'
Mr, Robert F, Swanberg
County Attorney
Missoula, Montana
Dear Mr. Swanberg J

You have requested my opinion concerning the manner
of holding an election for an extra levy for the maintenance
and operation of a County high school*
In considering your problem it is important to note
the statutory background for such a levy,

hrior to 1947

no provision was made by the Legislature for an extra
levy, for County high schools, although trustees of
- district high schools could under Section 1263,5, Revised
' ‘Codes of Montana, 1935,

amended, call an election In the

district for such an extra levy.

However, in 1947, the

Legislature enacted Chapter 274, Laws of 1947, which
authorized a special election for an extra levy for County
high schools for the following two school years. Chapter
274, by the specific language contained in Section 4 of
the act would not apply to budgets for school years sub
sequent to June 30, 1949• The result is that an extra
levy for the maintenance of county high schools must be
found in subsequent legislation if there is to be such a
tax.

Section 3, Chapter 130, Laws of 1949, reads as follows ;
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"Whenever the Board of Trustees of the local school
district within which the high school is situated
shall deem it necessary to raise money for high
school purposes in addition to its revenues from
County and State apportionments| s meeting of the
Board of Trustees of the high school district
together with the chairmen of the Boards of Trustees
of all common school districts included within
the high school districts shall be called end held
to consider the calling of an election to vote
upon the question of approving a special levy for
high school purposes. Provided* that any other
member designated by the Board of Trustees of any
such common school district may represent such
district in place of the chairman thereof. If a
majority of the Board of Trustees of the high
school district and the designated representatives
of said common school districts attending such
meeting shall determine that the proposed expendi
tures are necessary for the proper maintenance and
operation of such high school* said trustees of
the high school district shall ascertain and
determine the number of mills required to be
raised by special levy* and shall call an election
for the purpose of submitting the question of
making such additional levy to the qualified
electors who are taxpayers upon property within
the high school district, and if approved by a
majority vote of all the taxpayers voting at
such election, the result of said election shall
be certified to the Board of County Commissioners
end the levy approved by such majority vote shall
be made upon all property within said high school
district."
The first sentence of the above quoted, seemingly
limits the extra levy to district high schools situated in
high school building districts, but such a limited inter
pretation would preclude County High Schools and it was
such County high schools the Legislature had in mind in
enacting Chapter 274* Laws of 1947*

district high

schools have always had available rn extra levy as
authorized by Section 1263*5* Revised Codes of Montana,
as amended*

To construe Section 3 of Chapter 130, Laws
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of 1949» as limited to district high schools located in
high school building districts would constitute a complete
reversal of Legislative intent as previously evidenced
by the enactment of Chapter 274, Laws of 1947#

It is in

reality the County high schools which hrve needed appro
priate legislation for calling an election to authorize
an extra levy, and it is reasonable to hold that the author
ity is to be found in Chapter 130, Laws of 1949, The
latter portion of Section 3 , Chapter 130, which states,
"If a majority of the Board of Trustees of the high school
district and the designated representatives of said common
school districts,,.shall determine that the proposed ex
penditures are necessa%y.,#said trustees of the high school
district shall ascertain the number of mills required,,.
and shall call an election,*," is broad enough in the
language used to cover County high schools as well as
district high schools,
A rule of construction that is helpful in arriving in
the meaning of Section 3» Chapter 130, is found in the case
of:

In re Wilson’s Estate, 102 Mont, 17&» $6 Pec. (2d) 733:
"The intention of the lawmaker is to be deducted
from a view of every m terlal p^rt of the statute."
/pplicrtion of this rule to the statute under considera

tion must logically le^d to the conclusion th't trustees of
a high school, whether it be a County or e District high
located within a high school building district shall have
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the right to call 9 special election in the manner provided
by law for an extra levy for support and maintenance of the
high school*
It is therefore, my opinion that an election mry be
called for the purpose of submitting the question of an
extra levy for the support and maintenance of a County
high school located within a high school building district
under the provisions of Section 3# Chapter 130, Laws of
1949.

Very truly yours,

ARNOLD H. OLSEN
Attorney General
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Opinion 37 - 1949
Held:

Chapter 273, Montana Session Laws of 1947, which

provides for creation of High School Districts is mandatory in
terms and leaves no discretion in the Commission, consisting
of the Board of County Commissioners and the County Super
intendent of Schools, as to the creation of such Districts*
The Districts must be established if requested by a High
School Board of Trustees in the County*
July 21st, 1949
Mr* John J* Cavan .
County Attorney
Wheatland County
Harlowton, Montana
Dear Î-Ir* Cavan:
You have requested ray opinion upon the following
question:
”lnder Chapter 275, Montana Session Laws of 1947,
providing for the establishment of High School
Districts, may the Commission consisting of the
Board of County Comffdssioners and the County
Superintendent of Schools exercise discretion
as to the creation of such High School Districts?"
Chapter 275, Montana Session Laws of 1947, repealed
Sections 1301*1 to 1301*6, Revised Codes of Montana, 1935,
as amended, and contains the present law as to the creation
;

of High School ^Districts, Section 2 of Chapter 275 re^ds
in part fs follows;
"In all counties h ving a high school, or high
schools, a Commission consisting of the County
Commissioners and the County Süpèrihtéhdeht"6f
t>cnooIs”shf'li Ft the request^ of any High ochôdl
Bor rd of Trustees in the County , divide thd
County into High :'">chool Districts for tne pur
pose of this /ct, after heyrXn^ That the
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Commission, shall fix the time, date and place,
end at such time, date and place hold a public
Kearing of the requested division of the County
into High School Districts, at which hearing
any Interested person may rppear and be heard
concerning the requested 'divislon*«*{Emphasis mine.)
If the above quoted Section is held to be mandatory
in its terms then the Board of County Commissioners and the
County Superintendent of Schools cannot exercise any dis
cretion as to the creation of the High School Districts.
The wording of the statute is that the Coimnission "shall”
divide the County into High School Districts at the re
quest of any high school board of trustees.
The question as to how the courts will interpret the
word "shall" in a statute has arisen many times in the past.
The general rule is stated in 50 /m, Jur», Statutes, Section
2Ô, p. 49-50, 83 follows:
"The intention of the Legislature as to the man
datory or directozy nature of a particular
statutory provision is determined primarily from
the language thereof. Words or phrases which are
generally regarded as making a provision mandatory,
include "shall” and"must"..
Further, in Section 30 under Statutes at pp. 51-52 of 50
fm, Jur. it is said!
"...However, it should be helpful to keep in mind
the fundamental ihile that ordin rily the words "m?y"
and "shall" or "must" are not used interchangeably
or synonymously, but are given their ordinary meaning.
When the use of the words in other than their ordinary
meaning is Intended, the intention to do so must
clearly appear."
In the case of State ex rel. McCfbe v. District Court,
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106 Mont* 272, 76 Pec* (2d.) 634* the Montana Supreme Court
had under consideration the interprétation of the word "must”
in a statute holding that the District Judge must appoint
a special administrator under certain circumst-nces*

While

the court in that case held that "must” was not mandatory
but only permissive, it was made clear that the case fell
into the exception to the general rule*

On page 277 of the

decision the court said:
"We are reluctant to contravene or construe away
terms of a statute which in themselves are man
datory upon their face, except where the intent
and purpose of the legislature are plain and un
ambiguous end clearly signify a contrary constructionj
the synonymous terms ’’must’ and shall* in that
connection, being generally interpreted as man
datory, and the term *raay* being generally construed
as permissive or directory only.”
The latest consideration by the Montana Supreme Court as
to whether a statute is mandatory or directory is the case of
State ex rel* Sullivan v* District Court.
Pac* (2d) 452*

Mont*

,196

The court construed Section 11702, Revised

Codes of Montana, 1935, dealing with removal of public
officers, and held that the portion of Section 11702 which
said "the court must cité the party charged to appear before
the court at a time not more than ten or more than ten nor
less than five days from the time the accusation was pre
sented” was directory and not mandatory*

The court gave two

reasons for its decision, (1 ) that statutory provisions as to
precise time are many times not regarded as of the essence
but are regarded as directory merely and (2 ) a statutory
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provision is generally regarded es directory where a failure
!

of performance will result in no injury or prejudice to the
substantial right of the interested persons, and as manda
tory where such injury or prejudice will result. The
Sullivan case is distinguishable from the instant situation
on both counts• Her® we are not concerned with a statutory
provision as to time, and secondly it cannot here be said
that a failure of performance will not result in injury or
prejudice to the parties requesting the division into High
School Districts*

Thus the Sullivan case is not controlling

in the question at hnnd and need not govern the decision in
this opinion*
Accepting as a general rule the proposition that "shall"
is mandatory in,nature unless it clearly appears from the
remainder of the statute that a permissive use was intended,
all that remains to be done is to determine if anything in
Chapter 275, Montana Session Laws of 1947» indicates that
the Commission is to have any discretion in the establish
ment of High School Districts*
I find nothing in Chapter 275 to take it out of the
general rule*

While the Commission does have discretion

as to the territorial aspects of the division, i« e., how
many districts shall be created and how much land sh^ll be
placed in erch one, it has no discretion as to whether or
not it will create the districts*

Chapter 275 makes the

creation mandatory*

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

#

•147-

Therefore, It is my opinion that the direction In Chapter
275 , Montana Session Laws of 1947» to the Commission consisting

of the Board of County Commissioners end the County Superin
tendent of Schools to divide the County into High School
Districts at the request of any High School Board of Trustees
is mandatory and not permissive and therefore such Commission may
not*'^^exercise any discretion as to whether or not such districts
shall be created*

Very truly yours,

ARNOLD H. OLSiiH,
Attorney General
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Opinion 141 - 1950
Held!. The Board of Trustees of a school district maintaining
a district high school hns the power to request the division
of the County into high school building districts under
Section 75-46021 Revised Codes of Montana, 1947.
December 21st, 1950
Mr# Charles B# Sand®
County Attorney
Yellowstone County
Billings, Montana
’ Dear Mr# Sande:
You hcve requested my opinion concerning the right of
the Board of Trustees of a school district maintaining a
district high school to petition for the formation of high
school building districts within your County.
Your problem is the result of the language used in
/ Section 75-4602, Revised Codes of Montana, 1947, which reads
as follows!
**In all counties having a high school, or high schools,
a commission consisting of the County Commissioners and
the County Superintendent of Schools shall at the re.quest of any High School Board of Trustees In the
County divide the County into high school districts
for the purpose of this act, after hearing.”
It would appear at first blush from the above emph sized
portion thrt the power to request the division of ® County
into high school districts is limited to the trustees of a
■j

County High School as Section 72-4103, Revised Codes of
Montana, 1947, provides for an Independent Borrd of Trustees
for County High Schools.

District High Schools do not hf>ve

trustees designated ”High School Board of Trustees,” as school
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districts maintaining high schools are under the control of
trustees for the district which includes elementary schools,
Section 75-4101, Revised Codes of Montana, 1947*

However,

the history of the High School District law throws light on
the meaning of Section 75-4602*

The first statutory author- '

ity for the creation of high school building districts is to
be found in Chapter 47 of the Extraordinary Session of 1933-34*
Section 2 of this Act limited the division of a county into
high school districts to those counties having County High
Schools*

Chapter 16 of the Lews of 1937 amended Section 2

of the original act to pemlt the establishment of high
school districts "in all counties having a high school,"
The crse of Pierson vs* Hendrickson, 9B Mont, 244,3& Pac,
(2d) 991, held that Chapter 47, Extraordinary Sessions 1933-34,
was valid as an emergency measure and Chapter 275, Laws
of 1947, reenacted the High School Building law to make it
a permanent part of our school law, with amendments which
ere not material here.

The Legislature in amending wh t is

now Section 75-4602 by permitting the creation of high school
districts in counties which do not have County High Schools
must have intended that the initial petition for the divi
sion of a county into high school districts could come from
the trustees of any district maintaining a high school, other
wise, the amendment would h"Ve been a nullity*

The majority

of the counties in Montana do not have County High Schools*
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A rule of construction that is pertinent to the problem
presented is found in Mitchell vs# Banking Corporation, 9$
Mont# 23 , 24 Pac# (2d) 124» where the court said:
”It will be presumed that the Legislature in amending
an existing law intended to make some change therein,
and therefore, the courts will endeavor to give some
effect to the amendment*”
Also, it is apparent that the Legislature did not intend
to limit the power to request creation of High School Districts
to the Boards of Trustees of County High Schools from the use
of the phrase in the statute, "any High School Bo^rd of
Trustees in the County#” The word ”any” is often construed
to mean ”all” or "every”, 3 S. J# 232, and such construction
would indicate that trustees who administer a district main*
taining a high school could petition because there can be
only one County High School and the comprehensive word "any"
grants authority to more then one school governing body*
It is, therefore, my opinion that the Board of Trustees
of a school district maintaining a district high school has
the power to request the division of the County into High
School Building Districts under Section 75-4602, Revised
Codes of Montana, 1947#
Very truly yours,
ARNOLD H* OLSEN
Attorney General
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Opinion 38 * 1951

Held*
0^

Upon the abolishment of a county high school the property

the county high school should be conveyed to the school

district which establishes a high school rather than to the
high school building district#

The conveyance of the property

should be to the board of trustees and to their successors
in office,
August 29th, 1951
Mr* Howard W# Heraan
County attorney
Teton County
Choteau, Montana
Dear Mr* Heman*
You have requested my opinion concerning the title to
school property*

You advise that the county high school in

your county was abolished and a district high school estab
lished. You also advise me that the district high school is
located within a high school building district which letter
legal entity by means of a bond issue furnished a large por
tion of the funds to purchase the property of the county high
school#

Your specific question is whether or not the con

veyance of the property should be mads to the high school
district or to the school district#
In answering your question it is necessary to consider the
statutory procedure for the creation of a high school.

Section

75-4183 , Revised Codes of Montana, 1947» provides that the

trustees of the district may establish a high school with the
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approval of the Superintendent of Public Instruction,

Section

75*4139 states what should be included in the petition of the

trustees to the Superintendent of Public Instruction and defines
tke necessary* steps in the initial steges of establishing a
high

school.

Thereis no statutory authority for the estab

lishment of e high school by a high school building district.
In fact, the high school building districts were first estab
lished for a limited purpose and this is stated in Section
75-4605 , Revised Codes of Montana, 1947, which rerda in prrt

as follows ;
"This act she'll not prevent the exercise of powers
as elsewhere in the statutes of this state provided.
It shall constitute an additional and cumulative
method of borrowing money and of carrying out the
powers herein authorized. The high school districts
created under the provisions of this act are for
construction, repair, improvement and equipment
purposes only, and it shall not be construed so as
to interfere »kth or repeal any existing laws
relating to the maintenance or operation of high
schools within the county.”
Also, it is to be observed th t Section 75*4601 provides
in part:
”In any county having a high school the board of
trustees of the county high school, if there be one,
and the bords of trustees of any school districts
maintaining the high schools, are hereby designated
as the boards of trustees of the respective high
school districts established under this act.”
As is md e apparent by the above quoted portions of our
statutes high school districts were originally created for
"construction, repnir, improvement ^nd equipment purposes only."
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A condition precedent to the incurring of eny indebtedness
or the expenditure of tn y money by a high school district
is the existence of a high school# When a high school is
in operation in a high school district the trustees who govern
the school district in which the high school is located or the
county high school, by virtue

of their official position,

become the high school district trustees#

To convey property

to a high school district would be inconsistent with the
limited powers granted to such districts by our legislature#
In Finley vs# School District No. 1, 51 Mont# 411, 153 Pac#
1010, the court said;
"A school district is a public corporation, but
with very limited powers# It may, through its
board, exercise only such authority as is con
ferred by law, either expressly or by necessary
implication#**
There is no express grant of authority for a high school
district to hold property in its corporate name* Section
75-4605 , Revised Codes of Montana, 1947» previously quoted

in part, designates the purposes for the creation of high
school <3.stricts, however, this enumeration does not include
the ownership

of property#In fact a presumption is raised

against such power by the omission#
Chapters
and 210, Laws

130 and 199#Lawsof 1949, ^nd Chapters 20C
of 1951, usehigh school districts for levies

for the maintenance and operation of the high school located
within high school districts which is a variance from and
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en Implied amendment to Section 75-4605§ Revised Codes of
Montana, 1947# but not such an increase in the powers that
it might be concluded a high school district may be the
grantee of real property#
Section 75*1624# Revised Codes of Montana, 1947, grants
to the board of trustees of each school district broad powers
over property of the district.

This section states, ** all

conveyances of real estate made to the district or to the
board of trustees thereof shall be made to the board of
trustees of the district and to their successors in office."
It is not of m-terlal importance which district holds
school property as the case of Pierson vs. Kendricksen, 96
Mont# 244, 36 Pac. (2d) 991# held;
"The beneficial title of the school property Is in
the state.”
It is, therefore my opinion that upon the abolishment of
a county high school the property of the county high school
should be conveyed to the school district which establishes
a high school rather than to the high school building district.
The conveyance of the property should be to the board of trustees
and to their successors in office.
Very truly yours,
ARNOLD H. OLSm
Attorney General
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Opinion IDS - 1952
Held:

A high school district c»nnot be established in that

area of a joint district in which the high school is not
located»
August 13th, 1952
Kiss Mary M» Condon
Superintendent of Public Instruction
Capitol Building
Helena> Montana
Dear Miss Condonî
You have requested my opinion concerning the creation
of a high school district consisting of the area of a joint
school district within One county where the high school of
the joint district is located in the aPea of the joint
district within the adjoining county*
Under the provisions of Section 75-1^14* Revised Codes
of Montana, 1947» a joint district is defined as being a
school district which lies partly in one county and partly
in another#

High school districts are established under

the provisions of Chapter 46 , Title 75» Revised Codes of
Montana, 1947*

Section 75-4602, Revised Codes of Montana,

1947» as amended by Chapter ISÔ, Laws of 1951» provides

that the commission shall divide the entire county into high
school districts, ”providing, that each high school district
so formed must have one (1) or more operating, accredited
high schools within its boundaries.” This section also pro
vides thrt if a high school district shall cease to have
within its borders an operating high school then it shall be
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annexed to one or more high school'districts*
The commission which divides a county into high school
districts is limited in its authority and jurisdiction to the
area of the county*

Specific directions are given in regard

to joint districts as In Section 75-4602, as amended, It is
stated, "the entire portion of a joint school district within
the county shall be included within a high school district*"
This provision coupled with the provision that there must
be an operating high school in each high school district
precludes the coiarflission from considering a high school
which is not within the exterior boundaries of the county*
I realize that an additional tax burden will be placed
on the taxpayers within the joint districts as they must
contribute to the support of two high schools*

Yet, the

legislature in enacting the high school district law confined
the authority of the coimnission to each county without regard
to joint school districts operating high schools*
It is therefore, my opinion that a high school district
cannot be established in that area of joint district in which
the high school Is not located*
Very truly yours,
AMULD H. OLSm
Attorney General
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Opinion 130 - 1952

■A
A high school which has been declared to be an

Held*

isolrted high school by the Hoard of Budget Supervisors
is not entitled to state aid unless such high school has
been accredited by the State Board of Education end desig
nated by the board ss a high school which should receive
state aid»
The fact that state aid is not available to a non
accredited high school does not preclude the district from
voting an extra levy for the purpose of maintaining a high
school under the provisions of Section 73-3801, Revised Codes
of Montana, 1947# as last amended by Chapter 210, Laws of
1951*
December 24$ 1952
Mr» Norman R. Bamcord
County Attorney
Wheatland County
Harlowton, Montana
Dear Mr* Bamcord s
You have requested my opinion concerning the eligibility
of a non-accredited high school in your county to receive
state aid*

You advise me that the high school in question

has been approved as an isolated high school by the budget
board of your county*
f

In answering your question it is necessary to consider
Section 2 of Chapter 199# Lews of 1949# which provides for
state aid to the public schools throughout Monten''*

Section

1 of Chapter 199 specifies that the state*3 contribution
shall be determined on the basis of need for assistance of
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

the various school districts.

This financial aid is allocated

on the basis of “average number belonging” which in substance
is the attendance for the previous year.

Section 2 of Chapter

199, as amended by Chapter 10?, Laws of 1951, precludes the
inclusion of pupils in a non-accredited school in the compu
tation of the amount of state aid to a school dlstiict.

The

portion of Section 2 of Chapter 199, as amended which prevents
state aid to non-eccredited schools reads as follows :
“The average number belonging of secondary pupils
of a school district does not include the pupils
of any high school which has not been accredited
by the State Boc rd of Education.”
r
A high school which has an average number belonging(ANB)
of less than twenty-five pupils receives state aid only if
the State Board of Education has both accredited the high
school and designated it es one which should receive state
aid*

This is specifically set forth In Section 3, Chapter

199, in the following provisions
“A school h'ving an AKB of loss than twenty-five
(25 ) pupils shall not receive any state aid unless
it has been accredited by the State Board of Educa
tion end is desi^arted by said board es a school
which should receive state aid.”
While it is true that under Section 16, Chapter 199,
Laws of 1949, a high school with an average number belonging
of twenty-four pupils or less mry be approved as an isolated
high school by the County Budget Board yet such a declaration
does not itself alter the provision of Section 3, Chapter 199

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

Lews of 1949I that a high school having an AHB of less than
twenty-five pupils must be both accredited and designated
by the State Board of Education as being entitled to state
aid.
It must be remembered that Section 75-107, Revised Codes
of Montana, 1947, as amended by Chapter 92, laws of 1951,
specifically grants to the State Board of Education the power:
*»To prescribe standards of promotion to the high
school department of all public schools of the
state, and to accredit such high school as main
tain the standards of work prescribed by the board
on all such matters of promotion and accrediting#
The board shall act upon recommendation given to it
by the State Superintendent of Public Instruction,”
If it were held that the Board of Budget Supervisors
of a county by designating a high school to be Isolated
could thus accredit the high school then the above quoted
portion of section 75-107 , a@ emended, would be so modified
as to take away the powers of the State Board of Education#
Also, such an interpretation would violate the expressed
language of Section 3, Chapter 199, which requires that a
high school with an ANB of less than twenty-five pupils be
accredited and designated as a school entitled to state aid#
However, the fact that state aid is not available to a
non-accredited high school does not preclude a district from
voting an extra levy for the purpose of maintaining a high
school under the provisions of Section 75-3^01, Revised Codes
of Montana, 1947, as last amended by Chapter 210, Laws of 1951
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It is therefore my opinion thst a high school which
has been declared tobe an isolated high school by the
Board of Budget Supervisors is not entitled to state aid
unless such high school has been accredited by the State
Board of Education and designated by the Board as a high
school which should receive state aid.
It is further my opinion that whenever aid is not
available to a non-accredited high school district, this
does not preclude the district from voting upon an extra
levy for the purposeof maintaining a high school, under
the provisions of Section 75-3^01, Revised Codes of Montana,
1947t as last amended by Chapter 210, Laws of 1951.
Very truly yours,

/.RiVOLD H, OLSEN
Attorney General
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Opinion 36 - 1953
Held:

The act of a commission In establishing as a high

school district the area of a joint district in one county
does not result In creating as a high school district the
area of the joint school district in the adjoining county#
A high school district in the latter county can be established only by a commission acting in the letter county*
July 3 1 1933
Mr# Walter T* Murphy
County Attorney
Mineral County
Superior, Montana
Do?r Mr# Murphy1
You have requested my opinion concerning a joint school
district which maintains a high school within your county#
You advised me that Mineral County has been divided into high
school building districts i nd one of such districts is composed
of a common school district and that portion of a joint district
lying in Mineral County#

You asked specifically the effect of

Chapter 237, Laws of 1953* which is the last smendmcsit to
Section 75-4602, S. C# M., 1947 and whether It is self exe
cuting so as to incorporate the area in the adjoining county
into a high school district#
Section 75-4602 as amended, defines the method of dividing
a county into h i ^ school district*

The amendment to the

section by Chapter 237, L^ws of 1953, reads as follows:
*•###provi<Jed, further, that both parts of a joint
district maintaining a high school may be con- ■
sidered as maintaining an operating high school,
end as such each part of the joint district may,
together with one or more adjacent common school
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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districts whose pupils sttend the high school
in the joint district, be set ©side ©s a high
school district* Provided, that, such result
ing high school district in the county where
the joint district high school is not located,
shall be responsible for its share of the joint
district high school budgets as is arrived at
by the following of the procedure outlined in
Section 17 , Chapter 199, Laws of 1949 (75-3610),
and shall also be considered as a single high
school district with the high school district
of the joint district, wherein the high school
is located for purposes of bonding as pro
vided in Sections 75-4601 -46O5 , R# C# M.,
1947 »
amended by Chapter 188, Laws of 1951*
and also for purposes of selecting additional
trustees as provided for in Section 75-4601,
R* C, Mè, 1947 , a8 amended by Chapter 188,
Laws of 1951#,***
I.

This new statut»© in substance authorizes the commission
which divides a county into high school districts to estab
lish as one of the high, school districts'the area of a
joint school district in the county together with adja
cent school districts*
As your county has been divided into high school
districts, one of vdiich is the joint school district with
an operating high school, there is no problem within the
county*

However, the adjacent county in which the other

part of the joint district is located h^s not been divided
into high school districts and the amendment does not
effect this area by establishing a high school district
without the action of a comiaission dividing the county*
The pertinent portion of Section 75-4602, as amended states:
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"In all counties having a high school, or high
schools a commission consisting of the county
commissioners and the county superintendent of
schools shall at the request of any high school
board of trustees in the county, divide the
entire county into and establish one (1) or more
high school districts for the purpose of this
act, after hearing} provided, that each high
school district so fonaed must have one (iT or
more operation, accredited high schools within
its boundaries;*#*,"
It is to be noted that there must be one or more
operating high schools in each high school district*

The

amendment which we have under consideration makes an ex
ception to this requirement for the area in each county
of a joint school district.

This statutory provision

which permits the part of a joint school district in each
county to be created into a high school district Is not
self executing so that If one county does establish such
a high school district such act will result in the area of
the joint district in the adjoining county being formed
into a high school district.

Such a conclusion would

violate the express language of the act that "...each part
of the joint district may, together with one or more ad
jacent common school districts whose pupils attend the high
school in the joint district, be set aside as a high school
district.Permission, not a mandate, is granted to the
commission in each county to establish as a high school
district the county’s portion of a joint district whether
or not a high school is in such area.
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It is therefore, my opinion that the act of a commission
in establishing as a high school district the area of a joint
district in on© county does not result in creating as a high
school district the area of the joint school district in the
adjoining county.

A high school district in the latter

county can be established only by a commission acting in
the latter county.

Very truly yours,

ARNuLD H. ULSm
Attorney General
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Opinion 91 * 19$4

Heldï

That a non-accredited high school is not entitled

to receive an apportionment of the county ten mill special
tax for high schools #
August 21, 1954
Ihr» Edward J* Ober, Jr#
County fttomey
Hill County
Havre, Montana
Dear Mr# Ober;
You have requested my opinion concerning the eligi
bility of B non-accredited high school to receive an
apportionment of the county ten mill special tax for high
schools.
In Opinion No* 130, Volume 24, Report and Official
Opinions of the Attorney General, this office held that a
non-accredited high school is not entitled to state aid
under the foundation financial program as defined in Chapter
36 of Title 75f Revised Codes of Montana, 1947#

In arriving

at the opinion reliance was placed on that portion of Sec
tion 75-3611 , R# C# M#, 1947 , which reads as follows;
”#*..The average number belonging of secondary
pupils of a school district or of elementary
pupils of a school district does not include
the pupils of any high school or of any elemen
tary school which has not been accredited by
the state bo^rd of education##
Under Section 75-3610, H. C# M#, 1947, the str.te»s
contribution to the various schools is determined on the
basis of financial need which is computed upon the basis
of the average number belonging.

In other words, the
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measuring device for allocating money to school districts
S'

under the foundation program is "the average number be
longing" of the school*

The above-quoted portion of

Section 75-3011, H* C. M*, 1947, removes pupils of a
school which has not been accredited from consideration
under the foundation program*

Similar reasoning prevents

a non-accredited high school from receiving an apportion
ment of the special county high school tax as Section
75-3618 , R# C, M., 1947 , provides in part as follows :

"After the deduction of transportation re
imbursements provided by law, the proceeds of the
county ten (10) mill common school levy and
the proceeds of the county ten mill special
tax for high schools shall each be separately
distributed by the county superintendent to
the respective districts in the county, end
the county high school if there be one, in
proportion to their needs under the founda
tion financial program..
By the terms of this section, the county high school
funds are distributed to each high school in proportion to
their needs under the foundation financial program.

As

the foundation financial program is based on "the average
number belonging" of each school and a non-accredited high
school is precluded from receiving county apportionment of
the special county high school tax.

The ten mill levy is

provided for in Section 75-4516,1, R, C. M., 1947,
It.is, therefore, my opinion that a non-accredited high
school is not entitled to receive an apportionment of the
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county ten mill special tax for high schools,

Very truly yours,

ARNOLD H. OLSiiN
Attorney General
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Opinion 36 * I955

Held;

1* Territory of one high school district may bo

transferred to another high school district» notwith
standing that there is outstanding bonded indebtedness
as the territory trphSferred may be taxed for the payment
of the bonds.
2,

The legislature may provide a method for the change

of boundaries of-high school districts» as there is no
constitutional restriction limiting the legislative power
to enact a statute.
August 26 , 1955
Mr. Leo H. Murphy
County /ttomey
Teton County
Choteau, Montana
Dear Mr. Murphy;
You hnve requested ray opinion as to the legality of the
transfer of territory of a high school district to another
high school district when the high school district from which
the land is taken has outstanding bonded indebtedness.

You

have also asked if the transfer of territory is a violation
of the corporate rights of a high school district.
In answering your first question the provisions of Section
75-4607 » R. C. M., 1947, must be observed.

This section per

mits the re-division of a county into high school districts
Including the alteration of the boundaries of existing
districts.

The authority of the legislature to mrke such
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statutory provisions was recognized In State ex rel Redman
vs* Meyers, 65 Mont. 124# 210 Pec* IO64 # where the coirt
stated;
"A school district is merely a political subdivision
of the state, created for the convenient dispatch
of public business. In the absence of constitu
tions! limitations# the legislature may create
or abolish a district, or change or rearrange
the boundaries of an existing district# end by
the same token it may create joint districts from
territory lying in adjacent counties..."
The above quoted principle has been recognised by our
court in many subsequent cases.
Your second question is answered by the case of Fitz
patrick vs. State Board of Examiners# I50 Mont* 234, 70 Pac*
(2d) 285 , where It was held that counties and school districts
can not rely on constitutional provisions available to pri
vate corporations in the following language;
"These political subdivisions of the state may
not claim the constitutional protection of the
due process clause, or the provisions prohibit
ing the impairment of the obligation of existing
contracts by législative Act found in the federal
and. state Constitutions..."
However, where there are outstanding bonds of a high
school district, the chf-nge of boundaries of the high school
district will not relieve the territory which was within the
high school district at the time of the Issuance of bonds,
from being taxed to retire the bonds.

Section 11 of Article

111 of the Montana Constitution precludes the impairment of
contracts of Individuals.

The contracts of bond holders
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•170would be impj^^ed if all the area included in the district
at the time of the issuance of the bonds would not be
subject to tax for the payment of the bonds.

The larger

valuation and taxing area gives greater protection for the
peyment of bonds.

See Pass School District vs. Hollywood

City School District, 146 Gal, 416 105 Pac. 122, and
Geweke vs. Niles, 36Ô 111. 463 , I4 N. 2. (2d) 4Ô2,

Ex

press statutes may change this rule, providing adequate
protection is given for the payment of bonds, but there is
no statute covering the indebtedness of high school districts
when boundaries ere changed.
The fact that the original area of a high school district
will be subject to tax for payment of bonds does not pre
clude the change of boundaries of a high school district
as provided in Section 75-4607, R. C. M., 1947#

Obviously,

the change of boundaries does not impair the contractual
rights of bond holders if all of the area which was in the
high school district at the time of the issuance of bonds
remains liable for the payment of the bonds.
It is therefore my opinion that territory of one high
school district may be transferred to another high school
district, notwithstanding that there is outstanding bonded
indebtedness as the territory transferred may be taxed for
the payment of the bonds.
It is also my opinion that the legislature may provide
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^171a method for the change of boundaries of high school districts,
as there is no constitutional restriction limiting the legis
lative power to enact such e statute.

Very truly yours,

AMüLD H. OLSm
Attorney General
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CHAPTER HEFÊRE2JCES
The following official opinions of the attorney general
can be found in Volume 21 of the Report and Official Opiniona
of the Attorney General.
Opinion 135 ^ 1946
Opinion 157 • 1946
Opinion 175 - 1946
The following official opinion of the attorney general
can be found In Volume 22 of the Report and Official Opinions
S i M s Attorney General.
Opinion 115 • 1946
The following official opinions of the attorney general
can be found in Volume 23 of the Report and Official Opinions
of the Attorney General.
Opinion
Opinion
Opinion
Opinion

29 # 1949
34 1949
37 ~ 1949
141 • 1950

The following official opinions of the attorney general
can be found in Volume 24 of the
Report and OfficialOpinions
of the Attorney General# (To be publlsheST
Opinion 36 • 1951
Opinion 106 - 1952
Opinion 130 - 1952
The following official opinions of the attorney general
can be found in Volume 25 of the Report and Official Opinions
of the Attorney General. (To be Published)
Opinion 36 # 1953
Opinion 91 ** 1954
The following official opinion of the attorney general
can be found in Volume 26 of the
Report and JDfflcialOpinions
of the Attorney General. (To be published)
Opinion 36 - 1955
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CHAFTSR VI
PROFESSIONAL STAFF
Opinion 6 « 1947
Held; A county superintendent of schools cannot occupy such
office end also hold the position of teacher,
January 4» 1947
Mr, Cecil? N» Brown
County Attorney
Prairie County
Terry, Montana
Dear Mr& Brown;
You hrtve requested my opinion as to whether the newly
elected county superintendent of schools may continue in
her job as a primary grade teacher.
Section 955» Revised Codes of Montana, 1935» provides;
’
"The county superintendent shall hove the general
supervision of the Public schools in his County*"
This supervisory power precludes the county superintendent
of schools from being also a teacher in the schools in her
county*

In the cesg of Llinck v* Wittmer» 50 Mont* 22

144 Pac* 64#» our Court said;
"
"Offices are *incompatible* when one has power of
removal over the other,*.when ono Is in any way
subordinate to the other**.when one has power of
supervision over the other***or when the nature
and duties of the two offices are such as to
render it improper» from considerations of pub
lic policy» for one to retain both."
I

It is apparent.that» under the above rule given us,
the two positions are incompatible*

However, the County

Superintendent is an officer and a teacher is sn employee
!

and thus the epplioftion of the above rule might be
i

questioned*

In State ex rel* Br mey v, Hawkins, 79 Mont*
-

173^^
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B^nd in St?te ex rel* Nagle vs* Kelsey,

102, Mont* S, 55 P&c# (2d) 685, our Court considered s1ml1er
siturtlons end the determining point in each case wes whether
the second position was In fact an office*

In the Hawkins

case the court held the auditor of the board of railroad
commissioners was not a civil service officer and therefore
the position could be held by a member of the legislature*
In the Kelsey case the Court held that a member of the
Montana Kelief Commission was an officer end therefore the
*

office could not be held by a member of the legislature*
In neither of the cases was there a conflict as to the
time element necessary to the performance of the duties
involved and a violation of the rule of public policy stated
in the above quoted portion of the case of Klinck v. Wittmer.
Section 430, Revised Codes of Montana, 1935, requires
all officer» to take an oath of office which is in pert;
will discharge the duties of my office with fidelity.*
Section 974, Revised Codes of Montana, 1935, provides;
*The county superintendent of schools shall keep
his office open every day when he is not engaged
in the supervision of schools except holidays,
provided when he has a deputy or clerk, his
office shall be kept open every day in month
except holidays."
If the county superintendent maintains her office as
required, then she would not be able to teach because of
her inability to be in two places at once. Also the
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supervisory duties of the superintendent conflict with the
duties of the teacher as « superintendent cannot, with
logic, supervise herself in the performance of the work of
a teacher* The conflict in duties renders it ^improper"
from consideration of public policy, for one to retain both*"
,

It is therefore my opinion that a county superintendent
of schools cannot occupy such office and also hold the
position of a teacher*

Sincerely yours,

R. V* BOTTüMLÏ
Attorney General
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Opinion 23 - 1949

Held:

&
Under the provisions of the Teachers Retirement System,

a member is compelled to retire on the 1st day of September
following his or her seventieth birthday*
May 13thj 1949
Mr* R. W, Harper
Executive Secretary
Teachers Retirement System
Helena, Montana
Dear Mr* Harpers
You have presented the following factual situation for
my opinion î
’’S” a superintendent of schools, reaches the age of 70
years on July 9, 1949.

The local Board of School Trustees

desire to employ ^'S^ for another year.
The questions presented by you are as followsx

(1)

Is the school district in error in re-employing ^'S'?

(2)

If they decide to re-employ him, what penalties

could be invoked against the school district?

(3) Are there any other duties to fall upon the
Retirement Board in this particular case, other than noti
fication of both the teacher end school district?
(4)

Should "S" be continued in employment, would he be

required to continue payments to the System and would his
salary for the last year be actuiowledged in our records?

In answer to your first question, Section 6 of Chapter
By, Montana Session Laws of 1937, ®s amended by Section 2
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;

of Chapter 137, Montana Session Laws of 1945, and Chapter
23, Montana Session Laws of 1949, must be considered*

The

amendment reads as followsî
*Thet from and after the passage and approval of
this act, any member in service who has attained
the age of seventy years, during any school year
shall be retired by said Retirement Board on the
first day of September following his or her seven
tieth birthday*”
The provisions of this Section are mandatory in that
the Board of Administration of the Teachers Retirement ^ct
must retire a member when such member reaches the age of
seventy years*

The word ”shall” is generally construed as

mandatory in its ordinary and common use.
(Statutes) Section 23»

See 50 Am. Jur*

It is also a well recognized prin

cipal of law that the word "shall” is construed as must when
a public body is directed to do certain acts.

See 25 R.C.L*

Section 15, (Statutes), p. 7&9.
Furthermore it is my opinion that the clrar import of
of Section 2, Chapter 137, Supra, indicates that the Retire
ment Board must retire a member of the System on September
first following said member’s seventieth birthday.
Assuming that & member Is compelled to retire in light
of the above statute and discussion, the next question is
whether or not, under the hypothetical set of facts,
reached the age of seventy "during the school year*"
Section 1061 of the Revised Codes of Montana, 1935, states
that :
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"The school year shall begin on the 1st day of July
end end on the 30th day of June#"
It is my opinion that ’S" reached the age of seventy
during the school year, namely July 9# 1949, consequently
he must retire on September 1, 1949, and the school district
would be in error to employ "S’ after September 1, 1949» '
See also Volume 22 Attoniey General*s Opinions 52, page 70,
for a further discussion of Section 6, Chapter S?, Montana
Session Laws of 1937, as amended by Section 2, Chapter 137,
Montana Session Laws of 1945#
In answer to your second question, the act itself does
not provide for any penalty for a failure to observe the pro^
visions thereof.

However, under Section 1015, Revised Codes

of Montana, 1935, as amended by Chapter 103, Montana Session
Laws of 1943, the duties of a trustee ere prescribed as
follows :
"Every school board unless otherwise specifically pro
vided by law shall have power and it shall be its duty:
1. To prescribe and enforce rul^^'S not inconsistent
with law...
14#

To require teachers to conform to the law."

Section 999, Revised Codes of Montana, 1935, prescribes

the method for the removal of school trustees and is as follows:
"Any school trustee mry be removed from office by a
court of competent jurisdiction by law for removal
of elective civil officers; provided, however, that
upon charges being preferred and good cruse shown,
the board of county commissioners may suspend a
trustee until such time as such charges can be heard
in the court having jurisdiction thereof."
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If the school trustees, or eny member thereof, violates
the provisions of the Retirement Act to the extent that such
violation results in misconduct or malfeasance in office,
then such trustees, or any one member, may be removed from
office in the method prescribed by law.
In answer to your third question, Section 3, Chapter Ô7,
Montana Session Laws of 1937, provides that it is the duty
of the Retiraient Board to assume responsibility for the
general administration and proper operation of the retirement
system.
In order to make effective the provisions of this act,
it is my opinion that the Retirement Board has fulfilled its
duty when both the school district end the teacher ere
notified in the manner provided for by law of any action
taken by the Board.

Answering question Number four, it is my opinion that
if a member is lawfully compelled to retire under Section 6
of Chapter Ô7, Session laws of 1937, as emended by Section 2
of Chapter 137, Session Laws of 1945, and such retirement is
ignored by the school trustees, the retired member cannot be
compelled to continue payments to the retirement system, nor
can his salary, after he has been lawfully retired, be
acknowledged in your records.
In passing, I wish to bring to your attention the fact
that I am aware that there still exists in Montana a
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shortage

of competent teachers In our public schools, and I am also
aware that there are many employees of the system who are
as competent after reaching seventy (70) years of age as
many of the younger employees*

However, the Legislature

fixes the policy and enacts the laws under which the members
of the Teachers Retirement System are to bound*

Many of the

provisions of the Retirement Act may seem to be unsound,
especially in light of the economic conditions of today,
but neveîrthôlèss the Attorney General’s Office must interpret
the law as the Legislature has passed it*

?
Very truly yours.

ARNOLD H. OLSJaî
Attorney General
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Opinion 122

Held;

I95O

That by virtue of Section 7# Chapter 142» Laws of 1949»

teachers who held state secondary certificates on May 1» 1949,
are entitled to recf^iive life certificates providing they
meet the statutory requirements fixed by Section 75-2504»
Revised Codes of Montana» 1947» and the rules and regulations
of the State Board of Education#
^ August S» 1950
Miss Mary Condon
State Superintendent of Public Instruction
Helena, Montana
Dear Miss Condon;
You have requested my opinion concerning the application
of Chapter 142, Laws of 1949 to the holders of State Teaching
Certificates on May 1, 1949*

You have asked in particular

whether such teachers would be entitled to the type of
certificates authorized under Section 75-2504* Revised Codes
of Montana, 1947, which was repealed by Chapter 142, Laws of

.

1949

Chapter 142, Lews of 1949, was approved by the Governor,
March 1, 1949 , and contained no recital that it would be
effective on its passage and approval and as a consequence
the provisions of Section 43-507» Revised Codes of Montana,
1947 , applies and the act was not effective until July 1,
1949* Chapter 142 enumerates the classes of certificates

for teaching which the State Superintendent of Public Instruc
tion may issue and does not authorize the issuance of life
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certificates*

Section 75-2504, Revised Codes of Montana,

1947, ves repealed by Chapter 142 and prior to its repeal
and by its terms the State Superintendent was authorized to
issue life certificates*

Requirements

for life certificates

ere similar for both elementary and secondary schools* ,Jn
sub-section 6 of Section 75-2504, Revised Codes of Montana,
1947, the statute reads as follows:
Candidates for elementary life certificates must be
holders of an elementary state certificate in full force
and effect and must present satisfactory evidence of at
least thirty-six (36) months of successful teaching ex
perience in Montana during the life of a Montana elementary
state certificate and satisfactory evidence of having secured
subsequent to the issuance of the elementary state certifi
cate such approvaed academic and professional training as
may be prescribed and required by the rules and regulations
of the State Board of Education.
Section 7 of Chapter 142, Laws of 1949, contains the
following limitation on the provisions of Chapter 142;
No provision of this act shall affect or impair the
validity of any certificate for teaching in force on May 1,
1949, or the rights and privileges of the holders by virtue
thereof, save that any certificate may be suspended or revoked
for any of the causes end by the procedures specified by law*
The question presented is the effect of Section 7, Chapter
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142 , Laws of 1949# end it is necessary to determine whether

the types of certificates authorized by Section 75-2504,
Revised Codes of Montana, 1947# which was repealed are
available to holders of teaching certificates in force on
May 1, 1949* The phrase "or the rights and privileges of
the holders by virtue thereof" is the language to be construed#
It is reasonable to assume that the purpose of Section
7 was to preserve the right of a teacher who had taken
additional academic training in order to receive a teaching
certificate of a higher grade* The protection of the rights
of those practicing a profession at the time of enacting
a statute with different standards is in accord with general
legislative practice*

This was recognized in State v. Bays

100 Mont*. 125 , 47 Pac* (2d) 50» wherein our Supreme Court
approved a statutory provision that barbers who were prac
ticing their profession at the time of the enactment of a
statute requiring examination were exempt from taking the
examination.

The court quoted from an earlier Montana

case 63 follows:
"The principle la the same as that involved in the
multitudinous laws governing the right to practice
professions and to engage in numerous specialty
regulated lines of business activity# The erection
of new standards of qualification by laws relating
to them seldom contemplates the re-examination and
re-licensing of those previously licensed and
actually operating tinder the terms of a law in
effect at the time of the issuance of the original
license. The provision is not obnoxious to, but
rather consonant with, generally recognized prin
ciples of fairness and justice,"
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The rule quoted above which recognizes the power of the
legislative body to permit the granting of a license without
examination to a practicing member of a profession is ana
logous to the rights granted to teachers by Section 7 of
Chapter 142, Laws of 1949#

The teachers who had taken addi

tional academic training and who had complied with the rules
of the State Board of Education in order to obtain a life
certificate as provided in the law prior to Chapter 142,
Laws of 1949, would be deprived of a valuable privilege if
such were denied to them*

It would be just and fair to grant

a life certificate to those who held on May 1, 1949, state
certificates and met the statutory requirements and rules
for life certificates*
It is to be noted that Section 75-2504, Revised Codes of
Montana, 1947, grants to holders of both elementaiy and
secondary state certificates the right to secure life
certificates*
It is, therefore, my opinion that by virtue of Section 7,
Chapter 142, Laws of 1949, teachers who held state certificates
on May 1, 1949, are entitled to receive life certificates pro
viding they meet the statutory requirements fixed by Section
75-2504 , Revised Codes of Montana, 1947, and the rules end

regulations of the State Board of Education*
Very truly yours,
ARNOLD H* OLSEN

Attorney General
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Opinion 127 • 1950

Held!

School listrict employees with the exception of school

teachers are entitled to vacation leave in accordance with
the provisions of Chapter 131, Lews of 1949*
September 5th, 1950
Mr# James D# Freebourn
County Attorney
Silver Bow County
Butte, Montana
Dear Mr# Freebourn:
You have requested my opinion whether the employees of
a school district are entitled to vacation leave under the
provisions of Chapter 131, Laws of 1949*
The sections of Chapter 131, Laws of 1949, which are
pertinent to the question you have asked are as follows ;
•^Section 1$ Sach employee of the State, or any
County or city thereof, Is entitled to end shall
be granted annual vacation leave with full pay
at the rate of one and one-quarter (1 1/4) working
days for each month of service, such service to be
computed from the date of employment*#.*
Section 3* An employee, who is separated from the
service of the State, or any County, or city thereof,
for reason not reflecting discredit on himself, or
any employee transferred to or employed in another
division or department of the State, or any County
or City thereof, shall be entitled upon the date
of such separation from transfer to or acceptance
of new employment within the State, County, or
city thereof, to cash compensation for unused
vacation leave*##
Section 7* The term ’employee,* as used herein,
does not refer to or include elected State, County,
or City officials, or school teachers*”
Section 1, above quoted refers to employees of the State,
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o r any County or city thereof.

The question to be resolved

then is whether or not employees of a school district can
be considered as employees of the State or any County or
city thereof.
It is at once apparent that a school district is an
entity separate and distinct from any County or city and
therefore a school district employee could not be considered
an employee of either a County or city.
Howf^ver, the rule in Montana is that a school district
is a political subdivision of the State and as such is
at all times subject to Legislative regulations and con
trol, except in so far as the Constitution has placed
limitations upon the Legislative department.

Fitzpatrick

V. State Board of Examiners, et al., 105 Mont. 234i 70 Pac.
(2nd) 4^» State ex rel. City of Missoula v. Holmes, 100
Mont. 256, 47 Pec. (2nd) 624.
Since the school district is a political subdivision of
the State it is only reasonable to assume that the Legis
lature intended that the employees of a school district
were included in the category of State employees as pro
vided in the Act.

That assumption is strengthened by the

language of Section 7 of Chapter 131 wherein the Act speci
fically excludes school teachers from the operation of the
Act.

Since the law makers deemed it necessary to specially

withhold the benefits of the Act from school teachers, it
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follows therefrom that ib was their intention that the re
maining employees of school districts should be entitled to
vacation leave.
It is therefore my opinion that school district employees
with the exception of school teachers are entitled to vacation
leave in accordance with the provisions of Chapter 131, Laws
of 1949.

Very truly yours *

ARNOLD H. QLSiM
Attorney General
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Opinion 129 - 1950

Held:

Thfit if an election is not made by affirmative action

by a member of the Teachers* Retirement System, who has ten
years or more of service, to withdraw his accumulated con
tribution within six months after termination of service,
otherwise than by death or retirement, such member cannot
withdrew his contributions.

Such member upon reaching

retirement age will be entitled to a pension.
October 2, 1950
Mr. R. 'Af* Harper, Executive Secretary
The Teachers* Retirement System
State Capitol
Helena, Montana
Dear Mr. Harperi

,

You have requested my opinion concerning the status of
the account of a teacher with ten or more years of service
whose service is discontinued otherwise than by death or
retirement and who takes no action in regard to his retention
of membership in the retirement system within six months
after discontinuance of service.
.In considering your question it is necessary to examine
Section 4, Chapter Ô7, Laws of 1937» as amended by Chapter
215, Laws of 1939, Chapter 15» Laws of 1945 and Chapter 2S,
Laws of 1949, which section reads in part as followsî
"The membership of any person in the retirement
system shall cease;,..
(b) If he withdraws his accumulated contributions
or retires on a pension or dies, but not otherwise,
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except that the membership of a teacher who has
not withdrawn his contributions and who has not
had sufficient service to be eligible for disabi
lity retirement shall not be cancelled, provided
the member shall prove to the satisfaction of the
retirement board that absence from service was
caused by personal illness constituting disability,
or service In the Armed Forces of the United States
which includes all members of the Army, the Navy,
the Marine Corps, and the Coast Guard, or service
in the American Red Cross end Merchant Karine
during time of war, and provided any member with
ten (10) or more years or îTerviceV whose service
is discontInued btherwise than by death or retire
ment. shall have the right to elect within six (6)
months after such termination of service, end with
out rlEhïT or^revocation. whether to allow his
accumulated contribu'tlbns to remein in the retire
ment fund# Upon the qualific^etionjfor retirement by
reason of age or disability of a member who has
elected to allow his accumulated contributions to
remain in the retirement fund, he shall receive
a retirement allowance in accordance with the pro
visions of the teachers* retirement act*"
The emphasized portion of the above quoted section
indicates that those members with ten or more years of service
are in a different category than those members with a shorter
service record*

The reason for the distinction is apparent

when subsection 1 (a) of Section 6, Chapter 3?, Laws of
1937, as amended by Chapter 137» Laws of 1945» and Chapter
23, Laws of 1949, is considered as it provides :
"Any member in service who has completed ten years
of creditable service, the lest ten years of which
shall have been in this State, end who has attained
the age of Sixty may retire from service, if he
files with the Retirement Board his written appli
cation setting forth the fact of his retirement,"
The result of ten years of service is that the member
has satisfied the minimum reouirements for a pension*
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^190-»
expressly stated in the last sentence of Section 4» Chapter
Ô7, Laws of 1937# fis amended, and first quoted above, a
member of the retirement system who has completed ten years
of service and who has left his contributions in the retire
ment fund shall receive a pension upon qualification for
retirement by reason of age or disability.
If a member does not take any affirmative action by
either withdrawing his contribution or advising the Board
of the retirement system that he will leave his contribution
in the retirement fund within the six months period, then It
is reasonable to assume that by inaction the member has lost
his right to withdraw.

An obvious ambiguity is found in

the statute under consideration as to such members, but the
fact he has acquired a right to a pension by his ten years
of service should result in its retention as a matter of law*
Analogous situations have occurred in the construction of life
insurance policies such as the case of Jeske v. Metropolitan
Life Ins. Co., 113 Pa. Super. Ct. IIS, 172 A. 172, wherein
the Court held that after the death of the insured, '"the
lew will apply the option most advantageous to the insured,
or his beneficiary."
See also:

McSacheron v* Mew York Life Ins, Co., 15 Ga.

App, 222, É2 S. S, 020, Marti v. Midwest Life Ins. Co., 100
Neb, 045* 109 N.W, 300, 29 A.S.R. 1507.
The fundamental principle found in all retirement systems
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is the protection of the participating member during hla
declining years, and the construction given to the Montana
statute under consideration which will further such principle
is more beneficial to the members as a whole*
It is therefore ray opinion that if an election is not
made by affirmative action by a member of the teachers*
retirement system, who has ten years or more of service, to
withdraw his accumulated contributions within six months
after termination of service, otherwise than by death or
retlremait, such member cannot withdraw his contributions.
Such member upon reaching retirement age will be entitled
to a pension.

Very truly yours,

jm o w H.

O L S iîJ Ü

Attorney General
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Opinion 4.7 - 1951
Held:

<

A teacher who has three years of prior service end

whose contract was not renewed must appeal to the county
superintendent of schools end then to the state superintendent
of public instruction before resorting to the courts for a
preview of the trustees action*
November 13* 1951
Mr# Michael J* O’Connell
County Attorney
Gallatin County
Bozeman* Montana
Pear Mr* O’Connell:
You have requested my opinion concerning the authority
end jurisdiction of a county superintendent to hear an appeal
by a teacher from the decision of the board of trustees re
fusing to renew the teacher’s contract for the ensuing year.
You advise me that the teacher had been employed for more
than three years.

You also state that the teacher was

granted a rehearing by the trustees who refused to change
their previous decision*
Section 75-151Ô* Revised Codes of Montana* 1947* defines
the authority of the county superintendent to decide school
disputes and hear appeals as follows:
”Ke shall decide all matters in controversy
arising in his county in the administration
of the school law or appealed to him from
the decision of school officers or boards.
An appeal may be taken from his decision* in
which case a full written statement of the
facts* together with the testimony and his
decision in the case, shall be certified to
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state superintendent for his decision In the
matter* which decision shall be final* subject
to adjudication or the proper legal remedies
In the state courts*"
In Kelsey v. School District* 84 Mont* 433, 276 Pac* 26,

the court considered the case of a teacher who was dismissed
without cause end said:
^?rom the action of the board In discharging
the plaintiff she had a plain, speedy and
adequate remedy--by appeal first to the
county superintendent, and having been un
successful in that, to the superintendent
of public instruction* (Peterson v. School
Board, 73 Mont * 442, 236 Pac* 670; KInzer
V * Directors of Independent School Teachers
of Marion, 129 Iowa 441, 6 Ann* Css* 996,
3 I,*R.A. (n*x*) 496 , 105 N.W* 686.) It is
unquestionably the policy of this state, as
declared by the legislative assembly, that
ordinary school controversies shall be ad
justed by those who are specially entrusted
with that duty* It is not the policy to en
courage resort to the courts in such matters.
So long as the school officers act legally
and within the power expressly conferred
upon thma the courts will not interfere*
(State ex rel. School District v* Trumper,
69 Mont* 468 , 222 Pec. 1064*)"
In the more recent esse of Eastman v* School District
Ko* 1, 120 Mont « 63 , I80 Pec* (2d) 472, the rule ennounced in
the Kelsey case was quoted with approval end it was statedî
^’The rule is well settled in this jurisdiction
that resort may not be had to the courts until
adequate remedies by administrative boards have
first been exhausted."
An appeal by a teacher who was dismissed for cause before
the expiration of a written contract must be taken to the
county superintendent of schools under the provisions of
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Section 75-2411^ Revised Codes of Montana, 1947*

This section

would not apply to the facts under consideration as it was
the refusal to renew her contract which raises the question,
end the appeal must be taken under the authority of Section
75-151Ô, Revised Codes of Montana, 1947#

However, the

teacher haa the right to demand that the reason or reasons
for dismissal be stated and a rehearing and reconsideration
had, under Section 75-2401, Revised Codes of Montana, 1947,
as amended by Chapter 166, Laws of 1949* before taking an
appeal•
It is, therefore, my opinion that a teacher who has three
years of prior service end whose contract was not renewed must
appeal to the county superintendent of schools and then to the
state superintendent of public Instruction before resorting to
the courts for a review of the trustees action*

Very truly yours,
ARNOLD H* OLSÆ
Attorney General
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Opinion 5 1 - 1 9 5 1

Held*

»

A deputy county superintendent of schools is not

required to heve the same qualifications as those required
by law for the county superintendent of schools#
December 21, 1951
Kr# Robert Hurly
County Attorney
Valley County
Glasgow, Montana
Dear Mr# Hurlyî

^

You have requested my opinion concerning the qualifications
of the deputy county superintendent of schools#

You ask in

-i

particular if the deputy tonst haye the same qualifications
as the county superintendent*
Section 75-1502, H# C* M#, 1947» defines the qualifications for county superintendents of schools, which are
in substance that the superintendent must meet the Consti
tutional requirements for an office holder, have a teaching
certificate, and three years experience#

A deputy super

intendent of schools may be appointed under the authority
of Section 75-152S, but his statute does not fix any speci
fic qualifications for the deputy#

However, this has not

always been true as in 1947 the legislature in Chapter 194
amended what is now Section 75-1528, by eliminating the re
quirement that ”Such deputy shall hold a Montana certificate
not less in value than a professional grade certificate."
The fact that the legislature struck from the statute the
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^

requirement thet the deputy hold « teaching certificate.
Is very persuasive that e certificate is not now a quali
fication for a deputy superintendent of schools#

Such a

principle was recognized in State ex* rel. Federal Land
Bank v. Hays, 66 Mont* 56 , 262 Pac. 32 , where in the
court said*
"It will be presimed that the legislature, in
adopting the amendment, intended to make some
change in the existing law, and therefore the
court will endeavor to give some effect to the
amendment."
There is no express statutory authority requiring all
deputies to have the same qualifications as those of the
public officer by whom they are appointed.

In 43 Am.

Jur. 219 , the text states:
"But when the law provides that a ministerial
officer may appoint a deputy, for whose acts
he end his sureties are responsible, and does
not limit or restrict him as to whom he appoints,
he has authority to appoint whomsoever he pleases."
As the primary responsibility of the faithful performance
of the duties of the office falls upon the county superin
tendent, it will be to the best interest of the superintendent
to appoint a capable person which is a safeguard to the public.
It is therefore my opinion that a deputy county super
intendent of schools is not required to have the same quali
fications as those required by law for the county superintendent
of schools.

Very truly yours,
ASU'iULD H. OLSÆ
Attorney General
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Opinion 9 m 1953
Held:

That a board of trustees of a school district which

elects to close its school during the annual session of the
state teachers* association does not have authority to
withhold the pay of its teachers during the days school
is closed for such meeting, regardless of the teachers*
membership in the association or attendance at its annual
session.
March 11th, 1953
Mr, Edward C. Schroeter
County Attorney
Flathead County
Kalispell, Montana
Dear Mr, Schroeter:
You have requested my opinion concerning the authority
of the board of trustees of a school district to withhold
the pay of a teacher who is not a member of a state teachers*
association on the days school is closed for the convention
of the association.
There are two statutory provisions which pertain to the
closing of schools for conventions of teachers.

Subsection

22 of Section 75-1632, R.C.M,, 1947* as amended by Chapter

207* Dews of 1951» authorizes school trustees:
"To close school at their discretion during the
annual session of the state teachers* association
end to allow teachers to attend the same without
loss of salary."
Similar authority is given to the trustees of districts main
taining high schools and trustees of county high schools in
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Subsection 12 of Section 75-*4231» R* C# M*, 1947» as amended
by Chapter 106, Laws of 1951» which grants the power:
*To close the high school at its discretion
during the annual session of the state teachers*
association end to allow the principal or
trict superintendent and teachers to attend such
annual session without loss of salary*”
It is to be observed that the above quoted statutes pemit
the closing of schools for the meetings of the teachers*
association without loss of salary*

there is no requirement

thet the teachers attend the meeting to avoid a deduction in
salary, but the trustees are merely given the discretionary
power to close the school during the session.

The teachers

in entering into contracts for their services with the
trustees agree to teach school for those days school is open.
It is the act of the trustees which closes the schools and
prevents the teachers from teaching on the days the schools
are closed.

The discretionary power granted to the trustees

by the statutes is limited to the closing of schools for the
convention.

The statutes expressly preclude the loss of

salary if the schools are closed and there is no discretion
given to the trustees to withhold salary payment*
It is not made a duty of the teachers to attend a conven
tion, but the terns of the statute make it possible for the
attendance at the convention without salary loss.

The intent

of the statute is to remove obstacles to attendance, but
there is no suggestion of compulsion that would result from
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a loss of salary.

An analagous provision is found in Section 75-2202, R.
C. M., 1947» which states that^no teacher shall be required
to teach school on a legal holiday#•..and no deduction from
the teacher's time or wages shall be made by reason of the
fact that a school day happens to be a legal holiday.”
It is therefore, my opinion that a board of trustees of
a school district which elects to close its school during

the annual session of the state teachers' association does
not have authority to withhold the pay of its teachers
during the days school is closed for such meeting, regardless
of the teachers* membership In the association or attendance
at its annual session.
Very truly yours,

ARNOLD H. OLSm
Attorney General
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Opinion IDS - 1954
Held:

1.

There may be one or more teachers* associations

within this state and the members of one association have
equal rights with those members of a similar state-wide
teachers* association.
2.

Where a school is closed for any teachers* aSso-

elation convention, all teachers in the school are entitled
to receive pay for such days.
December 16, 1954 '
Mr. Irving C. Pearson
County Attorney
Deer Lodge County
Anaconda, Montana

'

Dear Mr. Pearsons
You have advised me that the trustees of your school
district closed the school for one day to permit teachers
to attend the annual convention of the Montana Federation
of Teachers, and you request my opinion as to whether mem
bers of this group have the same rights as members of the
Montana Education Association.
In Opinion No. 9, Volume 25, Opinions of the Attorney
General, it was held:
**A board of trustees of a school district which
elects to close its school during the annual
session of the state teachers* association does
not have authority to withhold the pay of its
teachers during the days of school the school
is closed for such meeting, regardless of the
teachers* membership in the association or
attendance at its annual session.**
While it is true that the Montana Education Association
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has been operating and in existence in this state for a
greater number of years than the Montana Federation of
TeachersI yet both are similar in nature and purpose, and
both are state-wide organizations*

Sub-section 22 of Section

75-1632 , R# G, M., 1947 » as amended by Chapter 207, Laws

of 1951 , grants the power to school trustees?
"22, To close school at their discretion during
the annual session of the state teachers* asso
ciation, and to allow teachers to attend the
same without loss of salary,"
This statute does not name any particular association
of teachers and if it did, there would be some doubt as to
its

constitutionality as Section 26of Article Vof the

Montana Constitution requires that where a general law can
be made applicable, no special lew shall be enacted.

In

State ex rel* Redman vs. Meyers 65 Mont* 124, 210 Pac, IO64 ,
our court said of this constitutional provision:
"..,.Interdicted class legislation includes all
laws that rest upon some false or deficient
classification, and the vice in such laws is
that they do not embrace all of the class to
which they are naturally related*.
Also sub-section 22 of Section 75-1632, supra, is in
general terms and the construction of this law to the effect
that some particular teachers* association was intended to
be the only organization recognized by this act would violate
the express words of the statute.
In Srultable Life Assurance Company vs. Kart, 55, Mont*
76 , 173 Fee, 1062, the case stated thet;

"..a supposed
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unexpressed intention cannot override the clear import of the
language employed-•
It is therefore, my opinion thet there may be one or more
teachers* associations within this state and that the members of
one association have equal rights with those members of a similar
state-wide teachers* association.
It is also my opinion that if school is closed for any
teachers’ convention, all teachers in the school are entitled
to receive pay for such days*

Very truly yours,

ARNOLD H* QlSm
Attorney General
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Opinion 11 - 1955
Held:

1#

The trustees of a school district have the authority

to employ any teacher they see fit and have a discretionary
power in the employment of a married teacher providing the
teacher does not have tenure rights*
2*

School trustees do not have the authority to provide

In a contract that a teacher must relinquish her position
should she marry during the term of the contract*
3*

No provisions may be included in teachers* contracts

discriminatory to married teachers*
4*

School trustees do not have the power to employ

married teachers on a day to day basis for the purpose of
evading the teachers* tenure law, nor do they have the power
to employ single teachers in such a manner.
May 12, 1955
Miss Mary M. Condon
State Superintendent of Public Instruction
State Capitol Building
Helena, Montana
Dear Miss Condon:
You have submitted for my consideration the following
questions î
1. May a school board in hiring teachers discriminate
against married teachers, all other qualifications being equal?
2. May a school board write a contract between the district
and a teacher and include therein a provision that a teacher
must relinquish her position should she marry during the term
of the contract?
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3# Msy a contract between a teacher and a school board
contain any provisions discriminatory to married teachers?
4. May a school board, In order to evade the tenure law,
hire married teachers or any other teachers on a day to day
basis?
In answering your first question, it is necessary to
consider subsection 2 of Section 75-1632,

, 1947, which

grants the power to a board of trustees "to employ or dis
charge teachers, mechanics, or laborers, and toorder paid
their wages,"

This statute gives to the board of trustees

the authority to employ any teacher who is qualified to
teach; and in the exercise of this power the board may refuse
to employ a married teacher, providing the teacher does not
have tenure rights.

The reason for this conclusion is that

the trustees have an absolute discretion to employ initially
those teachers who appear to be suitable for a teaching
position*

Whether the teacher is married might beconsidered

by the trustees in tendering a contract.
'

Your second question is directed to the power of a board

of trustees to include in a teacher’s contract a forfeiture
provision which will terminate the teacher’s rights prior
to the expiration of the contract.

Section 75-2411, R.G.M.,

1947, provides:
"In the case of the dismissal of any teacher
before the expiration of any written contract
entered into between such teacher and board of
trustees for alleged immorality, unfitness,
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.205incompetence, or violation of rules, the teacher
may appeal to the county superintendent; and if
the superintendent decides that the removal was
made without cause, the teacher so removed must
be reinstated, and shall be entitled to compensa
tion for the time lost during the pending of the
appeal»**
This statute was held, in Kelsey vs* School District
No. 25 , 64 Mont* 453» 276 Pac. 26, to be ”a condition of the
contract as effectively as if expressly written therein,**
It is obvious that marriage does not make a teacher either
unfit or incompetent to teach.
In Richards vs* District School Bd., 7^ Or. 621, L.R.A.
19160, 769 , 153 Pec* 4Ô2, Ann* Cas. 1917D, 266, a school
board attempted to enforce a rule providing that the mar
riage of 8 woman teacher automatically terminated her service.
The reason advanced for the

rule adopted by the boardwas

that

might devote her

after marriage a woman

to her home, to the neglect of her school work.

time andattention
In discussing

the reasonableness of the rule, the court said;
",.*It would be just as reasonable to adopt a
rule that if a woman teacher joined a church it
would work an automatic dismissal from the schools
on an imagined assumption that the church might
engross her time, thought'and attention, to the
detriment of the schools; but such a regulation
as the one supposed would not even have the sem
blance of reason. It must be conceded that quite
a different case is presented where the act ruled
against is inherently wrong. The Act to which
the instant rule relates does not involve a single
element of wrong, but, on the contrary, marriage
is not only protected by both the written and
unwritten law, but it is also fostered by a sound
public policy,..**
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Accordingly, it was held that the rule was unreasonable
and that the marriage of a woman teacher was not a ground for
dismissal under a statute providing that teachers might be
dismissed only for good cause shovm.

See also:

Elwood vs.

State ex rel. Griffin, 203 Ind. 626, ISO N.£. 471, end
Jameson vs. Board of Education, 74, W. Va. 3^9, 61 S. E* 1126,
In State ex rel. Saxborph vs. District Court,
275 ï*ac. (2d) 209,

Mont.

11 St. Rep*460, it was held that the

provisions of Section 75-2411, R.C.M,, 1947, which provide for

■
f

- the dismissal of a teacher for alleged **Immorality, unfitness,
incompetence, or violation of rules” states the only grounds
for the removal of teachers who have written contracts.

In

the Richards case cited above, it was held that a rule pro
viding for the termination of a contract, if the teacher mar
ried, was not a reasonable rule,
public policy that

Such holding establishes the

marriage isnot a ground for dismissal. In

Abshirs vs. SchoolDistrict Ro. 1, 124

Mont, 244, 220 Pac, (2d)

1056 , it was held that the Teachers* Retirement Act declared

the public policy that the compulsory retirement eg® in Montana
is seventy years and the trustees do not have the power to
adopt 8 rule contrary to public policy, it must be concluded
in answer to your third cuestion that there may be no dis
criminatory provisions in contracts with married teachers.
In your fourth question you ask if school trustees in
order to evade the tenure law may hire married teachers or
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any other teachers on a day to day basis*
Section 75-1632,

Subsection 2 of

1947# makes It the duty of a school

board to enter into written contracts with all teachers*
Section 75-2401* R.C.M*, 1947* establishes the public policy
in this state that a teacher shall acquire tenure rights
after having taught for three consecutive years in any school
district in the state*

In McBride vs* School listrict No* 2
\

Ô6 Mont* 110, 290 Pac. 252, it was held that the provisions of
the tenure law ’^became a part of the contract of employment and
were binding upon both the teacher and the board of trustees.**
In Public School District vs. Holson, 31 Ariz. 291, 252 Pec. 509,
it was held that the trustees of a school district did not
have the power to write into a contract a provision for dis
missal at pleasure*
It is therefore my opinion?
1* The trustees of a school district have the authority
to employ any teacher they see fit and have a discretionary
power in the employment of a married teacher providing the
teacher does not have tenure rights.
2,

School trustees do not have the authority to provide

in a contract that a teacher must relinquish her position should
she marry during the term of the contract*
3.

No provisions may be included in teachers’ contracts

discriminatory to married teachers*
4*

School trustees do not have the power to employ

married teachers on a day to day basis for the purpose of
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evading the,teachers’ tenure law, nor do they have the power
to employ single teachers In such a manner#

Very truly yours.

ARNOLD H# OLSEN
Attorney General
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Opinion 15 - 1955

Held;

A district superintendent of schools who hea served

two successive terms in a district may thereafter be appointed
to a three-year term by the board of trustees» Section 754140 ,

1947 # does not limit succeeding terms to one

year.
May 2S, 1955
Miss Mery M, Condon
State Superintendent of Public Instruction
State Capitol Building
Helena, Montana
Dear Miss Condon;
You have asked my opinion on the following question;
"If a District Superintendent of Schools has
served two successive terras, may be thereafter
be appointed for a three-year term, or are
succeeding terras limited to one year by Section
75-4140 , R.C.M,, 1947?”
The section in question, Section 75-4140, supra, provides;
"District Superintendent of Schools. The board of
trustees of any school district may appoint a
superintendent of schools for a terra not to exceed
three years* After his second successive election,
his contract shall thereafter be deemed renewed
for a further terra of one (1) year, and successively
thereafter for like terras of one (1) year each,
unless the board of trustees shall by majority
vote of its members give written notice to such
superintendent on or before the first day of Feb
ruary of the last year of his current terra that
his services will not be required after the expir
ation of his existing contract.”
Your inquiry primarily is whether the provision for
successive one-year renewals is a limitation upon the terra
for which contracts may be granted by the board of trustees

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

■«210—
or only a tenure provision giving the superintend®rt « right
to renewal of his eontrüct»
The present form of Section 74*4140, supra, was enacted
by Chapter 66, Lews of 1943.

Prior to that time, the statute

(originally passed es Section 39, Chapter 14S, tews of
1931,) reed as followsi
**listrlct Superintendent of Schools* The board
of trustees of any school district may appoint
a superintendent of schools his contract shall
thereafter be deemed renewed for a further term
of one (1) year, and successively thereafter for
like terms of on® (1) year, each, unless the board
of trustees shall by a majority vote of its
members give written notice to such superintendent
on or before the 1st é ry of F*@bruary of the last
year of his current term that his services will
not be required after the expiration of his
existing contract***
The 1943 ^ct made two basic changes *
(1)

It extend®^! the permissible term for which contracts

could be granted by the board of trustees to three years.
(2)

It provided that the superintendent *s rights to «

renewal of his contract should not be effective until he had
served two consecutive terms instead of one as bad been
provided by Chapter 140, taws of 1931*
In connection with the second point, it should be noted
that èt the time the 1943 law was passed, the case of State
ex rel. Howard vs. Ireland, 114 Hont# 406, 136 fac. (2d)
569 , was before the Supreme Court of tMontana.

The relator

in that action contended, and was upheld in his contention
by the Court, that the contract renewal provision of Section
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the contract renewal provision of Section 75-4140, supra
granted him tenure and that although it was not specifically
so stated in the law, he could not be discharged without formal
notice end hearing.
Although the Supreme Courtes decision was not handed down
until after the legislature had adjourned, It is evident that
the law was passed in anticipation of the result.

The change

in the contract renewal provision was quite plainly designed
to withhold the tenure right until the superintendents had
completed two terms in the district instead of the previous
one term.
In the light of its history, it is evident ."that the oneyear renewal provision was originally enacted and thereafter
ontinued by the legislature as a right and privilege of the
superintendent and not es a limitation on the terra of the
contract which could be given him by the board of trustees
after hia second successive contract had expired.
The first sentence of Section 75-4140, supra, is the only
limitation on the contracting power of the board of trustees,
and provides that the maximum permissible length of the con
tract shall be three years.

The trustees, if they see fit,

may grant a three-year contract to any district superintendent
regardless of the number of previous terms he has served in
the district.
It is therefore my opinion that a district superintendent
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of schools who has served two successive terms in a district
may thereafter be appointed to a three-year term by the '
board of trustees*

Section 75-4140| R.C.M*, 1947» does not

limit succeeding terms to one year#

Very truly yours,

ARNOLD H# OLSm
Attorney General
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Opinion 26 - I955

Reldî

1*

A teacher or principal who has acquired a tenure

right by virtue of employment for three consecutive years
may be deprived of this right only for legal cause*
2.

A school board in taking the right of tenure from a

teacher must observe the following provisions of the law;
a. The school board shall, on or before the first day
of April, give notice in writing to the teacher
that his (or her) services will not be required
for the ensuing year;
b# The school iboerd, if requested by the teacher, shall
declare clearly and explicitly the specific reason
or reasons for the failure to re»employ such teacher;

3*

e*

The school board, If requested by the teacher, shall
grant a hearing and reconsideration **of such dis
missal" to such teacher;

d.

The school board must hold such hearing and reconsider
its action within ten days after receipt of such
request*

At the hearing before the board of trustees, evidence must

be offered to substantiate the written charges with the right
of cross examination on the part of the teacher and the teacher
given the right to present evidence to refute the charges*
4#

On an appeal to the county superintendent, an additional

opportunity of presenting evidence with the right of cross
examination is granted to both parties and a written record
should be made of all testimony, including a written decision
on the part of the county superintendent, which record may be
used on an appeal to the State Superintendent of Public
Instruction*
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July a, 1955 •

Mr, S, Gardner Brownlee
County Attorney
Ravalli County ‘
Hamilton, Montana
Dear Mr, Brownlee:
You have requested my opinion concerning the rights of a
teacher and the power of the board cf trustees in the discharge
of a teacher with tenure rights#

You also ask how hearings

shall be conducted both before the board of t mstees and on
an appeal to the county superintendent of schools#
The statute which gives to a teacher tenure rights is
Section 75-2401 , R#C.M., 1947» which reads in part as follows:
^After the election of any teacher or principal
for the third consecutive year in any school
. district in the state, such teacher or principal
so elected shall be deemed re-elected from year
to year thereafter at the sane salary unless the
board of trustees shall by majority vote of its
members on or before the first day of April give
notice in writing to said teacher or principal
that he has been re-elected or that 'his services
will not be required for the ensuing year, but
in this written notice, the board of trustees
if requested by the teacher or principal, must
declare clearly and explicitly the specific reason
OP reasons for the failure of re-employment of
such teacher. The teacher or principal, if he so
desires, shall be granted a hearing and re-con
sideration of such dismissal, before the board
of trustees of that school district. The request
for a hearing and reconsideration must be mad©
in writing and submitted to the board of school
trustees within ten (10) days after receipt of
notice of dismissal. The board of trustees must
'
hold a hearing and reconsider its action within
ten days after receipt of such request for a
hearing and reconsideration,
A recent Montana case, State ex rel, Saxtorph vs. District
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Court, Mont#

275 fac* (2d) 209, 11 St* Rep* 4^0, considered

end interpreted the ebove-quoted statute and said*
«In taking the right of tenure frcsa a teacher
the law provides that certain steps shall be taken:
(1) The school board shall, on or before the last
day of April, give notice in writing to the teacher
that hi#.(or her) services will not be required for
the ensuing year;
(2) The school board, if requested by the teacher
shall declare clearly end explicitly the specific
reason or reasons for the failure to re-employ
such teacher;
(3) The school board, If requested by the teacher,
shall grant a hearing end reconsideration »of such
dismissal* to such teacher;
(4) The school board must hold such hearing and
reconsider its action within ten days after
receipt of such request*"
The court also made the following statement which Is
pertinent to the questions presented by you:
"The right of a school teacher to teach in a school, or
school district from year to year, after having taught
in such school or school district for three consecu
tive years, is called tenure* A teachers tenure is a
substantial, valuable and beneficial right which
cannot be taken ®v;ay except for good cause*"
In State ex rel* TJagle vs* Sullivan, 9^ Mont* 425, 40 Pac* (2d
995, our court construed cause for removal of a public officer
in the following language:
«This phrasé *for cause,* as used in this connection,
means for reasons wî^ich the law and sound public policy
recognize as sufficient warrant for removal..,that is
*legal cause*,,.and not merely a cuaae which the
appointing power, in the exercise of discrection,
may deem sufficient.,*"
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The manner ojf

,

•

th© hearing before the bverd of

troateod lor the dismissal of » superintendent of schools wes
discussed in the css® of Howard vs* Ireland# 114 »*4ont* 4SÔ, 13d
l^ac* (2d) 569* In this eas© th® court expressed the following
guiding principle®!
*At a hearing# if such is required# there would
need to be chargee preferred so that the subject
of inquiry be known# end adequate notice to give
the accused opportunity to prepare for and attend
the meeting to refute the charge® made# ^t such
hearing# evidence should be taken; witnesses should
be interrogated# with opportunity ;for cross examina*
tioaj all to the purpose of determining in a manner
Judicial the truth or falsity of the charges made*#*"

As Section 75-2401, E.C#n## 1947# provide® that# *#,
the board of trustee® # if requested by the teacher or principal#
au3t dealer® clearly and explicitly the specific r^.ason or
reasons for the failure of re*e%ploymmt *#.** # this provision
furnishes the written charges against the teacher and the
hearing m3s% be held within ten days after receipt of « request
for & hearing* The charges made must be substentirted by
evidence with the rlqfet In the teacher to relute the cherisa
with evldenc® offered In defense#
The hearing before the county superintendent # which is
authorised under Section 75-151Ô#

of « review or m appeal#
Ireland# supra#

1947# is in the nature

This wes recognised in Howcrd vs#

Section 75-151^# supra# authorizes an appeal

from the decision of the county superiatendmt to the Stcte
Superintondont of Publie Instruction,

This statute defines the
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r©cor<ît which is corttfiâd to tbs Steto Sypsrintondont, es
« full wrltt©» et®te*8ent of the facts# togjathcr with the tes-»
timony end the décision of the county miperlntmdent.

There

fore it is the duty of the comty superintendent to have made
s complete stenographic trenecript of ell testimony end s
copy of «11 papers end exhibits used et the hearing*
The fact that the hearing before the board snd the appeals
era before m sdmlnlstretlve board end edministretive officers
precludes the application of judicial procedure end rules of
evidence#

However# the burden of substsntlsting the chergcs

before the board is m the board# end the burden of proof
on ApiMPl Is cm the appellent#

These conclusions ere la

accord with the general pTectlce of the courts end may be used
as guides la the p*oce©dings before school authorities#
It is therefore my opinion î
1.

A teach, r or principal who he# esquired a tenure

right by virtue of employment for tbreo coosecutivo years

msy be deprived of this right only for legal cause#
2#

A school board in taking the right of tenure from a

teacher must observe the following provisions of the lew;
a* The school board shall# on or before the 1st day
of April# give notice in writing to the teacher that
that his {or her) services will not be required for the
ensuing yesr|
b# The school boerd# if requested by the teacher#
shall declare clearly and explicitly the specific
reason or reasons for the failure to re-employ such

teacher;
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c. The school boord, if requested by the teacher,
shall grant a hearing a reconsideration "of such
dismissal** to such teacher: ;
d* The school board must hold such hearing and
reconsider its action within ten days after receipt
of such request*
3* At the hearing before the board of trustees, evidence
must be offered to substantiate the written charges with the
right of cross examination on the part of the teacher and
the teacher given the right to present evidence to refute the
charges*
4* On an appeal to the county superintendent, an addi
tional opportunity of presenting evidence with the right of
cross examination is granted to both parties end a written
record should be made of all testimony, including a written
decision on the part of the county superintendent, which record
may be used on an appeal to the State Superintendent of Public
Instruction*
Very truly yours,
ARMQLD H* OLS^i
Attorney General
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VII

BUDGETS M D LEVIES
Opinion 112 - I946
Held*

The ten-mill levy provided for in Section 1203,

1935; as emended by Chapter 51, Laws of 1945, does not relate
to high schools end may not be levied for high school purposes.
January 5, 1946
Kr. Thomas Dignan
County Attorney
Valley County
Glasgow, Montana
Deer Mr, Dignan:
You have requested my opinion concerning the application
of the ten-mill levy provided for in Section 1203, R.C.M.,
1935 , es amended by Chapter 51, Laws of 1945, to the budget

of the Glasgow high school.
Section 1203, as ©mended, supra, provides for a "reserve '
fund for maintaining the elementary and high schools of the
district from July first to November thirtieth, of the next
succeeding school year."

The section also states:

"The board of county commissioners shall thereupon
levy a special tax for such purposes, not exceeding
ten mills per dollar on the taxable property of the
district.**"
This section was construed by this office in Volume 15,
page 1G6, Report end Official Opinions of the Attorney General,
wherein it was held that the ten mill levy does not relate
to high schools and does not become available to such schools
as a source of revenue.

I refer you to that opinion for the
-221m '
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reeaonlng therein contained with which I agree*
A high school is also preclWW from such levy by the
high school budget act which fixas the limitâtion on the
hi(sh school budget end also oa the county-wide high school
levy#

In Volume 20, pegs 254# Beport end Ofrieiel Opinions

of the Attorney General, high school budgets end the levy
for high schools were considered by this office» The above
cited opinion covers the budgets for the school years 19431944 end 1944^1945» sad the budgets for the school years

1945-1946 and 1946-1947 will have the edventage of Chapter
133, Laws of 1945»,which permits s thirty per cent increase
of the limitation on a high school budget and a resulting
increase of the special high school tax as provided by Section
1 2 6 3 # 11»

» 1935»

as

am ended#

It is to be noted that Section 1263*5, R#3*W#, 1935»
as emended fixes the limitations on high school budgets, but '
these limitations are increased for the years 1943-1944 end
1944-1945 by Chapter 191, laws of 1943, and for the yeors

1945-1946 and 1946-1947 by Chapter 133, Laws of 1945.

Any

increase of a high school budget beyond the above noted limita
tions fâtast be met by an additional levy for high school purposes
after submitting the question at ©a election as Section 1263,5
as amended » proddes in p:?rt:
*’*••provided further, that nothing herein contained
shall be constried as preventing any school district
fr<m voting upon itself an additional levy for high
school purposes, la accordance %dLth the general school
laws pertaining to the voting of additional levies by
by school districts,®
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It is therefore SQT opinion
provided for in Section 1203,

the tm-mill levy
1935t ea emended by

Chapter 51, laws of 1945# doe# not relate to high schools
end

not be levied for high school purposes*
Sincerely yours,

a. V, büTTUE'ïLY,
Attorney General
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Opinion l U - 1946
Held*

The reserve fund for meintalning high schools from

July 1 to December 1 of each year is to be considered as e
part of, and included in the maximum budget es fixed by
Section 1263 *5 » R*C*M*, 1935, ®s amended by Chapter 64 ,
Laws of 1941 , end the two-year increase of 30^ allowed
under Chapter 133, Laws of 1945#
April 25 , 1946
Mr* Ernest Z# Fenton
County Attorney
Treasure county
Kyshsm, Montana
Dear Mr* Fenton*
You have requested my opinion on the question of whether
or not the amount of the reserve fund for maintaining a high
school from July 1 to December 1 must be included in the
maximum budget for high schools*
In your letter you point out that if the reserve fund
is not included in the maximimi ©mount allowed for high
schools under the provisions of Section 1263*5, R*G*M*,
1935 88 amended by Chapter 64 , Laws of 1941, and the emer

gency Increase of thirty per cent permitted by Chapter 133,
Laws of 1945, ® substantially larger amount of money vdll be
availeble for the operation of your high school*
Section 1263 .2 , R.C.M*, 1935, sets out the preliminary
budget form, and in Part I of the form appears the item
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«Cash Reserve Required to Maintain High School from July 1
to December 1 of Following Tear***

Section 1263*5, R.C*M,, 1935,

as amended, provides the totâl amount appropriated in Part I
of the preliminary budget shall not exceed the maximum fixed
by that section#

As the reserve fund is a portion of Part

I, it necessarily follows the reserve fund is to be included
in fixing the maximum budget for a high school*
You call attention to Section 1203, R,C#M#, 1935, as
amended by Chapter 51, Laws of 1945, which provides school
trustees shall certify the amount needed by the district
schools to the county commissioners, and it Is specifically
stated the amount of money needed as a reserve fund shall be
separately certified by the trustees* You suggest this
section means the reserve fund is to be included in the final
budget and not the preliminary*

The purpose of Section

1203, as amended, as I view It, is to assure that a school
levy will be made each year by having before the county
comml8sloners certificates of the amounts necessary to be
raised by taxation.

Such certificates would take the place

of the final budget, If the latter were not presented on or
before the second Monday in August, the final date for it to
be filed with the commissioners*

That the final budget la

controlling,is recognized by Section 1203, es amended, in
that section recites;
«That the budget of any school district, after the
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same la finally approved and adopted, shall be deemed
end considered to be In lieu of and to take the place
of such certificates* Such reserve fund shall not
exceed thirty five per centum (35^) of the amount
appropriated in the final end approved budget of the
district for the then current school years.**
It is therefore my opinion the reserve fund for main
taining high schools from July 1 to December 1 of each year
is to be considered as a part of, and included in the maximum
budget 83 fixed by Section 1263*3, R.C.M*, 1933, as amended
by Chapter 64, Laws of 1941, and the two-year Increase of
thirty per cent allowed under Chapter 133, Laws of 1943*
Sincerely yours,
H. V* BOTTOmi
Attorney General
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Cpinion Ro. 171 H«Idf

yuads fitf W trmtt^rrml irm thd

bulXrfia* mû

elteretloA#* Itm ©f « #ehool biMgat, to the lat#r#tt mû ©inking
fund d^5rle,î tbe flmoal ye#r*

jfuak* ati#
Kf# lYod C. 0«,bri#l
Gwmty Attorney
lliilllp» SoîJity
Kelt© I Kontm#

tm r Kr# Gabriel i
Too have reoueeted «y oploloa e#*lag if fmda may b&
treaeferrsd from # #ohool f^letrlet h n iliin g fund to the Interest
and «Inking fund.
In your letter you refer to Gestion» 120# to 1210,
1935, wblob seetions provide for e buildioi^ mû r^mlshlnj?
füM end treaefer of funds. Thase section» were enaotod
prior to the budget lew fur schod district», end insofar as
there I» » conflict the budget law would cwtrol end work tn
Implied rejseal of tfe^ «erlier section»#

.Section 1019#3,

1535, set» cut the feu«'!s»t form lor school district» end provMea
for ^new billdlaig» end elter-fctlou® (not financed fr.# s»l® of
bond».}"
Gvctloa 1019.17, K.J.:4., 1935, provide» epproprirtluna
shell elapse at the <r$d of the echo ^1 ye&T# Thu» t!ï©re Is no
building fund which »ccLmul<,te@ frÆ yeer to yecr, t :t only
such Wilding fu'wl. an Is provi<.cf" in each h';df;et fwr one
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fiscal year*

(See Opinion Ko* 235» Volume 20, Report end

Official Opinions of the Attorney General*)
Section 1019*15# R*G#M,, 1935# authorizes the transfer of
ft part of the appropriation from one item to another, but this
can be done only during the fiscal year when it appears that
there is an excess appropriation for one item and a deficiency
in another*

(State v* District Court, 95 Mont* 230, 26 Pec.

(2d) 345.)
It is well to keep in mind the provisions of Section 3
of Article XIII of the Montana Constitution, which provides
”A11 moneys borrowed by or on behalf of the state
or any county, city, town, municipality or other
subdivision of the state, shall be used only for
the purpose specified in the law authorizing the
loan*”
This provision of our constitution would preclude any transfer
being made fi*oia the funds realized from the sale of bonds.
It is therefore my opinion, excess funds may be transferred
from the "new buildings and alterations" item of a school
budget to the Interest end sinking fund during the fiscal year.
Sincerely yours,
E. V* SUÎTUMLI,
Attorney General
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Opinion 177 - 1946
Held*

A school district does not have the power to use the

proceeds of â bond issue which was issued for the purpose of
constructing a workshop to be used in conjunction with the
schools of the district in the remodeling of m old swimming
pool Into a workshop and the construction of a new swimming
pool,
July 1* 1946
Mr* Ernest A, Peterson
County Attorney
Gallatin County
Bozeman, Montana
Dear îhr* Peterson;
You have requested my opinion asking If funds realized
from the sale of school district bonds issued for the purpose
of enlarging a schoolhouse may be used to convert a swimming
pool into a workshop and build a new swimming pool in the
place of the old* The construction of the workshop was the
original purpose of the bond issue.

Section 3 of Article

XIII of the Montana Constitution provides;
"All moneys borrowed by or on behalf of the state or
any county, city, town municipality or other sub
division of the state, shall foe used only for the
purpose specified in the law authorizing the loan,"
The above quoted would prohibit the use of the money for
any other purpose than the construction of the workship.
Section 1224,22,

1935, contains the same provisions as

the Constitution, and said section reads in part as follows:
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"All moneys ©rising from the sal© of such
bonds shall be paid to the county treasurer
and by him credited to the school district
issuing the same, end shall be immediately
available for the purpose for which the
bonds were Issued and no other purposes*"
While the indirect result of the proposed plan would
result in the construction of a workshop, yet a portion
of the money would be diverted to the construction of a
swimming pool, and thus violate both the Constitution and
the statutory prohibition against the use of the proceeds of
a bond sale for a purpose other than that for which the bonds
were issued*
The fact that the contemplated action may be in the best
interest of the county or school district is not an admissible
argument*

The doctrine of expediency does not enter into the

construction of statutes.

(Freaizke v* Fergus County,

Kont*

150, 15a, 245 Pec, 962 *>
It is therefore ray opinion that under the constitutional end
statutory provisions a school district does not have the power
to use the proceeds of a bond issue which was issued for the
purpose of constructing a workshop to be used in conjunction
with the schools of the district in the remodeling of an old
swimming pool into a workshop and the construction of a new
swlauning pool*

Sincerely yours,
R. V. huTTuMLY
Attorney General
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Opinion 17Ô • 1946
Held*

The schedule found in Section 7 of Chapter 152, Laws

o f 1941f as emended by Chapter 169, Laws of 1943, and Chapter

116, Lews of 1945, applies only to the computation of the
amount paid to parents or guardians of students who receive
such payments instead of bus transportation and the portion
of budgets for bus transportation paid by the county end the
school districts if fixed by the actual amounts called for
in the budgets*
July 5, 1946
Mr* R* McKenna
County Attorney
Fergus County
Lewistown, Montana
Deer Mr# McKenna*
You have requested my opinion asking if the transportation
budgets shall be computed according to the schedule fixed by
Section 7 Chapter 152, Laws of 1941» as amended by Chapter 169,
Lews of 1943, end Chapter 116, Laws of 1945# You advise me
that the county commissioners have made levies in accordance
with the above schedule and that the amounts so provided have
not been sufficient to meet the requirements of the transpor
tation budgets as submitted by the various boards of school
trustees within your county*
Under Section 14, Chapter 152, Laws of 1941, as amended by
Chapter 189, Laws of 1943, It is made the duty of school trustees
to provide complete transportation budgets for both elementary
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end high schools*
Ssch school district and each county high school is
reimbursed *^in an aaount not to exceed one-third (1/3) of
the actual cost of transportation from the state public school
general fund, under the provisions of Section I3 of Chapter
152 , Laws of 1941 , as amended by Chapter 1#9, Laws of 1943*

This provision of the law was construed in an opinion of this
office,, 1* e*. Opinion Ho* 120, Volume 21, Report and Official
Opinions of the Attorney General, wherein it was held:
"The State of Montana must pay to the school
district one-third the cost of transportation
by school buses in accordance with the schedule
fixed by the Board of Education as provided in
. Section 1200*0, R.C.M*, 1935* and also the state
must pay to the district one-third of the amount
paid to parents or guardians in lieu of bus
transportation as provided in Section 7 of
Chapter 152, Laws of 1941* ®s amended by Chap
ter!G9, Laws of 1943# and Chapter 116, Laws of
1945 , end the fact the per capita cost is
higher in one class than the other will not
change the method of computing the amount of
the state’s reimbursement to the school
district*"
From the above quoted it is apparent the contribution by
the state for bus transportation is limited and fixed by the
schedule promulgated by the State Board of Education. The
amount thus paid by the state as reimbursement for bus trans
portation might well differ from one-third the actual cost
because of the use of the schedule referred to#
School districts which furnish transportation for ele
mentary schools are entitled, under Subsection (b) of Section
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13» Chapter 152, Lswa of 1941, as amended by Chapter 1#9,
iawa of 1943, to reimbursement of one-third of the actual
cost of transportation from the common school fund provided
by the tax levy made in accordance with the provisions of
Section 1202, Revised Codes of Montana, I935 . The levy
provided by Section 1202 is a county-wide levy of not more
than eight mills and in the event such levy is not sufficient
to meet the requirements of the various district budgets,
the county commissioners are not arthorized to make en
additional levy.

Opinion No. 243, Volume 20, Report end

Official Opinions of the Attorney General.
The foregoing sets out the provisions for two-thirds of
the elementary school transportation budgets, end the re
maining one-third, end any deficiencies from the State of
Montana and the common school fund, are met by the school
district under the provisions of Subsection 1, Section 14 of
Chapter 152, Laws of 1941, as amended by Chapter 189, Laws of
1943 , which allocates the funds realized from a maximum levy

of ten mills authorized by ChsjÆer 51, Laws of 1945, to such
purposes.

If the amount available from such ten mill levy is

not sufficient, then, under Subsection 2, Section I4 , of Chapter
152 , Laws of 1941 , S3 amended by Chapter 189, Laws of 1943,

an additional levy against the property of the district may
be authorized by the qualified electors of the district.
Both district and county high schools receive reimbursements
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1

-,

from the state for one-third of ,their transi>ortstion budgets
as computed according to the previously indicated manner.

The

balance of high school transportation budget is provided by
a county wide tax levy which is not limited in amount as
Subsection (b) of Section 14, Chapter 1$2, Laws of 1941, as .
emended by Chapter 189, Laws of 1943 reads:
"...The county commissioners, except as herein
after provided, shall make a county-wide levy
of such number mills as will raise such total,*
The schedule found In Section 7 of Chapter 152, Laws of
1941, as amended by Chapter 189, Laws of 1943, has no appli
cation to the cost of operating school buses as Section 7
provides in part:
"The board of trustees may pay to the parents
or legally appointed guardian of each child,
eligible to transportation under this act,
board or rent or provide transportation under
for the child, the amount called for under the
following schedule in lieu of fumishiniT bus
transportation,*
From the emphasized portion of tho above quoted, it is
apparent that the schedule found in Section 7 fixes the amounts
paid to parents or guardians of students who do not receive
transportation on the school buses, but receive such cash
payments as a substitute for actual transportation.
It is therefore my opinion that the schedule found in
Section 7 of Chapter 152, Laws of 1941, as amended by Chapter
189, Laws of 1943, and Chapter 116, Laws of 1945, applies only
to the computation of the amount paid to parents or guardians

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

of students who receive such payments instead of bus trans
portation paid by the county and the school districts and
the portion of budgets for bus transportation paid by the
county and the school districts if fixed by the actual
amounts called for la the budgets»
Sincerely yours,
a, V, BLMiiauur,
Attorney General
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Opinion I85 - 1946
Hold}

The board of trustees of an elementery school district

may finance the purchase of a school site, which has been
epproved by the electorate, by either providing in the school
budget for such an appropriation item, or by using the funds
realized from the compensation paid for the destruction of
the school to be replaced*
July 31, 1946
Mr# Frank J# Roe
County Attorney
Silver Bow County
Butte, Montana
Dear Mr. Roe:
You have requested my opinion concerning the following
facts which were thoroughly discussed at a conference in this
office on July 29, 1946.

There were present at this conference

representatives of the budget board and school trustees of
School District Ko. 1, Silver Bow County, the county super*
intendant, the State Superintendent of Public Instruction and
representatives of interested citizen of Silver Sow County.
The procedure herein sot forth was suggested at this meeting
by this office as proper under the pertinent statutes involved,
and agreed to by all parties present.
School District Ko. 1 of Silver Bow County contemplates
the purchase of a new elementary school site, the acquisition
of iifhich.aita was approved by the qualified voters at an election.
The necessity for acquiring the site arises from the fact that
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#

two schools were destroyed due to the undermining of the schools
end shifting of the buildings so that they, together with
their lands, must be abandoned#

Compensation was paid for

the injury to the schools and thè money so paid is held as a
trust fund* The trustees asked the manner of payment for the
new school site*
While negotiations for the purchase of the new school
site were entered into prior to June 30th, yet payment could
not be made under the school budget in force at the time of
such negotiations as there was no appropriation made in the
budget for this purpose.

(Section 1019*16, R*C*M*, 1935*)

An emergency was declared by the board of trustees, but

there was not sufficient compliance with Chapter 134» Laws
of 1945, which emended Section 1019*16, R.C.M., 1935» to per
mit such an appropriation*
The new budget which is now being prepared could provide
for the purchase of the new school site, which has been
approved by the qualified electors*

Item II of Section 1

of the school budget which is set out in Section 1019*3» R.C.M*,
1935, provides for "new buildings and alterations (not
financed from sale of bonds)." This has been construed by
this office to be broad enough to include the purchase of
additional land for school purposes*

(Opinion No. 118,

Volume 21, Report end Official Opinions of the Attorney
General*}

Any surplus available from the previous budget
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would be available in the new budget to pay this item end thus
not filter the necessary appropriations In the new budget*
Another alternative - and perhaps the best • for the payment
for the new school site Is to utilize a portion of the funds
realized from the settlement for damages to the schools
that were destroyed*

The funds in question are analogous

to the moneys realized from insurance on a school which has
been destroyed by fire.

In the case of State ex rel* Diederichs

V* Board of Trustoes, 91 Mont. 300, 7 Pec, (2d) 543» the Court
said:
"Her© the Indebtedness Incurred for a county high
school buMing by the issuance of bonds was regu
larly approved by the people and the indebtedness
so incurred is drawing interest* In consequence
of the fire, the county is now without benefit*
The fire converted the building into money avail
able only for the reconstruction of the high school*•
"The fire has resulted in reconverting the
building into money* Instead of the building, the
county now holds the ruins o f the building and the
insurance money collected**,and in the meantime un
til the building is reconstructed, the county is
put to expense and inconvenience in maintaining
its high school#*
The money realized from the settlement is trust funds,
earmarked for the construction of a school to replace the
schools destroyed* The land on which the old schools were
located is valueless for the construction of a new school,
end in order to build a new school it will b© necessary to
procure a new site*

The use of the trust funds for the pur

chase of s new sit© would carry out the purpose of the trust
end be in no way a variance from the obligations of the trust*
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Th« Supreme 06urt of Georgle In tho esse of Conley v#
Ro^orof 169 G»* $$p 149 3,&« 699, considered a similar problm
and ©aid*
is strongly urged by able counsel for the
defendenta that the aum of 1^21,000, resulting
from the removal and destruction of tho school
building, c m properly be uaed by the trustees
of Reidsville school district in discharging
any proper and just obllgetloo of that district*
We cannot concur In that argument, but are con
strained to hold that the proceeds accruing
from the destruction of the building, whether
consisting of insurance or any salvage that
might have been saved from the Wilding, Is
by Inw placed in special trust of the trustees
of the school district, for the sole purpose
of replecing « school building for that dis
trict, either upon the site wnere the building
formerly stood or some other site purchased
by the board of trustees as the location of ®
nmf school building*.***

.Under the present budget, law it is oontwplated that
expenditures for the construction of school buildings shall
be financed by the issuance of bonds with the result that the
tax burden will be spread out over a period of years and not
constitute an unreasonable tax bidden for any one ye^-r# If
the purchase of tho school site la made from the trust funds
and the balance of the mon ys necessary for the construction
of the schools raised by a bond issue, the tax burden will b^
distributed over the period of the terras of the bonds*

Also

such use of the trust funds will permit the funds available
in the new budget to be used to better advantage as the cost
of malnt^ance m d opérât 1)0 of schools has greatly increased*
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The teachers, officers end employees of schools, due to the
increased cost of living, are entitled to additional compen
sation for their services, with the result that school budgets
must meet such justifiable demands*
It is therefore my opinion that'the board of trustees
of an elementary school district may finance the purchase
of a school site, which has been approved by the electorate,
by either providing in the school budget for such an appropdation item, or by using the funds realized fpom the compensation
paid for the destruction of the school to be replaced*

Sincerely yours,

H* V* BUTTvlILY
Attorney General
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Opinion 191 - 1946

Heldî

Funds for the operetion and maintenance of Junior

colleges may be provided for under Chapter 153, Laws of
1939, by inclusion of the necessary amount in the high
school budget/ or by charging tuition for each student, which
tuition should not exceed $125.00 per year.

Both of these

methods may be followed simultaneously in raising the neces
sary funds.
August 9, 1946
Mr.
W. Popham
County Attorney
Dawson County
Qlendive, Montana
Dear Kr. Pcphamj
You have requested ray opinion concerning the method of
providing for the annual expenses of a Junior college.
Junior colleges may be established under the provisions of
Chapter 15&, Laws of 1939.

Section 9 of Chapter 153 reads

as follows:
’’The county high school board or district high
school board shall be authorised to include in
their budget a sufficient sum to operate and
maintain the Junior college departments as herein
provided, the amount of such budget to be left to
their determination. Such boards are also em
powered in their discretion, when they shall deem
it necessary, to charge tuition at a maximum rate
of not exceeding one hundred twenty-five and no/lOO
($125.00) dollars per year for attendance at Junior
colleges established under the terms of this act."
From the above it is apparent thatbvo sources of revenue
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«r« evellebie far th# operftlcm end îseinteïîencô of the junior
eolX«ga ilepertmmt#

Flrat* the boerd of trustee® of the high

school may provide la their budget for such expenses end a
levy made la the seme manner as e levy for high echool pur

poses* The second method la to charge tuition which cannot
exceed |I25*00 per year for each pupil attending the junior
college*
The use of the phrase **tne amount Oi such budget to be
left to their determination* indicates that tho legislature
does not contemplate limiting the neoesaary funds for the
operation and maintenance of the junior college end gave
broad discretionary powers to the board in fixing the budget
for junior colleges*
It Is therefore my opinion that funds for the operation
and mslntenaoee of junior colleges may be provided under
Chapter 15&, Lawe of 1939, by inclusion of the necessary
amoimts in the high school budget and/or by charging tuition,which
shall not exceed $123*00 for each student per year#

Both of

these methods may be followW simultaneously in raising the
necessary funds*
Sincerely yours,
&* V* iîoTt'UïlY

Attorney Oeneral
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Opinion 200 - 1946
*.

Heldî

Outstanding warrants of a school district at the end

of a fiscal year which have not be^n presented for payment,
although there are sufficient funds, are paid from the funds
of the budget of the

prior year and not included

subsequent budget as

an item of expense*

in

the

August 2Ô, 1946
Mr* Edison W* Kent
County Attorney
Granite County
Philipsburg, Montana
Dear Mr* Kent;
You have requested my opinion concerning the Inclusion
in a current elementary school budget of the amount of out
standing warrants issued prior to the end of the last fiscal
year.

You advise me

that there were ample funds to

paythe

warrants, but the warrants were not paid because they were
not presented prior to the end of the fiscal year*
Section 1019*22, R,C*M., 1935» provides the clerk of the
district must issue warrants in triplicate and the warrants
4

must show one their faces the appropriation against which
they are drawn*

One copy is delivered to the county treasurer

end the treasurer, on receiving the copy of the warrant,
under Section 1019*23* R.C*M*, 1935» must enter the amount
of such warrant under the proper item of the appropriation
so that the unexpended balance will show at all times.
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Such procedure résulta In a partial assignment of the funds
as the treasurer who holds the funds has notice the warrant
has been Issued prior to the presentment of the warrant end
allocates the money for the payment of the warrant by his
bookkeeping entries*
Under Section 1019,10, R.C. M,, 1935, the treasurer
shows the cash on hand at the end of the fiscal year, and
such information is taken from his records.

The surplus or

cash on hand would be the unexpended balance from the prior
year end would not include outstanding warrants for which
money for their payment had been allocated.
Our Supresne Court in State v. State Board of Examiners,
74 Mont, 1, 23Ô Pac, 316, gave the following definition:
**However, a warrant is merely *sn order by which
one of competent authority authorizes another to
pay a particular sum.*"
In 14 Am, Jr. 295, the text states:
"Under the prevailing rule in equity, an order
drawn on 0 part of a particular fund then due
or to become due from the drawee to the drawer
will operate as an assignment of the fund pro
tanto and will make the drawer equitably answer
able to the payee for a failure to comply with
the order after notice thereof, irrespective of
acceptance."
Applying the above rules, it is apparent the outstanding
warrants of which the treasurer has notice and for which deductlon has been made, constitute an assignment of the funds,
which funds are those of the budget of the prior year.
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It la therefore my opinion outstending warrants of a
school district at the end of a fiscal year which have not
been presented for payment, although there are sufficient
funds, are paid from the funds of the budget of the prior
year and not included in the subsequent budget as an item
of expense#
Sincerely yours,
R# V# BvTTumi,
Attorney General
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Opinion H

- 1947

Helds

A board of school budget supervisors has no authority

1#

to assign to a county superintendent of schools the power
to approve or disapprove transfer of school district budget
items*
2» A board of trustees has authority to transfer surplus
money In the teachers* salary item to another item in which
there is a deficiency*
3*

After the adoption of the final budget, expenditures are

solely within the authority of the board of school trustees,
subject only to the provisions of the budget act, and no
authority exists in the board of budget supervisors or the
county superintendent to supervise or control expenditures*
March 7, 1947
Mr* James D# Freeboum
County Attorney
Silver Bow County
Butte, Montana
Dear Mr* Freeboum:
You have submitted for my opinion the following questions:
1. Has a board of school budget supervisors the authority
to assign to a county superintendent of schools the power to
approve or disapprove the transfer of school district budget
items?
2.

Has a board of trustees the authority to transfer

money budgeted for high school teachers* salaries to another
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^247item during the school year?
3» What power or check has e board of school budget
supervisors and the county superintendent as clerk of said
board over the extravagant or wilful spending of budget
items by a board of school trustees before the current school
year is completed?
four first question Is answered by Section 1019.15,
1935# 83 to elementary budgets, and by Section
1263.15 #

1935# 83 to high school budgets.

The pro

visions of these sections are clear end unambiguous.
*1019.15#

Section

1935 » relative to element©ry. budgets# provides :

”iShenever it appears to the clerk of any school
district that the amount appropriated for any
item in the final budget is in excess of the
amount actually required to be expended for such
item during the year for which such budget was
adopted, end that the amount appropriated for
any other item in such final budget, and payable
from the same fund, is less than the amount
which will be actually reauired for such item
during such school year, the clerk of such
school district may notify the county treasurer
in writing to transfer the excess appropriation,
or so much thereof as may be necessary, from
one (1) item to the item for which the appropria
tion is deficient, and the county treasurer must
thereof make a transfer of such amount.**
Section 1263 .15 # R.C.M., 1935# as the high school
budgets, provides:
"Whenever it appears to the board of trustees of any
school district maintaining a high school district, or of a
county high school, that the amount appropriated for any Item
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in the flnel high school budget is in excess of the amount
actually required to be expended for such item during the
year for which such budget was adopted, and that the amount
appropriated for any other item in such final budget, and
payable from the same fund, is less than the amount which
will be actually required for such item during such school
year, such board of trustees may direct the clerk to notify
the county treasurer in writing to transfer the excess
appropriation, or so much thereof as may be necessary, from
such item to the Item for which the appropriation is deficient,
and the county treasurer must thereupon make a transfer of
such amount*

Provided, however, that no transfer shall

ever be made by a county treasurer betv;een any appropriation
made in a budget for maintaining a high school or high
schools and any budget appropriation for maintaining elemen
tary grade schools in the same district*”
The only difference in the two sections, as to who shall
make the transfer, is that as to elementary budgets the clerk
is authorized upon her

otah

initiative to order the transfer,

while in the high school budget the board of trustees must
order the clerk to notify the treasurer to make the transfer*
It will be noted the only authority to cause a transfer is
placed in the clerk or the board of trustees, and upon notice
by the clerk to the treasurer, it is made mandatory on the
treasurer to make the transfer*

There is no provision in
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either statute for the approval of such transfer by the
board of budget supervisors;

such board not having the

authority could not authorize anyone else to exercise such
authority*

Without statutory provision, the budget board

or county superintendent would have no such authority*
As to your second question, Section 1263*15, R*C*M*,
1935I applicable to high school budgets, is controlling.
It authorizes the board of trustees to order the clerk to
notify the treasurer to make the transfer.

The only . -

restriction is that a transfer may be made only when it
appears that there is a surplus or excess in one fund and
a deficiency in another, and that no transfers may be mad©
between any items of the elementary budget to those of the
high school budget*

Therefore, the board of trustees would

have the right to transfer from the item of teachers* salaries
in the high school budget, when there is a surplus in such
item, to any other item In such budget where there is a
deficit*
As to your third question, whatever power or check the
board of school budget supervisors or the county superintendent
as clerk of said board may have over the spending of budget
items by a board of school trustees before the current school
year is completed, if any, must be found in the provisions of
the budget act*
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Section 1019,2,

1935# dsslgnatea the board of

county connaissioners as the board of school budget supervisors
and the county superintendent as clerk of such board,

Under

Section 1019.13* R.C.M,, 1935* th e budget board has authority
to make changes or corrections in the elementary budget deemed
necessary or proper In any item or amount contained In Sections
L, II, or III of any budget* either by eliminating or striking
out any Item or amount, or by increasing or reducing the
amount proposed to be expended for any item, and when it
appears to the budget board that any item is in excess of the
amount actually required to be expended for such item, the
board must reduce such amount to the amount actually re
quired*

However, this section then provides as follows:

"•••provided, that the budget board must, before
making any such change or correction in the pre
liminary budget of any district, afford the
trustees and clerk of the district an opportunity
to be heard thereon, and provided further, that
if et any such hearing the trustees of any district
and the budget board are unable to agree on the
amount to be expended for any such item, the
board of trustees by majority vote of all mem
bers of the board, may finally fix end deter
mine such amount, and the amount so fixed
cannot thereafter be changed by the budget
board."
Section 1263 .13 ,

1947* provides that at the

meeting of the board of school budget supervisors held on the
fourth Monday in July, such board shall have the power "to
make any change or corrections it may deem necessary or proper
in any item or amount contained in any high school budget,
either by eliminating or striking out any item or amount
contained therein, or by increasing or reducing the amount
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"221end when It appears to the budget board that the amount
proposed to be expended for any item, as shown by a pre
liminary high school budget, Is in excess of the amount
actually required to be expended for such item, the board
must reduce such amount to the amount actually required to
be expended therefor*"

This section then provides:

"#•.provided, however, that in the event the
board of budget supervisors shall reject any such
budget in whole or in part it shall cause the
reasons for its rejection to be spread upon its
minutes and a copy thereof to be immediately
furnished to the chairman of the board of trustees
which has submitted the budget, and provided
further, that no final action on said budget
shall be taken by the said board of budget
supervisors until after a hearing thereon
shall have been had, which hearing shall be
held by said board of budget supervisors on the
first Monday in August after said budgets shall
have been submitted* At said hearing the
chairman of the board of budget supervisors
or a member of that body appointed by him; the
chairman of the board of trustees of the dis
trict or coimty high school submitting such
budget or a member of the board appointed by
him; and the county superintendent of schools
shall constitute a board of review* This
board of review shall have the power and it
shall be its duty to consider such rejected
budget and to arrive at a budget by a major
ity vote which shall not be subject to further
review,"
It is therefore clear that, as to elementary budgets, the
board of trustees has the final say as to the amount to be
included in such budget, while In the high school budgets,
the board of budget supervisors, subject to review by the
board of review, composed of the chairman of the budget board,
chairman of the board of trustees of the district submitting
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the rejected budget end the county superintendent of schools,
has the final say.
However, it must be noted that the above procedure!.has
to do only with the making and adopting of the budgets and
not to expending of the amounts finally adopted in the several
budgets.

The expenditure of the budgetary itemized amounts

is exclusively within the power of the board of trustees,
subject only to the restrictions of the budget act.

Neither

the board of budget supervisors, nor the county superintendent
v ;/. ,

as such, or as the clerk ofysaid board, Is given any statu
tory authority to supervise or control expenditures.
It is therefore my opinionî
1.

A board of school budget supervisors has no authority

to assign to a county superintendent of schools the power
to approve or disapprove transfer of school district budget
items*
2#

A board of trustees has authority to transfer surplus

money in the teachers’ salary item to another item in which
there Is a deficiency.
3*

f i lt e r the adoption of the final budget, expenditures are

solely within the authority of the board of school trustees,
subject only to the provisions of the budget act, and no
authority exists in the board of budget supervisors or the
county superintendent to supervise or control expenditures
Sincerely yours,
R. V. BuTTUiUY

Attorney General
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Held:

Chapter 274# lews of 1947# suthorizes the meximum

budgets for high schools to be Increased during the next
two fiscal years by fifty per cent of the amount fixed by
Section 1263*5# R*C*M*# 1935# ®s amended by Chapter 166,
Lews of 1939, and Chapter 64, Lews of 1941, without a
special levy approved by the qualified electorate*
Funds in addition to the maximum budget above noted
may be granted by the qualified voters at an election sub
mitting the question of such additional levy#

In districts

maintaining high schools such question would be submitted
to the qualified voters of the districts#

The additional

levy for county high schools, in counties not divided into
high school building districts would be submitted to the
qualified voters of such building district#
April 2, 1947
Mr. W# W# Lessley
County Attorney
Gallatin County
Bozeman, Montana
Deer Mr* Lessley:
You have requested my opinion as to the effect of Senate

Bill 101, which has been designated Chapter 274, Laws of 1947,
in regard to high school budgets*
Chapter 274 provides the maximum for high school budgets
for the school years 1947-1948 and 1948-1949 may be increased
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fifty per cent at the discretion o f the trustees and the
budget supervisors*

By the terms of the act the computation

is based on Section 1263*5» R#0*M.» 1935, as amended by
Chapter 64, Laws of 1941# The trustees in fixing the
maximum amount will determine the permisssble maximum under
Section 1263 *5 , as amended, end then add an additional
fifty per cent. Funds received from the federal government
are excluded from the computation of the authorized maximum.
The maximum budget above mentioned is the amount that
may be expended by the trustees of a high school without
resorting to a special levy authorized by a vote of the
qualified electors.

Funds realized from a special levy would

in fact increase the amount of money available for the opera
tion and maintenance of the high schools during the next
fiscal year.
Authority for the extra levy for districts maintaining
high schools is found in Section 1263*5, R*C,M*, 1935, as
amended by Chapter 166, Laws of 1939, and Chapter 64 , Laws
of 1941 , which provides In parti
nothing herein contained shall be construed
as preventing any school district from voting
upon itself an additional levy for high school
purposes, in accordance with the general laws
pertaining to the voting of additional levies
by school districts.”
Previous to Chapter 274 (Senate Bill 101) there had been
no provision for an additional levy for county high school to
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supplement the msxlmm budgets aiîthorised hy Sectioa 1263,5,
$9 amended. Sow, under Section 2 of Chapter 274, if the trustees
of É county hi^ school find it necessary end advisshle e

special levy may be authorised by the qualified electors of
the county if such county high school is not in « county di
vided into high school building districts. The extra levy
for county high school building district must be submitted to

the qualified electors of such high school building district.
‘ In your inquiry you raised acme cuestlon cmcemlng the

effect of Section 3 of Chapter 274.

The purpose of this

section is to permit n special levy for high schools to raise
the amount necessary for the maximum budgets as fixed by
Section 1263.5, as amended, end Section 1 of Chapter 274*
Under Section 1263.11, es amended, a special seven mill high
school levy is authorised, which seven mill levy may be in
creased if seven miHs will not raise #125.00 per pupil, 8qctim 3 of Chapter 274 is broader than Section 1263.11, as
amended, in that there is no limitation of seven mills m d
such omission is necessary because of the fifty per cent
increase in the maximum budgets.

Section 3 is not to be con

strued as penaittlag any additional increase in funds for
high school budgets other than those previously mentioned in
this opinicHi.
It is therefore sy opinions
1.

Chapter 274, taws of 1947, authorises the mnxlmiaa

budgets for high schools to be increased during the next two
fiscal!years by fifty per cent of the amount fixed by Section
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1263,5, R,O.M., 1935, «s amended by Chapter 166, Laws of
1939, find Chapter .64 , Laws of 1941, without a special levy
approved by the qualified electorate,
2, Funds in addition to the maximum budget above noted
may be granted by the qualified voters at an election sub
mitting the question of such additional levy.

In districts

maintaining high schools such question would be submitted
to the qualified voters of the districts.

The schools

additional levy for county high schools, in counties not
divided into high school building districts would be sub
mitted to all of the ruallfied voters in the county, while
the cuestlon for the levy for county high schools situated in
high school building districts would be submitted to the
qualified voters of such building district.

Sincerely yours,
R. V, BÜTTOMLT
Attorney General
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Heldî

1#

Section 1204,

1935, «s emended by Chapter

272, Lews of 1947, does not apply to the apportionment of funds
realised from Section 1202,

1935, for the school year

1946-1947,
2. Funds apportioned under Section 1204,

1935, as .

emended by Chapter 2?2, Lews of 1947, are distributed to the
elementary school only, and attendance in the elementary schools
serves as the basis for such apportionment#
3* Reimbursement to elementary schools for their transportation
budgets ia made from the funds realized from the levy provided
by Section 1202, R,G*M#, 1935, as amended by Chapter 273, Laws
of 1947, before the apportionment of such funds under Section
■

•

1204, R,C*M*, 1935, as amended*
4. The period to be used in computing the ”average number
belonging" In determining the apportionment of funds for elemen
tary schools under Section 1204,

1935, as amended by

Chapter 272, Laws of 1947, is the previous school year,
April 24, 1947
Kiss Elizabeth Ireland
State Superintendent of Public Instruction
State Capitol Building
Helena, ^lontena
Dear Kiss Ireland;
you have requested my opinion concerning the Section 1204,
1935, as amended by Chapter 272, Laws of 1947, and have
asked the following questions;
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1#

Does Section 1204f as amended, apply to the apportion

ment of the common school tax for the last half of the school
year 1946-19472
2«

Are the funds apportioned to both elementary schools

and high schools under Section 1204, as amended?
3» Does Section 1204, as amended affect the reimbursement
to school districts for transportation from the proceeds of the
levy authorized by Section 1202,
Section 1204,

1935, as amended?

, 1935, as amended by Chapter 272, Lavrs

of 1947, provides*
’’All school moneys apportioned by county superintendents
of coomon schools shall be apportioned to the several
districts in proportion to the average number belonging*
In computing the average number belonging in each school
district, the gum of the aggregate attendance and the
aggregate days absence shall be divided by the number
of days school is in sessioniin the school or schools
of the district, provided however, that in computing
the aggregate days absence, pupils absent more than
three days shall be dropped from the rolls and shall
not be considered as belonging*”
In answering your first question concerning the application
of the amendment to the present school year, it is necessary to
consider the results which would follow if it were madeimmediately
effective*
The preliminary budget for elementary schools is prepared
and adopted in June and the final budget is prepared and adopted
in July*

Under Section 1019*12, R.C.M*, 1935, the tax levies for

each school district are fixed not later than the second Monday in
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Auguÿt*

The school district budget and all appropriations are

based upon the estimated revenue, Section 1019*4* R*C#M*, 1935,
« portion of which Is the funds realized from the levy provided
in Section 1202,
of 1947,

, 1935, as amended by Chapter 273, laws

If the method of computing the amount available for

each school district were altered during the current school
budget the result would be in many school districts that they
would be unable to meet their contractual obligations with
teachers, bus drivers, and other persons with whom the districts
had entered into contracts in anticipation that the method of
apportionment of revenue would not be changed*
The Montana Constitution prohibits the impairment of con
tracts

by legislation as Section 11 of Article111provides;
*Ko ex post facto law nor law impairing the obliga
tion of contracts, or making any irrevocable grant
ofspecial privileges, franchises, or immunities shall
be passed by the legislative assembly,**

Taking away all or a part of the means of the payment of the
school district’s contracts would Impair the obligation of the
contracts.

This principle is recognized in 12 Am, Jur, 21, where

the text states;
"When ever the law is so changed that the means of
enforcing the duty imposed by the contract are ma
terially impaired the obligation of the contract no
longer remains the same. Therefore, a Conëitution
or a statute impairs the obligation of a contract if
it prevents enforcement, or seriously interferes
with the enforcement of the contract, While it is
undoubted that the legislature may make changes in
the remedy, it is necessary that the contract be
left with the same force and effect, including the
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substantial means o f enforcement which existed
when it was made*®
Your second question is answered by reference to the budget
acts for both elementary and high schools, Section 1019*4*

,

1935, provides a form for the estimate of the revenue for ele
mentary schools*

One of the Items is the ®County Apportionment,

six (6) to eight (Ô) mill levy,® which is the levy provided by
Section 1202, S*C.M*, 1935, Chapter 2?3, Laws of 1947, has In
creased the levy to eight to ten mills, but the reference would
be the same*
The estimate for high schools found in Section 1263*3, a«C*M*,
1935, does not contain any reference to the six to eight mill
levy, but does provide for the apportionment of the county high
school levy*

Section 1263*11,

1935, as amended, provides

for a county wide high school levy and this is a special levy
for high school purposes which takes the place for high schools
of the levy provided la Section 1202, as amended*

The statutory

method for financing high schools does not contemplate that funds
realised from Section 1202, as amended, shall be available for their
budgets*

Chapter 272, Laws of 1947, %diich amended Section 1204,
1935, does not alter the disposition of the funds appor

tioned, but merely changes the method of computation of amount
distributed to each district*
Your third question is answered by Opinion No* l&O, Volume
20, Report and Official Opinions of the Attorney General, which
held that;
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"School districts maintaining elementary schools,
or which provide transportation to a-school in
another district, are entitled to reimbursement
from the fund provided by the tax levy author
ised by Section 1202, R.G.M*, 1935, in the
amount of one-third of the actual cost of trans
portation prior to the apportionment of the fund
under the provisions of Section 1204,
1935*"
The fact that Section 1202 has been amended by Chapter 273,
Laws of 1947, and Section 1204 has been amended by Chapter 272,
Laws of 1947# does not alter the application of the above quoted
opinion•
four fourth question concerning the period to be used in
the computation of the "average number belonging" must be
answered by reference to the practical matters which affect the
determination of daily attendance of the pupils *
In State v* Millls, Si Mont* 66, 261 Pac* 6&5, our Court saids
"Statutes are to be construed so as best to effectuate
the object of the legislature*"
was observed before in this opinion, budgets are made
for school districts in June and July and information concerning
the amount of funds from the levy provided in Section 1202, as
amended must be available at that time.

Therefore, the appor

tionment by the county superintendent must be based on the records
of attendance for the previous school year*

If the apportionment

were based on the attendance for the current school year, there
would be no records available on which to compute the amount
distributed*
Section 1076,

1935, makes it the duty of all teachers

to file an annual report with the county superintendent on or
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before the 10th day of July after the close of the school year#
This report would supply the basis for the computation of atten
dance and is the only adequate report which would meet the need
for the determination of the apportionment of the funds for the
various elementary districts#
It isI thereforeI my opinion:
1# Section 1204, R#C#M,| 1935» &s amended by Chapter 272, Laws
of 1947» does not apply to the apportionment of funds realized
from Section 1202,

1935» for the school year 1946-1947#

2, Funds apportioned under Section 1204» R#C*M,, 1935» as amended
by Chapter 272, Laws of 1947» are distributed to the elementary
schools only, and attendance in the elementary schools serves as
the basic for such apportionment#
3* Reimbursement to elementary schools for their transportation
budgets is made from the funds realized from the levy provided
by Section 1202,

1935» as amended by Chapter 273» Laws of

1947» before the apportionment of such funds under Section 1204»
R.G*H#, 1935» as amended*
4, The period to be used In computing the ^average number belong
ing" in determining the apportionment of funds for elementary school:
under Section 1204, R.C#M., 1935» as amended by Chapter 272, Laws
of 1947, is the previous school year#

Sincerely yours,

a. V# BOTTom

Attorney General
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Opinion 34 - 1947

Hôldî

Tho board of trustees of a county high school is not

authorized to pay insurance premiums in an amount in excess
of the amount appropriated for such item unless a transfer of
funds may be made in an amount sufficient to pay the premium
charge.
May 14, 1947
Mr* W, G. Gilbert, Jr.
County Attorney
Beaverhead County
Dillon, Montana
Dear Mr. Gilbert :
You have requested my opinion as to whether the board of
trustees of a county high school may pay insurance premiums
for insurance on the county high school buildings in excess
of the appropriations for the same contained in the budget.
You advised me that the county comriiissioners of your
county had renegotiated the county insurance policies end
the amount of the premiums exceeds the appropriation for
insurance in the current budget by $600.00.
Under sub-section 16 of Section 1262,03, E.G.M., 1935»
as amended by Chapter 207, laws of 1939, the board of trustees
of a county high school is given the power, and it is its duty
to transact all business and to make and execute all contracts
in the name of the county.

This section gives to the trustees

the power to make all insurance contracts.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

’«-264^
If we assume that the trustees of the high school should
ratify the contract for additional insurance and make the con
tract that of the board of trustees, the prohibition of Section
I
1263*14 ,
1935 , must still be considered* This latter
section limits expenditures or incurring of liabilities to
the amount of detailed appropriations as contained in the
budget*

However, Section 1263*13, S*C*M*, I935 authorizes

excess moneys in one item of the budget to be transferred to
an item for v/hich the appropriation is deficient, If these
two items are payable from the same fund#

This means that

transfers may be made to the insurance item from other items
contained in Section 6 of part 1 of the high school budget.
The payment of the increase in insurance premiums does
not constitute an emergency within the meaning of Section 1019*16,
R*^*M*, 1935 , as amended by Chapter 193, Laws of 1943, and Chap
ter 134 , Laws of 1945, as certain emergencies are enumerated
therein, and an increase in insurance rates is not designated
as justifying an emergency expenditure#
It is therefore, my opinion that the board of trustees of
a county high school is not authorized to pay insurance premiums
in an amount in excess of the amount appropriated for such item
unless a transfer of funds may be made in an amount sufficient
to pay the premium charge.

Sincerely yours,
K. V# BOTTüKLY
Attorney General
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Helds

the excess fund In the sslsries item of an,elementary

school budget cannot be transferred to the transportation
budget* end any excess in the transportation budget cannot
be transferred to any item in the general fund,
Juno 23, 1947
Mr, Patrick t, Donovan
County Attorney
Toole County
Shelby, Montana
Dear Mr# Donovan:
You have requested my opinion

as to whether fundsinthe

salaries item of an elementary budget may be transferred tothe
transportation budget#
Transfer among appropriations is authorized by Section
1019,15, H*G,M#, 1935, which provides:
Whenever it appears to the clerk of any school
district that the amount appropriated for any
item in the final budget Is in excess of the
amount actually required to be expended for
such item during the year for which such bud
get was adopted, end that the amount appro
priated for any other item in such final budget,
and payable from the same fund, is less than
the amount which will be actually required
for such item during such school year, the
clerk of such school district may notify
the county treasurer in writing to transfer
the excess appropriations, or so much there
of as may be necessary, from one (1) item
to the item for which the appropriation is
deficient, and the county treasurer must
thereupon make a transfer of such amount,**
It is to be noted that an excess in one appropriation
may be transferred to another when they are **payable from
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ftmd#*» Under Section 1019*3# R#G#^*, 1935 the item

th«

of «8slJ*ri08” is found In Section 1 déaignetod ^'gmorel fund

expottsod**'
A Wdgat for tronoportation la re<juir«d to be provided
under Section 14 of Cbepter 15%, lewa of 1941, «9 emended by
Chapter 169#

of 1943#

This eection, ee amended recognicea

the feet that the transportation budget Is a eepsrete budget
in that Section 14, e# emended, states in parti
"When a copy of the final elenentery budget for m y
school district is trensmitted by the county supers
Intondent of schools to the state superintendent
of schools, #9 required by Section 1019*20, It
shell be eccompenied by « copy of the treospor#
tstlon budget, if my, edopted for ouch school
district**
%il@ it is true that Section 14 of Jhspter 152, lews
of 1941# #9 amended, requires the amount of the trsnspor#

tstion budget to "be shown end included in Section 1" of the
budget, yet this does not mean that they ere "'payable from
the seme fund*"

Prior to the enactment of Chapter 152,

Lews of 1%1, trensportetlon expenses were paid from the
"general fund" but by the enectment of Chapter 152, Lews
of 1941, e new fund was crested to pey trenaportotion
charges*

thider Chapter 152 end Its amendments, additional

sources of revenue were made availible for tra^isportstion
which included reimbursements from the state public school
fund. Section 13 of Chapter 152, se emended, end an eddl-*

tionsl levy authorised by ®ufe»8octlon 2 of Section 14, Ch«p*
ter 152, Lews of 1941, es emended*

In other wonîs, the
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the transportation fund is made up in an independent manner
from the general school fund and thus cannot be considered as
the same fund*
If transfers between the general fund and the transportation
budget were permitted» the limitations of the budget system
would be defeated in that the additional levy authorized for
transportation would be utilized for operation and maintenance
contrary to the purpose for which the extra levy was granted*
Also state funds earmarked for transportation would be diverted
to other school purposes.
It is therefore my opinion that the excess funds in the
salaries item of an elementary school budget cannot be trans
ferred to the transportation budget # and any excess in the
transportation budget cannot be transferred to any item in the
general fund*
Sincerely yours,
R. V# BuTTuiaX
Attorney General
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Opinion 45
Helds

1947

Free Textbooks must be furnished in elementary schools,

but there may be no special textbook levy as Section 1199,
R*C*M., 1935, was repealed by Chapter I46 , Lews of 1931, the
elementary school budget act.

Section 119^,

1935,

was not affected by passage of the budget act. Therefore,
the item for free textbooks should be included under Item 13
of Section 1 of the budget,
July 12, 1947
Miss Elizabeth Ireland
Superintendent of Public Instruction
State Capitol Building
Helena, Montana
Dear Miss Ireland:
You have requested my opinion as to whether a special '. ?
3a vy for textbooks may be made for elementary schools under the
provisions of Section 1199, R, C. M,, 1935*
Section 119&, R,C*M,, 1935, requires all school districts
to furnish free textbooks in all schools*

Section 1199

authorizes a special tax which will raise an amount not in
excess of $3,50 per pupil for free textbooks if the general
fund of a school district is insufficient for that purpose.
Section 1199 was enacted in 1913 and lest amended in 19&5#
However the budget system for elementary schools was adopted
in 1931 , and Section 1019,3 includes textbooks as one of the
items of the general fund expenses.
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Section 1019.14 of the budget set prohibits expenditures
in excess of the final amounts fixed in the general fund of the
budgets.
The estimated revenues for each school district is made
by the county superintendent under the provisions of Section
1019.4 and the enumeration of the sources of revenue does

not include a textbook levy.

It therefore is to be concluded

that the budget act, having been enacted subseouent to Section
1199, the latter act was impliedly reperd and textbooks

must be considered as any other item of the general fund.
Also, Section 1019*7 limits the revenue for the general
fund to the estimated revenue as shown by the county super
intendent’s estimate, and any extra levy voted by the qualified
electors of the district.

This section does not recognize

the textbook levy as a possible source of income and by the
Omission eliminates it as an extra levy.

A like conclusion

was reached in Opinion Mo. 199» Volume 20, Keport and
Official Opinions of the Attorney General in regard to a
special levy for textbooks for high schools.
It is, therefore my opinion that free textbooks must be
furnished in elementary schools, but there may be no special
textbook levy as Section 1199, R.G.M., 1935» was repealed
by Chapter 146, Laws of 1931, the elementary school budget
act.

Section 1196, Revised Codes of Montana, 1935» was not

affected by passage of the budget act.

Therefore, the item
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for fro® textbook# ohouXé bo inoludod under Item IJ of
Section 1 of the budget#

Sincerely yotirs,

R# V#

mmiiv£

Attorn^ Generel
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Opinion 124 ~ 1948

Hold I Fund» re&llmed from the extra levy euthorleed by Section
2, Cbepter 274, tews of 1947, are for the sole use of the

county high school end shell not be ep|:ortloned In part to
any. district hi^h school within the county*
June 30, 1948
Mr# Robert F# Owcnborg

Joimty Attorney
Kissouls Oounty

Missoula, Montana
fear Mr* Swaabergi
You have rcouestod esy opinion as to whether the funds
realised under Section 2, Chapter 274, lews of 1947, for the
operation m û maintenance of ® county high school shall be
apportioned in part to high schools within the county*
The portion of Chapter 274, laws of 1947, which authorises
an extra levy for coimty high schools reads as follows?
**If it shall api>ear to the satisfaction of the
Board of Trustees of any county high school that

it is nocessary or proper to raise money by
taxatlm In excess of the mount allowed by law,
for the purpose of maintaining such county high
school**«said Board of Trustees of such county
high cchool shall determine and fix the smourt
necessary*••and shall submit the ct^estion of an
additional levy***to the cualiflod electors
residing in the county where such county high
school is situated in case of & county high
without « buildixig district, or to the
qualified electors residing within such county
high school building district**#*
The above cuoted portion of Chapter 274 authorises the

/
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additional levy for county high schools and does not mention.
district high schools and sa an extra levy for such high schools
is authorized by Section 1263*5»

1935» as amended.

The obvious purpose of the legislature in enacting Section 2
of Chapter 274 was to provide additional funds for the opera
tion of "county high schools** as distinguished from ’'district
high schools}** prior to such enactment, there was no method
of supplying additional money for "county high schools,**
There is no requirement that the funds realized for county
high school purposes shall be apportioned to district high
schools within such county.
In your letter you asked if Section 1263*11,
1935, as amended by Chapter 131, Laws of 1941, would apply
in the distribution of the money.

Section 1263*11, as

amended, provides for & county wide high school levy and
prescribes the apportionment of the money to the various high
schools in the county.

There is no specific requirement in

Chapter 274 that the funds realized from the extra levy shall
be apportioned to the high schools within the county and to
distribute the money in accordance with Section 1263,11 would
result in reading into the statute something that is not
there.

Also, the purpose of Section 2 of Chapter 274 is to

supply additional money for operation of county high schools
end not for district high schools.

The letter may have

additional funds as provided in Section 1263*11, as emended.
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Another reason for limiting the use of the funds realized
under Section 2 of Chapter 274 to county high schools is that
this section states that the trustees of such county high
schools fix the amount necessary for the maintenance and
operation of their school and the additional levy is based
on such an amount.

To apportion a part of the money to dis

trict high schools would result in a deficiency for the
county high school.

Also, it would not be within the powers

of the trustees of the county high school to determine and
fix the amount of additional funds for district high schools
as they would not come within the jurisdiction of the
trustees of the county high school*
It is therefore, my opinion that funds realized from
the extra levy authorized by Section 2 of Chapter 274, Lews
of 1947, are for the sole use of the coimty high school and
shall not be apportioned in part to any district high school
within the county.
Sincerely yours,
R. V.

BOTTUMLI

Attorney General
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Held:

(1) The cost of maintenance and operation of Junior

Colleges must be included in the County or District High
School Budget*

The maximum mill levy allowed for Junior

Colleges Is thereby limited and controlled by the maximum
mill levy allowed under the High School Budget System.
May 24» 1949
Kiss Mary M* Condon
State Superintendent of Public Instruction
Capitol Building
Helena, Montana
Dear Miss Condon:
You have submitted for my opinion the following questions:
(1)

What is the legal limit to the number of mills the

County Commission may levy for the Junior College without a
vote of the people?
(2), Is Chapter 1$8, Session Laws of 1939» Section 9 the
only reference to budgets for Junior Colleges?
The enabling act that provides for the establishment of
Junior Colleges is Chapter 15$, Session Laws of 1939,
In answering your first question, Section 9» of the above
act must be considered and it provides as follows:
«The County High School Board o t District High
School Board shall be authorized to include in
their budget a fhifficient sum to operate end
maintain the Junior College departments as
herein provided the amount of such budget to
be left to their determination. Such Boards
are also empowered in their discretion, when
they shall deem it necessary, to charge
tuitions at a maximum rate of not exceeding
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on# hundred twenty-Jfive and no/lOO (|125»00)
dollars per year for attendance at Junior
Colleges established under the terms of this
act."
It is apparent from the above section that the Legislature
Intended that the cost of operation and maintenance of Junior
College departments be included In the budget of either the
County High School Board or District High School Board ©a the
case may be.
The High School Boards, under Chapter I5S, Session Laws
of 1939 , are given wide discretion In providing a sufficient
sum for operations end maintenance of Junior Colleges, however
this expense must be included in the High School Budget,
Section 1263*5 of the Revised Codes of Montana, 1935» as
amended, provides for the preparation and adoption of High
School Budgets,

The statute also provides for restrictions

on the amount of appropriation that will be alla/ed, depending
on the estimated receipts for the general fund of such high
school and upon the number of pupils enrolled.
Section 1263,11 of the Revised Codes of Montana, as
amended by Chapter 131, Montana Session Laws, 1945, Chapter
274 , Montana Session Laws, 1947, end Chapter 199, and Chapter
199 , Montana Session Laws, 1949, la also important in this

respect as it provides that the County Commissioners may
levy an annual special tax for high school purposes, amounting
to ten mills on the dollar of the taxable value of ©11
taxable property within the County*
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From the above Sections it is evident that the maximum
mill levy for High School Budgets in each County or District
will vary#

As the Junior College Budget must be Included In

the High School Budget» it follows that the maximum mill
levy for Junior Colleges will also vary#
In passing, it should be noted that nothing contained in
the above mentioned statutes should be construed as preventing
any school district from voting an additional levy for high
school purposes or Junior College purposes, In accordance
with the general school lews pertaining to the voting of
additional levies by school districts#

;

In answer to your second question, it is my opinion
that Chapter 15#, Montana Session Laws of 1939, is the only
law with reference to budgets for Junior Colleges#

Sincerely yours,
fJÜKOUi H,
Attorney General
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•277Opinion 39 - 1949

Held;

Under the provision of Chapter 131, Laws of 1945, as

amended by Chapter 161, Laws of 1947, the funds transferred
into the deferred maintenance fund cannot be spent for new
building construction and equipment, but the expenditure
thereof is limited to the maintenance and repair of buildings
and the maintenance, repair and replacement of school equlpmmt#
July 22, 1949
Mr. Melvin 2 * Msgnuson
County Attorney
Helena, Montana
Dear Mr. Magnuson;
You have requested my opinion on the following matter;
"We have been asked whether, under the provisions
of Chapter 131, Laws of 1945, as amended by Chapter
161, of Laws of 1947, funds transferred into a
deferred maintenance fund can be spent for new
building construction during the next fiscal
year or whether the expenditure of such funds is
limited to the maintenance and repair of buildings
and the maintenance, repair and replacement of
equipment in such buildings."
Chapter 131, Session Laws of 1945 is entitled;
"An Act Authorising the Creation by Boards of
School Trustees of Reserve Funds for Elemen
tary Schools, District High Schools, and
County High Schools; Providing for the Accumu
lating of Post War Funds, for Maintenance, Re
pair and Replacement of school Equipment;
Prescribing the Manner in Which Such Funds
May be Accumulated; Providing the Time When and
the Purposes for Which Such Funds May Be
Expended; end the Time During Which This Act
Shall Be in Effect."
Section 1 creates a special reserve fund for post-war
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"msintensnce and repair of buildings and the maintenance,
repair end replacemertof @qi%ment
I call attention to Section 3 of the act which states
:

in part:
"Beginning with such first day of July the
moneys in such reserve funds may be ex
pended for the maintenance, repair, and
replacement of school equipment, but
for no other purpose,#."
Further, Section 4 of the act states that during the life
of the act none of the moneys in any such reserve fund may
at any time be transferred to any other fund or funds and
provides for transfers within fund itself.
The amendment of the act in Chapter 161, Laws of 1947
made no substantial change so far as this opinion Is con
cerned but established

the date July 1, 1947 as the date

of commencement of expenditure of the reserve fund.
The act itself very definitely limits the expenditure
of the reserve fund to specific purposes.

Nowhere in that

enumeration of purposes does there appear any reference to
new buildings construction and equipnent.

Moreover the

Legislature was extremely explicit in its limitation of the
expenditure only to those specific purposes enumerated.
Section 4 of Chapter 131, Laws of 1945 states that no
transfer to other purpose shall be made during the life of
the act and that upon its ceasing to have force and effect
any unexpected amounts may be transferred to the general
elementary or high school fund by order of the Board of
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Trustees#
The set is to remain in effect, according to Chapter
161, Laws of 1947 , which emended portions of Chapter I3I,
Laws of 1945 f "for a period of three (3 ) years after July
1, 1947, but no longer#"
In Volume 22 , Opinions of the Attorney General, Opinion
Number 10, Attorney General Bottomly, in discussing the pur
pose of an act similar to the one under consideration stated;
"It was undoubtedly the purpose of the Legislature
in enacting Chapter 69, Laws of 1945, to provide
post-war funds for the purpose therein set forth,
to take up the slack of employment they felt
would be in existence upon the termination of
the war emergency# I think thià is a fair
deduction from the reading of the title end
the act as a whole."
"Also it was felt repair work and bridge work,
and other construction during the war years
would be neglected because of the lack of
funds and the Impossibility of getting materials#"
At the end of that opinion, he stated that what he had
dald in regard to Chapter 69 , Laws of 1945, applied also to
Chapter I3 I, Laws of 1945#
Thus it is clear that .the fund Is not intended to add new
capital assets to existing school plants, but to repair and
renew those assets which exist and could
tained

not be properlymain

or replaced due to the exigencies of emergency,war

time shortages#
It is therefore my opinion that under the provisions of
I

Chapter I3I, Laws of 1945, as amended by Chapter 161, Laws of
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1947, the funds transferred Into the deferred maintenance
fund can not be spent for new building construction and
equipment, but the expenditure thereof is limited to the
**m8lntensnce and repair of buildings and the maintenance,
repair and replacement of school equipment.*'

Very truly yours.
ARNOLD H. OLSÜN,
Attorney General

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

Opinion 76 - 1949

Held:

1#

Funds which remain unexpended after the abandon--

ment of a District High School should be transferred to the
general fund of the elementary schools of the district.
December 29# 1949
Mr* James P. #alsh
County Attorney
Rosebud County
Forsyth, Montana
Dear Mr. Walsh:
You requested my opinion concerning the disposition of
funds which remain after the abandonment of a District High
School.
There Is no statutory provision made for the disposal of
unexpended funds of a District High School which has been
abolished.

Such is not true in the case of the abolishment

of a County High School as Section 1262.26, R.G.M.# 1935» (now
Section 75*4127 # R.C.M., 1947) provides for the distribution
of remaining funds of a County High School.

Also Section 970,

R.C.M., 1935, as amended by Chapter 16S, Laws of 1943 (now
Section 75-1522, R.C.M., 1947) designated the manner of
distribution of funds remaining of an abandoned school district,
In the case of State v. Brandenburg, 107 Mont. 199, S2 Pac.
(2d) 593, the Court considered the manner of disposal of
funds realized from the sale of a building which had been ac
quired for the use of the County High School.

The Court held
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that the funds should not be allocated to all of the high
schools In the County but must be held by the treasurer for
the use of the County High School*

The situation of a Dis- '

trict High School Is analogous in that the capital expendi
tures made for a District High School result from a tax on
the school district*

While you did not state the source

of the money on b^d, yet it is reasonable to assume that
much of it came from a tax on the district and as a conse
quence should be so used as to be of benefit to the district*
It is therefore my opinion that funds which remain
after the abandonment of a District High School should be
transferred to the general fund of the elementary schools
of the district.
Very truly yours,
ARNULD R* OLS^N,
Attorney General
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Opinion Ô1 - I95O

Held:

1.

Any surplus in en elementary school general fund

may be used in the next fiscal year to meet the deficiency
in the State aid for the foundation program, but such surplus
cannot be used to pay the twenty per cent permissive excess
over the foundation program#
2.

Any surplus in a high school general fund may be used in

the next fiscal year to meet the deficiency in the State aid
for the foundation program and also the fifteen per cent per
missive excess over the foundation program#
January 13, 1950
Miss Mary M# Condon
State Superintendent of Public Instruction
State Capitol
Helena, Montana
Dear Miss Condon:
You have requested my opinion concerning the use of the
surplus remaining in the post-war reserve fund for maintenance
and repair of buildings in the school districts and also the
use. of any cash balance In the general fund#
Chapter 131, laws of 1945, as amended by Chapter I6I,
Lows of 1947 , provided for the accumulation of a reserve fund
for repair and equipment of school buildings*

Section 5 of

Chapter 131, Laws of 1945, ss amended by Chapter I6I, Lews of
1947 , provided that the act would be in effect three years

after July 1, 1947, and that any balance on July 1, 1950,
must be transferred to the general fund as provided in
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Section 4, Chapter 131, Laws of 1945*

This will result In

many school districts having a cash balance at the end of the
fiscal year which raises the question of the use of such
money under the provisions of Chapter 199, Laws of 1949,
Section B of Chapter 199, Laws of 1949, provides for the
distribution of funds to school districts by the State Board
of Education in the months of December and April of each year
from the State Public School Equalization Fund op the basis
of reports made to the State Superintendent of Public Instruc
tion for the maintenance and operation of the schools.

The

standard for the financing of our schools is the foundation
program found in Section 3 of Chapter 199 end the distribu
tion of State aid in Section

Chapter 199 is limited to

fifty per cent of the foundation program for those districts
which qualify for State aid.

Section 19 of Chapter 199

makes it the duty of the State Superintendent of Public Instruction to notify each County Superintendent of Schools that
t h e r e b e a deficiency of the funds for State aid* If
■S.

the surplus remaining in the reserve fund can be applied to
meet the deficiency in State aid, there will be no necessity
for an extra

levy to supply these funds.

Section

B, Chapter 199 in limiting the

maximum aidfrom

the State to

fifty per cent also recognizes

the foundation

program as the standard end the phrase ”from all other
sources” justifies the utilization of the surplus to maintain
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the standard end thus meet the State deficiency*

This \vould

apply with equal force to any surplus in the general fund,
whatever the source, with the exception of the reserves as
provided for in Sections 10 end 14 of Chapter 199,
The application of the general fund surplus to meet the
permissive additional expenses of twenty per cent for
elementary schools, Section 9 of Chapter 199, and fifteen
per cent for high schools, Section 14, chapter 199, raises
additional questions*

The elementary schools would be pre

cluded from the use of the surplus to meet the additional
expense as Section 9 of Chapter 199 contains this limitation:
”*.*but the entire amount of such excess expense
over the foundation program shall be paid solely
from levies upon the property in such district,*#”
However, there is not such a prohibition as to high
school budgets as Section 14, Chapter 199 states:
”,,,but the allowance of such excess expense
over the foundation program shall not in any
manner increase the amounts to be apportioned
hereunder from the State Public School Equali
zation fund,.,”
It is reasonable to assume that the Legislature in making
the distinction between the elementary and high school budgets
recognized that the surplus in the high school general fund
could be used to meet the excess expense over the foundation
program*
It is therefore my opinion:
1,

Any surplus in an elementary school general fund may
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be used in the next fiscal ye»r to meet the deficiency in the
State aid for the foundation program, but such surplus
cannot be used to pay the twenty per cent permissive excess
over the foundation program,
2,

Any surplus in a high school general fund may be

used in the next fiscal year to meet the deficiency in the
state aid for the foundation program and also the fifteen
per cent permissive excess over the foundation program.

Very truly yours,

AHHOLD H, O W m ,
Attorney General
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Opinion Ô6 «• 1950

Held!

Any surplus remaining that is in the reserve fund for

post-war maintenance, repair and equipment created by Sections
75-3710 through 75-3714*

1947, mST be transferred

to school general fund after July 1, 1950.
January 31* 1950
t
,

Miss Mary M. Condon
State Superintendent of Public Instruction
State Capitol
Helena, Montana
Dear Miss Condons
You have asked if it is mandatory that the balance re
maining in the post-war reserve fund for maintenance and repair
of buildings of school districts be transferred to the general
fund of the school districts of this State.
Chapter 131, Session tows of 1945* «s amended by Chapter
I6l, Session Laws of 1947, ©s now contained in Sections 75-3710
through 75-3714, H.C.M,, 1947* created and defined the use
of the reserve fund*

Section 75-3713* supra, is as follows

in part!
■—

**...end provided further that immediately fol
lowing the date when this act shell cease to
be of any force or effect* if there shall re
main in any such reserve fund any amount un
expended and unappropriated such amount may,
by order of the Board of Trustees be trans
ferred to the general elementary school fund.,
or to the district high school fund...or to
the County high school fund...”
The date of the termination of the act is fixed at July 1,
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1950 , sa Section 75-3714» supra, reads as follows;

**Thia act shall be in full force and effect frcan
and after its passage and approval and shall re
main in effect for a period of three (3) years
after July 1, 1947» but no longer."
As the reserve fund is dependent for its existence on
•*

the life of Chapter 131» Session Laws of 1945» as amended, the
expiration of the act would preclude any expenditure from the
reserve fund.

The reserve fund as such would lapse end not

be continued as an item in the budget for the next fiscal
year.
Section 75-1714» R.C.M., 1947, formerly Section 1019.14
R.O.M., 1935 » which is a part of the elementary school budget
act, limits expenditures to the detailed appropriations fixed
by the budget*
budget act.

A like provision is found in the high school

It is a reasonable conclusion that as the author

ity for the deferred maintenance reserve fund has been taken
sway, the provisions of the budget law, referred to above,
will control.
The Supreme Court of Montana has made numerous rulings
upon the ouestion of whether the word "msy" in a statute can
be interpreted ®s "shall" or "must" end the general rule is
now well established that such interpretation is to be made
when it is determined that the Legislature intended the word
to be used in a mandatory sense.

Curland v# frlc^ett, 9^»

Mont. 399, 39 Pac. (2d) 652; State ex rel. McCabe v. District
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Court, 106 Mont» 2?2, 76 JPac# {2d) 634 ; Hansen y* City of
Havre, 112 Mont. 207, 114 Pac. (2f) 1053, 135 A.L.B. 1278,
In the Hansen case the court held as follows on page 217 of
the Montana Reports;

,,

"Defendants contend that the word "may" as used in
Section 5277.3 means "must" or "shall". We think
this contention must be sustained. We have often
held that "may" means "must" or "shall", depending
upon the apparent Legislative intent, (Citing
Cases)»"
Since any balance remaining in the post-war reserve fund,
could not be expended after the expiration of the act unless
such balance was transferred to one of the enumerated school
funds, the provisions of Section 75-3713» supra, that any
amount unexpended end unappropriated "may" be transferred
must be Interpreted to mean "must” be transferred.

It

cannot be said that it was the intent of the Legislature to
permit such funds to lie idle after the act creating the post
war reserve fund has expired »
It is therefore my opinion that any surplus remaining in
the reserve fund for post-war maintenance, repair and equipment
created by Sections 75-3710 through 75-3714» R.C.M,, 1947»
èîÜST be transferred to the school general fund after July 1,

,

1950

Very truly yours,
ARÜÜLD H» OLSaB,
Attorney General
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Opinion No* 29 ~ 1951
Heldî

Levies on high school districts and the county wide

levies for the maintenance of high schools are valid and
legal levies#
July 30, 1951
\

Mr, Norman R« Bamcord
County Attcrney
j Wheatland County
Harlowton, Montana
Dear Mr# Bamcordi
You have requested my opinion concerning the levy on
high school building districts and the county wide levy for
the maintenance and operation of high schools# Tour questions
are asked because of the recent opinion of our Supreme Court
in the case of Rankin vs# Love, et al*, 5 State Reporter
316, Psc# (2d), which wag decided June 14th, 1951*
The facts which were the basis for the litigation in
Rankin vs# Love arose from an attempt of a high school dis
trict to issue bonds#

The boundaries of the high school

district and the elementary district were identical end the
court directed its attention primarily to the limitation of
indebtedness for school purposes and stated;
"Contravening section 6 of Article XIII es it
does. Chapter 275$ Laws of 1947 (R#C#M#, 1947,
75-4601 75-4606 ), is unconstitutional and is
invalid#”
This quoted portion of the opinion illustrates that the
court’s concern was with the problem of school indebtedness
and this is more apparent in that the decision expressly
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overruled House vs# School District No# 4 of Park County,
120 Mont# 319, 1Ô4 Pec# (2d) 285, which held that a common
school district could incur indebtedness up to the constitu
tional limit without regard to the indebtedness of the high
school district in which it was located#

Our court by such

action precluded one piece of property il th being burdened
/

up to the limit of indebtedness of the elementary district
and then up to the same limit by the overlapping high school
district#
In the case of Rankin vs# Love the history of school diS"
tricts end in particular the legislation relating to high
schools was reviewed and the court said:
"In accordance therewith, a high school, when
established, becomes an integral part of the
public school system in that particular district#
It is under the jurisdiction of the same board
of trustees as the elementary grades or any
other department of the public school system
existing in that particular "school district,"
and financed end maintained by taxation on the
property lying and being within the exterior
boundaries of that particular school district.
This was the law of this state prior to and at
the time of the writing of our Constitution in
regard to public schools and "school districts,"
and it is still the ^law of this jurisdiction."
In making this statement the ease of Pierson vs. Hen
drick sen, 98 Mont# 244, 38 Pac. (2d) 991, which approved high
school districts, was not limited or reversed, although it
was before the Court.

The Pierson case considered the first

high school district law which is almost identical vi th the
present laws, and said;

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

*The state legislature may create or abolish
districtsI or change or re-arrange boundaries
fit will# {State ex rel, Rodman vs# Meyers, 65
Mont* 124 , 210 fac# 1064*) It has then by
Chapter 47 done so with the view of eliminating
some of the Inequelities pointed out in the
Henderson case, and with the view of having
the bonds paid by those who obtain the most
use of the property benefited by the*improve
ment* Wo see no constitutional objection to
the plan as provided in Chapter 47."
While it is true that high school building districts
were created for the purpose of issuing bonds for construc
tion, repair, improvement and equipaent of school buildings,
Section 75-4^’05 R#C.M#, 1947, yet the legislature had the
constitutional authority to utilize the high school districts
for maintenance end operation as was done in Chapter 199,
Laws of 1949#

Section 1 of Article XI of the Montana Con

stitution directs the Legislature to provide a school system
by the provisionî
"It shall be the duty of the legislative assembly
of Montana to establish and maintain a general,
uniform and thorough system of public, free,
common schools#"
This constitutional provision was considered in Evers vs#
Hudson, 36 Mont# 135, 92 Pac, 462 , wherein the court approved
a legislative act that authorized the establishment of county
high schools#

The Court’s observations concerning this section

of the constitution fire pertinent:
"The evident purpose of section 1, Article XI,
above, was to insure a system of common schools;
but there is not anything in that section, or
elsewhere in the Constitution, which directly
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limits, or by Implication may be said to limit,
the power of the legislature to provide for other
schools. As to whether there is m y limitation,
beyond which the law-making power may not go in
matters of this character, need not now be con
sidered, It was said in Koester vs. Board of
County Commissioners, 44 Kan, 141, 24 Fac, 65 ï
♦The concern of the constitution makers does not
seem to have been to provide against the ûBng&r
of too many schools, but to secure a common school
system principally, and also other schools of a
higher grade,*”
"Section 1, Article XI, is not a limitation upon
the legislative power, but is e solemn mandate to
the legislature. That the chiéf concern of the
framers of the Constitution was directed to free
common schools is evidenced by the facts that such
schools are made sole beneficiaries of the public
school funds. But the declared concern of the
Constitution framers for & system of public free
common schools does not in any sense militate
against the power of the legislature to establish
other schools, "The matter of education is one
of public interest, which concerns ell the people
of the state, and is therefore subject to the
control of the legislature,”
Thus, approval was granted by our court to an act which
authorized the establishment of county high schools. County
high schools have never been a part of any school district and
their bonds ere those of the county in which they are located.
The language used in State ex rel* Henderson vs. Dawson County,
ê7 Mont, 122, 286 Pac, 125 , is of specific application as

the court saidt
"However, a high school education is a necessary
Intermediate step between the ordinary grade
schools end the university courses provided for,
and the term "common” as applied to our schools
"bears the broadest end most comprehensive sig
nification, it being equivalent to public, uni
versal, open to all," It is used in contradistinction
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to private and denominational schools, colleges
and the like, but has no reference to the grade
of school or whet may be taught therein, nor the
method of rule or government thereof# *********
Thus, under constitutional authority, the legis
lature may either leave the matter of high school
education to the several school districts of a
county or provide a different method of rule or
government for this class of "common schools#"
For years the first method was followed ; such high
school education as was afforded was given in
district school courses or high schools estab
lished in districts, without legislative.sanction#
"In 1899 the legislative body provided for the
establishment of free county high schools by a
vote of the electors of the county, and for
which trustees were to be appointed by the board
of county commissioners; these trustees were
empowered to "bond the county" for the purpose
of building and equipping a county hi^ school
building."
The conclusion to be reached from the legislative pro
vision for, and the judicial recognition of county high
schools end their method of financing is that common school
districts are not the exclusive means of school financing#
In fact the Court in Rankin vs# Love was not faced with the
question of levies for maintenance and operation, and such
problems were outside of the scope of the decision#

It is

most important to remember that the real question decided by
the court was the limitation of indebtedness as evidenced
by the fact House vs. School District Ho# 4 of Park County
120 Mont. 319 , 184 Pac, (2d) 28$, was expressly overruled.
Two of the fundamental sources of income for the schools
of our state ere the county wide levy for common schools, Sec
tion 75-3706 , R.G.M., 1947 , and the county wide high school
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levy, Section 15» Chapter 208, Laws o f 1951#

If the school

district is the exclusive **taxing unit*^ for the support of
both elementary and high schools then the county wide levies
of both elementary end high schools then the county wide
levies would be unconstitutional*

This cannot be the intent

of the court and it would not be reasonable to read into the
case of Rankin vs# Love problems which were not before the
Court for consideration and concerning which the Court has
ruled as set foth above*

Historically the county wide levy

for the support of the common schools antedated the Montana
Constitutional Convention of 1889 as Section 44 of the Laws
of 1871 provided for such a levy and the statute was opera
tive in 1889#
Section 1 of Article XI of the Montana Constitution as
construed in Evers vs. Hudson, supra, gives legal sanction to
the legislative creation of high school districts and the
feet the decision did not overrule Pierson vs# Hendricksen,
98 Mont# 244» 38 Pac# {2d} 991, and Berthot vs# Gallatin
County High School District, 102 Mont. 356, 58 Pac# {2d) 264#
permits the conclusion that high school districts are legal
entities for school purposes#
It is therefore my opinion that levies on high school
districts and the county wide levies for the maintmance of
high schools are valid and legal levies*
Very truly yours,
ARNOLD H. OLSON
Attorney General
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Opinion 33 - 1951
Held:

Any deficiency in state aid for the elementary budget

in a joint school is the obligation of the entire area of
the joint district end a levy must be mad® on such area to
meet the needé
August 15f 1951
Mr, J, i5, McKenna
County Attorney
Fergus County
Lewistown, Montana
Dear Mr, McKenna:
You have requested my opinion concerning the levy to be
made on a joint school district to meet the deficiency In
state aid on the foundation program for the elementary budget.
You advise me that Judith Basin County, in which part of the
joint district is located, meets the standard of the founda
tion program without state aid.

You also advise me that

Fergus County, in which part of the joint district is situated,
requires state aid in order to achieve the foundation program.
As there is a 10 per cent deficiency in state aid, you would
like to know what area of the joint district is subject to
a levy to supply the funds for the deficiency.
Section 17 of Chapter 199, Laws of 1949, as amended by
Section 1 of Chapter 182, Laws of 1951, contains specific
directions for the computation of the elementary budgets in
joint school districts.

This statute reads in part as follows:

"The balance of the budget over the foundation
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program, plus any deficiency in the state equaliza
tion payment on the foundation program, shall be an
obligation of all parts of the joint district and
the levy for this amount shall be determined by divid
ing the amount required by the total taxable valuation
of the entire joint school district*”
From the above quoted portion of Chapter 182, Laws of 1951,
it is apparent that any deficiency in state aid must be met
by a levy on the whole area of the joint school district*
This results in an inequality to that portion of a joint dis
trict which is located in a county which does not require
state aid because the five mill district levy and the appor
tionment of the tea mill county levy are sufficient to meet
the foundation program budget requirements.

However, the

legislature by this statute, has fixed the means of meeting
the standard of the foundation program and we are bound by
this law.
It is therefore my opinion that any deficiency in state
eld for the elementary budget In a joint school is the obliga
tion of the entire area of the joint district and a levy must
be made on such area to meet the need.
Very truly yours,
ARNOLD H. OLSJN
Attorney General
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Opinion 46 - 1951
Heldî

The funds received by the school districts from the

Federal Government under Public law #74, #lst Congress, shall
not be used by the school districts In addition to the appro
priations found in the budgets of the school districts, but
shall be used to relieve the tax burdens due to the increased
enrollment resulting from federal Installations in the
districts.
November 7, 1951
Mr, Ted James
County Attorney
Cascade County
Great Falls, Montana
Dear I4r. James 8
You have requested my opinion concerning the use of
federal funds received by school district #1 of your county
from the federal government by virtue of Public Law #74, You
advise me that there has been a material increase in school
enrollment due to new federal agencies established in your
city.

The sum of $34,451.51 was received from the federal

government after June 30, 1951, as assistance to the school
district.

Your specific question is directed to the proper

use of this money under our school budget law.
Public Law #74, #lst Congress, reads in part as follows:
«Section 1. In recognition of the responsibility
of the United States for the impact which certain
federal activities have on the local educational
agencies in the areas in which such activities
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are carried on, the congress hereby declares it
to be the policy of the United States to provide
financial assistance (as set forth in the follow
ing sections of this act) for those local educa
tional agencies upon which the United States has
placed financial burdens by reason of the fact that—
(1 ) the revenues available to such agencies
from local sources have been reduced as the re
sult of the acquisition of real property by the
United States 5 or
(2 ) such agencies provide education for
children residing on federal property; or
(3 ) such agencies provide education for
children whose parents are employed on federal
property; or
(4l there has been a sudden and substantial
increase in school attendance as the result of
federal activities#"
The obvious pmp os® of the congressional act is to relieve
in part the taxpayers in your locality frcxn the increased
burden on your schools#
While the federal money was granted to the school district
to relieve the tax load, yet the congressional act did not
alter the operation of our budget laws or school finance
statutes#
From the correspondence submitted with your letter, it
appears that the federal money was not included in income for
the current school budget, as the funds were received sub
sequent to the computation of the budget#

It is the proposal

of the school board to use the money under an additional
federal funds budget#
The basis of our school finance system is a per capita
distribution of district, county and state funds for the
support of the schools allocated on the basis of "the average
number belonging" or the attendance for the previous school
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

year.

Sections 1 and 2 , Chapter 199, Laws of 1949*

This act

Chapter 199, Laws of 1949, established a **foundation program"
for our schools which is not only a minimum standard but also
a maximum standard with certain permissive increases authorized.

That the total amount of the general fund expenses shall not
exceed the foundation program, with permissive increases
and voted levies, is provided in Section 9 and 14 of Chapter
199, Laws of 1949, as amended by Chapter 208, Laws of 1951,
The items in the budgets which are to be expended during
the year constitute appropriations end the trustees cannot
under Sections 75-1714 and 75-4519, R,C.M,, 1947, exceed the
total of these items.

If additional expenses are incurred

they are not liabilities of the district#
It appears that the trusteed of the school district in
your county attempted to set up an independent budget for the
expenditure of the funds received from the federal government,
although there is not statutory authority for such procedure.
As was previously pointed out, the sum of money received was

a reimbursement for the additional expense to the district*
If an additional budget to spend the money is created and the
foundation program is exceeded, then there will be no relief
to the taxpayers and the purpose of the grant will thus be
defeated.
It is true that an independent transportation budget is
adopted each year, but his is done by virtue of Section 75-3414,
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-301Revléed Codes of Montana, 1947 which specifically states that
such a budget shall be provided.

Similar budgets are used for

vocational training, and school lunch program, but these
activities are under the general school laws, as is apparent
from a reading of Sections 75-4245 and 75-4802, R.C.M, 1947.
As you stated in your letter the funds in question were
not received until after June 30, 1951, the end of the fiscal
year for the schools and did not constitute "cash on hand” at
that time.

However it is the lack of appropriations in the

budget which constitutes the real barrier to the expenditures
of this money, as was pointed out above*

If there has been

an increase in enrollment so as to constitute an emergency
within the meaning of the definition found in Section 75-1716
end 75-4521 , R»C*M,, 1947, then emergency budgets may be
adopted and the cash on hand may be used to pay the appropria
tions of such budgets.

If emergency budgets are not adopted,

the funds will be available for us in the following fiscal year,
As these federal funds are to be used to relieve the
local taxpayers from the increased load, the money should be
allocated to all of the funds in the budget, including the
independent, budgets which are supported by levies on the
property in the district, in the proportionate amount each
bears to the whole*
It is therefore, my opinion that the funds received by
the school districts from the Federal Government under Public
Law Ô74, 81st Congress, shall not be used by the school
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districts in addition to the appropriations found In the
budgets of the school districts, but shall be used to
relieve the tax burden due to the increased enrollment
resulting from federal installations In the districts

Very truly yours.

AimOlD H. OLSEN
Attorney General
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Opinion 73 -* 1952

Held!

The failure to levy the full ten mill county wide levy

for the high schools of a county# due to a clerical errotj
cannot be corrected by a levy in excess of ten mills on all
the property in the county in the next fiscal year#
March 29, 1952
«

Mr# John Michael McCsrvel
County Attorney
Deer Lodge County
Anaconda, Montana
Dear Mr# McCarvelS
You have requested my opinion concerning an error made
in the high school levy in your county#

You advise me that

1

the high school budget provided for a ten mill county wide
levy, but a clerical error was made end the actual levy mad#
by the county commissioners was a four mill levy# You ask
if a sixteen mill county wide levy may be made for the next
fiscal year#
Section 15, Chapter 199, Laws of 1949, as amended by
Chapter 20&, Laws of 1951, provides for an annual county vd.de
levy of ten mills for the support of the high schools of the
county#

This section limits the county wide levy to the

fiscal year for which the levy is made#

Also, the founda

tion program for the current year is a limitation for the
levy#

To permit the levy for one year to be increased above

the authorised amount for the purpose of realizing funds to
restore moneys due to an erroneous levy for a previous year
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is not within the contemplation of the statute*

The applicable

rule is found in 51 An* Jr* 621, where it is said!
"It is essential to the validity of a tax that it
be of no f;reater amount than was authorized by the
legislature, and any excess over the amount so
authorized will render the assessment void, however,
trivial the excess may be*"
See! State ex rel* Tillman v, 11strict ^ourt,
101 Mont* 176, 53 P, (2d) 107, 103 A,L.R. 376
During this current fiscal year there are sufficient
appropriations in the budget to meet the needs of the high
school, but there are not funds to meet the appropriations*
The only solution Is to register warrants as permitted by
Section 16-2604# E.G.M*, 1947, as Section 75-4532, R*C*M*,
1947, limits the payment or registration of warrants to the
amount of the appropriation*

The registered warrants will be

an item for payment in the budget for the following year*
Because of this additional expense, it may be necessary
to vote an extra levy on the school district for the budget
for the next fiscal year*
It is therefore my opinion that the failure to levy the
full ten mill county wide levy for the high schools of a county,
due to a clerical error, cannot be corrected by a levy in
excess of ten mills on all the property in the county in the
next fiscal year*

Very truly yours,
ARNOLD H* OLSLN

Attorney General
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Opinion 101 - 1952

Heldî

Kindergarten pupils, in an established kindergarten

upon reaching the age of six years, may be included in the
A,N.B. of the school districts end their daily attendance
considered in determining the amount of state financial
aid for the schools of their district*
July Ô, 1952
Miss Maiy M. Condon
State Superintendent of Public Instruction
State Capitol
Helena, Montana
fear Miss Condon:
You have requested my opinion as to whether or not kinder
garten pupils, upon reaching the age of six years, may be
included in the A.N.B. of the schools involved in determining
the foundation program.
Section 7 Article I of the Montana Constitution
provides, "The public free schools cf the state
shall be open to all children and youth between
the ages of six and twenty«-one years."
From this constitutional provision it is apparent that
any child who reaches his sixth birthday is entitled to attend
school as a matter of right and should be considered in deter
mining the number of enrolled pupils.

The fact that the

child is in kindergarten would not preclude him from being
considered as a student in the public schools for the reason
that Section 75-2001 defines a public school so that it in
cludes an established kindergarten in the following language î
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"A public school Is a school established! end
maintained under the laws of this state at
public expense and comprising the elementary
grades, and, when established, the kindergarten
and the high school including all the junior
and senior grades of high school vo rk,«
The distribution of state aid to the public schools is
made under the provisions of Chapter 199, Laws of 1949, as
amended, and the basis of such distribution is fixed by the
«average number belonging" or

which is defined as

meaning "the average number of regularly enrolled full time
pupils attending a public school•«
1Indergarten pupils in an established kindergarten who

have reached the age of six years meet all the qualifications
of the above statutes and their attendance may be counted
in the computation for the state aid.
It is therefore, my opinion that kindergarten pupils, in
an established kindergarten upon reaching the age of six years,
may be included in the A.N.B. of the school districts and
their daily attendance considered in determining the amount
of state financial aid for the schools of their district.
Very truly yours,
ARNOLD H. OLSEN
Attorney General
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Opinion 92 •* 1954
Held:

1.

In the submission of the question to the qualified

electors of a high school district whether an extra levy
should be authorized the amounts needed for each high school
must be incorporated in one question*
2*

An extra levy may be voted by the electorate of a

school district for the use of the high school of the
district although the school district is a part of a high
school district*
August 26, 1954
Mr. «S/. M. Black
County Attorney
Toole County
Shelby, Montana
Dear Mr. Black:
You have requested my opinion concerning the validity
of two special elections for extra levies. You advise me
that there are two high schools in one high school district.
You also state that separate ballots were used at the election
submitting propositions for extra levies for the sup^>ort m d
maintenance of each of the two high schools. The electors
approved the extra levy for one of the high schools and re
jected the levy on the high school district for the other
high school.

Subsequently, a special election was held

in the common school district and a special levy was approved
for the support and maintenance of the high school whose
request for an extra levy on the high school district had
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boen rejected*
In considering the problem, it Is necessery to observe
the provisions of two pertinent code sections*

Section 75-3801,

R.C.M*, 1947# as last amended by Chapter 247» laws of 1953,
reads In part as follows ;
”{2) Whenever the board of trustees of any district
or county high school shall deem it necessary to
raise money by taxation in excess of the levy
required to meet Its foundation program*.,#******
for the purpose of maintaining the high schools of
said district or the county high school,,•♦or for
any other purpose necessary for the proper opera
tion and maintenance of the schools of said
district, or county high school, said board of
trustees shall determine end fix the amount neces
sary and required for such purpose or purposes
in addition to any other legal levies on the
district,*•♦and in the case of the district
high school it shall submit the question of an
additional levy to raise said amount to the
qualified electors residing within the district
who are taxpayers end whose names appear upon
the last completed assessment roll of the
county for state, county and school taxes,
either at the regular annual election held in
said district or at a special election called
for that purpose by the board of trustees of
said district."
The above quoted authorizes an election on the question
of an additional levy for the support of a district high
school to the voters of the district in which the high school
is situated.

Section 75-4609, R.C.M*, 1947, ®s last amended

by Chapter 120, Laws of 1953, provides:
"Special tax Levy - - Election. Whenever the
board of trustees of the local school district
within which the high school is situated shall
deem It necessary to raise money for high school
purposes In addition to its revenues from county
and state apportionments, a meeting of the board
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of tnjistees of the high school district together
%fith the chairjaen of the boards of trustees of
all common school districts included within the
high school district shall be called and held to
consider the calling of an election to vote upon
the cuestion of approving a special levy for high
school purposes# Provided, that any other member
designated by the board of trustees of any such
common school district may represent such district
in place of the chairman thereof# If a majority
of the board of trustees of the high school district
and the designated representatives of said common
school districts attending such meeting shell
determine that the proposed expenditures are
necessary for the proper maintenance and operation
of such high school, said trustees of the high
school district shall ascertain and determine the
number of mills required to be raised by special
levy, and shall cell an election for the purpose
of submitting the cuestion of making such add!**
tional levy to the cualified electors who are tax«
payers voting at such election, the result of said
election shall be certified to the board of county
commissioners, and the levy approved by such
majority vote shall be made upon all property
within said high school district#”
This section permits the qualified electors of a high
school district to authorize an additional levy to support
a high school which levy would be made over the entire high
school district#

It is important to observe that the

statute states that one levy may be made for the high school
of the district.

As a general rule, there is only one high

school in each high school district, but under the facta
here there are two high schools in a high school district#
The taxing unit is the high school district and the addi
tional levy may be imposed for high school purposes on this
taxing district#

The authorized purpose as stated in the
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statut© Is to.parait an additional levy to raise money for
high school purposes above the foundation program. The total
amount needed for high school purposes in the,district should
bo incorporated in this single levy#

If each of the high .

schools needs additional funds, then only on© question
incorporating the full amount of each high school should
have been suWitted to the electors#

Submitting the question

in this manner would comply with the language used In the
statute which requires but one additional levy and also
prevent discrimination between the two schools within the
taxing area. Section 11 of Article H I of the Montana
Constitution requires uniforaity in taxation and in Com, v,
Alden Coal Co* 251 Pa. 134, 96 Â 246, IRA 1916 f 154, it
was held that the constitutional provision that taxation
shall be uniform applies not only to the levy and assessment
of the tax, but to its expenditure and distribution as well.
The submission of the two questions resulted in a tax over
the high school district for the use of one of the two
high schools, and as a consequence there was a lack of
uniformity in the distribution of the funds.
The tax which was approved by the electorate of the
common school district for the support of the high school of
the common school district complies with Section 75-3601,
1947, as amended, and is uniform and not discrimin
atory.
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It Is therefore my opinion that?
1*

In the submission of the question to the ouallfied

electors of a high school district whether m extra levy should
be authorized the amounts needed for each high school must
be incorporated in one question*
2»

An extra levy may be voted by the electorate of a

school district for the use of the high school of the district
although the school district is a part of a high school
district.
Very truly yours,
m m U ) H, OLSEM

Attorney General
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Opinion 20 - 1955 .
Held:

It is within the power end ©uthorlty of the governing

offices of school districts, cities end counties to provide
in the current budget for the employer*s contribution in
anticipation of a favorable vote by referendum of the em
ployees to be covered under the Social Security Act*
June 22, 1955
Mr* Norman C# Robb
County Attorney
Park County
Livingston, Montana
Dear Mr* Robb:
You have requested my opinion concerning the manner of
financing the employer’s share of Social Security coverage
by cities, counties and school districts*
Chapters 2?0 and 271, Laws of 1955, extend coverage
under the Federal Social Security Act to employees of the
state and to political subdivisions and to members of the
staff and teachers of school districts of the state*

It is

to be noted that both of these laws were not specifically
made operative on passage and approval and as a consequence
under Section 43*507, R.C.M*, 1947, both statutes become
effective July 1, 1955*
It is to be noted that under Section 21Ô (d) (3) of the
Social Security Act, a referendum of the employees must be
held and a majority must approve coverage under the Social
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Security Act# Kinety days notice of such referendum must be
given and as the law is not; effective until July 1, 1955, the
earliest date for such an election will be approximately
October 1.

However, budgets for cities, counties and school

districts must be adopted prior to October 1, and as a con
sequence, a favorable vote for coverage under the Social
Security Act by the employees of these governmental units
would impose an immediate obligation on each governmental
unit#

The trustees of the school districts, the boards of

county commissioners end the councils of cities may antici
pate in their budgets that each as an employer must make
contribution for the Social Security coverage#
The source of the money for such payments must be the
general fund of each governmental subdivision# Ko addi
tional levy may be made for the employer’s contribution for
Social Security and this is in direct contrast with the
contributions to the Retirement Systems#

Section 68-603,

R#0#M*, 1947, authorizes the city to make payment from each
fund from which compensation for personal services are paid
and, if general revenue sources are insufficient, then a
special tax may be levied#

A similar provision is made in

Section 75-2709, R*C.K#, 1947, for school districts.
As there is no statutory authorization for the levying
of a special tax to meet the employer’s contribution by cities,
counties end school districts for the Social Security of its
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employees, e©ch unit must provide in the general fund for
such an expenditure»

If the governing offices of each of

these political subdivisions propose to call a referendum
and anticipate a favorable vote, It would appear advisable
to include in the budget now being prepared an item for
such liability*

In the event the employees did not cast a

favorable vote on the question of coverage under the Social
Security Act, then such funds so appropriated in the budget
may be carried in the budget and used in a subsequent
budget as cash on hand*
It is therefore my opinion that it is within the power
and authority of the governing offices of school districts,
cities end counties to provide in the current budget for the
employer*s contribution in anticipation of a favorable vote
by referendum of the employees to be covered under the
Social Security Act*
Very truly yours,
miOLd H* OLSJH

Attorney General
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Opinion 27 • 195 $
Held:

J

1* In detenainin^ the maximum amount for which a

high school district may become indebted, the proposed
indebtedness must be apportioned among the common school
districts comprising the high school on a proportionate
valuation basis#

If such proposed indebtedness will re

sult in any one common school district’s exceeding five per
cent of its valuation when the amount so apportioned is
added to the outstanding indebtedness of the common school
district, then the amount of the proposed indebtedness of
the high school district which causes the common school
district to exceed five per cent of the value of the
common school district is invalid#
2*

In determining the limitation of indebtedness of a

common school district, the proportionate share on a
valuation basis of the outstanding indebtedness of the high
school district must be deducted from five per cent of the
valuation of the common school district, and the amount
remaining is the limit of additional indebtedness which may
be incurred by such common school districts#
July 13 , 1955
f‘5r* Charles W# Jardina
County Attorney
Powder River County
Broadus, Montana
Deer Mr* Jardine:
You have requested my opinion as to whether the maximum
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a high school district may become indebted Is five
per cent of the valuation of the property of the high school
district irrespective of the debt bf any of the component
common school districts*

You have also asked if the common

school district may become indebted to the full five per
cent of the valuation of the property in the district when
there is outstanding indebtedness Incurred by the high
school district of which the common school district is a
part*
In answering your questions it is first necessary to con
sider the three taxing units which may issue bonds for high
schools*

County bonds may be issued for the construction

of county high schools as is provided in Section 75-4112,
R*0«M., 1947*

In Hamilton v* the Board of County Commis

sioners, 54 Mont* 301 169 Pac* 729, it was hold that county
bonds issued for the purpose of constructing a county high
school are obligations of the entire county.

In State ex

rel# Henderson v* Dawson County, 87 Mont* 122, 286 Pac.
125 , it was again recognized that bonds issued by a county

for the construction of a county high school are county
obligations and that a county in issuing such bonds lends
the credit of the county for high school purposes* This
case specifically stated that outstanding county high school
bonds do not limit school districts in the incurring of
indebtedness*

There is no statutory method now for the
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establishment of county high schools.
High school districts are established under the pro
visions of Chapter 46, Title 75# &.C,M,, 1947# and a county
may be divided Into one or more high school districts.

From

your letter it appears that your county has been designated
as one high school district.
Section 6 of Article XIII of Rontana Constitution
limits the indebtedness which may be incurred by school
districts to five per cent of the value of the taxable
value of the district.
The procedure for issuing high school district bonds is
the same as that for the issuance of school district bonds#
Section 75-4604 ,

, 1947, makes all the lews pertaining

to the issuance of bonds by school districts applicable to
the issuance of bonds by school districts.

Section 75-4603,

R.C.M., 1947 , states that the limitation for indebtedness
for high school districts is that it la not reduced by the
indebtedness of the common school districts.

In House v.

School District No. 4, 120 Mont. I64 Pac. (2d) 2 S5 , this
provision was held constitutional.

A contrary conclusion

was reached in Rankin v. Love, 125 Mont. 495, 240 Pac. (2d)
862, where the court held that high school districts have the
authority to incur indebtedness so long as such indebtedness,
when apportioned among common school districts in proportion
to the assessed valuation of the property in each and this
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part added to the existing indebtedness of the common school
districts respectivelyI did not bring the debt of any of the
latter in excess of the limit prescribed by Section 6, Article
XIII of the Montana Constitution#
The converse of the above rule Is also true In determining
the limitation of indebtedness of a common school district#
In ascertaining the possible limit of Indebtedness of a common
school district the proportionate share of outstanding indebted
ness of the high school district must he deducted from the
amount of additional Indebtedness which may be incurred by
such common school district#
It is therefore my opinion that In determining the maximum
amount for which a high school district may become indebted
the proposed indebtedness must be apportioned among the common
school districts comprising the hl^ school on a proportionate
valuation basis#

If such proposed indebtedness will result

in any one common school district’s exceeding five per cent
of its valuation when the amount so apportioned is added to
the outstanding indebtedness of the common school district,
then the amount of the proposed indebtedness of the high
school district which causes the common school district to
exceed five per cent of the value of the common school district
is Invalid#
It is also my opinion that in determining the limitation
of indebtedness of a common school district, the proportionate
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share on a valuation basis of the outstanding indebtedness
of the high school district must be deducted from five per
cent of the valuation of the common school district, and the
amount remaining is the limit of additional indebtedness
which may be incurred by such common school districts#

Very truly yours,

ARNOLD H# OLSùN

Attorney General
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CHAPTER VIII

TAXATION
Opinion 40 - I949

Held:

1« Chapter 208, Montana Session Laws of 1949j which

imposes a use tax upon trucks, trailers, semi-trailers, and
automobiles operating over and upon the highways of the State
of Montana does not apply to (A) school busses owned by a
school district, and (B) school busses owned by a private indi
vidual and used exclusively for the purposes of transporting
school children,
2« Chapter 208, Montana Session Laws of 1949, does apply to
school busses owned by a private individual and used partly for
the transportation of school children and partly for other
purposes,
July 23 , 1949
Mr. Robert J. Nelson
County Attorney
Great Falls, Montana
Dear Mr* Nelson:
You have requested an opinion of this office concerning
Chapter 208, Montana Session Laws of 1949#
Chapter 208, Montana Session Laws of 1949 provides in
part for ® use tax on trucks, trailers, semi-trailers, and
automobiles operating over and upon the highways of the State
of Montana,

You specifically inquire whether the tax imposed

by Chapter 208 applies in the following three cases, all involv
ing trucks and busses operated for the purpose of transporting
school childrens
-322Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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X»

Where the school bus is omed by a school district*

2*

Where the school bus is owned by a private individual

bus is used exclusively for the purpose of transporting school
children#
3» Where the school bus is owned by a private individual
and is used partly for other purposes*
Section 1998, R*C*M,, 1935» contains the general statutory
exemptions from taxation*

Section 1998 reads in part as

follows t
"The property of the United States, the State,
Counties, cities, towns, school districts,
municipal corporations, public libraries, such
other property as is used exclusively for
agricultural end horticultural societies, for
educational purposes, places of religious
worship,*.*are exempt from taxation*.##**
As was pointed out at length in Op* N0 I36 , Vol. 23 ,
Report and Official Opinions of Attorney General, Section
1998 , supra, provides for two distinct classes of property,

(1 ) that property which is absolutely exempt, consisting of
the property of the United States, the State, Counties, School
Districts, etc., and (2) that class of property which is exempt
only when used exclusively for certain enumerated puri^oses#
A school bus owned by a school district falls in the
first classification of property and therefore as stated
above is absolutely exempt from taxation.
A school bus owned by an individual and used exclusively
for the purpose of transporting school children falls in
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class 2 of Section 199Ô end is exempt from taxation if it is
in fact used exclusively for the transportation of school
children#

However, it is incumbent upon the ovner to claim

such exemption and make satisfactory-proof of the exclusive
use of the property#
A school bus owned by an individual and used partly for
transportation of school children and partly for other purposes
falls in neither of the classes of property set out in Section
199Ô and therefore such a bus is not exempt from taxation.
Therefore, it is my opinion that a school bus owned by
a school district is exempt from taxation, a school bus owned
by a private individual and used exclusively for the trans
portation of school children is exempt from taxation upon
claim end proof of exemption and that a school bus owned by
a private individual and used partly for the transportation
of school children and partly for other py^^sea is not exempt
from taxation#
V

' ■

Very truly yours,
■ ARNOLD H# OLSaN
Attorney General
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Opinion 79 - 1950
Hold!

1* A tax erroneously collected due to errors in the

Treasurer *s books which show a deficit end registered war
rants for a school district when in fact there were no
registered warrants and deficit,may be refunded under the
provisions of Section 2272,

1935, as amended by

Chapter 201, Laws of 1939 (now Section S4 -4176 ,

1947),

Such refund can only be made where there is strict compliance
with the statute as to the time and manner of making claim
for refund*
January 7, 1950
Mr. John J. Cavan
County Attorney
Wheatland County
Harlowton, Montana
Dear Mr. Cavan?
You have requested my opinion concerning the refunding of
taxes which were levied for a school district in your County*
You advised me that the books in the County Treasurer’s office
showed a deficit and outstanding registered warrants for the
district at the time taxes were levied and subsequent to such
time it appeared that the books were erroneous and there was
8 balance to the credit of the school district.
It is apparent that the increase in levy for the school
district in question would not have been made if the treasurer’s
books did not erroneously show that there were outstanding
warrants that would have to be paid.

In other words the
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-326additional levy was due to a bookkeeping error end resulted
In an unjustified levy»
Section 2222, M.G.M., 1935# es emended by Chapter 201,
lews of 1939 (now Section 04-4176, R.C*M», 1947) providesî
**Any taxes, percentum and costs, heretofore
or hereafter, paid more than once or erron
eously or illegally collected, may, by order
of the County Oomalssioners, be refunded by
the County Treasurer*”
In Ghristofferson v# Choteau County, 105 Mont» 577, 74
Fee* (2d) 427 , the court considered the Montana cases which
had previously construed Section 2222, supra, and held that
the Section would apply to taxes erroneously collected and
that a previous decision of the court which stated that such
recovery could not be had was inadvertently made#

The court

adopted the rule that an erroneous assessment occurs vihen the
taxing officers have power to act but err in the exercise of
that power end that an illegal assessment takes place when
they have no power at all to act.

Applying this rule to the

facts submitted it is apparent that a refund by the Board of
County Commissioners would be proper as the misinformation
shown by the Treasurer's books led to an erroneous collection
of the tax.

It is also imi>ortant to remember that such refund

can be made only if there is strict compliance with Chapter
201, Laws of 1939 , which designates the time and the manner
in which claim for refund can be made.
This problem has been previously considered by the office
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in Opinion No# 129, Vol# 20, Report and Official Opinions of
the Attorney General end also in Opinion No# 4^5# Vol 19,
Report end Official Opinions of the Attorney General end these
opinions are in accord with the views expressed here#
It is therefore, aqr opinion that a tax collected, due
to errors in the Treasurer's books which show a deficit and
registered warrants for a school district when in fact there
were no registered warrants and deficit, may be refunded
under the provisions of Section 2222, R#G.M., 1933, ®s
amended by Chapter 201, Laws of 1939 (now Section #4-4176,
R.G.M,, 1947)*

Such refund can only be made where there is

strict compliance with the statute as to the time and manner
of making claim for refund#

Very truly yours,
ARNOLD H# 0L3M
Attorney General
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Held;

Buildings owned by an educational institution and

used exclusively as residences for the principal and teachers
of the school are exempt from property taxation as property
used exclusively for educational purposes under the pro
visions of Article XII, Section 2 of the Montana Constltion,
and Section 04-202^

1947#
February 4» 1954

Mr* Michael J, 0*Connell
County Attorney
Gallatin County
Boteman, Montana
Tear Mr# O’Connell;
You have asked my opinion upon the following question;
’’Are buildings used as residences for the principal
and teachers of a school owned and operated by a
religious society exempt from property taxation
under the provisions of Article XII, Section 2 of
the Constitution of Montana, and Section #4-202,
R#G.M., 19477”
You have supplied me with these additional facts;
I

the

-

school is primarily for members of the religious society; it
is in a rural area several miles from the nearest city; and
it has boarding pupils as well as day pupils#
The Constitutional provision permitting ex^aptlon of
property from taxation is Article XII, Section 2 of the
Montana Constitution and it provides as follows;
’’Sec# 2. The property of the United States, the
state, counties, cities, town, school districts,
municipal corporations, and public libraries shall
be exempt from taxation; and such other property
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as may be used exclusively for the agricultural
and horticultural societies, for educational
purposes, places for actual religious worship
hospitals, and places of burial not used or held
for private or corporate profit, institutions
of purely public charity and evidences of debt
secured by mortgages of record upon real or per
sonal property in the State of Montana, may be
exempt frcxa taxation*"
The statute enacted pursuant to this constitutional
provision is Section Ô4-202, R*C,M., 1947, which provides in
part:
"Exemptions from Taxation. The property of the
United States of ^erlca, the state, counties,
cities, towns, school districts, municipal corpor
ations, public libraries, such other property as
is used exclusively for agricultural and horti
cultural societies, for educational purposes,
places of actual religious worship, hospitals and
places of burial not used or held for private
or corporate profit, and institutions of purely
public charity, evidence of debt secured by
mortgages of record upon reel or personal
property in the state of Montana, and public
art galleries and public observatories not used
or held for private or corporate profit, are
exempt from taxation, but no more land than is
necessary for such purpose is exempt.,.,"
Since nothing in the statement of facts indicates that the
residences in question are primarily used for religious worship,
it appears that the exemption is not claimed for a "place of
actual religious worship", but rather is based upon the use of
the property "exclusively ... for educational purposes."
The first, and leading case upon the question of exemptions
in this state, Montana Catholic Missbns v. County of Lewis
end Clerk, 13 Mont. 559 35 fac. 2 laid down the rule which has
been followed consistently.

That rule, briefly stated, is that
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the exemption applies to the property Itself, end not to the
institution owning the property#

Under this rule, the funda

mental consideration is the use to which the property is being
put at the time that the exemption is claimed*

If it is being

used to earn a profit, the property is not exempt#
This rule has bem followed in numerous opinions issued
by this office*

In 6 Opinions of the Attorney General 2Ô2,

it was held that portions of a f*M#C*A* building actually
used by the association in carrying on its work, including
rooms rented to members for living quarters are exempt from
taxation, because used exclusively for educational and
charitable work*

In 22 Opinions of the Attorney General 1Ô4,

Ko. 113, it was stated that a charitable institution is not
entitled to an exemption from taxation on property which it
leases or holds for revenue*

In 23 Opinions of the Attomey

General 93, No. 36 , this office held that the determining
factor in deciding whether property used by a hospital associa
tion is entitled to exemption is whether or not the dominant
and substantial use of the property is for benevolent and non
profit purposes, rather than to make a profit for the indivi
duals who comprise the association*

It is the primary duty

of local taxing authorities to investigate claims for exemption
and determine whether as a matter of fact, the dominant and
substantial use of the property la for an exempt purpose.

This

investigation will determine whether the above stated rules
of law apply in the particular situation*
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There has been no Montana case or previous opinion of this
office on the subject of residences for teachers at educational
institutions*

However, there have been recent decisions in

states having substantially the same requirement for exemption
as our own.
In the case of Application of Thomas G. Clarkson Memorial
College, 77 H.T.S. (2d) 182, it was held that the residences of
teachers are exempt from property taxation.

The court said;

”In all fairness, we may take notice of the fact
that colleges will find It difficult to obtain
teachers unless they can provide or find living
quarters for them* It is sheer nonsense to assume
that the educational process is not progressing
in the residences of the teaching staff. Prepara
tions have to be made for recitations, lectures
and examinations and duties consequent thereto, to
say nothing of meetings with the students, either
singly or in groi^)s. Students engage in educa
tional activities in their roomsî teachers do the
same in their homes,"
The result In this Case is essentially identical with the
conclusion reached by Attomey General Poindexter in 6 Opinions
*»i

of the Attorney General 282, supra, in which he held that the
portion of a X.M.C.A. used as rooms for members was used
exclusively for education end charitable purposes and was
therefore exempt.
It is therefore, my opinion that buildings owned by an
educational institution and used exclusively as residences
for the principal and teachers of the school are exempt from
property taxation as property used exclusively for educational
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purposes under the provisions of Article XII^ Section 2 of
the Montana Constitution, end Section S4-202, Revised Codes
of Montana, 1947*

Very truly yours.

ARNOLD H. QISM
Attorney General
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CHAPTER REFERB^CES
The following official opinions of the attorney general
can be found in Volume 23 of the Report and Official Opinions
SL the Attorney General.
Opinion 40 * 1949
Opinion 79 1950
The following official opinions of the attomey general
can be found in Volume 25 of the Report and Official Opinions
of the Attorney General. (To be published)
Opinion 60

1954
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CHAFTi^a II
CONSTRUCTION, R^FAIRS, IMFROV&IENT

Opinion 223 - 194&
Rôldï Money received es insurance for the destruction by fire
of a high school building, may not be expended for the building
of an elementary school without authority therefore having
first been procured from the electorate voting at an election
called for that purpose* Money received as damages for
the purpose of purchasing a site and building a new elemen-r
tary school to take the place of one destroyed, without a
vote of the electorate*
November 23, 1946
Mr# Frank J* Roe
County Attorney
Silver how County
Butte, Montana
Bear Mr* Roe:
You have requested my opinion concerning the following:
School District No* 1, Silver Bow County, contemplates
the construction of a new elementary school*

The district has

on hand funds paid as compensation for the destruction of two
elementary schools*

There is also available insurance money

paid to the district because of the destruction by fire of the
high school*

You ask if It is necessary to have the approval

of the electorate of the district before these funds may be
spent for the construction of a new elementary school*
•*334**'
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This office previously held in Opinion No* IÔ5 , Volume
21 , Report end Officiel Opinions of the Attorney General, a

portion of the funds realized as compensation for the destruction
of the two elementary schools could be used to purchase a new
elementary school site which had been approved by the electorate*
One of the reasons given was that the money realized from the
settlement was a trust fund, earmarked for the construction of
a school to replace the schools destroyed*

The prind pal

question involved here is whether or not the board of trustees
of School District No 1, of Silver Bow County has authority
to expend cash on hand for the purpose of erecting an elemen
tary school to replace two elementary schools dams^ to the
extent they had to be abandoned, without first having obtained
authority from the electors*

The cash on hand consists of the

sum of $300 ,000.00 received as Insurance for the destruction
by fire of an abandoned high school, and the further sum of
$100 ,000*00 received for damage to the elementary schools.
Our Supreme Court in the case of State ex rel, Diederichs
V. Board of Trustees, 91 Mont* 300, 7 Pac. (2d) 543, held that
insurance money received as a consequence of the destaniction
by fire of a county high school could be used to construct or
rebuild a high school to replace the one destroyed, without
first having submitted the question to a vote of the electorate*
The court in deciding the question of whether or not the ex
penditures of the insurance money came within the constitutional
prohibition as to creating a debt or liability, said:
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"•••The fire converted the building into money
available only for the reconstruction of the
high school and consequently, since the origi
nal purpose has been given approval by the
electors, there is now no useful purjxise to
be subserved by again submitting the ques
tion of the proposed expenditure to the people
for approval, nor does the Constitution or lew
require it#.##;
It seems plain that the constitutional
limitation does not apply to the expenditure
of cash on hand provided for a specific purpose; but rather to the creation of an
obligation to be met end paid in the future
by the taxpayers*"
Applying the lew as laid down in the Diederichs case to
the facts here, the money received as insurance from the
destruction of the high school may be used only for the pur
pose of replscipg the high school, end for no other purpose,
without a vote of the electorate*

It could not be used for

the purpose of building an elementary school, S>r the reason
that the original funds approved by the electorate were for
a different purpose, that is for the building of a high school*
The same is true of the money received for damages to the ele
mentary schools.

That money may be used for the purpose of

building an elementary school to take the place of the ones
destroyed, and for no other purpose, without a vote of the
electorate.
Under the provisions of paragraph 6 of Section 1015, R,C#M,
1935, as amended, before the trustees may build the new school
or procure a new site they must first be authorized to do so
by a majority vote of the electors of the district.
I am advised that the trustees have already been authorized
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to procure a site, and In fact, the same has already been
purchased*

I do not understand, however, that the trustees

were also authorised to build a school building on this Site*
If not, then this question must be submitted to the electorate*
At the same time the question as to the expenditure of the funds
received as insurance for destruction of the old high school
could be submitted to the electorate.
It is therefore my opinion that money received as in
surance for the destruction by fire of a high school building,
may not be expended for the building of an elementary school
without authority therefore having been first procured from
the electorate voting at an election called for that purpose*
It is further my opinion that money received as damages
for destruction of elementary school buildings may be used
for the purchase of a site and building a new elementary
school to take the place of the one destroyed without a vote
of the electorate.
Very truly yours,
R. V* BÛTTOMLÏ
Attorney General
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Opinion 93 - 1950
Held;

1* Bidders upon Rural Improvement District Works,

Special Improvement District Works, and upon the construction
ol* State buildings or the alteration, repair and improvement
of State buildings and grounds must accompany such bids with
designated security in the form of a certified check.

In

addition to the aforementioned situations wherein the security
is required by statute, a Board of County Commissioners and
;

a Board of School District Trustees may in the exercise of
their respective discretion end judgment require that bid
ders upon county end school district contracts deposit
security with their bids as a means of insuring that all
bidders are responsible parties.
March 9, 1950
Mr* Melvin 2. Magnuson
County Attorney
Lewis and Clark County
Helena, Montana
Dear Mr. Magnuson;
You have requested my opinion upon the following question;
”C8n contractors submit certified checks, cashier*s
checks, or bid bonds as security upon the submission
of bids to perform county or school district con
struction work in Montana?”
As examination of the Montana Statutes reveals that there
are no provisions of the law which require that contractors
for general county or school district work must furnish se
curity upon the submission of a bid.

There are, however,

several specific statutes recuirlng bidders upon public works
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to furnish security upon the submission of bids,

ihey are

as hereinafter set forth.
Section 16-1607, R.C.M., 1947, provides that all bids
submitted upon Rural Improvement District Work must be accom
panied by a certified check payable to the Board of County
Commissioners, certified by a responsible bank for an amount
which shall not be less than ten per cent (10;^) of the
aggregate of the proposal.
Section 11-2209, R.C.M., 1947# provides that all bids
submitted upon Special Improvement District Work must be
accompanied by a certified check payable to the city, certified
by a responsible bank for an amount which shall not be less
than ten per cent (10^) of the aggregate of the proposal.
Section 62-1133# R.C.M., 1947, provides that when bids are
submitted to the State Board of Examiners for the construction
of state buildings or the alteration, repair and improvement
of state buildings and grounds, such bids must be accompanied
by a certified check for five per cent i5%) of the amount of
the bid.
Apart from the three above cited provisions, the law is
silent as to any recuiraraent that security be deposited with
a bid upon any public work in the State of Montana. Your
question thus becomes whether or not the Board of County
Commissioners or the School District

Board of Trustees may,

in the absence of statute, recuire that bids upon construction
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work ba accompanied by a certain designated form of security.
Section 16-1025, Revised Codes of Montana, 1947, grants
to the Board of County Commissioners the Jurisdiction and
power under such limitations and restrictions as are pre
scribed by law to make and enforce such rules for its govern
ment, the preservation of order and the transaction of business,
as may be necessary.

Section 75-1624, Revised Codes of Montana, 1947, provides
that the board of trustees of each school district shall have
custody of all school property belonging to the district and
shall have the power to transact all business necessary for
maintaining schools end protecting the rights of the distil ct.
Certainly the powers granted to Board of County Commissioners
and School District Trustees by the statutes contained in the
preceding two paragraphs are extensive enough, in my opinion
to include the authority to establish uniform regulations and
procedures to be followed in the submission of bids for county
or school district contracts.

If in the exercise of their

respective discretion and judgment the governing boards of
counties and school districts decide that the requirement that
bidders on county and school district contracts deposit security
with their bids will insure the obtaining of responsible bidders
upon such projects, I can conceive of no reason under the law
why such a regulation cannot be promulgated and required.
It is therefore my opinion that bidders upon Rural Improvement
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District Works, Special Improvement District Works, and upon
the construction of state buildings or the alteration, repair
and improvement of state buildings and grounds must accompany
such bids with designated security In the form of a legally
sufficient certified check.

In addition to the aforementioned

situations wherein the security Is required by statute, a
Board of County Commissioners and a Board of School District
Trustees may in the exercise of their respective discretion and
judgment require that bidders upon county end school district
contracts deposit security with their bids as a method and
means of insuring that all bidders are responsible parties*

Very truly yours,

jLaJWOI,!) H.
Attorney General
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Opinion 107 - 1950
Held;

A school district has the authority to enter Into a

contract for the repair of a school building and provide in
the contract for payment over a period of three years.
May 5, 1950
Mr* James Ty Harrison
County Attorney
Phillips County
MaltaI Montana
Dear Mr* Harrison;
Tou Tiave requested my opinion concerning the authority of
a board of trustees of a school district to enter into a contract

for the repair of school buildings, the payment of which will
be spread over a period of three years.

You have advised me

that the trustees complied with the law in requesting bids for
material and labor in the repair of the school building*
This office, in Opinion No* 60. Volume 22, Report and Offi
cial Opinions of the Attorney General, considered the purchase
of a school bus by a school district which was to be paid for
oyer a period of three years*

The opinion held that the dis

trict had the power to miter into aich a contract and the
reasoning in that opinion would apply with equal force to a
contract for repair of a school building*
Section 75-1632, Revised Codes of Montana, 1947, enumerates
the powers granted to a school board and one of these is the
authority to repair school buildings*

Section 75-1637, R,C,M.
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1947* prohibits m y school trustee from having any pecuniary

interest in contracts for the repair of schools and It also
provides that a contract for repair "where the amount Involved
is two hundred end fifty dollars, or more," must not be let
without first advertising in a newspaper and calling for bids*
This letter section does not prohibit contracts being made by
the trustees, the payment for which shall extend over three
years*

Such manner of payment might well be a convenient

method for meeting such necessary expenditures without unduly
burdening the district in any one year*
Compliance with the budget law is necessary for such a
contract and the annual payments under the contract, for eleraen»
tary schools, must be included on Item 6 of Section 1 as found
in Section 75*1703, E,C,M*, 1947,

For high schools the annual

payment should be entered in subsection III, R*C*M* of Part I
of the high school budget as provided in Section 75-4502, R*C*M,
1947*

The repair of buildings could also be financed by a bond

issue as subsection (a) of Section 75*3901 names the repair of
school houses as one of the authorized bond purposes.

However

the trustees of the district ere its managing officers and
directors and have large discretionary power in managing school
affairs*
It is therefore my opinion that a school district has the
authority to enter into a contract for the repair of a school
building and provide in the contract for payment over a period
of three years*
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ARNOLD H* OLSSN,
Attorney Generali
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Opinion 4 •* 1951
HeldI

An architectes fee for drawing the plans and speoi*

ficstions for, and supervising the construction of a school
building may be paid from the proceeds of the funds realised
from the sale of bonds for the construction of such a building*
February 24> 1951
Mr# George D* Ore
County Attorney
Petroleum County
Winnetti Montana
Dear Mr, Ore;
You have requested my opinion as to whether an architect's
fee may be paid from the funds realised from the sale of bonds
for the construction of a school.
There is not « specific: statute concerning the payment of
an architect's fee and directing the manner of its payment.
Section 75-3922,

1947 provides in part as follows;

"All moneys arising from the sale of such bonds
shall be paid to the county treasurer and by him
credited to the school district issuing the same,
and shall be immediately available to the pur»
pose for which the bonds were issued and not other
purpose,"
In view of this statute it is necessary to determine whether
the expenditure of funds realised from the sale of bonds in pay
ment of an architect's fee is included within the purpose of
the bond issue,

A helpful definition of an architect is found

in 3 Am, Jur, 998, which reads as follows ;
"An architect is one whose occupation it is to form
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or devis» plen» and designs and draw up specifications
for buildings or structures^ and to superintend their
construction#**
It is apparent from this definition that the work of an
architect is supervisory in nature, but enters into the construe»
tioa of the building because of the fact that he plans the
building from its initial stage to completion*
Our Supreme Court In Caird Engineering Works vs* Seven-up
«

Mining Company, 111 Mont* 471 111 Pac# (2d) 1267, held that an
architect is entitled to a mechanic’s lien for furnishing plans
and specifications for, and supervising the construction of a
building*

In granting such a lien the court recognized that the

services of an architect were work and labor which entered into
the construction of the building* If an architect may claim a
lien for his fee then such a claim could also be paid from a
building fund as it would be on the same basis as any laborer
who performed services in the construction of the building*

This

office in Opinion No* 105, Volume 16, Reports and Official
Opinions of the Attorney General held that an architect’s fee
could be paid from the general fund of a school district, and
by Implication, also held that such payment could also be made
from the building account*
It is, therefore, ay opinion that an architect’s fee for
drawing the plans and specifications for, and supervising the
construction of a school building may be paid from the proceeds
of the funds realized from the sale of bonds for the construction
of such a building.
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Very truly youro,

m o m H* OLSEK
Attorney General
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The following official opinions of the attorney general
can be found in Volume 21 of the Report end Official Opiniong
of the Attorney General *
Opinion 223

1946

The following official opinions of the attorney general
can be found in Volume 23 of the Report and Official Opinions
of the Attorney General#
Opinion 9 Ô -* 1950
Opinion 107 ^ 1950
The following official opinion of the attorney general
can be found in Volume 24 of the Report and Official Opinions
of the Attorney General. (To be publlshedj
Opinion 4 * 1951
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CHAPTER I
TRANSPORTATION
Opinion 120 ^ 1946

Held*

The State of Montana must pay to the school district one-

third the cost of transportation by school busses In accordance
with the schedule fixed by the Board of Education as provided in
Section 1200«1| R*G#M,, 1935» and also the state must pay to the
district one-third of the amount paid to parents or guardians
in lieu of bus transportation as provided in Section 7 of Chapter
152 , Laws of 1941» as amended by Chapter 1#9, Laws of 1943, and

Chapter 116, Laws of 1945» and the fact the per capita trans
portation cost is higher in one class than the other will not
change the method of computing the amount of the staters reim
bursement to the school district»
February 6, 1946
Miss Elizabeth Ireland
Superintendent of Public Instruction
State Capitol
Helena, Montana
Dear Miss Ireland*
You have submitted for my consideration the following question*
If a board of trustees of a school district puts on a bus and
employs a bus driver to carry on transportation for the children
in a school district, end if this bus transportation costs more
than individual transportation (See Chapter 152, Section 7 of
the 1941 School Laws), will the state be required to pay one-third
of the cost of the bus transportation ; or is the state required
-349*
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to pay one-third of the coat of the transportation according to the
schedule as given in the chapter and section quoted above?
In answering your question it is necessary to consider Section
13 of Chapter 152, laws of 1941, as amended by Chapter 1Ô9, laws

of 1943, which reads in part as follows!
*£ach school district end each county high school
meeting the requirements of this act shall be en
titled to reimbursement from the state public
school general fund in an amount not to exceed
one-third (1/3) of the actual coat of transportation, or services rendered in lieu of trans
portation, annually on presentation to the
state superintendent of public instruction,
through the office of the county superintendent
of schools, or certified claims for such reim
bursement using for such purpose the forms
provided by the state superintendent of public
instruction. Such reimbursement shall be made
in accordance with the provisions of Sections
1200.1. 1200.6, 1200.7 and 1200.9, of the
Revised Codes of Montana, 1935, except that
the schedule provided in this act for indivi
dual transportation, or services in lieu
thereof, shall be used instead of any schedule
which may have been heretofore or may here
after be fixed and promulgated by the state
board of education.**
The above section differentiates between transportation by
bus and individual transportation in that it provides *such
reimbursement shall be made in accordance with the provisions of
Sections 1200*1, 1200.6, 1200.7 and 1200.9 of the Revised Codes of
Montana, 1935, except that the schedule provided in this act for
Individual transportation, or services in lieu thereof, shall be
ised.,*** The schedule for individual transportation, or services
In lieu thereof, is found in Section 7 of Chapter 152, laws of

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

-351-

1941, as amended by Chapter 1&9* Laws of 1943, and Chapter ll6,
Lavra of 1945, which reads in part as follows:
"The board of trustees may pay to the parents or
legally appointed guardian of each child eligible
for transportation under this act board or rent,
or provide transportation for the child, the
amount called for under the following schedule la
lieu of furnishing bus transportation#*•"
It would appear, therefore, that the amount of reimbursement
received by each district would be determined by two tests.

In

one class, bus transportation, the schedule fixed by the Board
of Education by virtue of Section 1200,1 would be applied, and
in the other class, individual transportation, the amount paid
under the schedule set out In Section 7 of Chapter 152, Laws of
1941, as amended, would be applied*

The fact that the cost

per pupil for transportation is higher in one instance than the
other does not effect the method of computation or the amount
paid to the school district by the state*

The transportation

furnished determined the method of computing the one-third
reimbursement by the state.

The payments made under Section

7 of Chapter 152, Laws of 1941, as amended, states that payments
made under the schedule found In Section 7 of Chapter 152, shall
be used as a basis for computing the reimbursement for such
individual transportation, or services in lieu thereof*

All

other transportation furnished by the district comes within
the provisions of Section 1200*1, 1200*6, 1200*7 and 1200*9 of
the Revised Codes of Montana, 1935*
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It is therefore my o p in io n that the State of Montana must
pay to a school district one*.third the cost of transportation
by school busses in accordance with the schedule fixed by the
hoard of Education as provided in Section 1200*1, Revised Oodes
of Montana, 193$, and also the abate must pay to the district
on@~thlrd of the amount paid to' parents or guardians in lieu
of bus transportation as provided in Section 7 of Chapter 1$2
Laws of 1941* as amended by Chapter 1#9, Laws of 1943* and
Chapter 116, Laws of 1945* and the fact that the per capita
transportatlbn cost is higher in one class than the other will
not change the method of computing the amount of the state’s
reimbursement to the school district#
.

Sincerely yours*
I* V# BOTTÛMLÏ
Attorney General
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Held I 1, Children whose parents have moved into a district and
whose parents maintain a permanent residence within the district
are entitled to the same school transportation privileges as are
the other children of the district without regard to the length
of residence of the parents within the district*
2* Children whose parents have moved into a school district
which does not maintain an elementary school are entitled to
attend the school in another district to which the children of
the district are transported and the district of the parents
residence must pay the proportionate amount for such pupil to
the school attended as provided in Section 4# of Chapter 152,
Laws of 1941*
3* The number of school trustees who must countersign school
district warrants with the school district clerk is not fixed
by statute, but the trustees may by appropriate resolution, pro*
vide for such counter signatures#
August 3, 1946
Mr, Bert L, Packer
County Attorney
Teton, County
Choteau, Montana
Dear Mr# Packers
You have requested my opinion concerning the following ques**
tions;
1.

What is the obligation of a school district to pay trans*

portation and tuition for children who have moved into the district
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from another county? Tou advise me the school district in ques-

•••

tion does not maintain an elementary school but provides transport
tation to an elementary school In another district*
2, What obligation does a school district have to pay
transportation for elementary pupils who have moved from one
district in the county to anothsr district?
3* What number of trustees should sign warrants In school
districts of the second and third class?
four first two questions concerning transportation are
answered by Opinion Ko* 272> Volume 19, Report and Official
Opinions of the Attorney General, wherein it was held:
"School trustees have the power to furnish transpor
tation, or services in lieu thereof, for all pupils
residing within their district and enrolled in the
public schools of their district end also to pupils
residing within their district who^ are enrolled in
eny Montana Public School and otherwise eligible
under Section 9 of Chapter 152 of the Laws of 1941
to receive transportation aid*"
As you will notq Section 9 of Chapter 152, Laws of 1941 >
does not require the residence in the district be for any fixed
length of time as the section provides "such child must reside
with his parents or legally appointed guardian, and his parents
or guardian must maintain a permanent home within the boundaries
of the district paying transportation*” It is the district in
which the permanent home is located which must pay the transpor
tation end not the district from which the family moved, even
though the move was made a short time before the request is made
for transportation*
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The payment of tuition for children who have moved into a
school district which does not maintain an elementary school is
covered by Section 4 of Chapter 152, Laws of 1941*

Section 4

of Chapter 152 provides the trustees of a school district have the
power to close an elementary school and transport the pupils to
a school in another district, which appears to be the case from
the facts you have given me*

Section 4 also provides it shall

be the duty of the school district which closes its schools to
assist In the support of the schools of the district where the
pupils attend in the direct proportion the number of pupils of
the closed school bears to the number of pupils In the school
attended.
Chapter 203, Laws of 1943, which amends Section 1013,
1935, provides for the transfer of school funds for children who
attend elementary school in a district other than that of their
residence#

Section 1013, as amended, does not specifically

recite the section has application only to individual applications
for transfer and not the transfer of all the children of a school
of one district in a school in another district, but such a
construction would be reasonable and would also be in accord with
the rule adopted in State v. Certain Intoxicating Liquors, 71
Mont* 79, 227 fac* 472, which statesî
"In the construction of a particular statute, or
in the Interpretation of any of its provisions,
all acts relating to the seme subject or having
the same general purpose, should be read in
connection with it, as together constituting
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one lew* And the law imposes a duty upon the
judicial department t o pursue the legislative
intent so far as possible* It Is our duty to
reconcile the statutes, if possible, and make
them operative*”
Applying the above rule to Section 4 of Chapter 152, Laws
of 1941* and Chapter 203, Laws of 1943, results in the conclusion
Section 4 of Chapter 152 must be applied when an elementary school
is closed end all of the students who normally attend the school
are transferred to a school in another district*

There is no

requirement of authorization for such attendance, and, therefore,
any pupil whoee parents reside in the district is entitled to
attend school in the district maintaining a school with the
resulting obligation on the part of the district of the child’s
residence to pay the proportionate tuition requirement to the
district where the child attends school*
There is no specific statutory requirement fixing the number
of school trustees who must sign school warrants*
H*0*M,, 1935, provides in part;

Section 1019*22,

"The clerk of each school district

must Issue all warrants drawn against any fund of the district in
triplicate***."

Section 1019*23 contains the provisions "that

no warrant must be issued by such clerk against such appropriation
item which will exceed the unexpended balance of the appropria
tion therefor*"

These sections by inference would Indicate the

clerk may issue school warrants*

However Section 1015, E.C.M#,

1935, as amended, provides in part;
"Every school board unless otherwise specially pro
vided by law shall have the power and it shall be
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*1# To prescribe and enforce rules not Inconsistent
with law, or those prescribed by the superintendent of
public instruction for their own government of schools
under their supervision#”
It would be both good business practice and to the best in
terest of the school district for the trustees to prescribe by
resolution the number of trustees who must countersign school
>

warrants before such warrants will be valid obligations of the
district#
It is therefore my opinion*
1# Children whose parents have moved into a district and
whose parents maintain a permanent residence within the district
are entitled to the same school transportation privileges as are
the other children of the district without regard to the Imgth
of the residence of the parents within the district#
2# Children whose parents have moved into a school district
which does not maintain an elementary school are entitled to attend
the school in another district to which the children of the district
are transported and the district of the parents^ residence must
pay the proportionate amount for such pupil to the school attended
as provided in Section 4 of Chapter 152, laws of 1941*
3*

The number of school trustees who must countersign school

district warrants with the school district clerk is not fixed by
statute, but the trustees may by appropriate resolution provide
for such counter signatures*
Sincerely yours,

a# V#

Bonoim

Attorney General
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Opinion 57 - 1947

Helds

The «Iteration of the transportation schedule in accord

ance with subsection 0 of Section 7 of Chapter 152, Laws of 1941»
as amended, is discretionary with the County Superintendent of
schools*

Such an alteration must be approved by the State

Superintendent of Public Instruction and cannot be demanded as
a matter of right by the parents of the children concerned*
August 19, 1947
Mr* M*L* Parcelle
County Attorney
Stillwater County
Columbus, Montana
Dear Mr* Parcelle I
tou have requested my opinion aa to whether the board of
trustees of a school district has discretionary power to classify
students who live more than three miles from an established bus
route under subsection Ô, Section 7, Chapter 152, Laws of 1941,
as amended by Chapter 1S9, Laws of 1943, and Chapter 116, Laws
of 1945.
Subsection 5 of Section 7# Chapter 152, Laws of 1941, as
amended, provides:
"School children living within one and one-half (1 1/2)
miles of an established bus route shall not be eligible
for transportation aid, other than the services of the
established route* Children living more than one and
one half (1 1/2) but less than three (3) miles from
such route shall receive transportation eld of onehalf (1/2) the rates given in subsection one (1) of
the schedule sat up in this section. Children living
three (3) miles or more from such bus route shall
receive transportation aid on the basis provided in
the schedule fixed in this section.”
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The above quoted section requires the payment of transpor
tation to children who live more than a mile and one-half from
an established bus route.
Subsection 6 of Section 7# Chapter 152, Laws of 1941, as
amended, states that In Isolated cases "this schedule may be
altered by the county superintendent of schools, with the
consent and approval of the state superintendent of public
instruction" and payments made in amounts greater than the
amounts fixed by the schedule.
Under the facts submitted it does not appear that the
school in the district has been closed, but the basis for
transportation aid is that the children live more than three
miles from the bus route.

As was observed above, the children

are eligible to transportation in accordance with the schedule.
Subsection S was enacted to take care of the unusual situation
such as the closing of a school or the difficulties of trans
portation, but the alteration of the schedule is permitted by
the county superintendent with the consent of the State Super
intendent of Public Instruction,

The use of the word "may”

together with the requirement of approval indicates that the
change in the schedule is discretionary with the county super
intendent and not mandatory and that justification must be
shown in each case.
It is therefore, my opinion that the alteration of the
transportation schedule in accordance with subsection Ô of
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Section 7 of Chapter 152, Iswg of 1941» ®s emended, is dis
cretionary with the County Superintendent of Schools.

Such an

alteration must be approved by the State Superintendent of
Public Instruction and cannot be demanded as a matter of right
by the parents of the children concerned.

Sincerely yours,

R. V. BOTTmil
Attorney General
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Opinion 60 • 1947
Held}

1.

A school district is not required to advertise for

bids in the purchase of a school bus, although it may do so
where the trustees deem it for the best interests of the district.
2.

A school district may purchase a school bus under a condi

tional sales contract and pay for the same over a period of
three years.
August 20I 1947
Kr* J.M. Watts
County Attorney
Musselshell County
Roundup, Montana
Dear Mr. Wattsi
You have submitted for my consideration the following
questions:
1.

Must a school district advertise for bids when the

district purchases a school bus?
2* May the board of trustees of a school district pur
chase a school bus on a conditional sales contract payable over
A period of three years?
In answering your first question it is necessary to con
sider Section 1016, R.C.M., 1935, which provides in part:
”^o beard of trustees shall let any contract for
building, furnishing, repairing, or other work,
for the benefit of the district, where the amount
involved is two hundred fifty dollars, or more,
without first advertising In a newspaper pub
lished in the county for at least two weeks,
calling for bids to perform such work..."
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It would appear that the above prohibition applies to
school buildings, furnishing for the same and work and labor,
A school bus would not come in any of the classes enumerated in
the statute#

Also, section 1016 was enacted prior to the pre

sent transportation act, Chapter 152, Laws of 1941, and its
amendments#

In other words, the purchase of a school buswas

not possible

at the time section 1016 became a law andIts

terms are not broad enough to prohibit the purchase of a bus
without first calling for bids,
Section

3 of Chapter 152, Laws of 1941, provides;

”The board of trustees shall have the power to
purchase or rent and provide for the upkeep,
cere and operation of school busses; or to
contract end pay for the transportation of
eligible pupils, such contracts to run for
terms not to exceed three (3) years#”
It is to be noted that a contract for transportation can
not exceed three years but no limitation is placed on the
manner of purchase of school busses,

A broad power is granted

for the purchase of school busses and the manner of purchase
is not designated.
Section 1022, R#C,M#, 1935, grants to school districts
the power to purchase personal property for school purposes.
Section 1015, R,C,M,, 1935 &a amended, defines the duties of
school trustees, but neither section limits the power to
contract over a period of years.

In Bennett v# Petroleum

County, ^7 Mont. 436, 266 Pac, 1016, our Court considered the
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validity of a contract entered into by a county which would
cover a period of four years and held that the fact the
county obligation would extend beyond the term of office
of members of the existing board would not make the contract .
invalid.
In Arnold v# Custer County» 03 Mont» 130» 269 Pac, 396,
the Court statedt
"When the statutes require an act to be done by
a county official or county officials and do not
provide a method of doing it, any reasonable
and suitable means may be adopted#* :
4

This rule would have application in the problem here pre
sented, and the purchase of a bus under a conditional sales
contract would appear to be a reasonable method#
Section 1019*14, and Section 1263.14, R.C.M#, 193$, limit
the expenditures for any fiscal year to the amount appropriated
for that year*
The conditional sales contract proposed would fix a. de
finite amount payable each year, and so long as the annual
Installments are Included in each budget these sections would
furnish no obstacle to such a three year term contract.
The amount of the annual installments to be paid for the
purchase of a bus must be included in Section 1 of the General
Fund Expenses, for elementary schools, under the item of "New
Equipment — Not financed from sale of bonds,"

Section 1019#3*

In the case of High Schools, payment should be made under the
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item "New Equipment" which Is found in the "Capital Outlay"
Account, Section 1263*2, R.C«M*, 1935*

There Is no authority

for the purchase of a bus by the issuance of bonds*
It Is therefore, my opinioni
1#

A school district is not required to advertise for bids

in the purchase of a school bus, although it may do so where
the trustees deem it for the best Interests of the district*
2*

A school district may purchase a school bus under a

conditional sales contract and pay for the same over a period
of three years*
Sincerely yours,

R. V*

Bonmx,

Attorney General
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Opinion 13*1949
Held;

The one-third contribution of school districts for their

elementary school transportation budgets Is to be paid from the
five mill district levy authorised by Section 10, Chapter 199,
Session Laws of 1949» if there are sufficient funds remaining
after deducting the operation and maintenance costs of the
budgets for the elementary schools*

If there are not suf

ficient funds remaining, thm an additional levy may be made
without an election to meet the district’s one-third obliga
tion for transportation.

The one-third contribution of the

County for the transportation budgets of the elementary schools
is to be paid from the ten mill levy authorized by Section
1202 of the R.C.M., 1935» es amended by Section 11, Chapter
199» Session Laws of 1949, in accordance with the schedule
set out in Chapter 200, Laws of 1949*
The two-thirds contribution or balance of each county for
the high school transportation budget is paid from a separate
transportation county wide levy authorized by sub-section (b)
of Section 14» Chapter 152» Session Laws of 1941, as amended
by Chapter 1#9, Session Laws of 1943*
April 11, 1949
Miss Mary M. Condon
State Superintendent of Public Instruction
State Capitol
Helena, Montana
Dear Miss Condon;
Tou have requested my opinion concerning the effect of
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Chapters 199 end 200, Laws of 1949, as to payments to be made
by school districts for both elementary and high school trans
portation budgets*
Prior to the enactment of Chapter 199, Laws of 1949, (H.B,
l6l) the elementary schools* one-third of the transportation
budgets was paid under the provisions of Subsection 1, Section
14 of Chapter 152, Laws of 1941, as amended by Chapter 189,
Laws of 1943, from the ten mill district levy authorised by
Section 1203,
1945#

1935 as amended by Chapter 51, Laws of

Section 1203 as amended was repealed by Chapter 199,

Laws of 1949 and as a consequence the school district*s con
tribution to the transportation budget must be found in Chapter
199, Laws of 1949*

Section 10 of Chapter 199 amends Section

1019*19 of the R*C.M«, 1935, and provides for a five mill dis
trict levy for elementary school budgets*

As the previous

source of the district*s contribution has been repealed, Sec
tion 1203 as amended, it is reasonable to assume that an ele
mentary budget must pay Its contribution to the transportation
budgets from the five mill levy.

However, if the budgets for

the operation and maintenance of the elementary schools of a
district will utilise all of the proceeds of the five mill levy,
end the authorised twenty per cent increase over such an amount,
then under Subsection 2, Section 14 of Chapter 152, Laws of 1941,
as amended by Chapter 189, Laws of 1943, ®n additional levy for
transportation may be made in such number of mills as will raise
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not to exceed one-third of the total amount set out In the
Budget for transportation without being authorized at an elec
tion*

An additional levy for transportation may be authorized

by the qualified electors of the district*

It is to be noted

that the State’s contribution for bus transportation is to be
computed by the schedule fixed by Chapter 200, Laws of 1949,
which might not cover the one-third of the approved budgets
with a resulting deficiency to be paid by the district from
any excess amount above its one-third contribution remaining /
from the district five mill levy or from the levy authorized
by the electors of the district* Opinions No* 120 and 17#,
Volume 21, Report'and Official Opinions of the Attorney General*
The county’s one-third share of the transportation costs
for elementary schools will be paid from the ten mill levy
provided for in Section 1202, R.C.M., 1935, as amended by Chap
ter 273,

Laws of 1947, and Chapter 199, Laws of 1949,

The

authority for such contribution of the County’s one-third is
found in Subsection (b), Section 13 of Chapter 152, Laws of
1941, as amended by Chapter 1#9, Laws of 1943, Chapter 169,
Laws of 1947, and Chapter 200, Laws of 1949*

This contribu

tion by the county is fixed at one-third of the schedule and
a deficiency may be Incurred from such computation in the same
manner that was pointed out above in regard to the state’s
one-third contribution *
District and County high schools receive reimbursement
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from the State for one-third of their transportation budgets|
1
computed according to the schedule in the manner outlined in
Opinion No* 120, Volume 21, Report end Official Opinions of
the Attorney General.

Chapter 200, Laws of 1949, increases

end fixe® the bus transportation schedule but does not alter
the method of computation defined by the above cited opinion
of this office*

The remaining two-thirds or balance of the

high school transportation costs is paid from a County-wide
tax which is not. limited in ©mount as Subsection (b) of Sec
tion 14, Chspter 152, Laws of 1941, as amended by Chapter 1Ô9,
Laws of 1943, reads*
**,*.The County Commissioners, except as herein
after provided, shall make a county-wide levy
of such number mills as will raise such total."
It is my opinion*
1.

The one-third contribution of school districts for

their elementary school transportation budgets is to be paid
from the five mill district levy authorized by Section 10,
Chapter 199, Laws of 1949, if there are sufficient funds re
maining after deducting the operation and maintenance costs of
the budgets for the elementary schools#

If there are not suf

ficient funds remaining then an additional levy may be made
without an election to meet the district’s one-third obligation
for transportation.
V

2.

The one-third contribution of the county for the trans

portation budgets of the elementary schools is to be paid from

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

*369^

the ten mill levy authorised by Section 1202,

1935f

as last amended by Section 11, Chapter 199, Lews of 1949, in
accordance with the schedule set out in Chapter 200, Laws of
1949,
3, The two-thirds contribution or balance of each county
for the high school transportation budgets Is paid from a
separate transportation county-wide levy authorised by Sub
section (b) of Section 14, Chapter 152, Lews of 1941, as
amended by Chapter 1&9, Laws of 1943#

Very truly yours,
ARNOLD H, OLSdN
Attorney General
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Opinion 57 - 1949
Held;

1* Under Chapter 200^ Laws of 1949* the Board of Trustees

of any School District or County High School has discretionary
power in the furnishing of transportation to the students of
the District.
2. If the Board of Trustees elects to furnish transportation
to any students within the District* they must furnish such
transportation to all students within the District»
September 21* 1949
Mr# James H» Higgins
County Attorney
White Sulphur Springs, Montana
Dear Mr# Higgins:
You have requested my opinion concerning the interpreta
tion to be placed on the word "may** as found in Section 1,
Chapter 200, Laws of 1949, in which the following language is
used#
"The Board of Trustees of any School District or
County High School within the State of Montana may
furnish transportation to and from schools for all
pupils residing In their Districts#
Prior to the amendment of Section 1, Chapter 152, Laws of
1941, by Chapter 200* Lews of 1949* it was provided that the
Board of Trustees "shall have the power to" furnish transporta
tion and the legislature by the amendment substituted the word
"may" for "shall have the power ta"

The question thus pre

sented la whether the use of the word "may" is to be construed
as mandatory»

Prior to the amendment of Section 1* Chapter 152,
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supra, this offica in Opinion No* 111, Vol* 19, Report and
Official Opinions of tho Attorney General, held that the
trustees of a School District had a discretionary power in
the furnishing of transportation#

In Opinion No# 240, Toi#

20, Report and Official Opinions of the Attorney General the
same conclusion was reached and it was also held that if the
Trustees decided to furnish transportation to any students
they must furnish it to all students within the District#
The legislature had before it the above cited interpre
tations of Section 1 of Chapter 152, Laws of 1941 when the
Section was emended by Chapter 200, Laws of 1949,
stitution of the word *%@y" for

The sub

shall have the power to"

is not, in my opinion, such an expression of the legislative
intent as to indicate a material change in the interpreta
tion to be placed on the statutes#

Our Supreme Coirt has

frequently considered the meaning of the word "may" and in
Durland v, Frickett, 9Ô Mont, 397, 39 Pac# (2d) 652 the court
quoted from an earlier Montana case, in construing the word, the
following a
"This word Is sometimes permissive only; some
times it is imperative# Legislative intent
determines whether it is directory or manda
tory#**
It is more than a reasonable assumption that if the
legislature had intended to deprive the trustees of their
discretionary power to furnish transportation more explicit
language would have been used, than the substitution of the
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*372word "may?
It is, therefore my opinion that under the provisions of
Chapter 152, Laws of 1941, as amended by Chapter 200, Laws of
1949 the Board of Trustees of a school has discretionary power
in the furnishing of transportation to the students of the
District*
It is also my opinion that if the Trustees furnish trans
portation to any students they must furnish transportation to
all within the limitations of the law.

Very truly yours,

ARNOLD H* OLSaN
Attorney General<
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Held;

The payment for transportation to be made by the parents

or guardian of a student attending a private or parochial
school may be determined by dividing the total number of stu*
dents using the bus, including thoseattending the private or
parochial school, into the cost of operating the bus as fixed
by the current transportation budget#
January 21, 1950
Mr* Millton G* Anderson
County Attorney
Richland County
Sidney, Montana
Dear Mr, Anderson:
Tou requested my opinion concerning the meaning of "propor
tionate share of the cost of transportation" which the parents
or guardian of a child attending a school other then a public
school must pay in order to entitle such child to ride on a
school bus, as provided In Section Ô, Chapter 152, Laws of 1941#
This office has previously considered the question of the
use of public school moneys for transportation of pupils attend
ing a private or parochial school and in Opinion Ho# 22#, Vol,
19, Report and Official Opinions of the Attorney General it was
held that "public school moneys may not be expended for trans
portation for a student attending a private or parochial school."
This opinion was recognized and approved by a later opirJon of
this office, Opinion No# 74, Vol. 21, Report and Official
Opinions of the Attorney General, wherein it was also held:
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"School trustee» hare the discretionary power to
permit pupils attending private or parochial schools
to ride on public school busses and the parents or
guardian of such children pay their proportionate
share of the cost of such transportation*"
In determining the meaning of the phrase "proportionate
share of the cost of transportation," the case of Hochsprung
V# Stevenson, Ô2 Mont. 222, 266, Pac. 406, is helpful as it
is stated therein, "Proportionate* means adjusted to some-*
thing else according to a certain rate of comparative rela
tion."

Dividing the total number of pupils using a bus,

including those attending a private school, into the cost of
operating the bus will give the comparative relation, and
also the amount of the contribution of the parents or guardians
of the pupils using the bus and attending apprivate school.
In your letter you ask if contribution must be made for
students attending a private school if there is no increase
in the cost to the district due to the fact such students
receive transportation.

Section Ô of Chapter 152, Montana

Session Laws of 1941, is specific in requiring that permission
from the Clerk of the District must be secured and "the
parents or guardian of the child shall pay their proportionate
share of the cost of such transportation,"

If the payments

so made are not immediately available for use because of a
lack of an appropriation in the transportation budget, then
such funds may be used in the transportation budget for the
next fiscal year.
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It is thereforeI my opinion that the payment for trans
portation to be made by the parents or guardian of a student
attending a private or parochial school may be detennined by
dividing the total number of students using the bus, including
those attending the private or parochial school, into the cost
of operating the bus as fixed by the current transportation
budget.

Very truly yours.

mUQW H« OLSEK

Attorney General
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-3760pinion 135 - 1950

Reid;

1# When a School Board closes a school in a school

district the Board Is not required to furnish actual transpor
tation by bus or rail, but rather may pay to the parent or
guardian the cost of transportation in accordance with the
schedule of payments provided by law*
2*

Sections 75-2901, and 75*2906, Revised Codes of Montana,

1947, provide a procedure for compelling a parent to send
children within the school age to school*
November 24, 1950
Mr* Roy W# Holmes
County Attorney
Carter County
Rkalaka, Montana
Dear Mr* Holmess
You have requested my opinion on the following questions
on behalf of the County Superintendent of Schools for your
County*
1# May the Board of Trustees of a school district close
a school in a district and merely pay the parents of pupils for
transporting the pupils to another school, or must the trustees
furnish actual transportation by bus or other vehicle?
2.

How may a parent w^o refuses to send his children to

school be forced to do so?
Section 75-3404 , Revised Codes of Montana, 1947, was
originally enacted as Section 4, Chapter 152, Session Laws of
1941 , and provides in part as follows;
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"The Board of Trustees âhall have the power to
close any elementary school within the district#
and transport the pupils to another school or
schools within that district, whep the Board
deems such act to be for the best interests of
all the pupils attending school,,."
It is clear that the Board of Trustees may close a school
in a district, and the question then arises as to what is meant
by the word "transport" In the above section.
Section 75-3402, R.C.M., 1947, which was enacted as Section
2 of Chapter 152# Session Laws of 1941# defines what Is meant

by the term "transportation" as that term is used in Chapter
152, of the Laws of 1941#

This section providesî

"Unless a different meaning Is plainly required
by the context, *transportation* shall in this
act, mean (1) the actual transporting of pupils
who live three (3) or more miles distant from a
public school, by bus, rail or otherwise; (2)
the providing of any services whereby the school
board is relieved of actually transporting such
pupils, such as paying parent or guardian for
transportation, paying rent or board or any part
thereof and providing supervised correspondence
study or supervised home study,"
The context of section 75-3404# supra, clearly indicates
that the word "transport" as used therein Is defined by Section
75-3402, supra*

Therefore, it is my opinion that if the Board

of Trustees of a school district closes a school it may pay
the parent or guardian in accordance with the schedule set forth
in Section 75-3407# R*C,M,, 1947# as amended by Chapter 200,
Session Laws of 1949# and need not provide actual transporta
tion by bus, rail, or otherwise. The purpose of giving the
term"transportation" a dual meaning in Chapter 152, Session
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Î*aw8 of 1941I was to allow a School Board to exercise Its
discretion and provide for payment to parents for trans
portation when circumstances were not such as to warrant the
supplying of actual transportation facilities by the school
district.
Section 75-2901 to 75-2906, inclusive, make it compulsory
that children between the ages of eight and sixteen years of
age be sent to a school In which the basic language taught is
English#

Section 75-2901, as amended by Chapter 61, Session

laws of 1949 , provides in part as follows :
"..#Any parent, guardian or other person having
the care and custody of a child between the ages
of eight {$) and sixteen (16-) years, who shall
fail to comply with the provisions of this section,
shall be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor, and upon
conviction thereof shall be fined not less than
five dollars (#5*00) nor more than twenty dollars
( 20. 00)»
Thus, a parent who refuses to send his child to school
may be found guilty of committing a misdemeanor, and subject
to a find.
However, I believe that Section 75-2905, E.G.M*, 1947»
which provides an alternate procedure in lieu of a fine Is
perhaps a more effective procedure to compel a parent to send
his child to school*

This section provides that the truant

officer may notify the parent in writing of the nonattendance
of his child and of the consequences of continued nonattendance,
and requires the parent to cause the child to attend school
within two days from the date of the notice.

The statute
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then provides as followsî
’’Upon failure to do so^ the truant officer shall
make complaint against the parent, guardian, or
other person in charge of the child, in any court
of competent jurisdiction in the district in
which the offense occurs for such failure, and
upon such conviction, the parent, guardian or
other person in charge shall be fined not less
than five dollars nor more than twenty dollars;
or the court may in Its discretion, require the
person so convicted to give bond In the penal
sum of one hundred dollars, with sureties, to
the approval of the court, conditioned that he
or she will cause the child under his or her
charge to attend some recognised school within
two days thereafter and to remain at such school
during the term prescribed by law; end upon
failure or refusal of any parent, guardian, or
other person to pay said fine and costs, or
furnish said bond, according to the order of
the court then said parent, guardian or other
person shall be Imprisoned In the County jail
not less than ten days nor more than thirty days.”
Thus, through the institution of court proceedings may the
County Superintendent coerce parents into sending their children
to school, providing that the children are within the school
age#
Very truly yours.

ARNOLD H# OLSEN ,
Attorney General
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Opinion 85 - 1952
Held;

1.

It is the duty of the board of trustees of a

third class district to request the county superintendent
of schools to call an election submitting the question of
annexation when a petition signed by twenty per cent of the
qualified electors of the school district has been presented
to the board of trustees of such third class district*
2* Upon the complaint being made to the county transportation
committee such comaittee has the authority to fix bus routes
and to order one school district to discontinue transporting
resident elementary pupils of another district who have not
been granted pejmiisslon to attend school in a district other
than that of residence*
May 19, 1932
Mr* Charles B* Sande
County Attorney
Yellowstone County
Billings, Montana
Attention:

Mr* Arnold A* Berger, Deputy

Dear Mr* Sande;
You have requested my opinion as to whether it is the duty
of trustees of a third class school district, which has received
a petition signed by twenty per cent of the qualified electors
of the district to a second or first class district* You have
also asked if the county transportation committee may fix bus
routes and prevent one school district from picking up elementary
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children of another district and transport them in the high
school bus to the district operating the bus.
In answering your first question it is necessary to consider
the provisions of Section 75*-lSl3,

1947, as amended

by Chapter 32, Laws of 1951, which defines the procedure for
the consolidation of school districts*
Section 75-1^13,

Subdivision 5 of

1947, as amended, is pertinent to

your question and reads in part as follows ;
"When, in the interest of reducing the cost of
operation or Improving the school service for
pupils, a board of trustees, of a third class
district, shall by a majority vote of its
members or at the request of twenty per cent
(20$) of the qualified electors of the dis
tricts Indicated by a petition, ask the county
superintendent of schools to annex the terri
tory and property of such third class district
to any second or first class district, the
county superintendent shall, upon an approving
vote of the trustees of the district with which
the annexation is sought, authorize an election
on such annexation within not less than twenty
(20) nor more than thirty (30 ) days*"
The above quoted fixes two methods for requesting the
county superintendent to call an election* The first is by
a majority vote of the board of trustees and the second by a
petition addressed to the board of trustees of twenty per cent
of the qualified electors of the district seeking to be annexed
to a first or second class district*

In both instances the

trustees of the district with which annexation is sought must
consent and then it is the duty of the county superintendent
to call an election.

Under the facts you presented it appears
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that twenty per cent of the qualified electors petitioned
trustees of their district to request that the county super
intendent call an election and that the trustees have failed
to make such a request*
It is to be noted that the above section states ” a
board of trustees*,* shall,** at the request of twenty per
cent of the qualified electors***ask the county superintendent
of schools to annex,** such third class district to any second
or first class district,'*The duty imposed

is mandatory end

does not permit the trustees toexercise any discretion*

If

the trustees do nob present the petition to the county super
intendent, then they would be guilty of violation of a clear
legal duty and & mandamus action will lie*

Section 93-9102,

R,C,M*, 1947* provides that a writ of mandamus may be issued
by a court "to compel the performance of an act which the
law specially enjoins as a duty resulting from an office,"
State ex rel* Peterson v* Peck, 91 Mont, 5» 4 Pac, (2d) 10d6*
In State v* McCracken, 91 Mont* 157» & Pac. (2d) 869, the
court said, "Mandamus is a proper remedy to compel the perfor
mance of a ministerial act or duty*"

The presentation of the

request to your county superintendent to hold the election
would certainly be a ministerial duty and should be performed
by the trustees.
While no time is fixed by the statute for the trustees to
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request that the county superintendent call an election, It
must be assumed that the trustees must perform the act within
a reasonable time as the delay might well defeat the purpose of
the statute*

State ex rel* Venek v* Justice Court * 110 Mont*

550, 104 Pac* (2d) 14*
It is therefore my opinion that It Is the duty of the bos rd
of trustees of a third class district to request the county
superintendent of schools to call an election submitting the
question of annexation when a petition signed by a twenty per
cent of the qualified electors of the school district has
been presented to the board of trustees of such third class
district*
Your second question Is concerned with the duties and
powers of the county transportation committee*

The county

transportation committee was first authorised by Chapter 109#
Laws of 1951# which amended Section 75‘
-3412, R*C*M*, 1947*
The committee was granted broad powers as the statute provides ;
^It shall be the duty of the county transpor
tation committee to approve bus routes and
applications for increased transportation pay
ments, and to act In all controversies resulting
from transportation matters*"
All bus routes are subject to the approval of the transpor
tation committee end any variance in route from the approved
route would raise a controversy within the meaning of the above
quoted section within the jurisdiction of the committee.
Picking up elementary school children in one district and

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

•>3

transporting them to the district operating the bus iscontrary
to Section 75-*3401|

1947» as amended by Chapter 1Ô9,

laws of 1951» if such children were not authorized to attend
the schools of the district operating the bus*

The prohibition

is found in Section 75*3401» as amended, which reads in part
as follows;
"The board of trustees of any school district
,»*may furnish transportation to and from
school for all pupils residing within their
district, who are enrolled in the public
schools of their district, or who have been
granted permission to attend a school in
another district**,*"
fenaisslon to attend school ia a district other then the
residence of a child must be given in the manner and as provided
in Section 75*1630, a*C*M,, 1947, as amended by Chapter 20?,
Laws of 1951.
It is therefore my opinion that upon complaint being made
to the county transportation committee such committee has the
authority to fix bus routes and to order one school district to
discontinue transporting resident elementary pupils of another
district who have not been granted permission to attend school
in a district other than that of residence*
Very truly yours,
ARNOLD H* OLSiSN
Attorney General
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Opinion 6 Ô ■«. 1954

Held:

1* Transportation by a school district of children to

another district for a school term of six months compiled with
the statute prior to July 1, 1951f and subsequently, the term
of school for such children was fixed at XÛQ days#

Compliance

with these standards would preclude the district from being
declared abandoned#
2#

It is within the discretionary powers of school trustees

to require a cash deposit by children to cover breakage and
excessive us of supplies in the course designated in Section
75-4232 , E#C*M#, 1947.

March 30, 1954
Mr# Henry I* Grant#, Jr#
County Attorney
Stillwater County
Columbus, Montana
Dear î-îr. Grant:
You have requested my opinion concerning the length of
time for each school year that transportation of children by
one district to another school must be furnished to preclude
abandonment of the district#
You have also asked if school trustees may require a cash
deposit to cover breakage and excessive use of supplies#
In answering your first question, it is important to con
sider Section 75-1522 , R#C#M#, 1947# Prior to amendment, Section
75-1522 supra, provided that transportation of all children

«to another district for the purpose of attending school
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therein for a term of at least six (6) months during each of
such three (3) years" will preclude the necessity of declaring
a school district abandoned*

The amendment to this Section by

Chapter 109# Laws of 1951# fixed the term of the school year
for a period of "at least one hundred eighty (ICO) days each
year*»
The precise problem is whether the 180 days provision of the
amendment applies to each of the preceding three years*

If such

a construction were given to the amendment# then a retroactive
effect would be given to this new statute* However# Section
12-201# R*C*M*# 1947 reads as followsî
"Ko law contained In any of the codes or other
statutes of Montana is retroactive unless ex
pressly so declared#"
Our Supreme Court# in Educational Bonds Case# 68 Mont 526#
219 Pae. 637, held*
"There is always a presumption that statutes are
intended to operate prospectively only# and words
ought not to have a retroactive operation unless
they are so clear, strong# and Imperative that no
other meaning can be annexed to them, or unless
the intention of the Legislature cannot be other
wise satisfied* Every reasonable doubt is resolved
against e retroactive operation of a statute,"
In view of the above presumption and the lack of clear
expression that the amendment is to operate retroactively, it
must be concluded that the 180 day requirement was applicable
on July 1, 1951# the effective date of Chapter 109, Laws of
1951#

The test for any school year prior to the amendment is

a term of at least six months*

A school month is defined for
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teacher’s contracts by Section 75-2202,

1947, as

twenty school days, or four weeks of five days each* and
such definition should be applied to the statute under
consideration#
Tour second question is answered by Section 75-4232, R#C#M#,
1947, which statesÎ
*Th@ board of trustees of any school district or
county high school may require pupils in the com
mercial, industrial arts, music, domestic science,
scientific or agricultural courses to pay reason
able fees to cover the actual cost of breakage
and of excessive supplies used.”
This section contemplates reimbursement by the pupils In
the designated courses for breakage and unusual us© of supplies#
No precise method of assessing the fees is fixed thereof by
the statute and any reasonable method will suffice#

Section

75-1632 , R.C.M#, 1947 ©s last amended by Chapter 233 , lews of

1953, enumerates the duties of school trustees, one of which is:
”To prescribe and enforce rules not inconsistent
with law, or those prescribed by the superinten
dent of public instruction for their own govern
ment of school® under their supervision#”
This gives wide discretionary powers to the trustees and
is in accord with the general law.
216 Mass# 483 , 104

See;

Whittaker vs# Salem,

359, and Brooks vs# Shannon, I84 Okla.

255 , 86 Pec# (2d) 792 #

It Is therefore my opinion that:
1# Transportation by a school district of children to
another district for a school term of six months complied with
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the statute prior to July 1, 1951* end subsequently| the term
of school for such children was fixed at 180 days* Compliance
with these standards would preclude the district from being
declared abandoned*
2m It Is within the discretionary powers of school trustees

to require a cash deposit by children to cover breakage and
excessive use of supplies In the courses designated in Section
73-42)2,

1947.

Very truly yours,

ARNOLD H. OLSSN
Attorney General
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Opinion 30 • 1954
Heldî

High School students may not be counted in computing

the average number of children transported by any school
district so as to preclude the district being declared abandoned
under the provisions of Section 75-^1522, R.G.M.# 1947^ as
amended by Chapter 109$ Laws of 1951.
June 23I 1954
Mr* Paul J. Murphy
County Attorney
Judith Basin County
Stanford, Montana
Dear Mr. Murphy;
tou have requested my opinion whether a school distdct
in counting children transported may include high school children
so as to avoid the abandonment of the district* Tou advised
me that if the high school students of a district are included
in the number of children transported in each of the last
three years, then an average of more then five children will
have received transportation.
Section 75-1522, R.C.M*, 1947* as amended by Chapter 109,
Daws of 1951 , states that a county superintendent must declare
a school district abandoned when a school has not been operated
in the district during a period of three consecutive years*
Such abandonment may be avoided if the school district comes
within the exception found In Section 75-1522, supra, which
reads as follows;
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•♦«♦that if any such school district has provided
transportation either by bus or by the payment to
Individuals, or has provided payments for board
and room in lieu of transportation for an average
of at least five (5) children of school age, during
a period of three (3) consecutive years living
within the district, to another district for the
purpose of attending school therein for a terra
of at least one hundred eighty (180) days each
year* Such transportation shall be deemed equlva-*
lent to the actual holding of school ia such district
for a terra of one hundred eighty (180) days in each
year, end such district shall not be fordered abandoned«•
It ia to be noted that the above^quoted portion of the
statute contemplates the furnishing of transportation by the
school district#

examination of Section 75-3414#

,

1947# as amended by ^hapter 189, taws of 1951# makes It the
duty of the Board of Trustees of every school district main
taining a high school and the Board of Trustees of every county
high school to provide a transportation budget# The sources
of the funds for this budget are the State of Montana and a
county-wide tax levy#

One third of the funds are received

from the state and two thirds from the county levy*

The money

from these two sources is liraited in amount by the schedule set
forth in Section 75-3407# E.C,M«, 1947, as last amended by
Chapter 189, Laws of 1951*

A greater amount may be included

in the budget by a special levy either on the high school district,
the county, or the school district In a priority fixed by the
statute#

In no event is a levy made for the transportation of

high school students on a school district as such where such
school district does not maintain a high school#

The conclusion
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-391must then be reached that a school district does not directly
provide transportation to high school students within the
meaning of Section 73-1522, supra, so that high school students
can properly be included in the number transported so as to
preclude the abandonment of the school district*
In construing Section 75-1522, supra, as amended, the
whole section should be considered in determining the legislative
In State vs* District Court, 51, Mont# 305 , 152, Pec#

intent*

745, the court said;
"The words, phrases and sentences of a statute
are to be understood as used, not in any abstract
sense but with due regard to the context, and In
that sense which best harmonizes with all other
parts of the statute#"
A

In applying the above^quoted rule, it is apparent that this
code section is concerned only with elementary schools#

Sub

section 2 of Section 75-1522^ supra, states, in part, as
follows Î

'

"iVhenever there are five (5) or more children in
abandoned territory eligible for attendance in an
elementary school as determined by the county
superintendent and residing more than three (3)
miles from an established school in the district
to which the abandoned territory is attached, the
school trustees shall provide a school in such
abandoned territory when requested so to do by
the parents of at least three (3) of such children!"
The feet that the residence of five or more elementary
school students in the area makes it the duty of the trustees
to open a school, leads to the conslusion that elementary school
students alone constitute the test for determining the necessity
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of operating the school and fixes the meaning of the five
children referred to In Subsection 1 of this act as elementary
school children*
The right to attend a high school by a resident of a
county is not dependent on domicile In any particular school
district since Section

1947» providest

"Attendance at any accredited high school shall be
free to all eligible high school pupils residing in
the county wherein such accredited high school is
located except for such fees as the board of trustees
are otherwise specially authorised by law to exact,"
As was pointed out above, transportation for high school
students is not furnished by any school district but is an
obligation of the county and state without regard to any parti
cular school district#

It must be concluded that if a school

^district does not directly pay for the transportation of high
school students, then a,school district does not "provide
transportation" within the meaning of Section 75-1522,

Also,

the right to attend m y high school in the county is given to
every student of the county without regard to residence in any
particular school district#
It is therefore my opinion that high school students may not
be counted in computing the average number of children transported
by any school district so as to precludethe district being de
clared abandoned under the provisions of Section 75-1522, R#C,K,,
1947, as amended by Chapter 109, Laws of 1951#
Very truly yours,

ARNOLD H. OLSiSN
Attorney General
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Opinion 1)0 - 1946
U%Mt

Sohool dletrlot m#y b$ omsolWeted with #n existing

joint eohool dletriet only toy the oreetloa or e new Joint eehool
4latrlct in compllenoe with the provision# of Section 1024 end
1035#. A.OfW.# 19)5$ e« emended,
Fetoraery 26, 1946
Mr. W,. lé Hyde
County Attorney
Mineral Cotmty
Superior, Hontene
Dear Mr# Hyde;
Tou have requested my opinion concerning the consolidation
of a joint school dlstrict with two school districts# Tou
advise me that two school districts la Missoula County are
adjacent to a joint school district and that you would like to
know what procedure to followf
Section 10)4# E#C*M*, 1935, as amended toy Chapter 201,
laws of 194), provides for the consolidation of a school district.
The section provides In part*
«Two or more adjacent school districts lying In
one county may toe consolidated.•»«
the above quoted precludes the possibility of proceeding
under Eectlon 10)4 $ as amended, as the joint school district
of necessity lies in two counties.
Section 10)5, R.O.M., 1935, provides for the creation of
* •

394

"*
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joint school districts, but is not complete in itself insofar
as it does not set out the procedure to be followed*

However,

it declares joint districts "may be formed in the same manner
as other new districts*"
The case of State v* Lensman, lOS Mont, 1X8, 88 fee, (2d)
63 , considered the method of creating a joint school district

and held that Section 1024 and IO35 , R*G*M*^ 1935, were the
applicable statutes.

It should be noted that the above case

involved the creation of a new joint district from a portion
of an old joint district and Is therefore an analogous situation
to the one presented here.
Section 1024 , R,C*M*, 1935, as amended by Chapter 61, Laws
of 1943 , defines the procedure to be followed as does Opinion
Ho, 396 , Volume 19, Report and Official Opinions of the Attorney
General*

Reference is made to Opinion Ho* 396 for the dis

cussion of the problem which should be helpful* As you will
note Section 1023, R,C.M*, 1935, precludes the creation of a
new district between March 1 and July 1 of any calendar year.
It is therefore my opinion that school districts may be
consolidated with an existing joint school district only by
the creation of a new joint school district in compliance with
the provisions of Section 1024 and 1035, R,C,M*, 1935, as
amended*

Sincerely yours,
R* V, BOTTUMLI
Attorney General

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

-396-

Opinion 147 - 1946
Held:

When two or more school district are consolidated, end

à new district is formed, the county superintendent of schools
must appoint three trustees to serve until the first Saturday
in April succeeding#

In the case of consolidation by annexa

tion, the officers of the first or second class school district
shall continue to hold office until the end of the term for
which they were elected*
April 26* 1946
Mr* M*i* Parcells
County Attorney
Stillwater County
Columbus, Montana
Dear Mr*.Parcells:
Tou have requested my opinion concerning the appointment
of school trustees for a consolidated school district*
Section 1034 # R.C.M#, 1935, as amended by Chapter 201,
lews of 1943 , provides in part:
"Two or more adjacent school districts lying
in one county may be consolidated either by
the formation of a new district, or by the
annexation of one or more districts to an
existing district.*#"
It is apparent from the above quoted that the consolidation
results in a new district| annexation results in the extinguish
ment of one district by its incorporation into another, which
district continues to function as an enlarged district*
If the proper steps are followed for consolidation of
two districts, and the vote of the trustees and of the electors,
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if an election is held, le favorable, the county superintendent
“shall effect the consolidation of such districts" by an
order and "shall appoint three (3) trustees to serve until
the first Saturday in April succeeding."

At the next annual

school election trustees ere regularly elected.

The trustees

of the discontinued districts relinquish their offices, to-*
gather with the records, funds, and effects of the old districts
to the officers of the new district*
Annexation occurs when a third class district is merged
into an adjacent second or first class district.

The officers

of the annexed districts turn over to the officers of the
district to which they are annexed all records, funds, end
effects.

The act then providesi

"The officers of the first or second class dis
trict Involved shall continue to hold office
under the consolidated district until the end
of the terms for which they were duly elected
and their successors shall be regularly elected
as provided by law."
The provision for annexation has application only when
a third class district becomes merged with a first or second
class district*

Consolidation occurs In all other situations

when two or more districts are combined*
It is therefore my opinions
1,

When two or more school districts are consolidated

and a new district Is formed, the county superintendent of
schools must appoint three trustees to serve until the first
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Saturday in April succeeding#
2#

In the case of consolidationby annexation, the

officers of the first or second classschool district shall
continue to hold office until the endof the term for which
they were elected*

Sincerely yours,
R* V# B0TTÛM1Ï

Attorney General
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Opinion $4 • 1947
Held;

In conformity with the law as given to ua by our

legislature I in an election, on the consolidation of school
districts, voters in the district which would assume an indebted
ness by reason of consolidation must have the qualifications
set out in Section 1002, R$G,M*, 1935» as amended by Chapter
65 f Laws of 1941 » and also the qualifications required by

Section 5199*1, R*C.M., 1935# Thus, In addition to the re
quirements of Section 1002,

as amended, the voters

in such district must be registered and their names must
appear on the last preceding assessment roll#

In districts

not assuming an indebtedness, the voter need only have the
qualifications under Section 1002, R.C.M#, 1935*

In other

words, when no indebtedness Is assumed the voter need not be
a taxpayer, or registered voter#
December 11, 1947
Mr# Truman Bradford
County Attorney
Cascade County
Greet Falls, Montana
Attention; Mr. W# H# Swanberg, Deputy County Attorney
Dear Mr. Bradford;
Tou have requested an opinion of this office concerning
the qualifications of electors at an election on the question
of consolidation, of two third class school districts. You
advise me that one of the districts has a bonded indebtedness.
Section 1034 » R*C*M*, 1935, as emended by Chapter 201,
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Laws of 1943» authorises consolidation of school districts by
the county superintendent of schools after an approving vote
of the board of trustees of each district#

However, such

consolidation cannot be made if twenty per cent of the qualified
electors of any one of the districts, or more petition for
an election in their district on the question, until after
a favorable vote on the question*
In Opinion No# 3&4, Volume 19, Report and Official
Opinions of the Attorney General, it was held that electors
who satisfy the requirements of Section 1002, R,C*M#, 1935,
as amended, are eligible to vote at an election for the
consolidation of school districts*

The opinion did not

consider the problem where one district had bonded Indebted
ness as ie the situation here*
Section 1034, S»C#M*, 1935, as amended by Chapter 201,
Laws of 1943, provides in part;
^Bonded indebtedness of any districts merged by
consolidation or annexation shall be assumed by
the consolidated district or the district to
which another is annexed#”
It is apparent that if the bonded indebtedness is assumed
by the consolidated district then a district without any
indebtedness, in becoming a part of a new district would be
assuming a debt or liability in proportion to its assessed
valuation*
Section 2 of Article IV of the Montana Constitution
provides:
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"If the question submitted concerns the creation
of any levy* debt or liability the person,.**»,
must also be a taxpayer whose name appears upon
the last preceding completed assessment roll, in
order to entitle him to vote upon such question."
The qualifications for voting upon the creation or in
creasing of indebtedness is covered by Section 5199*1 R.C.M*,
1935* which readsÎ
"That from and after the passage and approval
of this set, only such registered electors of
the city, town, school district, or other
municipal corporation whose names appear upon
the last preceding assessment roll shall be
entitled to vote upon any proposal to create
or increase any indebtedness of city, town,
school district or other municipal corpora
tion, required by law to be submitted to a
vote of the electors thereof."
Our Supreme Court in Weber v* City of Helena, S9 Mont,
109 , 297 Pac. 455, said in regard to this section:

"We think the evident purpose of the Act was to
provide the procedure for all elections to in
crease or create the indebtedness of the poli
tical units therein mentioned whenever the laws
required the approval of electors*.•"
In a district which has indebtedness, but assumes no new
indebtedness, electors who meet the requirements of bectlon
1002, R.Ü.M., 1935 as amended by Uhapter 65 , laws of 1941,
could vote on the question of consolidation.

This would

result in different qualifications in the elections held in
the two districts.
It is, therefore, my opinion, in conformity with the law
as given to us by our legislature, in on election, on the
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consolidation of school districts, voters in the district which
would assume an indebtedness by reason of consolidation must
have the Qualifications set out in Section 1002, R * C 1935,
as amended by Chapter 65 , Laws of 1941, and also the qualifica*
tions required by Section 5199*1, R*Q*M*, 1935*

Thus in

addition to the requirements of Section 1002, R,C.M*, as
amended, the voters in such district must be registered and
their names must appear on the last preceding assessment roll*
In districts not assuming an Indebtedness, the voter need only
have the qualifications under Section 1002, R.O«M., 1935#

In

other words, when no indebtedness is assumed the voter need
not be a taxpayer, or registered voter*

Sincerely yours,
B* V* BOTTOMLT
Attorney General
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Opinion 150 - I94Ô
Held*

Property located within school districts which are

abandoned and annexed to an existing school district prior
to the fixing of the levy for the latter district, shall be
taxed at the same rate as all property within the then existing
district* except in so far as prior indebtedness or out- ’
standing bonds are involved*
November 30* 194#
Mr, James H, Higgins
County Attorney
Meagher County
White Sulphur Springs, Montana
Dear Mr, Higgins*
tou have requested my opinion concerning the 3evy for tax
purposes on property located within three abandoned school
districts which were annexed to an existing school district,
Tou advise me that the order of abandonment and of annexa
tion was made by the County Superintendent of Schools on July
26 and 2#, 194#« Tou also state that residents within the

territory which was annexed feel that the tax levy on their
property should not be that of the district to which the
abandoned school districts were annexed.
Chapter 166, Laws of 1943, authorises the abandonment of
school districts and it provides that all funds of an abandoned
school district shall be placed in the general fund of the dis
trict to which its territory is attached#

Thii means that the

abandoned district has been so merged that there is but one

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

• * 4 0 4 * ^

legal entity.
Also the levies for school districts are fixed after the
preparation of the school budgets.
1263.19

Sections 1019.12 and

1935i provide that the Board of Gounty Commis^-

eioners shall meet on the second Monday in August for the
purpose of fixing tax levies#

It Is apparent that the an*»

sexed territory in question must be subject to the same tax
levy fixed for the school district to which it is attached
or otherwise escape liability for school taxes as school bud*»
gets cannot be made for abandoned school districts.

All sub

sequent taxes on property located within the districts aban
doned and annexed will likewise be at the same rate fixed for
property within the district to which the abandoned territory
is annexed, insofar as no prior Indebtedness or outstanding
bonds are involved.
It ia therefore, my opinion that property located within
school districts which are abandoned and annexed to an existing
school district prior to the fixing of the levy for the latter
shall be taxed at the same rate as all property within the
then existing district, except as to the above mentioned
prior indebtedness*
Sincerely yours,
B. V. BOTTOMLX
Attorney General
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Opinion 42 - 1949
Heldî

(1)

The territory of a Third Class School District which

is annexed to a First or Second Class District does not assume
any of the bonded indebtedness of the First or Second Class
District; but the bonded indebtedness of the Third Class Dis
trict is assumed by the First or Second Class District to which
the Third Glass District is annexed#
(2}

If a Third Class School District, or any other Class

District is consolidated with one or more School Districts and
a new District formed, the bonded indebtedness of each of the
component Districts Is assumed by the new District and all of
the territory of the new District is liable for the payment of
such bonds#
July 30 , 1949
Miss Mary M» Condon
State Superintendent of Public Instruction
Helena, Montana
Dear Miss Condonî
You have submitted for my opinion the following questions
"Does a Third Class District which has been annexed
to a second or third class district assume a share
of the latter*8 bonded indebtedness?”
In answering your question it is important to consider
Section 1034 , R#0#M#, 1935, es amended by Chapter 201, Laws of
1943, which defines the procedure for the consolidation of
School Districts and the annexation of one or more districts
to an existing district*

It is to be observed that under the
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provisions of this Section, consolidation of two or more
districts is effected by the merger of the districts after
appropriate action of the trustees of the districts concerned,
with the resulting fonaation of a new district.

Annexation of

a Third Class District occurs when the district Is merged with
a First or Second Class District, There Is no provision in
the Section for annexation of a Third Class District to a
Third Class District as your question suggests#

This inter

pretation of Section 1034» as amended, was recognized in the
Opinion No* 147# Volume 21, Report and Official Opinions of
the Attorney General wherein it was said;
"The provision for annexation has application only
when a Third Class District becomes merged with a
First or Second Class District# Consolidation
occurs in all other situations when two or more
districts are combined#"
The portion of Section 1034# as emended which applies
to the bonded Indebtedness reads as follows;
"Bonded indebtedness of any districts merged by
consolidation or annexation shall be assumed by
the consolidated district or the district to which
another is annexed#"
The above quoted statute contemplates two situations.

The

assumption of the bonded indebtedness of the component parts
of the new district resulting by consolidation of two or more
districts and the assumption by a First or Second Class District
of the bonded indebtedness of a Third Class District which is
annexed.

In the case of consolidation, a Third Class District
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which is Included within the new district would assume its
proportionate share of the bonded Indebtedness of the new
district, but in the event of annexation of a Third Class
District to a First or Second Class District no provision
is made for such assumption•
Section 1029*1, R*C*M«, 1935, '►diieh was amended by
implication by Chapter 201, Laws of 1943, provided that the
bonded Indebtedness of a school district which is consoli
dated or whose boundaries are changed shall remain the
indebtedness of the original territory against which the
bonds were issued*

Chapter 201 did not alter this rule in

regard to Third Class Districts annexed to First or Second
Class Districts and as a consequence such Third Class Dis
tricts so annexed would not assume the indebtedness of the
districts to which the Third Glass Districts are annexed*
The foregoing does not apply to school districts which
have been declared abandoned under the provisions of Section
970, R*C#M., 1935, as amended by Chapter 16Ô, Laws of 1943, as
such abandoned districts may be attached to one or more con

f '

tiguous districts on the order of the County Superintendent
and do not constitute annexation as is contemplated by your
question*

The territory of the abandoned district which is

attached will continue, under Chapter l6d, to be liable for
its bonded Indebtedness and there is no assumption of indebted
ness by the district to which it is attached*
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It is therefore, my opinion that the territory of a Third
Class District which is annexed to a First or Second Class
District does not assume any of the bonded indebtedness of the
First or Second Class Districts, but the bonded indebtedness
of the Third Class District is assumed by the First or Second
Class District to which the Third Glass District is annexed.
It is also my opinion that If a Third Class District, or
any class district, is consolidated with one or more school
districts and & new district is formed the bonded Indebtedness
of each of the component districts is assumed by the new dis
trict end all of the territory of the new district. Including
that of the Third Class District, is liable for the payment
of such bonds.

Very truly yours.

AilNOLD H. OLSai
Attorney General
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Opinion 50
Held!

1.

1949
Territory in a School District may be transferred

to an adjoining School District even though the territory to
be transferred is within three miles of a school house in which
school has not bean held for the last four years,
2#

The prohibition of Chapter 61, laws of 1943, against

transferring territory within three miles of a school refers
to an established school and in my opinion a school house
wherein school has not been held for the past four years is
not an established school.
September 7» 1949
Mr# G,0. SchmidtI Jr.
County Attorney
Fort Benton, Montana
Dear Mr# Schmidtt
You have requested my opinion concerning the transfer of
territory In one school district to an adjoining school district
when the territory to be transferred is within three miles of
a school house in which school has not been held for the last
four years# .
Section 1024, R.G.M., 1935, as amended by Chapter 61,
Laws of 1943, provides in part;
majority of the resident taxpayers who are
registered electors and whose names appear
upon the last completed assessment roll for
state, county and school district taxes, re
siding in territory which is a part of any
organized school district may present a peti
tion In writing to the County Superintendent
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of Schools I asking that such territory he trans**
ferred to* or included in, any other organized
district to which said territory is contiguous,
provided however^ that no territory within three
l3) miles of an established school in such dis*
trlet shall be so transferred and provided further
that the taxable valuation (the percentage value*
tion upon which levies are made and taxes computed)
of property in the district from which territory
is taken shall not be reduced to less than seventy*
five thousand dollars (#75|000.00)*«
The above quoted section prohibits the transfer of terri
tory from one district to an adjoining district when such
territory is within three miles of ”an established school**
The territory in question may be transferred to the adjoining
district if *an established school* means one that is used and
in operation as a school rather than an unused school house*
The first portion of Section 1024, as amended, provides that
thesame three mile limitation applies

to "any school house*•#

in which a school is maintained,* upon a petition to create a
new district out of one or more existing districts*

It is

reasonable to assume that the legislature would not impose a
different condition upon the creation of a new district than
upon transfer of territory from one district to another*
Uniformity in applying the limitation would result in carrying
out the purpose of the statute*

Such a construction of the

statute is in accord with the rule found in State v* Millis,
81 Mont* 66, 261 fee, 865, wherein our Supreme Court said
"Statutes are to be construed so as best to effectuate the
object of the legislature.*
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It is therefore my opinion that under the provision of
Section 1024»

1935» as amended by Chapter 61, Laws of

1943» the territory which ispart of an organized school distilct
and within three miles of a school house which has not been
used for school purposes in four years may be transferred to
an adjoining school district provided that the other conditions
of the statute are met*

Very truly yours,

ARNOLD H* OLSm
Attorney General
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Opinion 12Ô « 1950
Held;

1$

High School Building Districts may be consolidated

by virtue of Section 1, Chapter 130, taws of 1949, and the
procedure to be followed is found in Section 75-4602,
1947.
2#

Surplus funds realized from the sale of a high school con

structed with the proceeds of bonds issued by a High School
Building District should be allocated to the component
elementary school districts of the High School Building District
if a high school is no longer operated within the High School
Building District and the subsequent consolidation of the
High School Building District would not affect such distribution*
September 30, 1950
Mr* Robert 3. Purcell
County Attorney
Garfield County
Jordan, Montana
Dear Mr* Purcell;
You have requested my opinion concerning the procedure
to be followed in consolidating two High School Building Districts,
Also, you have asked what disposition should be made of
the surplus remaining after the payment of debts realized from
the sale of a high school building and dormitory which were
constructed from funds from a bond issue of a High School
Building District*
In answering your first question, it is necessary to
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consider Section 1, Chapter I30 , laws of 1949» which reads as
follows*
**In any Connty which has been divided into High
School Building Districts, at the request of
any High School Board of Trustees, the commis-*
sion, provided for in Chapter 275* laws of 1947*
may, in accord with the procedure provided in
said chapter, alter the boundaries of said dis^
tricts or re*divide the County into a different
number of high school districts, provided that
such alteration or redivision may not be done
within three years from the original division
or the last alteration of boundaries and last
redivision,**
The above quoted portion of Chapter I30 grants the
authority for the redivision of a County into a different
number of high school districts*

Section 7 $-4602,

1947 » which was formerly Section 2 of Chapter 275# laws of

1947# fixes the manner of dividing a County into High School
Building Districts which procedure can be used for any sub
sequent alteration of boundaries of high school districts*
In Opinion Ho* 121, Volume 17, Report and Official Opinions
of the Attorney General, this office held that the only statu
tory method of consolidation of high school districts was to
be found in Section 1034, R*C*M*, 1935, which is now Section
75-1613, R*0*M*, 1947#

However, the holding in that Opinion

no longer has application due to the enactment of Chapter 130,
Laws of 1949, which specifically deals with the manner of
redividing a County or altering the boundaries of high school
districts*

In the case of Langston v. Currie 95 Mont 57* 26

Fac* (2d) 160 , the court said:
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**%here there Is one statute dealing with a subject
in general and comprehensive terms, and another
dealing with a part of the same subject in a more
minute and definite way, the two should be read
together end harmonized, if possible, with a view
to giving effect to a consistent Legislative policy,
but, to the extent of any neeesaary repugnance
between them, the special will prevail over the
general,*»
Your second question is not answered by any specific
statutory provision#

The disposition of funds realized from

the sale of a County High School is covered by Section 75-4127,
R,C,M,, 1947 , and the distribution of remaining funds of an
abandoned school district is allocated under Section 75-1522,
R#C*M#, 1947* In the case of State v* Brandenburg, 107 Mont#
199 ,

S2 Pac# (2d)$93, the distribution of funds realized from

the sale of an obsolete building which had been acquired for
the use of the County High School was made to the County Hi^
School account.

The reasoning in the case was based on the

source of the money and the court held that the purchase money
having come from the distributive share of the County-wide
High School levy the proceeds of the sale of the building
should be the property of the County High School*

Applying the

reasoning of that case to the facts presented here the con
clusion must be reached that the funds realized from the sale
of the building should be distributed to the general funds of
the elementary schools comprising the High School Building
District as it was the area within the High School Districts
which paid off the bond issue#

However, the obligations and

debts of the High School District must be first paid, before

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

-

4

1

5

*

distribution of eny surplus to the «oaponent eleaontsry dis*
triots.
It Is therefore mf opinion t
1#

Nigh school Bull<& ng Dlstrlots may be consolidated by

virtue of Section 1, Chapter 130* lews of 1949# end the pro
cedure to be followed is found in Section 73*4602# R,0,M,# 1947»
»]

2, Surplus funds realised Xvm the sale of ft High School

constructed with the proceeds of bonds Issàsd by # High School
Building district should be allocated to the component elemen*
tary school districts of the Ki^ School Building District
if ft high school 1ft no longer operated within the Hi#% School
Building Districts end the subsequent consolidation of the
High School Building District would not effect such distrlbu*
tion.

Very truly yours#

ABHOLB H, OL@m
Attomey General
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Opinion 66 - 195V
Held:

An eppeal may be taken to the board of county comaiis-

aloners from an order of the county superintendent of schools
denying the petition requesting the transfer of territory from
one school district to another under the provision» of Sub
section 7 of Section 75-1S05,

1947*
March 29, 1954

Mr* Russell K* Fillner
County Attorney
Rosebud County
Forsyth, Montana
Dear Mr# Fillner;
You have requested my opinion concerning the right of
appeal to the board of county cotmaissioners from the decision
of the county superintendent under Subsection 7 of Section
75-1&05,

1947*

You advise me that a petition to

transfer territory from one school district to another was
presented to the county superintendent who, after a hearing,
denied the petition and an appeal was taken to the board of
county commissioners by the petitioners#
Subsection 7 of Section 75-1605, R#C»M#, 1947, provides
that the county superintendent, after receiving a petition
to transfer territory, shall:
»**.proceed to hear such petition, and if he deem
it advisable end for the best interest of the terri
tory proposed to be transferred or included, he shall
grant such petition and make an order fixing the
boundaries of the district so changed, which order
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shall be finely unless an appeal be taken to the
board of county commissioners of the county wherein
such districts are located within thirty (30) days
thereafter, end upon hearing thereof the decision
of said board shall be final***
The above quoted portion of the statue does not state in
precise language that an appeal may be had when the petition
is denied.

However, the statute states that if the petition

is granted, the county superintendent must make "an order
fixing the boundaries of the district so changed*” Such an
order calls for statutory directions, while an order denying
the petition need not be defined.

To authorize an appeal when

the petition is granted and to prohibit an appeal on the
denial of the petition would not be justified and would not
appear to be the legislative intention.

The right of appeal

to the board of county commissioners and the powers of the
boardwere broadly construed in the

case of Read vs, Stephens,

121 Pîont, 50S, broadly construed in the case of Read vs,
Stephens, 121 Mont, 50S, 193 Pac, (2d) 626.

The court in

rendering its opinion did not questionthe right of appeal
from an order of the county superintendent denying the petition
and recognized the broad powers of both the county superin
tendent and the board of county commissioners in the following
language,
”,*,the legislature has delegated to the county
superintendent of schools and to the bca rd of county
conmiissioners a full measure of discretionary power
in creating and changing the boundaries of school
districts,®
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"When an appeal is taken to the board of coimty
commissioners from the order and decision of the
county superintendent of schools> this power and
discretion is vested in the board, end upon
hearing of the appeal, the statute declares that
*the decision of said board shall be final*,"
It is therefore my opinion that an appeal may be taken
to the board of county commissioners from an order of the
county superintendent of schools denying a petition requesting
the transfer of territory from one school district to another
under the provisions of Subsection 7 of Section 75*1805,
1947.

Very truly yours,

ARNOLD H. OLS^N
Attorney General.
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Opinion 69 • 1954
Helds

1#

It is the duty of the county superintendent to

make every reasonable effort to ascertain the number of
qualified electors In a school district In computing the
requisite per cent of signers on a petition for annexation
of a school district.
2.

Under the facts submitted the petition requesting

annexation of a school district had the requisite signatures
and an election should have been called and the question
submitted to the qualified electors*
March 31, 1954
Miss Mary M. Condon
Superintendent of Public Instruction
State Capitol Building
Helenap Montana
Dear Miss Condonj
You have requested my opinion concerning the sufficiency
of fi petition requesting the county superintendent of Flathead
County to annex School District Ho. 1, a third class district,
to District No. 6, a second class district.

The petition was

signed by 23 qualified electors, and attached to the petition
is the certificate of the county superintendent which recites
the method followed by the superintendent In ascertaining
whether or not the petition was signed by 20 per cent of the
qualified electors.

The pertinent part of the certificate

is as follows ;
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"Basis of Calculation
Humber of voters in a 'contested* school trustee
election as nhovna by official tally in 1952 election..,70
Number of voters in a 'contested school trustee
election as shovn by official tally in 1953 election**.67
Number of parents listed on 1953 census list.,.*...#***68
Humber of registered voters voting in last general
e
l
e
c
t
i
o
n
.
*109
Number of registered voters as of now**•«•**•*•«••••*«*112
A number of people in the district were contacted as to
probable number of eligible yotera-highest estimate wssllO."
On these facts the superintendent concluded that the petition
had a sufficient number of signatures and called an election*
The total vote cast at the election was 1151 61 of whom voted
for annexation end an appeal was taken to your office.

The

appellants, In support of their appeal, submitted twelve affi
davits of persons who stated they were qualified electors and
did not vote at the election*

These affidavits raise the

question as to the sufficiency of the petition*

Emphasis must

be placed on the dates of the various steps taken in regard to
the proceedings* The petition was filed with the county super
intendent on January 2, and on January 5» the superintendent
acted on the petition by notifying the school boards of the
petition*

The election was held on February 4#

The affidavits

of electors submitted executed more than ten days after the
election by the appellants recited that each affiant was
qualified to vote at the election.
This opinion is confined to the sufficiency of the petition,
as the appeal on the whole record submitted must be decided by you.
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In answering your question as to the sufficiency of the
petition it is important to consider several statutes#

The

authority end procedure for the annexation of a third class
district to a first or second class district is found in
Subsection 5 of Section 75-1Ô13» R#C#M,, 1947, as last amended
by Chapter 23 , Laws of 1953, which reads in part as follows;
"(5) When, in the interest of reducing cost of
operation or improving the school service for
pupils, a board of trustees, of a third class
district shall by majority vote of its members
or at the request of twenty per cent (20) of the
qualified elednrs of the districts indicated by
a petition, ask the county superintendent of
schools to annex the territory and property of
such third class district In its entirety, or
proportionately to any number of first or second
class districts as the board resolution or
petition requests, the county superintendent
shall upon an approving vote of the trustees
of the district with which the annexation is
sought, authorize an election on such annexa
tion within not less than twenty (20) nor more
than thttty days##*’»
This code section permits two alternatives#

Zither a

resolution of the board of trustees or a,petition of 20 per
cent of the qualified electors of the third class district were
able to request that the county superintendent annex the third
class district to a first or second class district#

A petition

directed to the county superintendent initiated the proceedings
with which we are concerned#
Only qualified electors of the third class district were
eligible to sign the petition and qualifications of electors
are defined in Section 75-1610, R#C#M#, 1947:

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

'•Î^Z'Z'T

\

*'QuftllJflQfttloa8 of Electors* Every cltisen of the
UnltW States of the ege of twenty*one yeers or
ovsr who has resided la the stete of Montana for
one year# end thirty day# In the school district
next preceding the election# may vote thereat#"
It is Important to observe that registration 1# not a
condition precedent to costing a vote at a school district
election In a district of the third class. That registration
is not a qualification to vote in a general school election
was the conclusion reached in 22 Opinions of the Attorney
General 1$#, Ko* 94#

The Montana Supreme Court# la State

ex rel. Lang vs* furnish# # Mont# 2d, 134 Pec, 297# expressed
the rule in this language ;
",##It Is « principle long established that
registration Is no part of the qualifications
of an elector end adds nothing to thorn; it is
merely a method of ascertaining who the qualified
electors are, in order that abuses of the elective
franchise may be guarded against***"
Ky reason for emphasising that registration Is not an
essential element to vote at a school election is apparent
when it is remembered that the county superintendent must
determine whether a petition is signed by 20 per cent of the
electors and no registration list Is available as a standard
in esoertalning the sufficiency of the number of signers.
This perplexing problem was considered in the case of Swaim
vs, Kedeen# 101 Mont* $21, $5 fee, (2d) 1# although there
was a marked difference in the statute there considered# as
the petition had to be "signed and acknowledged by a majority
of the resident freeholders,"

The court held that the county
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superintendant wa» justified In relying on the county records
ss *the freeholders of the district ere the freeholders shown
to he such fey the county records** The ©idaion also stated
****Wo do not think It may fee reasonably assumed
that the superintendent shell personally contact
each of the residents of the district and by
direct Inquiry determine whether such resident
is a freeholder or not**,*
The Swalm case was followed In State e% rel* Wilson vs,
Muefeurger, 114 #3nt* 1751 153 fee, (2d* 5&6, and the court
specifically stated the petition for consolidation of school
districts Is jurisdictional end it la the duty of the county
superintendent to search all the county records Including
those of the clerk of the court In determining the freeholders*
However» both of these cases must fee distinguished from the
facts which you presented » as there ha» been & change in the
statute fey amendment* Ho longer must theaidera fee freeholders»
but qualified electors for school elections are proper peti
tioners* . As was previously pointed out» school electors need
not fee registered and as a consequence the county superintendent
does not have the benefit of a fixed mathematical basis for

her computation*
As the petition was filed January 2 and the election held
February 4» more than thirty days elapsed between the two dates.
The county superintendent acted on the petition January 5» and
the sufficiency of the petition must be tested as of such date*
This conclusion Is la accord with the opinion in Swaia vs* Eedeen»
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“*

supraI where the court said;
*’Th« petition was filed In the action at bar
July 16I 1934» The order calling the election
or directing that notices of election be posted
was made between 1*30 and 2*30 P*M,, July 25th.
Some two hours thereafter, or at 3 o*clock P.M*,
the same day, the deeds heretofore mentioned
were filed for record so that the number of
resident freeholders was increased to the
extent that the petition did not containa
majority of such freeholders at that time* The
deeds were filed after the election had been
ordered and came too late to alter the required
number of signatures on the petition,**"
No showing is made by appellants as to the exact number
of electors on January 5# and it is conjecturalwhether there
were

more or less than115 electors at the time the super

intendent acted on the petition*

Six different inquiries

were made by the county superintendent as set out in the
"Basis of Calculation" recited in full above, and in my
opinion each of these was a real probative force in reaching
the conclusion that twenty-three signers were sufficient.

It

is not reasonable to require the county superintendent to
conduct a door to door census and this was recognized in the
Swaim case*
The petition is questioned after the election and this
makes the recent case of State ex rel* Graham vs. Board of
Examiners, 125 Mont* 419, 239 Pac* (2d) 2#3, particularly
applicable as the court in the case discussed attacks on an
initiative petition*

The opinion stated the rule;

",,,But after the people have voted on the measure
and a great majority of the voters throughout the
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state have expressed their approval, the courts
presume that the public interest was there and
technical objections to the petition or its suf
ficiency are disregarded.”
The delay in challenging the petition until after the
election also mitigates against the appellants* position as it
was held in Reid vs. Lincoln County, 46 Mont. 31, 125 Pac# 429:
”#,.But the election should he held valid unless
it appears that a sufficient number of legal voters
to have changed the result were prevented from
casting their ballots..»”
No showing was made nor was the claim made that any
elector was deprived of a chance to vote.
It is therefore my opinion that is is the duty of the
county superintendent to make every reasonable effort to ascer
tain the number of qualified electors in a school district In
computing the requisite per cent of signers on a petition for
annexation of a school district.
It is also my opinion that under the facts submitted the
petition requesting annexation of a school district had the
requisite signatures and an election should have been called
and the question submitted to the qualified elector s*
Very truly yours,
ARNOLD H. OLSEN
Attorney General
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XII :

SCHOOL SITES AWD ABANDONED æHOOL DISTRICTS
Opinion 3
Held I 1#

1946
*
That the inclusion o f a site for a high school

gymnasium in the bond election ballot Is surplusage and the
location of the site must be determined as an independent
matter*
2* That the preliminary work in the construction of a county
high school gymnasium may be done by the county and funds
realized from bonds used in such work*
December 27# 1946
Honorable Leon G# Olmstead
Senator from Sweet Grass County
Big Timber# Montana
Dear Senator Olmsteadi
You have requested my opinion concerning the followingî
The ballot submitted in a bond election for the construction
of a gymnasium for the county high school recited the purpose
of the bond issue was the **constructing and erecting a high
school gymnasium on Lots 6# 7» 6# 9# and 10 (or a portion
thereof)

of Block 27 in Boulder Addition Ho* 1 to the City

of Big Timber# î'îontana*'*
1* You ask if the gymnasium may be constructed on the lots
other than those described in the ballot*
2*

You ask if the foundation may be constructed with the

use of ' county machinery or if the whole building must be built
by a contractor after bids are called for end the best bid accepted<
Your first question concerning the inclusion in the ballot
-427Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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of the location of the building raises a serious problem#
Section 4630*11 R#C*M*| 1933, provides that "If bonds are
sought to be Issued for two

(2) or more purposes, then

separate ballots must be provided for each purpose,"

The

location of the building Is not a bonding proposition and
therefore does not violate this section*

However, the

qualified electors for a county bond issue must be taxpayers
— Section 4630 *12 ,

1935, as amended by Chapter 136,

Laws of 1939— while there is not the requirement of being a
taxpayer for eligibility to vote on the question of the
acquisition, sale or change of a site for a school building.
Section 1262 ,63 # R*C#M,, Montana, 1935, ae amended by
Chapter 207, Laws of 1939, and Section 1002, R.C,M,, 1935,
as amended by Chapter 63 , Laws of 1939, and Chapter 65 , Laws
of 1941 .
The inclusion of the proposed site in the ballot for the
bond issue does not invalidate the bond issue.

In State v#

School District 97, Mont 356, 34 fac* (2d) 522, our Court
considered a bond election at which the selection of a school
site was also submitted*

The Court said}

"It will be observed that the site matter was
submitted at the first election on a separate
ballot and in a qualified manner*.*Dld the
submission of the question constitute fraudu
lent misrepresentation to the voters? We do not
see how it could have done so* There is
nothing in the record before us to support the
allegation that anyone was influenced to vote
for the bonds by reason of the site matter*
There is no evidence that the submission of
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-429that subject even in the qualified manner
effected the result*"
While the site was incorporated in the ballot in your
election, yet the reasoning of the above quoted case would
apply end would in effect put the burden on the taxpayer
who complains to show that there was a sufficient number
who were misled*
Also the lots described are a portion of the present
high school site and are owned by the county* Without
question the board has the authority to construct the
building on a portion of the high school site*

The fact

the description of lots which are a portion of the high
school site was included in the ballot makes one of the
conclusions expressed in Morse v# Granite County, 44 Mont*
7&, 119 fac* 286, pertinent :
"That the electors have been asked to give
their consent to things which the board may
or must do without such consent, may not be
held to restrict the discretion lodged In it
by statute*"
If the lots in question were contiguous to the high school
and not owned by the county, the board would have the authority
without consulting the electorate to pKrchase the same*
1262 .83 ,

Section

1935 , AS amended by Chapter 207, haws of 1939#

Such a situation would come within the rule of the Morse case,
supra*

However if non-contiguous lots were to be used for

the building, the electorate would have to be consulted under
Section 1262 *83 , as amended, end such an election would be
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independent of the bond election.
It is thereforeI my opinion that the inclusion of a site
for a high school gymnasium in the bond election ballot is
surplusage and the location the site must be determined as an
Independent matter in accordance with Section 1262,83,
1935» as amended by Chapter 207, Laws of 1939#

The lots described in the ballot under consideration are
a portion of the present school site and, therefore, their
inclusion in the ballot constitutes surplusage*
If lots other than those described are to be used for the
gymnasium site, then it will be necessary to proceed in accor
dance with Section 1262,83# R*G.M., 1935» as amended by Chapter

207, Laws of 1939#

Under that section, approval of the elec

torate is necessary if the lots are not contiguous or part
of a previously authorized site.

Tour second question is also answered by Section 1262*83,
R*C,M*, 1935» as emended by Chapter 207, Laws of 1939, which
requires that "all boards of trustees of county high schools,
or districts maintaining high schools, shall be prohibited
from letting any contracts for building, furnishing, repairing
or other work for the benefit of the school" without submitting
the matter for bids*

It is to be noted that the prohibition

applies to letting of contracts, and your proposal is to use
county machinery for preliminary work and subsequently submit
for bids the balance of the construction.

Section 1262,83,
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«9 emendW* «tetos th«t the boerd of trusteed eheXX hev« the
power «et Its Otscretion e# restrieted by lew to build*
hig^i school gyaaiaslums#*
strieted by

The letting of bids would be re*

ss above noted ^ but if the prelimiuery work

is done by the county, then the provisions concerning bids
would not be sppliceble#
It is therefore, my opinion that the preliminary work
in the construction of a county high school gymnasium may
be done by the county and funds realised from bonds used in
such work*

Sincerely yours,

m* V * B O T T O M U ,

Attomey Gmeral
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Opinion 43 - 1947
Held;

A school site may be sold by the Board of Trustees of

a school district either under the provisions of subdivision
Ô of Section 1015

,1935, as amended, or under the pro

vision of Chapter 106, Laws of 1939, as amended, and that the
fact the site and property may be desirable for school purposes
for schools other than those maintained by the district will
not preclude the sale by the district*
June 24, 1947
Mr* James Preeboum
County Attorney
Silver Bow County
Butte, Montana
Dear Mr* Preeboum î
You have requested my opinion concerning the procedure to
be followed In the sale of the site formerly used by the high
school*

You advise me that there have been Inquiries made by

other schools for the purchase of the property for school purposes*
This office considered the sale of school sites in Opinion
No* 15, Volume 21, Report and Official Opinions of the Attorney
General, and held:
"Abandoned school sites may be sold by the Board
of Trustees of a school district either under the
provisions of subdivision 8 of Section 1015, R.C.M*,
as amended, or under the provisions of Chapter 106,
Laws of 1939***
While the above opinion was written, prior to the amend
ment of Chapter 106, Laws of 1939, by Chapter 232, Laws of
1947, yet the rule is not altered by Chapter 232 as the effect
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of Chapter 232 is to provide for the disposition of the funds
realized from the sale#
If the Board of Trustees decides to proceed under Chapter
106 I Laws of 1939 , as amended# in making the sale# the detailed

steps to be taken must be followed.
It Is to be noted that Chapter 106, as amended, provides
that ’’the Board shall duly pass a resolution declaring such
lands, buildings, fixtures or other property to be or about to
become abandoned, obsolete, undesirable or unsuitable for
school purposes of said District."

The fact that the site

may be suitable for some school other than that maintained by

the district does not precludethe district from finding that
the site and buildings are not desirable for the district’s
schools and therefore are abandoned.

As indicated by the

quoted portion of Chapter 106, it is the lack of usefulness
for "school purposes of said District" which authorizes the
board to initiate the procedure for the sale of the property.
It is therefore, my opinion that a school site may be
sold by the Board of Trustees of a school district either
under the provisions of subdivision Ô of Section 1015,
1935, as amended, or under the provisions of Chapter 106, Laws»
of 1939 , as amended, and that the fact the site end property
may be desirable for school purposes for schools other than
those maintained by the district will not preclude the sale
by the district.

Sincerely yours,

R. V# BOTTOmi

Attorney General
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Opinion 73 • 1947
Holds

The territory of a school district \diich Is attached

to another school district by reason of abandonment in
accordance with the provisions of Section 970, R*G»M., 1935,
as amended, is not liable for the bonded or warranted Indebted*
ness of the school district to which the abandoned district
is attached#
October 20, 1947
Mr* S.W* Popham
County Attorney
Dawson County
Glendive, Montana
Deer Mr* Pophamî
ÏOU have requested my opinion concerning the liability
of a school district which was annexed to another district
for the bonded
district*

or warranted indebtedness of the latter

You advised me that the district which was annexed

was an abandoned district within the meaning of Section 970,
E#C#M*, as amended by Chapter 16Ô, laws of 1943*
Under Section 970, R*C*M., 1935, as amended by 'Chapter
166 , laws of 1943, the property of such abandoned district

would be liable for any indebtedness of the district and the
property of the district to which the abandoned district was
attached, would not be liable*

This section is silent as to

the liability of the abandoned district for the debts of the
district to which the abandoned district is attached*

Ana*

logons situations arise in the creations of new districts or
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the consolidation of districts which come within the pro
visions of Section 1029.1#

1935#

this last section

limits the liability for bonded indebtedness to the original
territory against which such bonds were Issued*
In Opinion So. 91* Volume 15# Report and Official Opinions
of the Attorney General# this office considered the liability
of the territory of an abandoned district for outstanding
bonds of the district to which the abandoned district was
annexed and held that the territory of the abandoned district
could not be subjected to a tax levy for the payment of the
bonds* Many oases were cited and reference is made to the
opinion for the reasoning found therein.
It is therefore# my opinion that the territory of a
school district which is attached to another school district
by reason of abandonment in accordance with the provisions of
Section 970, R*G,M.# 1935* as amended, is not liable for the
bonded or warranted indebtedness of the school district to which
the abandoned district is attached.
Sincerely yours#
R* V. BOTTQMLt
Attorney General
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Opinion 134 # 194^

Hiildt

A 0chool distrlet ha® th# authority to opérâta and

maintain a achool loeated upon ground which bsa been leased to
it by the United State® government and the students attending
such school will receive full credit for their woi4c as In
any public school of this state# if the school is supervised
and accredited by the proper officers of the state*
August 20# 194^
Kiss Elisabeth Ireland
Superintendent of Public Instruction
Capitol Building
Helena# hWtana
Dear Mia® Irelandf
You have requested my opinion coaeeming the authority of
a Montana school district to operate and maintain a school
located on United State® government promrty#
You advised me that the contractor who is constructing
a dam for the government must# under hi® agreement# provide
education for the children of government employees*

The con

struction of a school building is also a part of the contractor’s
obligation*
You also state that « lease for the school site and building
could be made to the district in the event the board of trustees
deemed such en arrangement edventageous and to the best interests
of the district*
Sub-section Ô of Section 1015# R*C*M*# 1935# #s amended#
stakes it the duty of school trustees to acquire sites for
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sehooX hou99S whieh the district wiXl o m *

Thla would, by

Implication, permit the leeaing o t lend for the use of such
schools end would also allow the district to opereto a school
on land to which e formal lease has not been given#

Section

lOOd, h#0 »K*, 1933, as emended by chapter 206 , laws of 1939
provides for notice to the trustees by the owner of lend of
the termination of the use by the district of school sites
•used by will or suffranco #• By such enactment It would appear
our legislature has recognised that sdhools have been located
end operated on lend to WdLch the district had rights that
were less than a freehold or leasehold interest#

However,

it would be advantageous to school districts always to have a
deed or a written lease in such instances, and thus avoid %mcertainty as to the districts rights#
In your letter you state that the contractor must, under
such an arrangement, pay to the district tuiticm charges for
the education of employees» children#

Sub-section 3 of Section

1015, R.O.M#, 1935 , as amended, grants the power to school
trustees "to determine the rate of tuition of non-resident
pupils#*

It will, therefore, be a subject for negotiation

between the school trustees and the contractor of the amount of
the tuition charge#
I further understand that under the contract of construc
tion, the contractor has obligated himself and his bondsmen

to

provide a school building or buildings, the heat, light, end ell
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necessary equipment, as well as the necessary Instructional
staff t In fact, to provide at his own expense a school that
will In all respects meet the standards and qualifications
required by our state laws of all public schools for all of
the school children who have accompanied their parent, guar
dian or legal representative, who ere employed by the con
tractor In or about the dam and the works*
The school contemplated will be operated within the
boundaries of the school district and will be used primarily
for the children of employees, yet the location of the school
site on government land should not preclude the school district
from exercising its supervisory powers, if it Is determined
by the board of trustees to be more advantageous to the district
to assume such responsibility and relieve the contractor thereof#
It is therefore, my opinion that a school district has
the authority to operate and maintain a school located upon
ground Wiich has been leased to it by the United States govern
ment and the students attending such school will receive full
credit for their work as in any public school of this state,
if the school is supervised and accredited by the proper of
ficers of the state#
Sincerely yours,
H# V# BOTTÜMLÏ
Attorney General
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Opinion 144 - 194^
Held*

The legislature has provided where a district has been

abandoned and the territory annexed to another district and
the requirements» as amended have been ascertained and
determined it is mandatory on the Board o f Trustees of the
district to which the abandoned territory is attached to
provide a school for such children when requested to do so
by the parents of at least three of such children#
October 15» 1948
Mr# John F# McGough
County Attorney
Jefferson County
Boulder, Montana
Dear Mr# McGoughs
You have submitted for my opinion the following*
^^ere a school district has been abandoned and
annexed to another district end where there are
five or more children In such abandoned territoiy eligible for attendance in an elementary
,school,'as determined by the County Superin
tendent, and such children reside more than
three miles from an established school in the
district to which the abandoned territory is
attached, are the trustees of such district
to which the abandoned territory has been
attached, required to furnish a school for
such children#*
The answer to your inquiry is found in Section 970
1935* as amended by Chapter 168, Laws of 1943*
Prior to the amendment, there was no relief for such
situated school children#

A protest from all over the State

arose because of the harsh results of abandoning a district

«
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and annexing the territory to another district without pro
viding for the elementary school children that might be re
siding in such abandoned territory*
The legislature I to correct the situation, amended Section
970

1935 » by Chapter 168, taws of 1943, by providing

the same method of abandoning a school district end then made
provision for a school in such abandoned territory under the
following condition*
1# Whenever there are five or more children in such
abandoned territory eligible for attendance in an elementary
school#
2#

Such eligibility to be determined by the County

Superintendent#
3#

Said children residing more than three miles from an

established school In the district to which the abandoned
territory is attached#
4»

That after the foregoing requirements have been ascer

tained then;
3# The School Trustees shall provide a school in aban

doned territory when requested so to do by the parents of at
least three of such children#
Therefoi^ it is my opinion the legislature has provided
that where a district has been abandoned and the territory
annexed to another district and when the requirements, Nos#
Ij 2, end 3, set forth above have been ascertained and
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determined to be correct| then the legislature, by the above
mentioned amendment, hag made it mandatory on the Board of
Trustees of the district to which the abandoned territory Is
attached, to provide a school for such children when requested
to do so by the parents of at least three of the chlldrai#

Sincerely yours,

B. V. BOXTOMIT
Attorney General

t'
\
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Opinion 73 - 1949
Held*

County Superintendent of Schools must declare a school

district abandoned where school has not been held for three
(3) consecutive years, and the School Trustees have no pro
vided transportation in school bus operated under contract
let by school district#

Furnishing of any service in lieu

of transportation to children of district will not preclude
district from being declared abandoned#
December 1, 1949
Mr. Robert J# Nelson
County Attorney
Cascade County
Great Falls, Montana
Dear Mr# Nelson*
You have requested ray opinion concerning the power of the
County Superintendent of Schools to declare the abandonment of a
school district in which school has not been actually held during
the last three years#

You advised me that the children of the

district have been attending school in a nearby district and
the district of their residence has been paying to the parents
of the children money in lieu of providing actual bus trans
portation#
Section 970, R#C.M#, 1935, as amended by Chapter 16S,
Daws of 1943, provides that the County Superintendent "must
declare a school district abandoned when terms of school ag
gregating at least twelve (12 ) months have not been actually
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held in a district during a period of three (3 ) consecutive
years*"

Section 970 contains an exception which la pertinent

to the facta which you submitted end reads as follow»s
"That If any such district has provided transportation
for all children of school age, living within the
district, to another district for the purpose of
attending school therein for a term of at least six
(6 ) months during each of such three (3 ) years, such
transportation to be by means of a safe and proper
omnibus or omnibuses, driven or operated by the
Board of Trustees of the district, and which driver,
or drivers, shall be under proper and sufficient
bonds, such transportation shall be deemed equlva*
lent to the actual holding of school in such district
for a term of six (6 ) months in each year, and such
district shall not be ordered abandoned*"
It is to be noted in the above quoted exception that bus
transportation under contract let by the trustees of the dis
trict will relieve the district from any question of being
abandoned*

Section 2 of Chapter 152, Laws of 1941 defines

"transportation" as used in the school transportation act to
#
Include payments to parents in lieu of furnishing actual bus
transportation*

As Section 970, ss amended, deals specifically

with the abandonment of school districts its terms, which are
unambiguous, will control the determination of the manner of
declaring school districts abandoned*
This office in Opinion No* 182, Vol» 19, Report and Offi
cial Opinions of the Attorney General considered the exception
found in Section 970 end it was stated therein as follows x
«In making the exception to the law, the Legisla
tive intent is clear to the effect other modes of
transportation, such as rent, board and room,
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paying parents or guardian and providing
supervised correspondence study or supervised
home study, are not to be considered*”
This office has held in many opinions that the actual
transportation in school buses operated by the district is
necessary to prevent the abandonment of a district under the
provisions of Section 970, R*C.M*, 1935.

See Opinion No*

344* ?ol* 19* Report and Official Opinions of the Attorney
General for an extensive discussion of the interpretation
of the statute in question*
It is therefore, my opinion that the County Superintendent
of Schools must declare a school district abandoned where
school has not been held for three (3 ) years* consecutively,
and the trustees have not provided transportation in a
school bus operated under a contract let by the district
and that the furnishing of any service in lieu of transpor
tation to the children of the district will not preclude the
district from being declared abandoned*
Very truly yours,
ARNOLD M# OLSEN

Attorney General
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Opinion 91 *• 1950
Held*

An elementary school may be constructed adjacent to

an existing elementary school and on the same site after the
qualified electors of a third class school district have
authorised the construction of a new elementary school at
a bond election, without the necessity of an election to
designate the site for the new building*
February 10, 1950
Mr# Walter T* Murphy
County Attorney
Mineral bounty
Superior, Montana
Dear Mr. Murphy*
You have requested my opinion concerning the necessity
for an election for a school site in a third class school
district.

You advise me that bonds were authorized at an

election to construct it adjacent to the old elementary
school and the two are to be connected.
The construction of the new elementary school on land
which

is a part of the location of the old elementary school

will not result

In a change of the school site.

This office,

in Opinion No# 11&, Volume 21, Report and Official Opinions
of the Attorney General, quoted with approval from 5# C. J.
740 the definition of "site" as follows*

"A plot of ground suitable or set apart for some
specific use; a seat or ground plot. The term
does not ofitself necessarily mean a place or
tract of land fixed by definite boundaries."
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From the above quoted it Is reasonable to Interpret the
use of the word ”slte" in our codes as meaning a general loca«
tion for a specific purpose*

The site for the old elementaiy

school was selected by the qualified electors in accordance
with Section 7$»3101^ R*C,M*, 1947» which provides for the
election in school districts of the third class. Nichols v*
School District No. 3» 67 Mont. 161, 267, fee. 264*
The question submitted to the electors in the bond elec
tion recited that the bonds were to be issued ”for the purpose
of constructing a new grade dr school building.**

Subsection

(a) of Section 75-3901, R.C,M., 1947, is the authority for
the submission of such a question and the site having been
previously selected, the new building may be constructed on
the site.
If a new site had been contemplated by the trustees or
the electorate an independent election could be held for the
determination of such question under the procedure set out in
Section 75-3101,

1947*

As no such question has been

presented there is no need for an election.
It is therefore my opinion that an elementary school may
be constructed adjacent to an existing elementary school and
on the same site after the qualified electors of a third class
school district have authorized the construction of a new
elementary school at a bond election, without the necessity of
an election to designate the site for the new building.
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Very truly yours.

ARNOLD H« OLSEN
Attorney General
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X

Opinion 123 • 1952

Held;

The Board of County Conmilssloners does not have the

power to give to a school district a public park owned by
the county for the use of the school district as a school
site,
October 1, 1952
Mr* Michael J* 0 ♦Connell
County Attorney
Gallatin County
Bogeman* &!ontana
Dear

0 ♦Connell;
You have requested my opinion concerning the authority

of the board of county commissioners to make a gift of lands
contained in a federal townsite and designated for public
park purposes to the board of trustees of the school district
to be used by the school district as a school site.

The

land in question is not in an incorporated city or town and
there is no problem of ownership by the federal government*
The power of a county to acquire land for park purposes
is found in Section 62-101, Revised Codes of Montana, 1947,
which reads in part as follows;
"The several counties of this state are hereby
authorized and empowered to acquire by purchase,
grant, deed, gift, devise or condemnation, or
otherwise, lands suitable for public camping and
public recreational purposes, civic centers,
youth centers, museums, recreational centers and
any combination thereof, or may lease such land
tracts, each of which shall be so situated as to
offer ready access to a public highway."
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Also I a county has the authority to hold lands within its
limits under the provisions of Section I6-ÔO4 ,

1947«

There is no statutory authority authorising a county to vacate
the use of the land for park purposes*

In the case of Lloyd

vs* City of Great Falls, 107 Mont. 442, $6 Pac. (2d) 395> the
court quoted with approval the following*
*i

**Where lands have been dedicated and used for
a public park or square, the municipal corpora
tion holds the title in trust for the public and
has no power, unless specially authorised by the
legislature, to appropriate such lands for the
use and benefit of private persons or corporations,
sell the same, or in any way divert the land from
the uses end purposes of its original dedication."
In the absence of specific statutory authority to vacate
the land for park purposes the board of county commissioners
does not have the power to divert the use of the land to the
school district*

The board of county commissioners has only

such powers as are conferred by law, either expressly or by
Implication, Lewis vs. Petroleum County, 92 Mont# $63, 17 Pac*
(2d) 60.
I realize that the public interest might be served by
authorizing the county to give the land to the school district#
,

However, such cannot be considered as the rules stated in
Franzke vs# Fergus County, 76 Mont. 150, 245 Pac* 962 , applies
to the problem presented*

The court in this case said:

"The fact that the contemplated action may be in
the best Interest of the county is not an admissible
argument# The doctrine of expediency does not enter
into the construction of statutes."
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It Is therefore my opinion that the board of county
commissioners does not have the power to give to a school
a public park owned by the county for the use of the school
district as a school site*

T&ry truly yourar.

AEHOLD“ H . OLSülK

Attorney General
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Opinion 32 -» 1955

Held*

A high school building financed by bonds issued by a

high school district, may be constructed on land owned jointly
by the county high school and a school district,
August 4# 1955
Hr, Edwin T, Irvine
County Attorney
Granite County
Philllpsburg, Montana
Dear Hr, Irvine *
You have requested ray opinion as to whether a new high
school building financed by bonds issued by the high school
district may be built on land owned jointly by the county
high school and a school district#
High school districts, as provided in Section 75-4605,
1947 , are established for construction, repair, im~

proveraent and equipment purposes only*

This law was enacted

to provide an additional method of borrowing money.

High

school districts are not operating units of our school system
and do not have budgets for the maintenance of the schools
constructed from the proceeds of high school building district
bonds.

In Pierson vs, Hendricksen, 96 Mont, 244, 36 Pac* (2d)

991, the court approved the expenditure of funds realised
from high school district bonds on the county high school and
said;
"Nor is it of controlling Importance that the
Improvements contemplated are to be made on the
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coimty high school building, legal title to which
is in the county* The county, la the management
of the county high school, is simply the agency
of the state for that purpose#♦•The beneficial
title of the school property is in the state#**
(Cases Cited}
From the above quoted It must be concluded that the fact
that the beneficial title to school property is in the state
permits the use of high school district funds on property of
the county high school*

In Hebei vs# High School District "C**,

Mont#, fee# (2d), 12 St* Hep# 170, it was held that lots ac*
quired by the trustees of a school district as the site for a
high school, financed by bonds issued by the high school
district may be used as a proper location for the construction
of the new high school building#
As a high school district is organized primarily for
raising construction funds, there are no statutory restrictions
on the uses of the funds#

However, the money realized from

bonds must be used for high school purposes end the title to
the land where the building is located is not material so
long as it is school land*
It is therefore my opinion that a high school building
financed by bonds issued by a high school district, may be
constructed on land owned jointly by the county high school
end ft school district*
Very truly yours,
ARHOiD H* OhSSN
Attorney General
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CHAPTER XIII
MISaEELANSOUS OPINIONS
Opinion 110 - 1946
Heidi

A liquor license may not be granted for use on premises

which fire directly across the street from a school although
the main entrance of the school is not on the same street as
the premises applying for the license, but the entrance of the
school is within six hundred feet of the entrance of the
premises seeking the license*
January 2, 1946
Honorable Sam iC* Ford
Governor of Montana
State Capitol
HelenaI Montana
Dear Governor Ford;
You have requested an opinion from this office concerning
the granting of a liquor license for premises located in the
3 SOO block on Second Avenue North, directly north of and across

Second Avenue North from the school for the deaf end blind,
whose address is 3^00 Second Avenue North, Great Falls, Montana*
You also submitted a plat showing the location of the
school end the premises operating under the license*

It would

appear from the plat that the main entrance of the school is not
on the same street as that of the licensed premises, but that the
side lawn of the school Is directly across the street.

The

distance in a straight line between the center of the main
•

454*»
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entrance

of the school and the center of the nearest entrance

of the licensed premises is less than six hundred feet.
Chapter 041 Laws of 1917» was adopted by vote of the
people at the general election held November 0» 1930 and be
came effective by virtue of the Governor^a proclamation on
January 21, 1939*
Section 13 of the act providess
”No license shall be granted for any premises
which shall be on the same street or avenue end
within six hundred feet of a building occupied ex
clusively as a church, synagogue or other place
of worship, or school, except a commercially
operating school; the measurements to be taken
in a straight line from the center of the nearest
entrance of such school, church, synagogue or
other place of worship to the center of the
nearest entrance of the prmises to be licensed{
except however that no license shall be denied
because such restriction may apply to any pre
mises so located which are maintained as a bona
fide hotel, restaurant, railway car, club or
fraternal organisation or society except similar
places of business established and in actual
operation for one year prior to the passage and
approval of this act.”
The obvious purpose of the above quoted section is to
protect students from the environment surrounding a tavern
which serves liquor.

The public policy involved is to protect

the young and in construing such a statute, the principle set
out in In re Wilson’s Estate, 102 Mont# 170» 56 fao# (2d)
should be followed#

The court said:

«In the construction of a statute the primarv
duty of the court is to give the effect to the
intention of the legislature in enacting it,”
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The main entrance of the school la not on the same street
as the tavern, but only the grounds of the school are across
the street therefrom.

Section 13 provides in part that "no

license shall be granted for any premises on the same street
or avenue,,,,,as a school,"

The act could have provided that

the school and the proposed licensed premises must front on
the same street for the tavern to be in the prohibited class.
However, the act does not so provide, but does prohibit the
licensing of premises on the same street when the entrances of
the two buildings are within six hundred feet of each other#
It is therefore my opinion that under the facts presented,
a liquor license may not be granted for use on praaises which
are directly across the street from a school although the
main entrance of the school is not on the same street as the
premises applying for the license, but the entrance of the
school is within six hundred feet of the entrance of the pre
mises seeking the license.
Sincerely yours,
E, V, BOTTÛMLÏ
Attorney General

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

-457O p in io n 1 6 4 - 1946

Held; A sehool district» through its board of trustees, does
not have the power or authority to enter into an oil and gas
lease concerning school district land which is not necessary
for school purposes.
June 6 , 1946
Mr* Wilbur P. Warner
County Attorney
Glacier County
Cut Bank, Montana
Dear Mr. Werner*
You have requested my opinion whether a school district
may enter into an oil and gas lease#

You advise me the land

in question is an abandoned school site one acre in area and
the school board does not anticipate the lend will be needed
in the future for school purposes*
Subsection 9 of Section 1015# R.C.M#, 1935# ®s amended,
makes It the duty of the board of trustees to hold property
for the benefit of the school*

Inother words, the power

and duty of the school district is to own real property for
school purposes, and the grant of power is not given for the
purpose of permitting the district to engage in profit ventures.
Section 100Ô, R.C.M*, 1935# as amended by Chapter 206,
taws of 1939# provides in part;
«The trustees of the district shall have the
power to lease any propertybelonging to the
district which is not being
used for school
purposes."
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The above quoted portion of Section lOOS is broad in its
terms, but must be construed in relation to other pertinent
statutes,

(Register Life Insurance Co* v* Keniston, 99 Mont*

191, 43 Pac, (2d) 251.)
Our Supreme Court in îoung v. Board of Trustees, 90 Mont.
576 4 Pac* (2d) 725, held a school district had the power to
rent a school building for public dances under a statute which
authorised the trustees **to rent, lease and hire such halls,
gymnasiums and buildings and portions of buildings as may be
suitable for public entertainment."

The court considered the

question of a school district entering into competition with .
citizens who operated similar places of entertainment and held
by the above statute that the legislature had fixed the public
policy in the matter.

The court observed the fact that tax

exempt property was used in competition and noted the com-*
mercial aspect of the power granted the trustees.
In Herald v. Board of Education, 65 W.Va. 765 , 65 S.S.
102 , the court held a board of education could not lease a

schoolhouse lot for the production of oil and gas, since it had
only the powers given by statute and such as were absolutely
necessary to execute its powers, and could not engage in
business or make contracts outside its functions touching
education.
Our court, in McNair v. School Pistrict No. 1, 67 Mont.
423 , 266 Pec. 166, statedI
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school district. Is a political subdivision
of tho stateI created for the convenient dis*
patch of public business# It is a public
corporation# Tho Board of Trustees, therefore,
constitutes the board of directors and managing
officers of the corporation, and may exercise only
those powers expressly conferred upon them by
statute and such as are necessarily implied in
the exercise of those expressly conferred. The
statute granting power must be regarded both as
a grant and a limitation upon the powers of the
board,.#"
It would appear from the above quoted limitation on the
powers of the trustees that they must be able to point to a
specific statute authorizing an oil end gas lease.

Such a

lease would mean the district was engaging in a commercial
enterprise for profit which was far removed from any educa^
tlonal function.
This office, in Opinion No* 19, Volume 21, Report and
Official Opinions of the Attorney General, held the trustees
of a school district had the power, under Section 1000, R.C.M#,
1935, *s amended, to lease a teacherage not needed for school
purposes as a residence.

However, It was sfiid "in making the

lease the trustees must bear in mind that the property in
question is trust property which is for the benefit of the
schools,"

The underlying principle is that the power to grant

a lease is ancilary to the trust for school purposes and is
limited at all times by the necessity of utilizing the property
for the schools.
While it is a fortuitous circumstance that abandoned school
land has an enhanced value because of its proximity to a
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producing oil well, yet such a fact would not justify the
trustees In engaging In a long time lease with a purely com
mercial aspect*

The whole theory and policy of our school

laws is to give to the school trustees the powers necessary
and requisite to manage and conduct schools for school pur
poses only.
The trustees may realise a profit by the sale of the
lands upon being directed to do so by the electors of the
district*

Such a sale would have to be of the whole of the

property as there la no provision in the statutes granting the
power to sell for the reservation of the mineral Interests*
The procedure for sale was set out in an opinion of this office,
Opinion No# 15, Volume 21, Report and Official Opinions of the
Attorney General, and I refer you to it*
It should be kept in mind the legislature determines the
policy end the law governing school districts, and the author
ity of boards of school trustees*

Boards of county commissioners

for many years have been granted the authority to lease county
owned lands, but before they could enter into an oil and gas
lease for the county on such lands, it was necessary for the
legislature to enact special enabling laws granting to boards
of county commissioners that particular authority and setting
up procedural practice therefore*

The legislature may see

fit to grant such authority to boards of trustees of school
districts, but until such enabling legislation is enacted, it
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would appear to me that such a procedure Is beyond the present
authority granted to boards of school trustees by the legis
lature#
It Is therefore# my opinion a school district, through its
board of trustees, does not have the power or authority to
enter into an oil and gas lease concerning school district
land which is not necessary for school purposes#
Sincerely yours,
R# V# BOTIOMLY
Attorney General
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Opinion 44 - 1947
Held:

The residence of a child committed to the State Orphans*

Kome is that of his parents• If the parents move from the
*

state of Montana the county of the former residence of the
parents is no longer under obligation to transfer funds to the
h i ^ school at Twin Bridges in Madison County*

The expense

of such*education is the obligation of the State of Montana*
July 11, 1947
Mr* J* Chandice Ettlen
County Attorney
Granite County
Phillpsburg, Montana
Beer Mr* Sttien:
You have requested my opinion concerning the following:
A child whose parents were resident in Granite County
was committed by the district court to the Montana State
Orphans* Home*

The parents subsequent to the coimitment moved

V

from Granite County to the State of Washington*

Must Granite

County provide for the transfer of funds to Madison County
for the education the child in the High School located at
Twin Bridges under the provision of Chapter 219, laws of 1943?
The question to be decided is the residence of the child,
as Chapter 219 provides that the county treasurer of the county
of a pupil*» residence shall transfer to the Twin Bridges
High School in Madison County funds for education of the child*
Section 33, R.C.M*, 1933, provides in part:
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“Th« residence of the father during his life, and
after his death the residence of the mother while
she remains unmarried is the residence of the
unmarried minor child*"
From the above quoted it would appear that the residence
of the child follows that of the father and would now be In
the State of Washington*
In State ex rel Johnson v* Kassting, 74 Mont* 25 23Ô Pac*
582 , our Court considered the residence of girls commiitad to

the Vocational School in lewis and Clark County*

The Court

held that even if the state has become the guardian of the
child committed, the residence of such minor children will
not be changed by the committment to the school*

The Court

said I
"Therefore these girls cannot be held to have
acquired a residence in School District Ho* 6
of Lewis and Clark County, nor lost their
residence in the county in which their parents
resided by reason of committment to this school»"
There is an apparent conflict between the rule stated in
the above case and Section 585O, R*C*M*, 1935* which penaits
a parent entitled to the custody of a child to change his
residence*

As the commitment to the Orphans* Home deprives

the parents of the custody of the child, it might well be
argued that the right to change the residence is dependent
on the right to custody.

However, Section 585O must be con

sidered in conjunction with related sections end the conclusion
reeched that the section has reference to the conflicting
claims of the two parents, and no application when there is no
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controversy between the parents, as is the case here#

Also

the general rule is stated In17 Am# Jur# 62#;
"A needy, delinquent, or neglected child does
not lose the domicile of its parents by being
sent to an Institution#*
It might b® urged that Section 1051, R#C#M#, 1935 as
amended, would also preclude the chlldiï'om being considered
a resident of Granite County as this section fixes the rules C
for the making of the school census#

However, the transfer

of funds under Chapter 219, Laws of 1943, is based on the
residence of the pupil, and whether the pupil is included
in the school census Is Immaterial#
The parents of the childhaving moved from the state of
Montana and thus relieved thecounty from the duty totransfer
funds, it now becomes the duty of the State to pay the expense
of education, as Section 1492 and 1493» R#C#M*, 1935, provide
that inmates of the Orphans^ Home are to receive free educa
tional benefits at the expense of the State#

Chapter 219,

Laws of 1943, would control, being subsequent legislation, if
the parents continued to reside in Montana, but having departed.
Sections 1492 and 1493 will fill the need and supply the neces
sary funds#
It is therefore, ny opinion that the residence of a child
committed to the State Orphans* Home is that of his parents#
If the parents move from the State of Montana the county of
the former residence of the parents is no longer under
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obligation to transfer funds to the high school at Twin Bridges
In Madison County»

The expense of such education Is the obli

gation of the state of Montana*

Sincerely yours*
R* ?, BOTTOMLÎ
Attorney General
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Opinion 92 - I94 Ô
Held;

1.

The state and local boards responsible for voca

tional education have the responsibility of furnishing and
providing related end supplemental instruction for apprentices,
and the coordination of instruction with job experience, and
the selection and training of teachers and coordinators for
such instruction.
2» The state board of education is designated as the state
board for vocational education and has the authority to make
all rules and regulations governing the establishment, conduct
and administration of vocation courses, including the power
to fix the qualifications of instructors and the course of
study to be followed, in conformity with the requirements of
the federal board of vocational education.
3.

The Apprenticeship Council is authorized to make rules

and regulations, but such rules and regulations must be limited
in their purpose and effect as aid in the administration of
the law.
4.

It was the purpose and intent of the legislature that all

departments of state and federal government concerned with
the administration of the act, or its fulfillment, to cooperate
to the fullest extent within their respective fields, to the
end that the apprentice may receive the full benefits of the
act.
January 6, 1946
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Montana State Apprenticeship Connell
Mr* James B* 0*Brian. Chairman
State Capitol
HelenaI Montana
Bear Sir*
Tou have subaitted the following question for my opinion:
**1* le the Montana State Apprenticeship Council
as a whole responsible for providing ’related and
supplemental Instruction for apprentices*, in
cluding the selection of teachers, providing
textbooks, outlining the classroom curricula and
other such similar factors, or does this entire
responsibility rest with state and local boards
responsible for vocational education?
"2* Is there a State Vocational Education De
partment or some other Department or Division of
the State Government who might have the responsi
bility of providing such related and supplemental
instruction for apprentices? If so, what is the
official name of the Department or Division?
**3. If there is such a State Departmmt or Divi
sion of Vocational Education, Is It directly under
the supervision of the State Superintendent of
Public Instruction or the State Board of Education,
or is there some other department, board, bureau,
or division under which the Department of Voca
tional Education operates? If so, what la the
name and officers of such a Department, board,
bureau, or division?
•5

**4.# Does the Council have the authority to issue
rules and regulations as may be necessary to carry
out the intent and purposes of the act, which in the
opinion of the Council would rebound to the benefit
and protection of the apprentices and the industry
involved as a vdiole?
«5* Is it the Intent end purpose of the Act to
cause governmental agencies such as the Council
itself, the Federal Apprentice Training Service or
Federal Committee on Apprenticeship, the State
Department of Vocational Education, the Federal
Veterans Administration, the State Superintendent
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of Public Instruction and the State Board of
Education to cooperate with each other, causing
bona fide apprentice training to come about and
related Instruction for apprentices to become a
possibility in fact? If$ for example, related
instruction is not being provided apprentices by
the Vooational Education Departments end the
apprentices suffer because of the lack of such
supplemental related Instruction, then should not
the Council as a whole, as well as the other govern»
mental agencies, do whatever be within their power
and through legal means to cause the State Depart*
ment of Vocational Education and the Local Coordin
ators for Vocational Education to bring about
related instruction for apprentices?**
As to your first question, I call your attention to Section
2 (5) of Chapter 149, Laws of 1941, which provides as follows;
"Related and supplemental instruction for apprentices,
coordination of instruction with job experiences,
and the selection and training of teachers end coor
dinators for such instruction shall be the respon
sibility of the state and local boards responsible
for vocational education ’ *•*
Tour second and third questions may be considered together*
By Chapter 14#, Laws of 1931, uow Section 1262*93 to and
including 1262*100, K*G*M*, 1935, as amended by Chapter 160,
Laws of 1939, the legislature reaffirmed the state's acceptance
of the Act of Congress providing for promotion of vocational
education in the several states* By said Chapter 14#, the
state board of education was given authority, "to adopt all
necessary rules and regulations governing the establishment,
conduct and administration of vocation courses, including the
power to fix the qualifications of instructors and the course
of study to be followed.**"

The Act also provides for the
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appointment of an advisory committee consisting of four citizen
members representing the manufacturing and commercial Interests,
the agricultural interests, skilled labor and home making
Interests, and the state superintendent of public instruction or
a person designated by the state superintendent*

The board is

directed to cooperate with the several boards of trustees of
school districts and of county high schools in the establish
ment and maintenance in the public elementary and high schools,
appropriate courses for vocational training in agriculture,
home economics, the trades and industries and commercial branches*
The State Superintendent of Public Instruction is the
executive officer of the vocational board and is charged with
the responsibility for the administration of all laws of Montana
relating to vocational education, and the rules and regulations
promulgated by the board*
The state board of education, therefore, is constituted
the state board for vocational education*
Chapter 160, Laws of 1939, authorises the state board for
vocational education to designate any district high school,
county high school or high school district maintaining a
vocational training department as a vocational center*

This

chapter also provides that all rules end regulations governing
admission to such centers shall be promulgated by the state
board for vocational education*
As to your fourth question. Section 1 (b) (2), of Chapter
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of 1941 , providea:
**{2)#,*lsau© euch rules and regulations as may
be necessary to carry out the intent and purposes
of this act;,,**"
The Council, therefore is authorized to make rules and

regulations as are necessary to carry out the intent and
purposes of the Act*

In the case of Mc^atridge v* District

Court, 113 Mont, 81, 88, 122 Pac, {2d) 834 # our Supreme Court
in speaking of the power end authority of the Montana Liquor
Control Board to make rules and regulations under a similar
provision in the Liquor Control Act as the abovesaid*
"The board is an administrative body, func«*
tloning as a bureau of the executive department
of the state government* It has no lawmaking
power# Any attempt to create for itself authority
and discretion not given by the legislature must
fail# The board is authorized to make rules and
regulations, but these must be limited in their
purpose and effect as aid in the administration
of the law,"
Your Council may, therefore make rules end regulations,
but such must be limited in their purpose and effect as aid
in the administration of the law*
It is very apparent from a reading of the provisions of
the Apprenticeship Act that the legislature intended its
administration to be in conformity and in conjunction with the
federal legislation on apprenticeship#

In providing for the

personnel of the Council end its composition, it would seem
clear that the intent was to have all those departments of
state government represented In such council to work together
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la their respective fields to carry out the purposes and Intent
of the lew to the end that the apprentice be given the full
benefits therein provided#

It Is only by the full cooperation

of all those departments mentioned in your fifth question that
the propose of the act may be fully carried out and those
Intended to be benefited thereby receive all benefits intended#
It is therefore, my opinions
1»

The state end local boards responsible for vocational

education have the responsibility of furnishing and providing
related and supplemental instruction for apprentices, and the
coordination of instruction with job experience, and the selec
tion and training of teachers find coordinators for such
instruction#
2,

The state board of education is designated as the state

board for vocational education, and has the authority to make
all rules and regulations governing the establishment, conduct
and administration of vocation courses, including the power to
fix the qualifications of instructors and the course of study to
be followed, In conformity with the requirements of the federal
board of vocational education#
3 # The Apprenticeship Council is authorized to make rules

and regulations, but such rules and regulations must be limited
in their purpose and effect as aid in the administration of the
law#
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It was the purpose and Intent of the legislature that

all departments of state and federal government concerned with
the administration of the act, or its fulfillment, to cooperate
to the fullest extent within their respective fields, to the
end that the apprentice may receive the full benefits of the
act*

Sincerely yours,
E* V* BOTTOMLI
Attorney General
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Held*

1950

The title to a eehooX building erected on the land of

an individual under a tenancy at will or sufferance remains
in the district and can be removed by the district until
title is divested as provided in Section 75*1624#

1947*

August 10, 1950
Mr* M, K* Daniels

County Attorney
Powell County
Deer Lodge, Montana .
Dear Mr. Daniels:
You have requested ray opinion concerning the ownership of
a school house which has not been used for school purposes for
several years*

You advised me that the school building Is

located on land which is owned by an individual*

You also

state that there was no written lease or agreement concerning
the use of the land by the district*
The problem presented is answered by Section 75*1624#
8.S.M*, 1947 * which reads in part as follows*
«Whenever# after the passage and approval of this
act, « conditional deed has been issued to a school
district for land or whenever land has been used at
will or sufferance for a school site and therehas
been built upon such land a school house and other
improvements, and said building and improvements
cease to be used for the maintenance of a school in
accordance with the provisions of Section 75*1631
and 75*1632 , said Board of Trustees must be notified
in writing by the owner or claimant of the land which
which has been so deeded or used by will or sufferance
for a school site that he intends to repossess the
land and the school trustees shall within a period
of not exceeding one (1) year, remove the building
and improvements placed thereon or they shall be
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deemed thereafter to have forfeited any further
right to such property. Provided futher that
before the landowner or claimant to said land
shall have the right to give the notice of re*
moval aforesaid, the intent to abandon said land
by the school district must have been expressed
by the dulty qualified electors In the school
district in accordance with the provisions of
subdivision eight (Ô) of Section 75-1632*
It la to be noted from the above quoted statute that the
owner of the land before he can claim title to the building
must give written notice of his intention to repossess the
land reciting that the trustees shall remove the building
within a year’s time*

This is a statutory recognition that

a school house located on the land of another is the property
of the district and the school district can be divest of title
only by failure to remove after written notice*
As was stated in Van Hess v, Pecard, 2 Pet (U*S*) 137, 71*
Ed* 374:
"The general rule of the cimmon law certainly is
that whatever is once annexed to the freehold
becomes pert of it, and cannot afterwards be re*
moved except by him who is entitled to the in*
heritance* The rule, however, never was, at
least as far back as we can trace into the books,
inflexible end without exception,"
The exceptions referred to above are multiple in regard to
trade fixtures and include buildingsuused in trade such as
filling stations*

In Farmer v* Golden Rule Oil Co*, 130, Ken,

#02 , 287 pac* 706 , the court held that a tenant who had leased
premises for a filling station under a five-year lease could
remove the building

erected by him at

the end of his lease

without a specific reservation of the

right to do so inthe
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lease « Cases of similar import which permitted the removal of
building erected for commercial purposes are the following;
Firth V, Eowe 53 N.
Eq, 520, )2 A 1064
Earle v. Kelly 21 Cal* App# 460, 132 Pac* 262
Ri Barcroft and Sons Co* v. Cullen 217 Cal, 706,
20 Pao. (2nd) 665
Only one case has come to our attention concerning a school
building*

In Wlttenmeyer v* Board of Education, 10 Ohio C,G#

119, 6 Ohio G#D* 256, 2 Ohio Dec# S* P* 555, it was held that
a school building erected upon leased premises by a lessee
Board of Education and used exclusively for school purposes,
was held to be governed by the same rule as that applying to
trade fixtures, end therefore to be removable by the lessee
during the term, or within a reasonable time after the expira*^
tion thereof, although the lease contained no agrément to
that effect#

/

The fact that there is not any written lease providing that
the building cannot be removed leads to the concluaion that the
school district used the land at the will or sufferance of the
owner#

The statutory rule as to the notice and the common law

rule concerning fixtures Is determinative of the question,

The

title to the building remains in the district until such time
as the owner of the real property divests the district of its
title by the notice and procedure provided in Section 75^1624,
Revised Codes of Montana, 1947#
It is therefore my opinion that the title to a school
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building erected on the land of an individual under a tenancy
at will or sufferance remains in the district and can be removed
by the district until title is divested as provided in Section
7$-1624» Revised Codes of Montana, 1947*

Very truly yours,

ARNOLD H. OLSEN,
Attorney General
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The latent of the legleletura In «nooting tho low

extending «ducetionol bonofits to all ollgiblo vatorona who
torvod honorably in tho United Statea in any of its ware* is
construed as extending tho said benefits to veterans of tho
Korean Conflict « which although not technically declared a
war» contains all of the attributes of a war as ©nvlsaged by
tho loglslsturo»
Educational benefits as provided by state law may properly bo
extended to eligible veterans of tho Korean Conflict»
April 25» 1952
t

Mr# 8 »J# Callaghan» Director
Veterans e’olfaro Commission
State of Montana
Helena» Montana
Dear Mr* Callaghani
Tou have recently requested my opinion as to whether veterans
of tho Korean Conflict are entitled to tho benefits as provided
by Chapter 194» laws of 1943# as emended by Chapter 44» lews of
1945.

Section 1 of this Act» as amended» reedsi
•All honorably discharged persons who served
with the United States forces in any of its
wars» and who were bona fide residents of the
state of Montana at the time of their entry
into said United States forces shall have free
fees and tuition in any and all of the units
of the University of Montana» including the
law end medical departments» and for extra
studies in any of the units of the University
of Montana» provided, however» that the pro*,
visions of this act shall not apply to pers<xis
who qualify under the provisions of the
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♦servicemen*® readjustment act of 1944 * being
♦public law 346 of the seventy eighth-congress|
chapter 268 , second session* and public lew
16 of the seventy-eighth congress, chapter 22 ,
first session,* end all acts supplementary
end amendatory thereof***
The answer to your Inquiry depends upon the Interpretation
to be given the above emphasised words*

It is evident from

the very language of the act that the intent of the legislature
was to provide educational benefits to eligible veterans,
however it is noteworthy that the provisions thereof wore not
limited to veterans of World War II, on the contrary the act
expressly states that the benefits will accrue to "all honor-^
ably discharged persons who served with the United States forces
in any of its wars****#"
Is the present Korean Conflict a "war" as was contemplated
by the legislature at the time of the original enactment of
Chapter 194, Laws of 1943, and at the time of the subsequent
amendment as contained in Chapter 44, Laws of 1945? In con
struing a statute, the intention of the legislature is the
controlling consideration, and, in the construction thereof,
courts may look to the history of the times and the cause of
necessity influencing the passage of the Act.

(Lerch v.

Missoula Buick & Title Co*, 45 Mont* 314, 123 Pac, 25j Fergus
Motor Co,,y* Borensor, 73 Mont* 122, 235 Pac. 422; State ex
rel*

Williams v, Kamp, 106 Mont# 444, 7^ Pao* (2d) 5^5)•

At

the period the Act in question was passed, this country end
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the citizens of Montana In the armed forces were engaged in
a struggle of force against the force and forces of enemy
nations*

Through an act of Congress this struggle was de

signated a war and specifically named *»World War II"*

The

present struggle in Korea of force against force involves all
of the elements of a war with the sole exception that the
Congress of the United States has not declared the aame to be
a war*

It has been designated a conflict and a police action*

Realistically war may be defined as hostile contentions
by means of armed forces, carried on between nations, states
or rulers*

(Gillow v* Kiely, P*C*H#T*, 44 F* (2d) 227» 233)*

It means and intends the destruction of life and property.
(The Ambrose Light, 25 F* 40S)«

It was held in Area v. State,

Tex*, 202 S,W. 951, L*R*A* 1916 E* 358, that in the battle
of San Tgnacio between United States troops led by General
Pershing and expeditionary forces of Mexico commanded by
officers of the Carranza de facto government, where soldiers
engaged in combat were killed, wounded and captured, that a
state of war existed*

The court in holding such cited an

official opinion issued by Brig* Gen, Enoch H* Crowder, Judge
Advocate, U,S,A* as follows;
«It is thus apparent that under the lew there
need be no formal declaration of war but that
under the definition of Vattel a state cf war
exists so far as concerns the operations of
the United States troops in Mexico by reason
of the fact that the United States is prosecu
ting its rights by force of arms and in a manner

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

In which warfare Is usually conducted» The
statutes which are operative only during a
period of war have been Interpreted as relating
to a condition and not a theory#
X am therefore of the opinion that the actual
conditions under which the field operations in
Mexico are being conducted are those of actual
war# That within the field of operations of
the expeditionary force in Mexico it is a time
of war within the meaning of the fifty-eighth
article of war»"
In the case of Hamilton v# McClaughrey, I36 F, 445, the
court statede
"Mr# Justice Grier, delivering the opinion
In Prize Cases, 6 ? Ü#S* (2Black) 666 , 17
L# Ed. 459, seyst ’War has been well defined
to be that state In which a nation prosecutes
its right by force#’ In the present case, at
no time was there any formal declaration of
war by the political department of this govern
ment# A formal declaration of war, however,
is unnecessary to constitute a condition of war#
The court then held that a condition of war existed in
China within the spirit and intent of the fifty-eighth article
of war#
Recurring to the history of the time when Chapter 194, laws
of 1943 , was enacted to determine the intent of the legislature,
it was their Intent to benefit those citizen veterans who had
served during time of war#

I cannot limit the construction of

that law so as to exclude those veterans who have served their
country honorably in the present Korean conflict, which is at
least a condition of war#
It is, therefore, my opinion that the intent of the legis
lature was to provide educational benefits to all eligible
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veterans who served In the United States forces In any of its
%rarS| and that the present Korean Conflict* although not
technically declared a war* has all the attributes of a war
as contemplated by the legislature#

It follows, of course, and

it Is my opinion, that educational benefits should be extended
to eligible veterans of the Korean conflict#

Very truly yours,
ARNOLD H. OLSEN
Attorney General
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Opinion 124
Held!

1952

A notice of non-renewal of a contract of an assistant

professor given hy the chief executive of the Institution
and approved by the Chairman of the Board of JSducation is*
during the time the office of Chancellor is vacant* in sub
stantial compliance with regulation 5 of the State Board of
Education#
October 2, 1952
Miss Mary M# Condon
Superintendent of fublic Instruction
State Capitol Building
Helena* Montana
Dear Miss Condon;
You requested my opinion concerning the contract of an
assistant professor at Eastern Montana College of Education#
You advised me that the assistant professor was under a one
year term contract# You also stated that she has not been
under contract for three years# Notice was given to her that
her contract would not be renewed by the President of the
institution with the approval of the Governor as Chairman of
the Board of Education#
The problem presented calls for an Interpretation of
regulation No# 5 adopted by the State Board of Education end
incorporated in the contract signed by the assistant professor#
This regulation reads as follows;
"At the expiration of the term of appointment
of a professor or an associate professor* if
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appointed for a limited term, or of an assistant
professor, lecturer* instructor, or assistant,
there is no obligation whatever to renew the
appointment, and without renewal the appointment
thereupon lapses and becomes void» In every
case of such non-renewal of appointment* official
notice thereof shall be given by the chief execu
tive of the Institution, station, or division,
with the approval of the Chancellor, not later
than April 15thj provided, that a notice given
ninety days prior to the expiration of the contract
shall be sufficient in case of the non-renewal of
the appointment of any member of the Agricultural
Extension Staff»”
From the above quoted regulation it appears that a term
contract lapses and becomes void If not renewed.

However, the

regulation also requires that the chief executive of the insti
tution give notice that the contract will not be renewed and
such notice must have the approval of the Chancellor.

As we

know, there Is not a Chancellor in Montana at the present time,
and as a consequence the approval by the Governor as Chairman
of the Board of Education would seemingly be sufficient as it
would be unreasonable to preclude a unit of the university
from terminating a contract becuaee there is not an incumbent
in the office of Chancellor.

As I observed before, the notice

must be given by the chief executive of the institution and
approved by the Chancellor#

This is required under the regu

lation, rather than a notice by the Chancellor.

In State ex

rel. Keeney vs* Ayers, 10Ô Mont* 54-7> 92 Pac. (2d) 306, our
Supreme Court considered regulation No. 5 and recognized the
sufficiency of a notice of termination given by the president
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of the institution»

It is my understanding the assistant pro

fessor does not contend that she did not receive notice in
ample time* but does contend that there being no Chancellor
she can never receive a notice of non-renewal#

Such a con

tention* if it were valid* would mean that any assistant
professor who received a term contract for one year would
thereby secure permanent tenure#
The subject of a permanent appointment Is within regulation
No# 2 * which reads as followsi
^Professors and associate professors are on
permanent appointment{ provided* however* that
the initial appointment to a full professorship
may be for a limited term# Such limited term
appointment may be renewed; provided, however,
that reappointment, after three years of service
shall be deemed a permanent appointment.**
Bedanse she is an assistant rather than an associate pro
fessor* she cannot secure permanent tenure by three years of
service#

However* the acquisition of a permanent appointment

is relative to the issues Involved in her case#
In State ex rel# Keeney vs# Ayers, supra, the court inter
preted regulation No. 2 which held that any reappointment after
three years of service constituted a permanent appointment#

The

distinction between a temporary and permanent appointment was
expressed by the court In the following manner#
*In this connection it should be emphasised that
the only difference between a temporary and a
permanent appointment under the rules is that as
to the former,’without renewal the appointment
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thereupon lapses end becomes void* automatically
and without hearing, and upon mere notice thereof
(Regulation 5), which was given; whereas in the
case of a permanent appointment, the employment
automatically continues, unless terminated after
an investigation and a hearing, as provided in
regulations 7 and 8* The difference Is thus not
In the length of the tenure, but in the nature
of it
whether terminable with or without an
investigation and hearing*’*
If it were held that a tm p o rs x y appointment could be
terminated only by a notice which had the Chancellor's approval
then so long as there is a vacancy in the office of Chancellor,
a temporary appointment would in fact be a permanent appoint
ment with permanent tenure and terminable only after an investi'
gation and a hearing before the CoBBnittee on Service#

Such

an interpretation would nullify that part of regulation No# $
which states in regard to a term appointment that "there is
no obligation whatever to renew the appointment, and without
renewal the appointment thereupon lapses and becomes void#"
A rule of construction which is of assistance here is found in
the case of E^er vs# States Realty Company, 223 Minn* 305, 26
N#W* (2d) 464 , where the court saidI
"Unless required by the contract as a whole, no
construction of a subsidiary provisioni^ls permis
sible which runs counter to and is in frustration
of the dcrâinant purpose of the contract#"
In applying this rule the portion of regulation No* 5
which requires notice of non-renewal be given by the chief
executive of the institution with the sp proval of the Chan
cellor should not be given such a strict interpretation as to
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preclude the giving of notice during the vacancy in the office
of Chancellor*

In Snider vs* Carmichae*^ 102 Mont* 387 ,

Pac* (2d) 1004 » the court said, concerning a contract, that
«it must be so interpreted as to give effect to the intention
of the parties at the time contractingThe intention of
the parties in the contract under consideration was not to
give her permanent tenure when she was employed for one year
and in fact the limited term given is in derogation of per
manent status*
A reasonable method was used in giving notice of non-renewal
and the fact the Chairman of the Board of Education approved the
notice in place of the Chancellor in no way injured her*
The fact the Committee on Service investigated and con
sidered the non-renewal of her contract is not material as
under regulation 7 and Ô such committee has jurisdiction to
investigate proposed removals and suspensions of Instructional
and scientific staff members and here our problem is that of
a legal nature*
It is therefore, my opinion that a notice of non-renewal
of a contract of assistant professor given by the chief executive
of the institution and approved by the Chairman of the Board
of Educations is, during the time the office of Chancellor Is
vacant, in substantial compliance with regulation 5 of the
State Board of Education*

Very truly yours,
ARBOLD H* OtSEK
Attorney General
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Hdldt

^h« Workmen’s Compensation. Act is, as to a school district,

exclusive, compulsory and obligatory upon both employer and
employee and there Is no right to elect whether or not each
shall be subject to the act,
April 4, 1955
Mr* lames Ç* Wilkins, Jr*
County Attorney
Fergus County
Lewistown, Montana
Dear Mr. Wilkinsï
You have requested my opinion as to whether it is mandatory
for school districts to comply with the Workmen’s Compensation Act*
In answering your question, it is necessary to consider
Section 92-206,

1947» which reads in part as followss

"Where a public corporation is the employer, or
any contractor engaged in the performance of con
tract work for such public corporation, the terms,
conditions and provisions of compensation plan
Ho. 3 shall be exclusive, compulsory» and obligatory
upon both employer end employee."
There is no doubt th#t a school district is a public oorporatlon, as Section 75-1603,

1947, provides that every

school district Is a body corporate.

In Jay vs. School District

Ho. 1, 24 îtont. 219, 61 Pac. 250, and State ex rel School district
No. 26 vs. ürton, 76 Mont. 456, 246 Pac. 369 » it was held that
school districts are public corporations.
In Butte vs. Industrial Accident f^oard, 52 Mont 75, 156
Pac. 136 , our Supreme ^ourt considered the above quoted statute
and held that plan Ho. 3 of the Workmen’s Compensation Act is
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to a city, exclusive, compulsory end obligatory upon both •
employer and employee.

Approval wag given to this conclusion

in Alekslch vs* Industrial Accident Fund, 116 Mont. 127 , 151
Fac* 1016, where it was held that the "Workmen’s Compensation
Act as to the public corporations and their employees is
exclusive, compulsory and obligatory."
In your letter you suggest that Section 92-206, R.C.M.,
19471 means that all public corporations. If they are engaged
In an Inherently hazardous industry and elect to come under
the act, must take their Insurance from the state, rather
than from a private company or carry it themselves. Thit
contention was specifically considered in Butte vs. Industrial
Accident Board, supra, where the court said:
"If this was the intention of the lawmakers, the
least that can be sâid is that they made a superla
tive effort to conceal their intention in a multitude
of useless words. To express the view of the attorney
general, it was only necessary to say: ’Whenever a
public corporation elects to become subject to this
Act, the provisions of compensation plan No* 3 shall
be exclusive as to It#* But the legislature did not
so express Itself; on the contrary, it declared that
where a public corporation is the employer, the terms
conditions and provisions of compensation plan No. 3
shall be not only exclusive but compulsory and obliga
tory as well. It is a general rule of statutory
construction that ’every word of a statute must be
given scnae meaning if it is possible to do so.*
(State ex rel# Patterson v. Lentz, 50 Mont. 322,
146 Pac. 932.) But, if the contention of the attorney
general prevailed, the words ’compulsory and obliga
tory* would be meaningless."
You also call attention to the fact that Section 92-301,
.

R.C.M., 1947, states the act applies to all inherently hazardous
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occupations*

This section Is Introductory to the four following

sections dealing with hazardous occupations and is primarily
limited in scope to these sections*

This conclusion was recog

nized in Alekslch vs# Industrial Accident Fund^ supra^ and was
not construed as a limitation on Section 92-206, R*G*M*, 1947#
In the Butte Case the court stated the act must be read
as a whole and la light of the history of similar acts*

The.

Court said in this connectiont
*At the time the bill for this Act was under con
sideration by the legislature the impression was
general throughout this country that an Act com
pulsory upon private employers would not be
constitutional, whereas the right of the state to
impose the provisions of the Act upon Itself could
not be questioned (Wood v* City of Detroit,(Mich#),
155 N.W, 592,) There is some reason, therefore, to
assume that the legislature made the Act compulsory
as far as it was deemed possible to do so#*
It is, therefore, my opinion that the Workmen’s Compensation
Act is, as to a school district, exclusive, compulsory and
obligatory upon both employer and employee#
Very truly yours,
ÂRHOIH H. 0L3SN
Attorney General
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Opinion 5
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CHAPTER 117
tEGAL fiACKÜROHHD
SOURCES OP SCHOOL LAW
Stephen P# Roach states that there are four basic sources
of authority In the Control of public education in the United
States*

These four sources are constitutions, legislatures,

court decisions end the rulings of the appropriate governmental
officers.^
Oonstitutlcns. The Tenth Amendment to the Constitution
of the United States reserves to the several states all matters
not specifically delegated to the United States#

Since ©du«*

cation was not mentioned In the United States Constitution,
it is a state function*
Remmlein holds that the Pourtemth Amendment to the
Constitution made many of the restrictions of the Bill of
Rights applicable to the states*

Hence, no state may violate

any of the fundamental rights guaranteed by the first ten
amendments*

This includee the field of education which Is

within the sphere of state control*^
School law has been developed within the framework of

^Stephen P» Roach. "Court Opinion Concerning School
Boards," Educational Administration
3upervl.g.lon 39:147#
March 1953*
Madeline K* Remmlein, The Law pf Local Public, School
i^minifttration (Hew fork: McGraw-Hill Book Company Inc**
1953)# P# if Madeline K# Remmlein, School Law (Hew York;
MicGraw-Hill Book Company Inc*, 1950)', p.H*
-491"*
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thô Federal Constitution by the provisions o f the state
constitutions and state statutes#

Each of the forty*eight

state constitutions has some mention of the staters responsi
bility in the field of education*^
State Legislatures# State legislatures| as required
by State Constitutions, have enacted literally thousands of
school laws#^ These state statutes are the most prolific
source of regulations concerning public schools#

Some

aspects of the public school program are specifically spelled
out while others are merely mentioned end the power of
e
regulation is delegated to the State Board of Education#"^
Like the official opinions of the attorney general, the
rulings of the State Board of Education have the force and
effect of law until challenged and overruled in the courts#
Oourt Decisions# Court decisions are primarily of two
typesÏ (1) interpretations of constitutional and statutory
law and (2) the application of the principles of common law#'^
The application of the principles of common law comes about
only when a particular set of circumstances has not been
decided upon and the court finds it necessary to protect the
rights of the parties concerned by applying general traditional

3Joachim F, Weltzln, T M Legal Authority of
American
Public School (Grand Forks, North Dakota;The Hid West
Book Concern, 1931), PP# 23 - 24#
^Remmlein,

clt, p. 2#

^Ibld. p.,3.
^bid.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

-493**^

principles*
Government Officers# There are several governmental
officers whose decisions are binding upon schools and school
districts#

The State Board of Education was already mentioned#

Another officer is the State Superintendent of Public Instruc
tion*

The officer with which this study is concerned Is, of

course, the Attorney General of the State of Montana
The attorney general, as the chief law officer of the
state, has several duties#
*

One of these duties is that of

advisor to the various other officers of the state# This
1
advice is usually given in the form of opinions* There are
three types of opinions*

oral* written or letter and official#

This study Is concerned only with official opinions*

In

this type of opinion the research is usually done by an
assistant attorney general who specializes in the field under
consideration and is revised and criticized by the attorney
general himself or the rest of the legal staff before issuance#
Opinions are often sought because the courts cannot
possibly consider all of the legal questions arising in the
various departments in the state# Oftentimes there is a time
factor to be considered#

The office requesting the opinion

may have to act quickly in the best interests of public wel
fare and hence might not wish to bog down the administrative
system while preparing and presenting the information to the
courts*
The attorney general has the highest professional res
ponsibility for his opinions, which stand with the weight of
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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law, affect and even control governmental admlnlatretlon ^
1•*'

and act as a protection and a safeguard for the rights and
privileges of the general public.
LEGAL FTilHCIPLSa OP SCHOOL LAW
Although very little literature was found directly
relating to the role of the attorney general in the field of
educationg the literature relating to the adjacent fields of
school law, constitutions, court decisions and other adminis
trative rulings seems to indicate several basic premises upon
which many of the official opinions of the attorney general
were based.
Local school districts are territorial divisions of a
state created for the express purpose of operating public
schools*^ The agency in charge of the schools in a specific
school district is the school board.

The powers given to

the school board are only those specifically granted and
necessarily implied for the performance of the specific function
of operating the public schools*^
The school district and the school board are state agencies
and as such are subject to the will of the state legislature
and the state educational authorities, except in those matters

^Roger B. Hamilton and Paul R. Mort, The Law and Public
Education (Chicagoî The Foundation Press, Inc », 1941), p. 523
0. Garber, Handbook of School Law (New London,
ConnecticutJ Arthur i2T"5ro2Ts“^uSîIcâtion3, 1954) PP.3-4;
Hamilton and Mort, pp. clt, P# ^6#
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left to local determination*^ The powers of the school
district therefore are delegated by the state and are not
inherent#

The school district is a territorial area populated

by the residents thereof{ the school board is composed of
locally elected officers chosen to operate the local schools
but whose responsibility is to all the people of the State
of Montana rather than only to the people of their local
school district*

In school law, however» the district must

be thought of as a unit and the school board as a body rathem
than as a group of individuals#^.© School districts and school
boards are corporate entitle
Therefore, when there is a change In the personnel of the
school board» the board continues as an entity regardless of
12

the change in membership#

Contracts, titles to property and

other business is not carried on in the names of members of
the board*

It is carried on in the corporate name of the

school district even though the names of members of the school
board may appear on official documents as officers authorized

^Calvin Grieder and Willis Everett Rosenstengel, Public
School Administration (New York* The Ronald Press Go#, 1954)
P P # 35-361 Remmlein, Law of Local. Public School Administration
PP# 6-7*
^^Eemmlein, 0 P« citf. p# 7» Weltzln, op# clt#. pp# 37~39#
^Hamilton and Mort, ^ # clt## p# 67} Remmlein, School»
Law# P# 12#
^^loc# clt#
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to *ct for the local school district
Courts have held, In general, that legislation providing
for school consolidation does not carry with it the right to
provide transportation#

Authority to transport does not

carry with it the implied authority to purchase liability
insurance covering the operation of transportation facilities
Courts are not In agreement as to whether a law authorizing
the transportation of private and parochial school pupils at
public expense is constitutional*

They are generally agreed,

however, that the board may not transport such pupils without
statutory authority
In local elections the courts have generally agreed that
the statutes must be strictly complied with but that minor
irregularities are not necessarily f a t a l T h i s has been
particularly true in the case of elections where such minor
irregularities have not been shown to have affected the result#
The school district’s right to issue bonds is somewhat
like its right to tax. It la not an Inherent power*

It is a

power derived from the granting statute# The proceeds derived
from the sale of school bonds can be used only for the purpose
designated and for no other.

In the issuance of school

^^Ibld, p, 13.
'barber, op. clt,. p. 154*

l^Ibld.
lÔRemmlein, law of Public School Administration,
p. 240; Garber, oj^é cit.. p. 19#
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•497district bonds the statutes must be followed explicitly.

If

this is not done, the legality of the bonds may be affected,^^
Bonded indebtedness cannot be incun*ed in unlimited
amounts.

The laws restricting the amount of bonded indebted*

ness must be faithfully and carefully observed if the actions
10
of the district are to be legal#
The school district has no Inherent right to levy and
collect taxes.

Authority to do so is delegated to it from

the state# The state exercises this power through constitu
tional and statutory enactments# In a situation where a
state compels the school district or county to levy a tax
for educational purposes the tax, regardless of who levies it,
is a state tax*^^
When the statute delegates to some agency the authority
to levy a school tax, the mandatory provisions of the statute
must be followed explicitly In order to make the tax valid.
This is not true, however, if the provision was made discre
tionary*
It must constantly be remembered that money received
from taxes levied for a certain purpose must be used for

^^Garber, o^* clt#. p# 52 *
^%arber, ^ # clt#» p. 57*
^^Hamilton and Î4brtj o£#
pp# 51*56;
op, clt#, p# 57; Garber, op. eg, p, 46.

Weltzln,

^®loc# clt#
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th«t purpo99 «Ü4 mon#

For exmplo^ monies derived

I'roai a t«x levied for ssohooX melatmemee canaot be used to
retire bonds end mooey oolleeted for teechers* ssXerlee
oenmot be used for building purposes,
^%ere

statute provides for free publie eduostlon#

it le genersliy held that # child must attend » school
loosted la the district in which he resides in order to
receive free tuition, Ordinsrily the child is held to be a
resident of the district in which his parents reslde#^^
The right to attend school free from the paymmt of
tuition is not «a absolute ri#t.

In some states It has

been held that schools may set up reasonable roles and
regulations covering admission to schools, and may reject or
exclWe any applicant» %Ao do not meet these requirements*^^
This, of cotirse, cannot be done in a state whose constitution
provides for a uniform system of free public cducsticai*
The major Ideas expressed ia this discussion c m be
stated briefly as follows*
1,

In school matters there exists a supremacy of
state regulation over city and home rule charter*

2*

ill school officer®, no matter how appointed,
are agents of the state*

Raymond Trusler,
S il ^SÎS22i
(Hilwaukee, '«flsconslnt The Bruce ruollshing Company, 192?)
p# 5^*

^3ibid,. pp* 111-112.
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3*

The responsibility o f local school officers
is directed to the people of the entire state
rather, than to Just the people of the locality*

4*

The state legalization of school districts gives ,
these districts only the powers to carry on
certain functions delegated to them by the state#
The local school district has no inherent rights*
The state legislature in most states may at any
time alter district boundariesi increase or
restrict delegated district authority or eliminate
the districts entirely*
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CHAPTER XT
SUmARI, CONCUJSIOHS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
SBMARI AND CONCLUSIONS..........
1

The one hundred thirty official opinions concerning edu
cation rendered by the office of the attorney general in the
ten year period under consideration would seem to the writer
to be indicative of the varied and numerous question that
can arise concerning legal problems which involve education*
The educational system of the State of Montana is founded
on Montana’s State Constitution with further elaboration by
the state’s Legislative Assembly, interpretations by the
courts and, as is seen in this paper, the official opinions
of the attorney general*
It should be noted that in the summary and conclusions
in this study the tentative nature of any interpretations
made by the author will be a distinct limitation upon their
usefulness*
The Interpretative power of the attorney general ia
needed as a time-saving Intermediate step between state
officers and the Supreme Court because the relationship
between the Constitution of the State of Montana, the Montana
Legislative Assembly and the Interpretations of the courts
appear in many Instances to conflict with one another in
apparent or theoretical contradictions and movement to the
courts is of itself time consuming action when time may be
the most important consideration*
- 500Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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Any real progress In education must be based upon a sound
legal foundation*

The needs and demands of education In the

State of Montana change with the passing of time* The attorney
general, howeverp ‘cannot alter the laws to meet these changing
needs but rather must be most careful to render all opinions
In a manner consistent with the Montana State Constitution,
statute law and pertinent court decisions*

This, in the

opinion of the writer, the attorney general has done*

The

i

office of the attorney general appears to have met every
question fairly and impartially*

It would seem that in al

lowing for changing local conditions the office of the attorney
general has tried, by his interpretations, to allow freedom
from state interference to local boards of education In meeting
the educational needs and demands In their own local situations*
The attorney general points out time and time again, however,
that in the case of McNair v* School District No* 1 (È7 Mont*
483 ,

Fae* 1#) the Supreme Court of the State of Montana

said that the board of trustees may exercise only expressly
conferred and necessarily Implied powers, and that the
statute granting power is both a grant and a limitation*
Grieder end Rosenstengel seem to concur in their work Fubltc
School Administration when they state that in most states
"there is wide leeway In which boards may act so long as they
follow the spirit of the law and do not contravene consti
tutional statutory requirements or prohibitions*"^

Calvin Grieder and William Everett Rosenstengel, Fublic
School Administration (New York; The Ronald Press Co*, 1954)
p. ill*
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The opinions considered in this paper did not seem to
indicate that tBere was any clearly discernable trend in
thinking on the part of the office of the attorney general.
There did seem to be more consistency of interpretation in
the opinions of the two attorneys general under consideration
than had been anticipated.

The reason for this was found to

be that both Mr. Olsen and Mr# Bottomly utilised the services
of the same lawyer in research on educational problems.
It appeared to the writer that the attorney general in
some Instances was handling matters that were already adequately
covered by specific sections in the law which do not seem to
require interpretation. One Instance of this is Opinion 11
of 1947 in which it was held by the attorney general that
school districts may recover the cost of educating elementary
children when permission for attendance has been given.
This matter seems to be adequately covered by the pro
visions of Chapter 203^ laws of 1943 and Section 1022
1935.

Chapter 203, laws of 1943, provides in part that children

may attend schools in other counties when permission has been
secured and that the child’s school district shall pay the
actual costs of education*
Section 1022,

1935, provides further that a school

district ’’may sue and be sued.®
In a few of the opinions considered it was noted that
an official opinion of a previous fttomey general was con
tained within the opinion rendered.

One example of this is

found in Opinion 43 of 1951 in which the attorney general
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quoted directly m opinion of former Attorney General Poin
dexter*

Poindexter had stated that a school district is not

liable in tort and that the decision of the Supreme Court
with respect to non-liability of counties for tort and Indl*

I

t

i

vidual liabilities of county officers for neglect* applies
with equal force to school districts end the officers of the
school district*
Elections* The eight opinions considered in the chapter
on elections bring out some vital Issues# Of general interest
is the ruling by the attorney general that the public meeting
for the purpose of nominating school trustees in a first
class district must be held forty full days before the elec
tion and that the day of the meeting and the day of the
election cannot be counted in the forty full day period*
Another key opinion seems to be Opinion 06 - 1952 in
which it was ruled that the names of deceased voters may
not be deducted in computing the forty percent necessary for
passing a bond issue#

The impact of this decision might be

keenly felt in the case of a failing bond election in which
the vote was quite close*
*

A third decision which seems of general fundamental
interest is Opinion 25 - 1951#

This opinion states that

retail beer and liquor licensees must remain closed during
all school elections*

The fundamental importance of this

opinion is not apparent at first glance*

The significance is

in the fact that the law requires the closing of these estab
lishments only in the case of a general election*
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In order

to rule that they must be closed also for school elections
the attorney general has, In effect, ruled that school
elections are general elections#
'This chapter on elections gives the impression that
there is some confusion in the mind of schoolmen in the
matter of interpretation of the election law# This is to
be expected when we consider that for a law to be effective
it must be general enough to be workable in a variety of
circumstances*
Trustees# A reading of the nineteen opinions considered
in the chapter on trustees gives a brief idea of the powers
and some of the limitations of school boards# It may be
seen, for example, that the trustees have the power to lease
any land and buildings which they deem necessary and which
will be used for school purposes although they do not have
the power to engage in any activity which is not exclusively
for educational activities.
There are four opinions in this chapter which seemed
to be, because of their more general nature and more general
application, of more importance than the others. Opinion 43 *
1951 states that neither school districts nor boards of
trustees are liable in tort for injuries of pupils* The
implications here can readily be seen.

School districts

are immune from suit caused by negligence of school officers.
Using this basic reasoning the attorney general also held
that schools cannot expend money for liability insurance
simply because the school, not being liable, has no . need
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for such Insurance*
Another opinion which seems of general Importance Is
Opinion 102 * 1952 which states that school districts cannot
engage in any activity which la not exclusively for educational
purposes*

The importance of the opinion seems to be that

schools cannot and should not engage In any activity which
might be used as commercial or general service device and
which therefore would be in competition with local merchants*
In Opinion 24

1955 the attorney general ruled that

school districts cannot budget for and establish six-year
high schools*

Although many small communities would find it

advisable and expedient* In their own situations* to budget
for a six-year high school* It is not legally possible* The
attorney general shows that the statutes make absolutely no
provision for this set up*
Opinion 55 « 1955 deals with appointments to principalships in Butte* Montana under the terms of an agreement with
the Butte Teachers Union*

The importance of this opinion

lies In the fact that the attorney general has upheld this
agreement*

It would seem that upholding this agreement Is

tantamount to upholding the existence of a closed shop among
professional educators although this seems to have been his
only legal recourse*
The twenty opinions in this chapter on trustees cover
many of the powers and limitations of trustees#

The office

of the attorney general has been liberal in its interpretation
of the law* The local boards of tinistees have been allowed
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aa Bruch power In the adialnistration of local school affairs
as is consistent with Imposed statutory limitations#

Evidence

of this Is seen la the attorney general’s repeated references
to the doctrine of Implied powers#
Attendance# Although there are only five opinions In •
this chapter on attendance, It should be noted that there Is
only one central problem#

That problem is tuition#

In order

for a district to collect tuition the child must have the
permission of the county superintendent in the county of his
residence to attend school out of the county end also the
permission of the county superintendent of the county in which
the child is to attend school#
In the attendance chapter also Is found the procedure
for compelling a parent to send school ago children to school#
The law provides a fine of not leas than five dollars nor more
than twenty dollars for any parent, guardian or other person
having care and custody of a child between eight and sixteen
years who fails to send said child to school#

An alternate

procedure is also provided wherein the court may require the
person to give bond of one hundred dollars on condition that
the child will attend school within two days and remain at
such school during the term. Upon failure to comply the
aaid parent or guardian can be sent to the county jail for
not less than ten nor more than thirty days*
The central problem of tuition collection indicates that
the legislature might well consider a revision of the statutes
in the area of pupil residence and attendance#

It would also
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seem that some more workable or practical method of forcing
reluctant parents to send their children to school be made
since the primaty method seems inadequate and the alternate
method is quite cumbersome in its requirements for a court
trial*
Hijdi SchOQl Districts. In the chapter on high school
districts three opinions of the fourteen seem to require
special attention♦ In Opinion 157 - 1946 the attorney general
held that proportionate share of the high school district’s
debt must be included in computing the debt of common school
districts*

This is important because if the districts were

considered separately the common school districts could bond
Independently*

The attorney general# by his decision, has

limited the burden of taxation*

This whole picture may be

changed by a referendum in 1956*

The voters will determine

whether or not they want the common school district to bond
independently*
Opinion 130 - 1952 declares that isolated high schools
are not entitled to state aid unless aoaredited by the state
board*

He added, however, that their board of trustees might

vote an extra levy for maintaining their school#
In Opinion 91 - 1954 the attorney general ruled that
non-accredited high schools were not entitled to the county
ten mill special high school tax.

This opinion seems important

because it might easily have served as one means of forcing
a consolidation end reorganization of high schools#

However,

later legislation has authorized distribution of county taxes
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to non^accredited high schools*
An opinion which Is related to others in a different
chapter is Opinion 175 * 1946 which deals with attendance of
high school pupils#

It should be noted that although grade

school pupils may attend schools in other counties with pen#
mission and that such counties will receive reimbursement
based upon actuel costs of education, districts In which out
of county high school pupils are in attendance receive only
one hundred fifty dollars regardless of educational costs*
This Inequality might merit legislative consideration,
investigation, and possible legislative correction*
In the remaining opinions will be found a variety of
Information#

High schools may Issue bonds for construction#

The vribole of the county must be divided into high school
building districts and these boundaries are not altered by
the merger of conaaon school districts*

High school districts

must be created if requested by the county high school board
of trustees*

Property of an abolished county high school

should go to the district maintaining a high school*

The

territory of one high school district may be transferred to
another*
The opinions on high school districts are so closely
Interwoven with common school districts that the following
plan la suggested* Would not the legislature do well to
consider unifying all of the small independent common school
districts within a high school district under the administrative
head of the high school superintendent?

It would seem that
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thls might alleviate many of the problems brought out not
only in the chapter on high school districts but also in the
chapter concerning budgets and levies and in the chapter on
consolidation*
jProfegsional Staff. Chapter VI on the Professional
Staff has only twelve opinions but seems to be a chapter of
considerable importance because of the relationship of these
opinions to the entire teaching staff and the potential
bearing on teacher turnover In the state of Montana. There
are two opinions which deal directly with teacher tenure.
They are Opinion 47-1951 and Opinion 26-1955• These opinions
basically tell what action a teacher must take in case of
being deprived of tenure and also what actions the board must
take.
Opinion 23-1949 explains that a teacher must retire on
September 1st after his or her seventieth birthday.

This

will probably be felt most strongly when a teacher of this
age is employed by a district and when both district and
teacher feel that it would be beneficial to the school
children to retain the teacher.
There are two opinions which deal with teachers*
associations and the conventions of these associations.

In

Opinions 9 and 106 the attorney general held that If a school
district closes its schools during the state convention of
any teachers* association all teachers must be paid regardless
of membership or attendance. Whether for good or bad it must
be noted that the attorney general has placed the American
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Federation of Teachers and the Montana Education Association
on an equal plane*

In the opinion of the writer the teaching

profession would do well to consider the fact that one
professional teachers* organization would present a united^
stronger front, capable of gaining the respect and prestige
the profession should claim.

Since the profession itself

presented this problem to the attorney general by presenting
him with the dilemma of two professional organizations thus
giving him no choice but to recognize them both, it becomes
incumbent upon the educators to solve their own problem by
uniting.
The attorney general also has ruled that married women
teachers must have the same employment benefits as single
teachers.

They may not be discriminated against in any way.

In another opinion the attorney general states that a
county superintendent cannot occupy such office end also hold
the position of teacher.

The reasoning of the attorney general

on this point Is that it would be impossible for the super
intendent to adequately supervise himself*
Budgetq and levies. ■ The twenty-eight opinions in the
chapter on budgets and levies indicate the numerous problems
which can arise in this field#

The opinions in this chapter

are relatively unrelated except for their general application
to school district monetary problems. The reader will quickly
realize that although there may be broad general application
of the majority of these statements the very divergence of
their subject matter precludes the possibility of a well
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connected general summarlaatlon*
Hero Is one area In which the board of trustees Is very
definitely limited In its powers# The statutes are specific,
possibly too specific, in their limitation of power in this
field.

This is easier to understand when one takes into

consideration that school trustees are considered to be
agents of their state and not of their local districts.
Some of the basic ideas expressed by the attorney general
in this field may be stated quite generally.

School districts

may provide in the current budget for an anticipated favorable
vote on social security#

Budgets may be set up to provide

for school site purchases# The amount paid for transportation
is governed by the transportation budget#

Junior colleges

are to be financed by the inclusion of the necessary amount
in the high school budget and by a tuition not to exceed one
hundred twenty-five dollars per year* Outstanding warrants
are to be paid from the budget of the prior year.

Proceeds

from a bond issue must be used for the purpose approved by
the voters*

Although Items may be transferred from one fund

to another within a budget, they may not be transferred from
one budget to another*

The board of school budget supervisors

la limited in power and cannot take power away from the board
of trustees* While the excess general fund monies of both
elementary and high school may be used the next year to meet
state aid deficiencies, only the high school may also use it
in the field of permissive levies*

Kindergarten pupils may

be counted in the A.N.B. after their sixth birthday#
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Joint school any deficiency in ..state aid must be met by a
levy on the entire district# Funds received under Public
Law 874 may be used only to alleviate local tax burdens*
Taxation* The three opinions in this chapter were
segregated from the chapter preceding them because of the
fact that they consider the problem of money and taxation
from such a divergent stand# Opinion 60 - 1954 and Opinion
40 - 1949 are quite clear in their position*

School district

property used for educational proposes is tax-exempt*

Opinion

79- 1950 merely indicates that erroneously collected taxes

may be refunded when claims are properly filed#
Construction. Rewlrs end Improvement# In the four
opinions in the chapter on construction# repairs and
improvement the attorney general stated that persons bidding
on Jobs must prove to the satisfaction of school and other
state officers that they are responsible persons# This may
be done by deposit of a certified check or some other
security# The attorney general has also stated that the
insurance payment received by the school district for the
destruction of an elementary school may be used for the pur
chase of a site and a new building without a vote of the
electorate#

In the case of necessary repairs the contract

may provide for a payment over a period of three years#

If

the case should necessitate a bond election, an architect’s
foe may be paid from the proceeds of the bond sale#
Transportation. In the chapter on transportation there
were only ten opinions rendered* More requests for opinions
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ftrose from a lack of understanding of the state transportation
schedule than from any other single cause*
la the elementary district one third of the cost of
transportation is paid by the state* one third by the county
end one third by the district*

Payments are based upon a

state transportation schedule* which was indicated by the
questioners to be inadequate*
In the h i ^ school transportation system one third is
paid by the state and two thirds by the county#
i:

In another opinion the attorney general ruled that
parochial school children may be transported* but that they
must pay a proportionate cost of the operation of the bus*
The school district therefore cannot be sàid to be helping
in the support of sectarian education*
Another point made by the attorney general is that if
the board elects to transport one child* transportation must
be provided for all children in the district*

All children

are entitled to transportation regardless of the length of
time they have resided in the district*

If the child lives

in a district which does not maintain a school, he is entitled
to transportation costs*
It seems that the attorney general by these opinions
has removed any chance of favoritism being shown by the
school district*
nnnsolldation* The chapter on consolidation had only
nine opinions in it*

A central problem approached in this

section was the assumption of bonded indebtedness* In a
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consolidation of the school district bonded Indebtedness of
each district Is assumed by the new district formed#

In

annexation a third class district does not assume the bonded
Indebtedness of the third class district. When a district
Is assuming bonded Indebtedness voters In the election on
consolidation must be registered and their names must appear
on the preceding assessaent roll#

In the case of consolidation

with a joint district, there must be formed a new joint
school district.
Another opinion states that the county superintendent
is the person responsible for ascertaining the number of
qualified electors in a school district for the computation
of the required per cent on petition for annexation#

Since

registration has no part in determining the qualifications
of an elector It may be seen that the county superintendent
has A most difficult problem in attempting to ascertain the
per cent of the qualified voters signing the petition#
The small number of opinions rendered in the ares of
school consolidation, annexation and reorganisation at a time
when such things are growing on a national scale poses an
interesting question.

Does Montana school law need revision

to make these things easier?

Perhaps the push should come

more forcibly from the state level since education is a state
function*

The small number of opinions indicates that pro

bably very little consolidation Is taking place in Montana#
Assuming that consolidation would benefit the education of
our youth it may be said that not enough is taking place#
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Schopl Sites# In the chapter on school sites of the
nine opinions rendered it was noted that the most prevalent
problems were those involving abandoned school districts*
It should first be noted that the county superintendent must
declare a school district abandoned where school has not
been held for three years and actual bus transportation has
not been provided*

Also mentioned was the fact that when

requested by parents of at least three children school must
be provided la the abandoned district by the district to
which attached*

The abandoned district retains liability

for its own bonded indebtedness#
Other opinions in the chapter relate to various problems.
School sites may be sold by the board of trustees regardless
of the proposed use by the buyer*

Schools may be constructed

adjacent to existing buildings without an election to designate
the site*

Rl#i schools financed by bonds may be built on

land owned jointly by the county high school and a school
district* County commissioners may not give a public county
paHc to the school district as a school site*
Miscellaneous Opinions# In the thirteenth chapter
were placed those opinions of the attorney general which did
not seem to JCitllogically into any of the regular categories
and which would not coBsaonly affect the administration of our
public schools* These opinions may be briefly stated as
follows*

Idquor Jlloenses will not be granted for use on

premises across the street from schools*

School districts
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®ay not enter Into oil and gas leases*

The residence of a

child in the state orphans’ home is that of his parents and
if they leave the state^ the expense of his education becomes
the responsibility of the State of Montana*
The title to a school building erected on private lend
where there was no written agreement remains in the district
and can be removed by the district* Notice of non^renewal
of a contract of an assistant professor given by the chief
executive of an institution end in the absence of the
Chancellor complies with regulation 5 of the State Board of
Education*

The Workmen’s Compensation Act is, as to a school

districtI exclusive, compulsory and obligatory both to em»
ployer and employee without the right to elect whether or
not each shall be subject to the act*
One opinion which has had far reaching consequences la
opinion

• 1952 in which Attorney General Olsen stated

that educational benefits as provided by state law for veterans
of any of the wars of the United States may be extended to
veterans of the Korean Conflict*

In writing this opinion the

attorney general referred to statements of authoritative
individuals such as the Judge Advocate of the Army and even
went back to the case of Hamilton V* McClaughney which con»
cemed the Boxer Rebellion in China*

According to a personal

talk with former Attorney General Olsen, much research was
done on this problem end in searching for a precedent it was
found that no other state had taken a similar step with regard
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to the Korean Conflict# Montana^ therefore| was the first
state to grant wartime benefits to Korean veterans,^
The number of problems presented to the attorney general
during this ten year period end their variance in subject
matter, together with the vast number of problems presented
to the various county attorneys during this same period,
has led the writer to the conclusion that the legislative
assembly at its next session might well consider a complete
revision of school law in this state#

RECOKraDATIOKS
If a compilation and segregation of the official opinions
of the attorney general such as has been presented in this
paper was to be kept up to date and disseminated to interested
parties, it might then be possible to eliminate some unnecessary
work on the part of the attorney general and his staff.
A looseleaf manual containing all official opinions of
the attorney general relating to education would in all pro
bability be the most practical and economical type to be kept
up to date*

The office of the attorney general could then

send out mimeographed copies of the official opinions of the
attorney general to all offices designated to receive copies

2June 13, 1957#

Permission to quote secured#
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o t the official opinions*

This would eliminate the time lag
r

which occurs while offices wait for the bound copies of the
MIÛ Official Opinions

the Attorney General. An

undertaking of this type would also serve many of the purposes
of the digest which was recommended by former Attorney General
R» V# Bottoffily. He felt that "such a volume would be incal
culable assistance to county attorneys, all state and county
offlcero" and to the office of the attorney general*
Distribution should of course, include the university
units, Junior colleges, state custodial institutions, vocational
schools, the Department of Public Instruction, city superin
tendents of schools, county superintendents of schools, district
superintendents of schools and the office of the county attorney
of each county*

Since it would seem to be almost impossible

for a copy to be sent to each public and private school teacher
in the state it Is recommended that a copy be placed in the
libraries of larger schools and institutions*

A copy should

also be placed in each public library for the information of
interested school patrons*
It is also recommended that a committee composed of the
attorney general and selected county attorneys or competent
persons designated by them go over these opinions at least
once every five years for the purpose of deleting those which
have been rendered obsolete by reason of new laws enacted by
the Legislative Assembly or recent decisions of the courts*
By discarding these opinions the proposed manual can be
kept to a minimum size*

This recommendation should not be
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80 construed as to indicate that all opinions rendered by

the attorney general should not be kept In bound volumes
in some designated depository*
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